WITTGENSTEIN’S PROGRESS
1929–1951

TO THE MEMORY OF
NICHOLAS PAUL AND YORICK SMYTHIES

BY
DENIS PAUL

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DENIS ERIC PAUL, 1925–2006
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Denis Paul and I have been in contact since 2004, when he wrote to me in order to take up issues in Wittgenstein Nachlass research. He also presented his planned book to me and we discussed some of its themes. In 2006 we agreed on publishing his manuscript in the Wittgenstein Archives’ publication series.

Sadly, Denis Paul died on 21st December 2006 before he could put the finishing touches on his book and see it published. In agreement with Denis Paul’s son, Aaron, the editing and publishing process was continued.

In editing, we have interfered with the text as little as possible, and where we did, we tried to keep in line with Denis Paul’s style.

I would like to thank Aaron Paul for his continued support of this project. I would also like to thank Anne Lindebjerg for layout and the index, and Deirdre Smith for proofreading and compiling the bibliography.

Finally, we are indebted to the University of Bergen Faculty of Arts (HF-fakultetet) for financial support of this publication.

With this publication, the English name for «Skriftserie fra Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet i Bergen» has been changed from «Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen» to «Publications from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen».

Bergen, May 2007
Alois Pichler
This book began in 1976, when the old Nottingham College of Education, now absorbed into Trent University, gave me six months’ sabbatical leave. I used them to devour the so-called Cornell microfilms, much despised these days for their nannyish censorings of private passages but then invaluable as a source for Wittgenstein manuscript and typescript texts.

In 1980 I worked my notes up into a detailed text covering the years 1929–1930, with a sketch of the whole 1929–1951 corpus, still known at the time, very inaccurately, as ‘late Wittgenstein’, as if that were one homogenous thing. In 1991 I began a revision, which I called Climbing out of the Swamp, using a phrase of Wittgenstein’s that he used to characterise a philosophical episode which he grew out of very rapidly but which stayed in his memory as a constant itch of self-reproof. This revision was completed in 1994, and a photocopy of its typescript was given to the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge, where anybody wishing to check its differences from the present volume can do so. I am retaining its title as a chapter title, and portions of its contents, but the changes I have made are substantial.

I am also retaining a rather waspish preface which Brian Waltham, now dead and my benefactor in a legacy, was always wanting me to suppress. In it I vowed to use no sources that were not available to the academic world at large. Now, thanks to the Waltham legacy, I have at last been able to obtain the full Oxford-Bergen electronic edition, which must surely be familiar now to the academic world. Although it lacks two important texts, one of which I have traced and another I am still trying to, it is enormously welcome and will surely revivify Wittgenstein scholarship. If any scholars draw my attention to texts in it that I ought to have mentioned, I shall be very grateful, and I shall acknowledge their help on my website, www.wittgenstein.co.uk. As to that, one thing I must indubitably acknowledge here is the trustees’ never objecting to my choosing a name for it that made it appear official when it was nothing of the kind. In view of the unkind things I say in my preface about the three original trustees (the inheritors) that is most
magnanimous of them. Two of those have now died. My belief is that, contrary to the Latin tag, one should speak nothing but the truth of the dead, and I hope the surviving inheritor will agree with me. (But before I could give him an opportunity to, he died himself, on the 16th of June, 2003.)

To Elizabeth Anscombe I owe especial gratitude for her agreeing, towards the end of 1951, to my helping her with her translation of the two parts of Philosophische Untersuchungen, now known universally in English as Philosophical Investigations. I wish she had accepted more of my suggestions, but, even more, I wish I had been more thorough and more accurate in my criticisms. If it is any kind of excuse, she was in a frightful rush to get the job finished, especially with Part II. However, more than owing to her an early familiarity with Investigations, in the form of two slightly differing typescripts, both of which are safely in the electronic edition, I also owe her giving me the run of the manuscripts that Wittgenstein had left in her house in Oxford, and, with supererogatory generosity, leaving me in charge of them for the best part of a month while she went to Austria to find what had been left there.

A most important person to acknowledge not only for my debt to him but for that of Wittgenstein scholarship in general is Dr. Michael Nedo. His editing of the Wiener Ausgabe (Springer Verlag), which I have used for the first ten large manuscript books that Wittgenstein termed Bände (strictly, nine and a half, because the second half of Band X was written after a gap and Nedo omits it in his fifth printed volume) is exemplary. Over and above his textual editing he had a remarkable eye for typefaces, and he went to extreme lengths to track down a reproduction of the Baskerville face that was more accurate than the rough and ready reproduction used by most modern printers. It would be an enormous pity if the availability of the Bergen edition led scholars to neglect the Wiener Ausgabe. The first nine and a half Bände form an important unit in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development, and the Vienna edition is not only convenient and kind to scholarly eyesight but comparatively cheap. (Of later Vienna volumes I know only the eleventh, devoted to the Big Typescript, discussed in Chapters 5 and 8.)

Elizabeth gave me further help when, in 1964, she lent me, for the sake of completing my translation of Über Gewissheit, a larger set of her uncensored trustees’ photographs of late notebooks than I strictly needed. The memory of these has been helpful in writing comments on the last Wittgenstein volume to be printed, on the subject that he called “das Innere”. The English title of this is Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II, and my comments on it form the penultimate section of the last chapter of the present book.
Yorick Smythies, who shares my dedication with my elder son, must be men-
tioned for his gift to me of an important typescript, now in the Wren. It is a plea-
sure to be able to record that he left a son, Danny, who turned up in my village
some years ago, and that he now has, as his third grandchild, a new granddaughter,
Minka Stear.

The Wren, of course, deserves a paragraph of its own, and with it its Librari-
ans, Drs. Gaskell and McKitterick, whom I took advantage of from 1976 until I
was too old to make the journey but still pestered by post.

My debt to Dr. Josef Rothhaupt of Munich is so great that I shall have to detail
it in a full acknowledgements section, and the same is true of Professor Timothy
Smiley of Clare College Cambridge, whose most significant contribution to this
book is mentioned in the preface, which preceded this introduction in time by
twelve years, but now follows it in print.

And talking of villages there is Aberarth, which keeps me active in what ought
to be retirement. Indeed, this introduction and its companion preface might be
called a tale of two villages, the other being in Scotland. Of course, as anyone who
knows the two will understand, my heart is still in the Highlands, collecting drift-
wood on the banks of Loch Duich, where I wrote my preface when another war
was beginning in the Middle East.

And while it is, alas, still continuing there, I must add another debt of gratitude
and an embarrassing confession about it. For thirteen years I deprived myself of
using the Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein because of a textual error I thought I had
found in it, which turned out to be my own misreading. The multitudinous
changes I am now having to make in my own text in order to incorporate Monk’s
biographical discoveries have been a substantial delay in preparing my book for
publication. So is a final debt that I must mention: the help given me by Dr. Alois
Pichler of Bergen and, through him, Dr. Brigitte Parakenings of Konstanz. It is
gratifying to discover how closely my own efforts over more than fifty years coin-
cide with the results of the Bergen team, and I shall be happy if my attempt to
combine detail with perspective in respect of the Wittgenstein texts leads a wider
public to them in their Bergen publications, electronic and otherwise.

Aberarth, 2005.
Forty years have passed since Isaiah Berlin asked me to ‘keep an eye’ on the Wittgenstein manuscripts, which he feared the trustees might “tamper with” (single quotation marks giving his gist, double his actual words). As things have turned out, tampering is a misnomer for what has actually happened. The trustees’ editing has mainly been meticulously accurate, but their decisions as to what to publish and in what order have been insensitive to the wishes of scholars, their publication for libraries of microfilms has been tardy and quite unnecessarily censored, and scholars, for their part, have failed to make good use of these defective offerings, the combination of these combined failings leading to a result so appalling that one finds it difficult to think of a name for it.

Wittgenstein originally thought he had settled the problems of philosophy in the *Tractatus*. It is possible that a visit to Ramsey in England in 1925 helped him decide otherwise. In the spring of 1928 a paper by Brouwer on the foundations of mathematics is often said to have been the trigger, and meetings with Schlick in 1927 and 1928 will also have played a part. At all events, in drafts for the preface to *Philosophical Investigations* he gives the impression that he began to *think* again in 1928 and to write in 1929. Any notes that might have been made of any 1928 conversations with Schlick have been lost – the published conversations begin at the end of 1929. The written start, however, is not lost. It has a precise date – the 2nd of February 1929, when Wittgenstein began work in Cambridge in a series of large manuscript books (mainly foolscap or quarto books made for offices) and smaller notebooks. He had been given a place at Trinity College as a research student but not a fellowship, and the notes he made eventually provided his fellowship submission, finally presented in November 1930 via Russell and Moore, two of his examiners.

Halfway through the fourth of his manuscript volumes Wittgenstein went to Austria for his Easter vacation. There he dictated a typescript of what he thought the most important passages that he had so far written. This he used to obtain a
small grant to enable him to continue his research (he had obtained a similar grant the year before), but in November he applied for the fellowship. Meanwhile he had completed Volume IV and nearly completed Volume V, but he did not use any of this new material for his submission. Instead, he took an empty office ‘minute book’ and pasted onto its pages selected paragraphs which he cut from a carbon copy of the very typescript that he had already submitted for his grant, putting them in an order which quite disguised the processes of thought that had occupied him in writing the original three and a half manuscript volumes. Rather as in the original manuscript draft for the *Tractatus*, he began with paragraphs which were summaries of the various themes that made up the final book, and only thereafter proceeded to long sections dealing with those themes individually.

Because of its conciseness and its perplexing order the submission must have been extremely difficult for the examiners to judge, even though they had already seen the typescript from which its paragraphs had been cut, but they recommended a fellowship, granted on the 5th of December 1930. This had a term of five years, unlike modern Trinity prize fellowships, which last only for four. Wittgenstein, in gratitude, gave the minute book with its pasted paragraphs to Moore, who gave it to the trustees after Wittgenstein’s death in 1951. They came to know it as the Moore volume and one of them, Rush Rhees, left it in a telephone box and it has never been seen since, but fortunately, in addition to its having first been photographed, he had also made a typed copy. From this it was due to come out in 1964 under the title of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, and in anticipation Elizabeth Anscombe asked me to translate it, lending me Rhees’s typescript. I found the German difficult and said I would rather complete my ‘Certainty’ translation. While returning Rhees’s typescript I compared it with the by then printed volume and noticed that the latter had some half dozen omissions. (In the following study I mention one of these that I have meanwhile found again).

Wittgenstein’s gift of his fellowship submission to Moore indicates that he did not consider it a source of further writing. In contrast, he did keep the top copy that it had been cut from, and used it as material, in particular for what he called the Big Typescript, a kind of anthology redrafted as a book, made in 1933 and embracing his work from 1929 to 1932. This exemplifies and even explains the progress of his ideas in these first four years of his return to philosophy, whereas the Moore volume had disguised the progress that led to it. It gives the impression that ideas he had grown out of belonged to the past, perhaps to 1928 Vienna before he started writing again. The second paragraph begins (TS 209, page 1):
The phenomenological language or 'primary language' as I called it does not appear to me as an aim now; I do not consider it necessary any more.

Yet many later paragraphs in the book are taken from manuscript passages written while he still did consider it a proper aim, without any indication that they had been written before a radical change of view took place.

Whatever he may have felt about his Trinity examiners I do not believe that Wittgenstein had any intention of concealing this change of view from posterity. On the contrary, he went to as much trouble preserving the large manuscript books in which he had expressed it as he did with his later ones, which continued, in all sorts of different sizes, until his last entry, made on the 27th of April 1951, two days before his death. He had done preliminary work for the *Tractatus* in similar diary form, by writing philosophy on right hand pages and personal entries (in a simple code) mainly on the left. In 1929 he began with this right-hand left-hand system; but this time his personal remarks were not in code and he kept them up for only a few days, leaving the rest of his left hand pages blank. At the end of his philosophical right hand pages of the first volume he proceeded to the right hand pages of the second. Then he filled the left hand pages of the second and finally the left hand pages of the first. The third volume was written normally, and so were all the remainder. In these, when he wanted to make a personal remark he simply wrote it down wherever he happened to have reached, sometimes using his code and sometimes not, and then continued with philosophy.

The first three volumes are in Vienna, but most of the rest are in Trinity College, Cambridge. Their merely being in a different place, however, is not the most significant reason why the first three are so little known. In 1952 the Rockefeller Foundation, who had been subsidising the work of the trustees, and in particular paying Elizabeth Anscombe’s stipend as a fellow of Somerville so that instead of teaching she could concentrate on translating and editing, insisted that all Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts should be photographed and prints made in order for the academic world to have access to them. The resulting photographic record was made in two stages: the first immediately, uncensored and for the benefit of the trustees, so that each could have copies at home, and the second, much delayed, in the form of microfilms, censored for the benefit of the academic world by having pieces of paper placed over most of the passages that were in code and quite a few that were not. These are mostly dated 1968, with a penultimate reel dated 1970 and a last one dated 1978, the delay for that one being no fault of the trustees. They were published (in so far as that word is appropriate, since they
could only be purchased by universities and libraries) by Cornell University, and are known as the Cornell microfilms.

The academic world did not take kindly to being told what it was allowed to read. Nor was it very persistent in unravelling the right and left hand passages in the first two manuscript books. And while the third was reasonably well photographed, the fourth, equally important to this story, was photographed and reproduced with exceptional obscurity.

In one case the censorship was even more radical. I was present when Elizabeth Anscombe burnt a section of a few lines from a late manuscript book after obtaining a photograph of the other side of the leaf so that it would not suffer similarly. She said that this burnt passage referred to someone who was still alive and so felt herself entitled to destroy it. At the time I could not decipher Wittgenstein’s code and had only read un-coded private passages (in the final notebooks, on the subject of knowledge and certainty). These passages were mainly much redrafted and somewhat paranoid remarks about Ayer, Wisdom and some third philosopher, and how dishonourably and ineffectively they had misrepresented his ideas. I assumed the destroyed sentences to be of the same kind, but in 1980, when I was able to see uncensored microfilms in Trinity and had cracked the code, I found this cut, with some uncut code above it that made it clear that it was one of a series of extremely sentimental and inhibited remarks about Wittgenstein’s friendship with Ben Richards (in code Y), whom everybody knows about now because of a picture of them taken in front of a Liverpool bus. The gap and its surround are still to be seen in these Trinity microfilms with, nearby, the silhouette of a dry, pressed pansy.

One would think that the interest in how Wittgenstein came to develop his later philosophy was so gripping that difficulties like shabby microfilms, censored private passages and notebooks written topsy turvy would be scorned by philosophers who wanted the truth. Quite the contrary. Wittgenstein’s manner of first emerging from his old ideas, embodied in three and a half manuscript books and impenetrably encapsulated in the Moore volume, is almost unknown [or was as I wrote this preface – it is now well known but still dismissed as a mere wrong turning]. While the misjudgement of the trustees in their choice of what and when to publish and their refusal to distribute uncensored microfilms was culpable beyond delinquency, the feebleness of the academic world in failing to read what has been available for more than twenty years is just as deplorable. The two together constitute the state of affairs which I termed appalling but could find no name for.

Sir Isaiah has been able, at least, to find some quite telling phrases for it (in a letter to me of the 2nd of July 1987):
I am sure you are right: looking at the actual manuscript, at diaries, at fragments, at notes, gives a far more intimate understanding of the philosophical process – I don’t know what else to call it – than the finished article – there is something direct and inescapable about such jottings, which can literally produce a kind of precipitate in one which is as near to the truth of particularly such a philosopher as Wittgenstein, who did not believe in finished articles but in the painful process itself, than anything else could do.

And later in this letter:

… from the point of view of achieving your aim, as I take it to be, which is to penetrate the complacent shell of writers on Wittgenstein, who argue about or interpret the texts as if written by a man long dead, of whom nothing but the printed work survives.

In my own search for the workings of Wittgenstein’s mind I have no more been restricted to the Cornell microfilms than I have restricted myself to the printed works. Nor could I have made anything like as good a study if I had been. Elizabeth Anscombe was extremely generous to me in my earliest research. Unfortunately I was too busy earning a living to take the advantage I might have done of her generosity. When I was given a sabbatical half-year by my teachers’ training college in 1976 I started work at last (and could have kicked myself for not making time earlier) on the Cornell microfilms, but over and above that I was given permission by Rhees to read originals in the Wren Library, Trinity, which continued into 1978 and 1980. In 1980 I also had access to the new uncensored (and excellently photographed) microfilms being made for Trinity by Dr. Michael Nedo.

Now, however, that I have an opportunity to return to my study and revise it, I am determined to use only the access that any other academic can obtain. An anecdote may help explain my scruples. In 1957, when a friend had typed my first ‘Certainty’ translation, I asked Sir Isaiah if he would like to see it, and he replied that he would only do so if I did not ask Miss Anscombe for her permission. Since she, for her part, had extracted from me a promise that I would not show anything to anybody without her permission, I kept it to myself. Now, after these long years, I can see the matter from Sir Isaiah’s viewpoint.

In my 1980 preface I assumed that the notebooks analysed in my study would all soon be published in the complete edition that Dr. Nedo was planning. Now, in the spring of 1991, that seems to have been delayed, but I can at least assume that complete and uncensored microfilms will eventually be distributed to the world’s universities and libraries in the manner of the Cornell microfilms. In 1980 I had
written “Knowing that the Gesamtausgabe will appear whether I complete my book or not, I am able to proceed with less inhibition than if I thought my own work was to be the last word. I can afford to put my book together with a rapidity which I might otherwise feel was risky. This could well be to its advantage. A piece of furniture or a musical instrument can also benefit from being made swiftly: its various parts, all at the same degree of seasoning and assembled in the same humidity, will fit better and last longer, and this, I hope, will be the case with my book.”

Eleven years later there have been changes in seasoning and humidity. I must explain these briefly and hope that when I have joined everything together again they do not make my cabinet warp.

Early in 1980 I faced (as I quite often do) bankruptcy, after the failure of a somewhat improbable wood business. I decamped from Wales to Cambridge, where Professor Smiley and his wife put me up while I made last notes in the Wren Library. Returning to Wales to complete my study and have it typed I found, belatedly, that my tenants had been bust for dope and I threw them all out. It was not the dope I objected to so much as their trying to keep the news of the bust from me. Then, with summer ending and in an old farmhouse above the 1000 foot contour line, I wrote my study. It came together with far more rapidity than even the remarks above might suggest. My elder son had been given a half-fee scholarship at a prep school where he was to be coached for a scholarship to Eton. To pay his fees I needed a job. In complete isolation, with not even my cow to keep me company, I focused on subtleties of meaning in a way which I could not possibly repeat. I left for Cambridge where, with Professor Smiley’s help, I made last changes. Term, meantime, in my son’s and other prep schools, had begun. Simultaneously, it seemed, I handed my study to the binders to be forwarded to Nottingham University as a Ph D thesis and obtained a science post at a school in Cadogan Square where the previous science man had just been sacked.

My external examiner, whose name quite slips my mind, denied my claim that Philosophische Bemerkungen could only be understood by comparing it with its manuscript origins, with the simple argument that he had understood it perfectly well himself. He was also of the opinion that Wittgenstein’s carefully preserved manuscript books were nothing more than the equivalent of preliminary drafts discarded in a wastepaper basket and rescued, perhaps, by his bedder. On these two grounds he rejected my thesis. I therefore assumed that my study would stay in oblivion, because I could not possibly rework it in time to anticipate the Gesamtausgabe, with the help of which even scholars who could not work from microfilms would be able to reconstruct my conclusions.
There is, however, no sign of its being published. As I write, the trustees (one
deaf and two co-opted, making four) still refuse to distribute either their own
photographs or Dr. Nedo’s Trinity microfilms uncensored. Of course, if matters
change before my study is printed I shall be happy to eat my words. Meanwhile I
shall improve my 1980 text by completing gaps and correcting errors and generally
mending faults which I would have turned it down for if it had been submitted to
me; but having made a clean breast of all that, I shall feel entitled to disguise from
my readers exactly where the joins come.

There is one apparently trivial technicality which I must mention finally. Witt-
genstein drew a scrupulous distinction between new paragraphs which were sepa-
rated by a line space (“Absatz”) and sub-paragraphs which merely started on the
next line (“neue Zeile”). The former were his real units, and he called them
“Bemerkungen” or “remarks”. I prefer to call a spade a spade and a paragraph a
paragraph, but whatever term one uses the distinction was extremely important to
him and it has to be preserved. Unfortunately it is very difficult to get either typists
or typesetters to observe it with Wittgenstein’s absoluteness. My 1980 text cannot
be trusted in this respect. Before my revision appears in print I or my editors (or no
doubt my trustees) will have to see that it is always clear to the eye and corresponds
exactly to the manuscripts. What has taken me fifteen years to complete will con-
sequently take a little longer still to publish – and while this one detail is being
checked, the time taken to put others in order will not be noticed at all.

Chapter I

A bird’s eye view

Where should a student start in studying Wittgenstein? The obvious answer is the Tractatus, together with its preparatory notebooks, and for good measure the version published by von Wright as the Prototractatus (the original manuscript in facsimile and the text printed in accordance with Wittgenstein’s editorial markings). There is no doubt that acquaintance with these is important, but I should like to encourage a certain tactical impatience rather than immersing oneself in them, because the next beginning Wittgenstein made, or at least the next beginning that he committed to paper, starting in February 1929 and now available in print in the Wiener Ausgabe (Springer Verlag), is not only fascinating but reveals faults in the Tractatus that we might never have noticed if Wittgenstein had not drawn our attention to them. (Further faults are revealed fascinatingly in a notebook of 1943 and 1944, MS 127.) And what about the notes dictated for Russell in September 1913 and dictated to Moore in April 1914? They are very important, and they are printed as appendices to the preparatory notebooks (called Notebooks 1914–1916) but they will not mean much to a beginner. The time to read them is when one has read enough later Wittgenstein to have a sense for the working of his mind.

What would be a disastrous starting point for any student is a volume which appeared in 1964 as Philosophische Bemerkungen and later in English as Philosophical Remarks. This was edited from a text which Wittgenstein derived from the first three and a half large manuscript books which he began writing on the 2nd of February 1929 at Trinity when he was still a research student there, before being given a fellowship. From these he dictated, during his Easter vacation of 1930, a typescript of which 144 pages have survived, catalogued as TS 208. After using this to obtain a College grant, he cut up its carbon copy and pasted a selection of its paragraphs in a new order onto the pages of a large office minute book, and used the result (catalogued as TS 209) to apply for a fellowship, which he was granted in December 1930. Now selecting and reordering was Wittgenstein’s normal treatment of any of his material, in manuscript or typed. What makes Philosophische
Bemerkungen so difficult to study is that its new order disguises a profound change in his philosophical views which he made about half way through the three and a half manuscript books. For on its very first page there are references to an abandoned viewpoint, giving the impression that the change was made before the book was begun. This change was first recorded in October 1929, though it may have been brewing somewhat earlier than that. It concerns an attempt to justify a ‘primary’ or ‘phenomenological’ language for the description of sense data without any reference to objects that might have caused them. Many paragraphs from this ‘phenomenological’ episode are included in the final version without any indication that they were written before the attempt was given up. In fact, to read Philosophische Bemerkungen without its manuscript sources is to cripple any possibility of understanding it.

Nor is there any evidence that Wittgenstein ever regarded it as a book for publication. After serving its purpose of providing him with a fellowship he gave it to Moore, in gratitude for his help in gaining it, and it thus ceased to be part of his working material. The uncut top copy, however, remained with him, and some of its paragraphs were pasted into later manuscript books from which they contributed to an important typescript which was a kind of retrospective of his development up to its being made, and in this, known as the Big Typescript, he did not disguise – well, hardly ever disguised – the stages of that development. It is an extremely useful source for Wittgenstein studies, and is now in print as the eleventh Wiener Ausgabe volume and also published in the Oxford-Bergen electronic edition.

Wittgenstein himself would not have thought it at all important that students of his work should begin at its beginning, or at any particular stage of its development. To be sure, it is well known that he hoped to have the Tractatus printed in one volume with Philosophical Investigations, but this idea came to him in a rather late stage in his work on the latter. As to the study of philosophy itself, however, as distinct from his own writings, he is quite explicit. At the opening of my website I quote a passage from Imre Lakatos describing the impression Wittgenstein gave his students, and here I should like to quote a passage of Wittgenstein’s that Dr. Nedo drew my attention to. It is to be found on page 43 of Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1933–1935, edited by Alice Ambrose, where it forms the opening paragraph of the so-called Yellow Book.

There is a truth in Schopenhauer’s view that philosophy is an organism, and that a book on philosophy, with a beginning and an end, is a sort of contradiction. One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic
We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we had no map, or else a map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language, and the geography its grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but when forced to make a map we go wrong. A map will show different roads through the same country, any one of which we can take, though not two, just as in philosophy we must take up problems one by one though in fact each problem leads to a multitude of others. We must wait until we come round to the starting point before we can either treat of the problem we first attacked or proceed to another. In philosophy matters are not simple enough for us to say “Let’s get a rough idea”, for we do not know the country except by knowing the connections between the roads.

The terrain of philosophy, to take up Wittgenstein’s metaphor, is like an open moor, giving the impression that nothing can be easier than to find a way across it; but here a short cut tempts one into a quagmire, there one tears one’s clothes on hidden barbed wire, a left-over from abandoned boundaries, and elsewhere, equally unexpectedly, a modest rise that hardly seems worth the effort of climbing brings a wide range of countryside into view. Only after years of repeated and patient exploration do the details of this moorland fit together.

The inescapable fact is that each person who studies philosophy must choose a starting point for himself, and why not for the study of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? The volume from which my quotation comes is as good a one as any, incidentally. So it is fair that anyone who wishes to write about Wittgenstein’s thought should be allowed the freedom of traverse that he takes for granted himself. The present book, however, is about the manner in which he wrote his thoughts down. Any reader of my quotation will sense that he did not like the ineluctable necessity for the thoughts that any one person writes down to come in an order, to form a series. In Volume XIV (MS 118), on 15.9.37, while he was trying to complete *Philosophical Investigations* in Norway, he wrote that he would rather let his thoughts jump around their theme (“um das Thema herumspringen”) than write them down in a series.

A book about what Wittgenstein wrote must certainly not jump around. Only one order is appropriate: the order in which Wittgenstein wrote his thoughts on paper. Naturally, this is easier said than done. There were times when he wrote in parallel notebooks (he called it being *zweibändig*), sometimes the difference being between subject matter but more often between states of organization, between preliminary notebooks and revised ones. There is also the complication of his
typescripts. At any given period when he was dictating a typescript he might be writing, in current notebooks, a later stage in his thought than the notebooks from which he was dictating; and just as between notebooks, so there could be differences between typescripts – fuller ones coming earlier, compressed and reordered ones later. Sometimes it would happen that a typescript would be followed by a further manuscript stage. The most extreme example of such complexity of development is the work now known as Part I of Philosophische Grammatik (Philosophical Grammar), the second subject of my study.

In spite of these problems, however, a general and fairly well ascertainable order can be found in what Wittgenstein wrote between the 2nd of February 1929, when he made his first entry in Cambridge after taking up his place at Trinity, and the 27th of April 1951 when he wrote his last, also in Cambridge, two days before he died. The details of this order are extremely complex, as the reader will already have gathered. Before embarking on them, therefore, I shall present a survey.

Twice in his life (although he also went there at other times) Wittgenstein retired to isolation in Norway to plan a new work, in 1913–14 and in 1936, and the books that eventually resulted are known as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung) and Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen). After writing the Tractatus Wittgenstein believed that there was no more philosophy for him to do. What, for him, was important about the Tractatus was what it did not and could not say: the significance of life, the ethical, or, as he termed it, das Mystische.7

After qualifying as a school-teacher he taught in four schools in Austria – in a secondary school for a short time and then in three village schools, Trattenbach, Puchberg and Otterthal. In 1925 he came to England at the invitation of Keynes.8 He completed his teaching in 1926 and came to Vienna to design a house for his sister Margarethe Stonborough and supervise its building. There, in 1927, he made contact with Schlick, and eventually with other members of the Vienna Circle. Schlick, professor of philosophy at Vienna, was its leading member. He had first written to Wittgenstein in 1924. Another Circle member whom Wittgenstein met was Waismann, who formed an ambition to write a kind of updating of the Tractatus called Thesen (Theses).9 Schlick had seen the Tractatus as providing a justification for what came to be called the verification principle, that no proposition was meaningful unless it was in some way or other verifiable. As a scientist he had himself put this principle into practice: in his 1922 Space and Time in Contemporary Physics, which is still one of the simplest, clearest and most elegant introductions to
Relativity, he had pointed out that there is no meaningful distinction between a light path’s being bent by a star’s gravity and its following a geodesic path through a space which has varying characteristics of interior curvature, as it were travelling straight through a space that is bent. These are alternative descriptions of the same state of affairs, and we choose the one we think more convenient, not the one we think more true. Indeed, the possibility of equally valid and truthful descriptions of the same state of affairs, which cannot be distinguished by an experimental test, is fundamental to Einstein himself, let alone Schlick. The fact that Wittgenstein had committed himself explicitly to the verification principle became well known from the Vienna circle discussion volume, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* (1967), though *Philosophische Bemerkungen* (1964) also contains clues to this; and it was assumed that he had actually originated it. If so, he must have done this in discussions that have not been recorded, held in 1927 or 1928. Until there is better evidence, the most reasonable conclusion, considering Schlick’s book, is that he did not so much teach them the principle as help them to formulate it.

Towards the end of 1928 Wittgenstein completed the Stonborough house and was offered his place at Trinity as a research student. In notebooks for drafting *Investigations* there are hints that in 1928 he had already been thinking about philosophy without writing anything down. On the 2nd of February 1929 he started making his manuscript entries at Trinity. In December 1929, on vacation in Vienna, he met Schlick and Waismann again and began a series of discussions that, unlike the earlier ones, were recorded (by Waismann) and, as above, published.

After pasting the Moore volume together and being given his fellowship Wittgenstein was more preoccupied with thinking out new ideas than embarking on a book. It is true that in November 1930, just before the fellowship, he had written some ‘motto’ or ‘preface’ passages that look forward to a book, and Rhees used these as if they had been meant for the Moore volume when he printed it as *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, but while their date does suggest that they were triggered by presenting the Moore volume for his fellowship, they read as anticipating something new, a book that had not even begun to form. On 19.6.31, on page 180 of Volume VI (MS 110) he was again referring to ‘this book’ with lines from a poem by Matthias Claudius:

Ein Motto für dieses Buch: “Seht ihr den Mond dort stehen? Er ist nur halb zu sehen & ist doch rund und schön”. [Translation: A motto for this book: “Do you see the moon, standing there? It is only half visible and yet it is round and beautiful”.]
from which one can infer that he still thought that his ideas, if beginning to shape, were far from fully revealed. Even in his Volume VII (MS 111), begun in July 1931, which includes the eventual opening passage of *Investigations*, and clearly constituted a fresh start for him, he does not seem to have a firm idea of what form his new book is going to take.\(^{13}\)

In a 1938 draft (TS 225) of a preface for *Investigations* he says that it is four years since he attempted a “Zusammenfassung” of his ideas. His normal use of this word was not so much for putting ideas together as combining paragraphs in which they were expressed, but this date (1934, being 1938 – 4) refers to the dictated *Brown Book*, which is quite emphatically a putting together of ideas. (My first assumption had been that the reference was to the final version of *Philosophische Grammatik*, the one used by Rhees for his publication of its Part I. That was made early in 1934, while the *Brown Book* dictation began in the autumn of 1934.) The Big Typescript, TS 213, was a Zusammenfassung in both senses, but it was completed before the end of 1933.

Not contented with the *Brown Book*, which had been dictated in English to Alice Ambrose and Francis Skinner, Wittgenstein began redrafting it in German. This attempt was given up in Norway in the autumn of 1936. Almost immediately he began to compose a draft of *Investigations*. This occupied him for the remainder of his stay in a hut which he had had built for him in 1914, and he gave it to his sister Margarethe that Christmas.\(^{14}\) In February 1937 further passages intended for *Investigations* were written, also in Norway, and more again in another visit to his hut in the autumn of 1937. He spent his last night in his hut (as it turned out his last visit until after the war) on the 10th of December and travelled to Vienna, and thence, early in 1938, to Dublin and Cambridge.

A typescript for *Investigations* was dictated in 1938 and some of it translated by Rhees, not to Wittgenstein’s satisfaction, who asked Smythies to improve it in the hope that it would help him obtain a vacant professorship.\(^{15}\) Towards the end of the war a further typescript was made, much of it making use of carbons of the first and not going beyond the point where it had stopped (and where the original manuscript, MS 142, had also stopped). Meanwhile, in spite of war work in two hospitals, Wittgenstein went on writing contributions to the final *Investigations*, working in small notebooks. Preparatory typescripts followed, and then a final typescript. The date of the typed (and later printed) preface is 1945, but the full typescript cannot have been finished before 1946 and probably 1947. He took a copy with him in July 1949 when he visited Malcolm in America.\(^{16}\)
In the early thirties Wittgenstein had been profoundly convinced of his lack of originality, and reverted to this feeling later in the thirties.\textsuperscript{17} To us, knowing that he was going to write \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, his doubts seem astonishing. To me personally, however, what deserves the term “original” even more than \textit{Investigations} itself is the complete effort in which that work is embedded as a central piece. Before he came back to Trinity he had let his thoughts ‘jump around’. In Cambridge he made a fresh start. On the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of February 1929, full of doubt and mistrust, he began what was to become a new work of art. The end of it is the full stop that he set down on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of April 1951. It consists of many strands of thought and has a structure of extraordinary complexity. It has a main melody line, formed by the principal manuscript books, but it comes near to being polyphonic, for composed side by side are also preliminary notebooks, revised notebooks, loose manuscripts, typescripts, lecture notes, lectures, discussions, dictations of different kinds and even, at one stage, a proposal that someone else, Waismann, his \textit{Thesen} abandoned, should write a book expounding Wittgenstein’s new ideas.

Waismann’s book is now in print, but it is much revised, containing Waismann’s own later ideas and some ideas of Schlick’s, as well as ideas of Wittgenstein’s from the pre-war \textit{Investigations}; it no longer corresponds to what Wittgenstein intended when he first proposed it – an exposition of his ideas as they were before \textit{Investigations} had begun to form in his mind.

I can give three incomplete pieces of evidence for my claim that the entire 1929–1951 corpus was a composite work of art, and beyond them I can only say that my long acquaintance with it, beginning with reading contraband copies of the \textit{Blue Book} in 1949, gives me that impression overwhelmingly. The first piece restricts itself to philosophy, which the corpus does not. It is a passage written in code on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of November 1946 on page 13 of MS 133:

O, warum ist mir zumute, als schrieb ich ein Gedicht, wenn ich Philosophie schreibe? Es ist mir, wie wenn hier ein kleines wäre, das eine herrliche Bedeutung hat. Wie ein Blatt, oder eine Blume. [Translation: Oh, why does it seem to me as if I were writing a poem when I am writing philosophy? It seems as if there were some small thing here that has a glorious meaning. Like a leaf or a flower.]

Even without that, I think the point must be evident to anyone sensitive to the care Wittgenstein took over his German style. My second piece of evidence concerns, again, not the corpus as a whole but the notebooks with their many kinds of asides. I had long thought that he had treated these asides as an art form when I found that a small notebook (post duodecimo, the Trinity librarian told me),
MS 153a, contained seven asides, one so personal that one would think that nobody could write it down twice over. Yet he copied them all in code in Volumes VI, VII and VIII, MSS 110–112, with the revealing result that the trustees censored them in the Cornell microfilms of those manuscripts but left them for all to read in the film of MS 153a. And thirdly, there is the history of his longer personal passages. These began in 1914 with notebooks that continued into 1917. Wittgenstein wrote these with philosophy occupying only right hand pages and personal diary entries mainly occupying left hand pages. These were in code, and the few passages I have read were written in a very vivid and flowing style. When he began writing philosophy in 1929 he again reserved left hand pages for personal notes, but did not write many of them, and not in code. Right through the first two large volumes he went on writing philosophy on right hand pages only; then he filled up the empty left hand pages with philosophy. From the third volume on he never returned to a right-hand left-hand system, personal remarks simply being interspersed, sometimes written ordinarily and sometimes in code. Most of these interspersions are short, until three volumes (XIV, XV and XVI, MSS 118–120) written mostly in Norway in 1937 and completed in Dublin and Cambridge in April 1938, when Hitler had invaded Austria. In these three volumes the private entries are once more comparable in quantity with those in the 1914–1917 notebooks. They are about his hut, his spiritual life, his relationships with his Norwegian neighbours and with Francis Skinner, an adventure with a bird caught in a mousetrap, descriptions of storms, the sea and the mountains and his anxieties about his work; and all these passages are carefully composed in impeccable, simple, elegant German. He is, after long inhibitions and tentative attempts, returning to a kind of composition that he had practised during his service in the first war, but with a difference, in that private entries are now essentially parentheses, asides, interruptions of a working flow of philosophy, to which they actually contribute, by giving both Wittgenstein and his readers pause for breath.

Naturally, Wittgenstein did not plan this composite work of art in advance. It just grew. His first preoccupation was with working out his ideas. His second was with the possibility of expressing them in a book. His first attempt at one, the Moore volume, was not intended for print, but his second, which grew into Part I of Philosophische Grammatik, was so carefully revised that he perhaps originally intended it for private circulation – he sent Schlick a typescript of the crucial opening of his final revision, which has fortunately survived and justifies Rhees’s editing of it – indeed the slight differences between the Schlick typescript and the sources used by Rhees show that he cannot have known the typescript, highlight-
ing what a daunting task following Wittgenstein’s final revision signs must have been.

In the early stages of this long revision Wittgenstein dictated a most important typescript, TS 213, known to everyone, including, apparently, Wittgenstein, as the Big Typescript. I have already called this this a kind of retrospective, and it differed as one from the Moore volume in that it did not disguise the evolution of his thought. Then came what reads as if it began as a further revision of *Philosophische Grammatik*, written in the first 315 pages of Volume XII, MS 116, which I can especially recommend to students now that, at last, they can read it electronically in facsimile manuscript.

Meanwhile Wittgenstein had been dictating the *Blue Book*, to Alice Ambrose and Francis Skinner, for circulation among his students to help them understand his philosophical methods. I shall never forget the electrifying excitement of reading it in my first year at Oxford in typescripts lent me by a fellow undergraduate and a tutor. Wittgenstein followed it by dictating the *Brown Book*, which was lent me by another friend. It caused me less excitement, which may well show how little I understood it. It was important then for spreading to Oxford and Cambridge philosophers the idea of language games, and it is important now because we know it to have been a kind of prelude to *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein took it to Norway with him in the late summer of 1936 and made an extended and revised translation of it into German, rather confusingly at the end of a manuscript book he had already used, Volume XI, MS 115. He then wrote in it “Dieser ganze ‘Versuch einer Umarbeitung’ von Seite 118 bis hierher ist nichts wert” and put it aside.

What seems to have been an opening sketch for *Investigations* was written in a 1936 notebook called C8 (for “Cambridge”, one would suppose, though this passage seems to have been written in Norway and at least one of the C notebooks, the second, was written in Vienna), and the real first draft for *Investigations* was written in Norway later that year, in MS 142. This was the notebook given to Margarethe Stonborough, his sister. It ends with what is now the first sub-paragraph of § 189 of Part I as it is in print, and the same is true of the pre-war typescript, TS 220, but in between the two a great deal of notebook work was done, both in the February of 1937 and the autumn, and in between (see Monk page 373) there was a typescript dictated to Skinner, presumably in German. It has not survived. The typescript that has, 220, dictated in 1938, led Wittgenstein to hope for a professorship on Moore’s retirement, and with some string pulling he obtained it. Another typescript, partly freshly dictated but mainly cobbled from TS 220, was made late in the war, TS 239, also ending with that sub-paragraph.19
This sub-paragraph seems to have had more significance for Wittgenstein than one would guess from reading it. TSS 220 and 239 both end with it. Whenever it was written in MS 142, on 11.9.37 it was drafted afresh in Volume XIV and fair-copied into Volume XIII, both on the same day, which included other work as well. This remarkable haste of composition, and my not knowing MS 142, led me into a theory that it was caused by an idea that had been at the back of Wittgenstein’s mind coming suddenly to the fore. This does not seem to me now to hold water, and so I am relegating it to the notes at the end of this chapter.

What is certain is that the first 110 pages of Volume XIII (MS 117) were dictated into a Typescript (TS 221), in turn revised as TS 222, which is now in print as Part I of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Wittgenstein originally intended this as a continuation of the pre-war Investigations, and its §§ 1 and 2 are almost identical to §§ 189–190 of Investigations as now printed, while §§ 191–242 of that embody TS 222’s philosophical significance and use some of its paragraphs. To us that might seem a somewhat unbalanced continuation, but I believe Wittgenstein intended to balance it by a third section for Investigations which did eventually get into it, namely §§ 243–317, now known as the private language argument.

That, however, is much changed from how he first wrote it. There are many passages in earlier notebooks introducing ideas on privacy, but they jump into life in the next two Bergen manuscript books, Volumes XV and XVI (MSS 119 and 120), the latter being finished, as already mentioned, in Dublin and Cambridge after the Anschluss. Anyone who finds the private language argument tedious should read it in those volumes. The last two of these specially designated manuscript books are XVII and XVIII (MSS 121 and 122), and the last has a continuation, written in 1940, in some spare pages at the end of XIII.

After the war a twinned pair of typescripts called Bemerkungen I & II appear to have contributed to the final version of Part I of Investigations. I owe this information to Dr. Josef Rothhaupt. When Elizabeth Anscombe showed them to me in 1952 neither she nor I suspected this connection. Her story about them was what Wittgenstein had told her. They were housed in identical box files and consisted of roughly identical paragraphs arranged in different orders, and his interest in them was that they demonstrated the different ways in which philosophical ideas can connect with one another. That II was an improvement on I and also a step towards the ordering of the post-war additions to the pre-war Investigations is entirely convincing (though there is evidence that Wittgenstein began by using Bemerkungen I on its own).
There are late manuscript additions to *Investigations* in the opening pages of a set of manuscript books (MSS 130–138) that are better known for their contributions to Part II of *Investigations*. The later pages were first intended by Wittgenstein to help him revise *Investigations* as what he hoped would be a unified book, but he had to resign himself to using them to write a separate work, on what he called the philosophy of psychology. This might be taken to indicate that the philosophy of psychology was for Wittgenstein a new post-war interest, but all that was new about it was, first, the enormous length at which he elaborated his ideas on it, and second the extraordinary degree of condensation to which he then submitted those elaborations.21

It was clear to me in 1952, while I was still working on what I now know to have been the pre-war sections of the Part I typescript, that his work in this area was an analysis of mental concepts, not of what we understand as psychology. Nevertheless, I found it almost a paradox that this concept-analysis seemed to grow out of a phenomenal insight into the data of consciousness, and I am sure that readers of Part II, let alone the notes it is based on, will be even more impressed by this insight of Wittgenstein’s – without, I hope, falling into the trap of thinking that he used it to propound any kind of theory of psychology.

These late notebooks, i.e. MSS 130–138, not only open with changes for *Investigations* (that is, its Part I) but include near their end many paragraphs that lead towards Wittgenstein’s last interests of all, namely colour concepts, the problems of knowledge and certainty, and what he called “das Innere”, an extension of his pre-war work on privacy. These interests were, of course, nothing new. What was new about them was his treatment of them, heavily influenced, one cannot help suspecting, by his knowledge that he had not long to live. The flavour of these final efforts can best be found by comparing Part III of *Remarks on Colour* with its Part I, written later and condensing it, Wittgenstein’s last fling with his passion for condensation. In the case of the other two one can only suppose that what condensation he had left in him was applied in the actual drafting, and in the case of what is now printed as *Über Gewissheit* the result is a style that (particularly towards the end) is both condensed and flowing. I have always felt that these three, with nothing in common but Wittgenstein’s wish to write them before he died, deserve to be distinguished as his last quartets.

The condensation and reordering to which Wittgenstein habitually subjected the contents of his small and large manuscript books had quite different results in different cases. With what led to the Moore volume, the process made the final book
incomprehensible until one finds its manuscript origins – or at least it did for me until I found them. In the case of the second attempt at writing a book, the most important version of which is in print as Part I of Philosophische Grammatik, the manuscript books from which it derived were comparatively homogenous. Reading them, it is a pleasure to find the first description of Augustine’s theory of ostensive language learning and the building-block language game (on pages 15 ff of MS 111, Volume VII, 15.7.1931), and the first language games (on page 249 of MS 109, 24.11.1930 and page 19 of MS 110, 22.1.1931) – but no one can pretend that one needs to meet these in the manuscripts before one can understand them. The manuscripts do, of course, embody philosophical work and the search for solutions. In particular, around page 100 of MS 109 (Volume V) there is an intriguing complex of anxieties concerning sense data, logic and problems of explanation, but these developments and innovations are not of the same revolutionary order as the abandonment of the attempt to find a ‘phenomenological language’.

Yet although the ‘second attempt’ as printed is understandable without the notebooks, it still disguises the enormous effort of problem solving that lay behind it. Now, with the Oxford-Bergen electronic edition, we can have our cake and eat it and read both. I should like to recommend, in addition to the preliminary manuscripts in which these problems were being solved, the first 315 pages of MS 116, Volume XII, in which they are dealt with retrospectively and with a considerable degree of polish (and with some looking forward to what was to follow after the war).

The printed version aroused controversy when it first appeared, because people who had some acquaintance with the original manuscripts declared that Rhees had concocted his own selection from them. When I began reading these manuscripts (at first, MSS 114 and 115) in 1976 at the Wren this belief did seem quite plausible, but then I discovered that Wittgenstein had marked in their margins, and between their paragraphs, instructions for moving from one paragraph to another, and not only in the bound manuscripts but in two sheaves of manuscript paper called großes Format and kleines Format. Only having all four together on a table at the Wren enabled me to find that Rhees had done his job properly. Elizabeth Anscombe happened to arrive as I had them spread out and, although she knew Wittgenstein’s methods of working in general, had not known these particular signs, and she was very glad to be shown them. (One has to admit that the fashionable complaint was true in the case of the printed book’s extras, an Appendix to Part I, Part II itself and an Appendix to that. These were a somewhat arbitrary selection by Rhees,
from unrevised sections of the Big Typescript and from small typescripts and some manuscripts.)

In the case of the next attempts at a publishable book (the Brown Book with its Versuch einer Umarbeitung and, replacing it, what grew into Part I of Philosophical Investigations) an accusation of disguising their problem-based origins would be a complete misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s intention in writing them. They have a problem-solving basis, but the problem-solver is the reader, whose thought Wittgenstein expressly says he does not wish to spare. The book was meant to be worked through. It is useless unless one thinks about each problem as one meets it. If one understands the problems already one does not need to read the book, and Wittgenstein would not want one to. It is what he calls a Lehrbuch. Certainly, for most people, it would not be sensible to look for one’s own path through the problems which Wittgenstein presents until one had at least worked through the pre-war passages in his order. Then, I dare say, one could start to find one’s own order with his blessing.

These pre-war passages reach, as I have said, up to the first sub-paragraph of § 189, and my personal view is that he went too far in not sparing his readers’ thought when he reworked them. To read the less condensed pre-war version on microfilm was an especial pleasure to me, and now of course everybody interested in Wittgenstein can share it, and I hope they will. Naturally, that will be no substitute for reading the final version, which contains so much extra material written later, immediately before, during and shortly after the war.

While I normally much prefer reading Wittgenstein’s ‘first draft’ manuscripts or failing those his ‘second draft’ manuscripts or his typescripts, I must admit that the extreme condensation of Part II of Investigations always bewitched me (with the exception of a very unbewitching section, xi, discussed ahead, which took me many years to digest). My first encounter with it was its now lost typescript. Nearly thirty years later the long typescripts from which, partly, that was condensed, TSS 229 and 232, were published as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volumes I and II, and then manuscript material which contributed to it without the aid of a typescript (Last Writings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I). For once I found the apparently uncondensed bases the more difficult. In 1995 I at last tackled in detail the manuscript books from which all three were taken, using the Cornell microfilms, in other words the completely uncondensed bases, and my faith in ‘original’ Wittgenstein was restored. What I was able to infer from this encounter
(helped by photocopies of some censored passages sent me by the Wren) is recorded on my website and now, supplemented by discoveries in the electronic edition, forms the major part of my last chapter.

Fortunately, in dictating the typescript from which Part II of *Investigations* was edited and published before being lost, Wittgenstein was using a nearly identical manuscript version that he had written in his best hand, MS 144, which was one of the Cornell microfilms’ best efforts, and I used to urge everyone to read it as a way of feeling under Wittgenstein’s skin. Now, of course, they can do so with much less trouble thanks to Oxford-Bergen.24

This still leaves me needing to defend the unappetising Section xi, dealing, mainly, with what it means to say that one sees something as this or as that. There being something on the subject in the *Brown Book* had not prepared me for its extraordinary detail. Here was a sequence of observations, each one perfectly clear (in itself, so to speak), but what was the philosophical significance of collecting them together in this way? There are people, I have noticed, who feel exactly the same bewilderment in respect of Wittgenstein’s later work as a whole, but I had always supposed that, in the main, I understood it. For a long time I could not make any attempt to explain what these passages devoted to ‘aspect’ or ‘seeing as’ were about philosophically. I suppose this classifies me as ‘aspect’-blind (as distinct from being aspect-blind, which I am certainly not), but the matter became clear when I discovered the phenomenological language passages of the 1929 note-books. The experience of ‘aspect change’ must have contradicted his 1929 presuppositions.25

Something similar may have been a spur to Wittgenstein’s late work on colour, although it also grew out of an interest that he had had in colour as a scientific subject. Since I had always had the same interest (less scientifically) myself, and since some of my boyhood problems had what I now see as a conceptual component,26 finding his final colour notes in 1952 did not cause me a moment of estrangement – though I did later become dissatisfied with the way he restricted himself to the conceptual and never seemed to notice that keeping up his old interest in colour as a scientific subject would have provided grist to his mill as a conceptualist.

In the case of what I first knew as the Moore volume, that is to say *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, it was the whole book that I first found perplexing, with only small sections that I responded to. This will readily be understood, I hope, from what I have said so far about its manuscript origins, and when I have described these in detail in the next two chapters I am sure that understanding will extend to charitable sympathy, not only for myself but for anybody else who has tussled with this bewildering book.
Notes to Chapter I

1. The first two dictated scripts are printed as appendices I and II in the '1914–1916' volume. The first was dictated to a secretary for Russell late in 1913, the second to Moore early in 1914. The first includes the gnomic “‘A’ is the same letter as ‘A’”, and on his page 92 Monk not only quotes the relieved secretary as saying “Well, that’s true anyway” but gives his own very reasonable account of what it means. This is just what a lecturer might say to a class about the technicalities of symbolism, and is one example of what can be meant by the difference between showing and saying: aspects of a calculus that cannot be expressed within it can be quite easily explained at a blackboard. The Moore dictation opens with much more problematic examples of this difference.

2. It was certainly made from what in German is called a Durchschlag (a metaphor from duelling, I am told), and I doubt whether anyone is interested in my memory of seeing it in 1952. Its pasted paragraphs were blue, and of course carbon is black. There are probably many colours of copy paper, and no doubt typists call all of them carbon paper, and the copies made with them carbon copies. Still, in case there are any pedants who are interested in such details, I record this simple fact. I must also draw attention to the fact that the original photographs, made at the insistence of the Rockefeller Foundation, the ones that are now reproduced in the electronic edition facsimile, make it difficult to detect where the pasted paragraphs begin and end.

   Thanks to the Bergen Working Papers (No 17) sent me by Alois Pichler, I now find that matters are more complicated. In Paper 8, on page 58, he quotes von Wright as describing TS 209, the Moore volume, as having been a black cash book. It was certainly not black, but a rather faded reddish brown (‘maroon’), and its having no cash lines can easily be seen from the Rockefeller photographs reproduced by Bergen. It was in fact a minute book, designed to be used for recording company minutes.

3. See letter M 56, 16.12.48, written in Dublin, in Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore. In this, Wittgenstein asked Moore to put in his will the instruction that any of his typescripts should be given either to himself or to his trustees on Moore’s death. Since Wittgenstein died first, Moore gave TS 209 to the trustees himself. It was the only Wittgenstein typescript he had.

4. This was scuppered by Routledge & Kegan Paul, who held the Tractatus copyright and would not permit it. His seriousness about it is confirmed by a letter dated October 13/44 from Moore to Malcolm, saying that the [Cambridge University] Press had agreed to publish both together, with no translation and possibly in two volumes “in order that people may be able to see the difference” (Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002). The idea
occurred to Wittgenstein in 1943, when he was reading passages from the *Tractatus* with Nicholas Bachtin. In the printed preface to *Investigations*, dated 1945, Wittgenstein says he had had the idea *four* years previously, but on page 3 of TS 227, the *Investigations* typescript, this was originally “zwei”, changed to “vier” apparently in Wittgenstein’s own hand (but see *Papers* 14, pages 33 and 34). Even if made by an amanuensis this change could have been the result of his revising the typescript in 1947. On the index pages of the 1944 MS 129 there are multiple preface drafts in which “zwei” appears four times, and it is reasonable to guess that these index pages were used a year after the main notebook was filled. (Wittgenstein made a habit of using up spare pages.). And I also find, in 2004, that the 1943 Bachtin date is confirmed by Monk – see his page 457.

In MS 127, under the date 1.3.44, there are seven quotations from the *Tractatus*, namely 4.22, 3.21, 3.22, 3.14, 2.03, 2.0272 and 2.01, followed by the exclamation

Die sprachwidrige Verwendung des Wortes “Gegenstand” und “Konfiguration”!

This is an echo of “Die Wurzel dieser Verwechslung ist der verwirrende Gebrauch des Wortes ‘Gegenstand’.”, near the end of the essay *Komplex und Tatsache*, which Wittgenstein dictated as a separate typescript from pages 236–238 and pages 249–252 of MS 110, written on the 30th of June and the 1st of July 1931. And at the end of MS 128, catalogued as “approx 1944 51pp”, there is the projected title

*Philos. Untersuchungen*

[im Gegensatz]


entgegengestellt.

The essay *Komplex und Tatsache*, thought by Rhees important enough to put in the appendices of both *Philosophische Bemerkungen* and *Philosophische Grammatik*, was a cardinal attack on the ideas of the *Tractatus*, and so I hope these references make it clear that the idea of printing *Tractatus* and *Investigations* together was not to present them as forming one joint work, the impression I gained from Elizabeth Anscombe when she told me about it, but to criticise the *Tractatus*. It is well worth reading the *Tractatus* references in print or as quoted in MS 127, because they give a particularly vivid impression of what one might call the general superstition he wished to demolish, namely that ideally constructed sentences configure in the same manner as the states of affairs that they describe. The problem is that in his essay he attacks a more particular superstition, that e.g. “Socrates is mortal” could count as ideally constructed if it mirrored the configuration of two objects, Socrates and mortality. Monk, on his page 70, cites letters to Russell of January 1913 about “the Complex Problem” and quotes a letter of the same period in which he attacks the idea. From this one would guess that it was a pre-*Tractatus* superstition, disposed of in 1913, but there is no hint in either the essay or in MS 127 of its not being intended in the *Tractatus*. In that notebook Wittgenstein continues, running onto page 77:
A configuration can consist of balls in a certain spatial relationship; but not of the balls and their spatial relationship. And if I say "I can see three objects here" I do not mean: two balls and their mutual position.¹

5. There is an interesting variant of this image, in which we do not know our way when we come from a different direction to a point where have been before:

Die Sprache ist ein Labyrinth von Wegen. Du kommst von einer Seite und kennst Dich aus; Du kommst von einer andern zur selben Stelle und kennst Dich nicht mehr aus. (MS 129 page 121, August or later 1944, and § 203, Investigations Part I.)

The original Yellow Book typescript has a von Wright number of 311, classifying it as a Wittgenstein dictation to or for academics, which it was not, having been made by Ambrose, Masterman and Skinner in 1933 from lecture and discussion notes. It is not given complete in the Ambrose lecture volume, and the typescript is not included in the electronic edition. There is a note about its absence at the end of my Chapter 8, on typescripts, and there is also a note in the Bergen Papers 14, page 61.²

6. In full this quotation is

Wenn ich für mich denke, ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich um das Thema herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihe gezwungen fortzudenken ist mir eine Qual. Soll ich es überhaupt probieren?

Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf eine Anordnung der Gedanken, das vielleicht gar keinen Wert hat.

This note was written in MS 118 on the 15th of September 1937, a day after some extremely pessimistic remarks about his inability to write and a day before the first brief preface draft for Investigations.³

7. This word comes in the Tractatus, 6.44, and there is a letter written to von Ficker (and printed in Wittgenstein, Sources and Perspectives) while he was trying to get the Tractatus.

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¹ Translation of German quotes:
The counter-linguistic use of the words “object” and “configuration”!
The root of this muddle is the confusing use of the word 'object'.

Philosophical Investigations
[in contrast]
contrasted
to the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus

² Translation of German quotes:
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You come from one side and know your way; you come to the same place from another side and you don’t know your way any more.
published, in which he says “In Wirklichkeit ist er [der Stoff des Buches] Ihnen nicht fremd, denn der Sinn des Buches ist ein Ethischer”. It is clear from the 1929 Lecture on Ethics that the two words meant much the same to him. And Paul Engelmann’s Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir also makes clear that the final paragraphs of the Tractatus are meant to hint at a significance that the rest of the book was incapable of expressing.

The question remains, whether Wittgenstein meant by his term what anybody else might have meant by the mystical. In the Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore volume there is a letter from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell (printed between R 42 and R 43) telling her that Wittgenstein had shifted just after the first war to something that went with the normal usage.

I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he had become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates becoming a monk. It all started from William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, and grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone in Norway before the war, when he was nearly mad. Then during the war a curious thing happened. He went on duty to the town of Tarnov in Galicia, and happened to come upon a bookshop, which, however, seemed to contain nothing but picture postcards. However, he went inside and found that it contained just one book: Tolstoy on the Gospels. He bought it merely because there was no other. He read it and re-read it, and henceforth had it always with him, under fire and at all times. But on the whole he likes Tolstoy less than Dostoewski (especially Karamazov). He has penetrated deep into mystical ways of thought and feeling, but I think (though he wouldn’t agree) that what he likes best in mysticism is its power to make him stop thinking. I don’t much think he will really become a monk – it is an idea, not an intention. His intention is to become a teacher. He gave all his money to his brothers and sisters, because he found earthly possessions a burden. I wish you had seen him.

To me, all this is an aberration that he grew out of, and in the Tractatus itself and his Essay on Ethics and his 1937 asides on religion and his later ones, I find a quite sane attitude which relates to what other entirely sane people have meant by mysticism, though they might have been wise to choose a different word for what they were driving at. Before I went to Oxford I was much impressed by Aldous Huxley on what he called the

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iii. Translation of German quotes:

When I think just for me, without wanting to write a book, I jump around the theme; that is the only way of thinking that comes natural to me. Being forced to pursue my thought sequentially is a torment to me. Ought I to try it at all?

I waste unspeakable pains over putting thoughts into an order that perhaps has no value.
Perennial Philosophy, and in Hamburg during a course on Medieval Philosophy by the so-called Dionysius the pseudo Areopagite, the founder of the via negativa. At Oxford Isaiah Berlin was quite unimpressed by my attempt to explain Huxley, and now I am not at all surprised, having revisited his ideas in his introduction to Isherwood’s translation of the *Bhagavad Gita*. Mentioning Dionysius together with the Buddha, the Hebrew prophets, Lao Tse, Plato and “the Persian Sufis and the Christian mystics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance”, he declares a ‘highest common factor’ between them, namely “the Perennial Philosophy in what may be called its chemically pure state”. This “can never, of course, be expressed by any verbal statement of the philosophy,” and there, remembering the *Tractatus*, he should have stopped, but after an explanation of why nothing can be said he goes on: “It is only in the act of contemplation, when words and even personality are transcended, that the pure state of the Perennial Philosophy can actually be known. The records … make it abundantly clear that all of them … were attempting to describe the same essentially indescribable Fact.”

This is as if Wittgenstein had said “Über die Tatsache, die man nicht beschreiben kann, muss man schweigen”. There is no ‘indescribable fact’. Nor is personality transcended, because personality doesn’t come into it. Only consciousness does, and it is not consciousness of some transcendental thing, nor is it ‘pure consciousness’ in any transcendental sense either, nor any kind of abstraction from consciousness of this or consciousness of that. True, one can be taught to exercise one’s consciousness, and this can be called turning one’s consciousness within, but the result is not an apprehension of some contemplated ineffability. The only thing I can call it is clarity. The people mentioned by Huxley all seem to have attained or attempted it, and in particular many people in the western tradition of the ‘via negativa’, going back to so-called Dionysius, and so have many people in a similar tradition coming from India and encountered by Huxley and Isherwood, as have people in a related tradition that I have encountered myself. In the latter case I do not think the term “mysticism” has ever been used at all, and it would certainly be rejected if anybody suggested it, but the fact remains that there is a sane use of the term and that Wittgenstein can be associated with it – if only the reprehensible uses suggested by Russell, and worse, could be disentangled from it.iv

8. Keynes had written in 1924, mildly suggesting a visit. Out of this Wittgenstein made quite a song and dance, involving both Ramsey and Eccles. With the help of £10 from

iv. Translation of German quotes:

In reality it [the subject matter of the book] is not strange to you, for the meaning of the book is an ethical one.
Keynes he made the trip in 1925. See letters K11 to K 15 in *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore*, which are very revealing of Wittgenstein’s psychology.

9. *Investigations* § 128 (“Wollte man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen …”) appears to be a rather unkind reference to Waismann. This also comes in the mid-war Smythies typescript, TS 239, as § 137. As to the book, whatever this was supposed to be, I was told by Elizabeth Anscombe that when Waismann published an early attempt and thanked Wittgenstein for his “wertvolle Anregungen” (valuable suggestions, stimulation) towards it, Wittgenstein thought this an extreme understatement and, I understood from her, wrote him a scornful letter about the phrase. According to Malcolm’s *Memoir*, however, he asked Schlick to put his outrage to Waismann, but Schlick was assassinated before he could do so. Malcolm avoids naming Waismann in this passage (on page 58). The full Waismann book was eventually published posthumously as *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*. See Peter Keicher’s article in *Papers* 15 on the *Diktat für Schlick*, on the Waismann connection in general, and in particular see that article’s page 53.

10. It is interesting to find Wittgenstein’s own expression of Schlick’s ideas on Relativity in a Lent term lecture of 1930 (page 8 of the Lee volume):

   (Minkowski accounts for the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment by a new geometry, Fitzgerald by a contraction. These are merely two expressions of the same fact; we can adopt either, unless a decisive experiment is possible between them.)

The relevant chapters of Schlick’s book (published in English in 1922, in German in 1917) are IV and V. I expanded the summary above for my own mathematics students in a pamphlet (21.9.1972, Nottingham College of Education) thus:

Naturally, having given a meaning to the curvature of space, Riemann wished to ask whether space is *in fact* curved. But space is not like the surface of an object, capable of being reasonably judged to be really curved or really flat: it is not an object at all, and whether it is ‘curved’ in Riemann’s sense depends on how its coordinates are set up. Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle, puts the matter extremely clearly in his discussion of Gauss’s triangle experiment. What, he asks, could we have inferred if the angle sum had been different from 180 degrees (for three peaks in the Harzgebirge)? We should have had to choose how to describe our discovery: for we could either have said that space was non-Euclidean or we could have described the paths of the light as curved in a Euclidean space. What makes an absolute judgement of the properties of space impossible is that alternative descriptions are always available.

To this I must add a 2004 warning to confident philosophers. Recent experiments, whose results are some months or years away, are designed to give decisive information
about the properties of space, and whether this constitutes an absolute judgement on
them is something we shall just have to wait and see.

11. There is, for example, a long remark beginning on page 47 of *Wittgenstein und der
Wiener Kreis* and headed “Der Sinn des Satzes ist seine Verifikation”. A few verification
passages were included in *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. For example, on page 174 there is

Jeder Satz ist die Anweisung auf eine Verifikation

from page 16 of Volume I (MS 105), making this a comparatively late passage because of
Wittgenstein’s system in the first two ‘Bände’ of using up right hand pages before left
hand ones. There are other verification passages in these manuscript books that were
omitted from the Moore volume. A significant one is the following, from page 1 of Vol-
ume IV (MS 108), significant because it comes immediately after a paragraph which is
in print (the first quoted here):

Unter Anwendung verstehe ich das, was die Lautverbindungen überhaupt zu einer
Sprache macht. In dem Sinn, in dem es die Anwendung ist, die den Stab mit
Strichen zu einem Massstab macht. Das Anlegen der Sprache an die Wirklichkeit
(printed on page 85).

Und dieses Anlegen der Sprache ist die Verifikation des Satzes (unprinted).

Another passage not printed is to be found on page 177 of Volume III (MS 107), and it
has a date, 25.[10.29], the very period when Wittgenstein was abandoning his quest for
a phenomenological language:

Jeder Satz ist ein leeres Spiel von Strichen oder Lauten ohne die Beziehung zur
Wirklichkeit und die /seine/ einzige Beziehung zur Wirklichkeit ist die Art seiner
Verifikation.

The verification passage which comes closest to a Vienna Circle formulation was writ-
ten somewhat before this (late September or early October) on page 143 of the same
manuscript book, followed by a quotation from Einstein:

Die Verification ist nicht ein Anzeichen der Wahrheit sondern der Sinn des Satzes.

Both are printed on page 200 of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. However, on page 252 of
the same manuscript volume, written on the 21st of January 1930, after an interlude in
Vienna written in the opening pages of Volume IV, we find what reads like a softening:

Die Hypothese ist /steht/ mit der Realität, gleichsam, in einem löseren Zusam-
menhang als der der Verifikation.

and on page 254, written on the 23rd,

Wenn ich sage dass eine Hypothese nicht definitiv verifizierbar ist so ist damit nicht
gemeint, dass es eine Verifikation gibt der man immer mehr nähern kann ohne sie
while on pages 283–284, just before the date 5.[12.30], Wittgenstein seems to have turned Popperian:

Hypothese nenne ich jeden Satz der nicht einer definitiven Verification fähig ist.

Alas, this simply goes with a dogmatic hangover from the phenomenological language, in which “this is a chair” is construed as expressing an hypothesis. This is declared in a lecture from Michaelmas 1931, printed in the Lee volume on page 66:

A proposition is a judgement about sense-data, a reading of one’s sense-data; for example “This is red”. No further verification is needed; it is a priori. A hypothesis is an expression of the form “This man is ill”, “The sun will rise tomorrow” or “This is a chair”.

Yet under the date 11.10.[29] on page 160 of Volume III, before the Vienna interlude, he had written, entirely sanely and in accord with what one would expect of him later,

Die ängsten philosophischen Irrtümer entstehen immer wenn man unsere – gewöhnliche – physikalische Sprache im Gebiet des unmittelbar gegebenen anwenden will.

Wenn man z.B. fragt “existiert der Kasten noch wenn ich ihn nicht anschaue?” so wäre die einzige richtige Antwort “gewiss, wenn ihn niemand weggetragen oder zerstört hat”. Natürlich wäre der Philosoph von dieser Antwort nicht befriedigt aber sie würde ganz richtig seine Fragestellung ad absurdum führen.

and in the lectures nearest our problem entries (Lent 1930) there is no hint at all of demoting “this is a chair” to expressing an hypothesis. Some seven months after getting his fellowship for the Moore volume, on 30.[6.31], page 238 of Volume VI (MS 110), there is a more convincing softening, in the spirit of a story (told by Malcolm) about Stout, but certainly not in the spirit of the dogmatic lecture of Michaelmas 1931:

Die Angabe / Beschreibung / der Verification eines Satzes ist ein Beitrag zu seiner Grammatik.

The Stout business is saddening. It is recorded in the Memoir. In the early thirties, on his way to catch a train, he calls at Wittgenstein’s place to ask him about verification. Wittgenstein tells him a parable. A policeman is asked to make notes about the employment of people in his locality. He thinks it proper to mention certain people who have no employment. The moral is that while the normal thing is for propositions to be verifiable, the fact that certain (no doubt wayward) propositions are unverifiable is relevant to their meaning – not a proof that they have no meaning. Fine and good: but one could wish that as he saw Stout off to the station he had added “That’s what I think now, but actually, only a few years ago, I was going great guns for verification”.

38 | A BIRD’S EYE VIEW
12. In three out of a series of drafts for a preface to *Investigations*, Wittgenstein describes himself (in 1938) as having been thinking again about philosophy for ten years, with some ambiguity as to when he started writing it again. These manuscript drafts (there is also a typescript draft, TS 225, from the same year) are in Volume XIII (MS 117) and start on page 110, on 27.6.38. On page 114 this draft has

> Ich habe, seit ich vor 10 Jahren wieder mich mit Philosophie zu beschäftigen anfing, schwere Irrtümer in dem einsehen müssen, was ich seinerzeit in der ‘Log. Phil. Abh.’ geschrieben hatte.

Unfortunately, in this draft the phrase “im Laufe der letzten 10 Jahre niedergeschrieben” also occurs. The draft ends with

> Gewidmet sind diese Schriften eigentlich meinen Freunden. Wenn ich sie ihnen nicht förmlich widme, so ist es darum, weil die meisten von ihnen sie nicht lesen werden.

The second begins on page 116 with

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v. Translation of German quotes:
- Every proposition is an instruction as to a verification.
- By application I understand whatever makes sound-combinations into any kind of language. In the sense in which application is what makes a rod with marks on it into a measuring rod. The laying of language onto reality [printed on page 85].
- And this laying of language is a proposition's verification [not printed].
- Every sentence is an empty play of marks or sounds if there is no relationship with reality, and its only relationship with reality is the way it is verified.
- Verification is not some indication of truth but the meaning of a sentence.
- An hypothesis stands to reality in, as it were, a looser connection than that of verification.
- If I say that an hypothesis is not definitively verifiable, that does not mean that there is some verification which one can only approach without ever reaching it. That is nonsense, of a kind one often falls into. Rather, an hypothesis has simply a different formal relation with reality than that of verification.
- Hypothesis is what I call any proposition that is not capable of definitive verification.
- The most dreadful philosophical mistakes always come about when one wants to apply our – normal – physical language in the realm of the immediately given.
- If one asks for example “does the box still exist when I’m not looking at it?” the only right answer would be “of course, if no one has carried it away or destroyed it”. Naturally, the philosopher wouldn’t be satisfied by this answer, but it would quite correctly take his posing of the question ad absurdum.
- The account / description of a proposition's verification is a contribution to its grammar.
Meinen Freuden Gewidmet

Vorwort

In den Folgenden will ich eine Auswahl der philosophischen Bemerkungen veröffentlichen, die ich im Laufe der letzten 10 Jahre niedergeschrieben habe. Sie betreffen eine Menge von Gebieten …

In this draft there is also

Ich habe, seit ich vor 10 Jahren wieder mich mit Philosophie zu beschäftigen anfing, schwere Irrtümer … in dem einsehen müssen, was ich seinerzeit in der Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung niedergelegt hatte.

However, on page 120 another draft starts thus:

Vorwort

In dem Folgenden will ich eine Auswahl der philosophischen Bemerkungen veröffentlichen, die ich im Laufe der letzten [10] 9 Jahre niedergeschrieben habe. Sie betreffen viele Gebiete …

And on page 125 there is

Ich habe, seit ich vor 10 Jahren wieder mich mit Philosophie zu beschäftigen anfing schwere Irrtümer in dem einsehen müssen …

This draft ends:

Cambridge im August 1938

The single correction in these three drafts is not strong evidence for the distinction I took Wittgenstein to have been drawing, and I began to doubt my own judgement, but I found confirmation in MS 159, started in 1937 and continued in 1938. On page 34, certainly a 1938 passage, the phrases occur “welche ich im Laufe der letzten 9 Jahre niedergeschrieben habe” and shortly afterwards “seit ich mich vor etwa 10 Jahre wieder mit Philosophie zu beschäftigen anfing”.

Incidentally, the very first ‘preface’ passage which could have been intended for Investigations comes in the early pages of C 8 (MS 152), a 1936 notebook, and possibly as its code suggests at least started in Cambridge. Because of its pessimism I think it more likely to have been intended for the Versuch einer Umarbeitung of the Brown Book that he was writing in Norway (and abandoned there). It includes the phrase “wie sie sich in den letzten acht Jahren entwickelt haben”, and 1936 – 8 is 1928. This is the notebook that I mention on page 13 as containing the first Investigations sketch, which comes a little later in it, and sufficiently later not to require the preface sketch to go with it. See Papers 14, pages 25–35, for a full list of the various preface sketches.
13. Not only did the early pages of this notebook include what became the opening of *Investigations*, but Wittgenstein began the dictation of a new typescript (TS 211) with it, even though it also came to include passages from Volumes V and VI as well. On the 21st of September 1931 he is recorded in *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* as arriving at Schlick’s place bringing a typescript, which must have been this one, while he was still writing Volume VII. Moreover, I owe to Dr. Kienzler’s essay in *Wittgenstein Studies* (2000–2) the information that Volume VII included the beginning of an important enterprise of Wittgenstein’s of which I had not been aware. This was to make use of passages in TS 208 (209 being of course lodged with Moore) to provide examples of how he was now doing philosophy differently. In *Wiener Ausgabe* Volume 5 Nedo prints a photograph of his doing this by actually cutting out three paragraphs from TS 208 and pasting them onto a manuscript page (page 40 of Volume X as edited by Nedo, marked as 21 in the photograph by a Wren librarian), but mainly he simply copied passages that he wanted to be seen from his new point of view. What is remarkable, considering the reordering of TS 208 to make TS 209, is that Wittgenstein used his passages for reinterpretation in exactly their order in TS 208. Kienzler calls this process a “Wiederaufnahme”. He indicates three passages in Volume VII where this is done, twenty six in Volume VIII, and for sixty two in Volumes IX and X refers to Nedo’s *Register to Volumes 1–5*. This is not the most appealing reference volume, and while it is essential for finding the full details of the Wiederaufnahme there are briefer references in the Introduction to Volume 5, though this omits quotations and only comments on pages 26–29 of X. I am very relieved to find that in my Chapter 2 I have quoted the second of these self-quotations, and that my translation of it is backed by Kienzler. The first quotation illustrates the tactic behind this system: it is of the very opening of right hand Volume I,

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vi. Since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again 10 years ago, I have had to face up to bad mistakes in what I had written in those days in the ‘Tractatus Logico Philosophicus’. These writings are really dedicated to my friends. If I don’t dedicate them to them formally, that is because most of them won’t read them.

Dedicated to my Friends

Preface

In what follows I am publishing a selection of philosophical remarks that I have written down in the course of the last 10 years. They deal with a number of areas … Since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again 10 years ago, I have had to face up to bad mistakes … in the very things I had set down in those days in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus.

Preface

In what follows I am publishing a selection of the philosophical remarks that I have written down in the course of the last [10] 9 years. They deal with many areas … Since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again 10 years ago I have had to face up to bad mistakes in the very things …
2.2.29, which ends with a question implying that the irrational numbers are presupposed in the rationals, but on 16.7.31 in VII Wittgenstein adds the comment “As little as chess is in draughts”.

14. The Norwegian hut materialised so quickly (in the early summer of 1914) that I often wondered why it is always described as having been built by Wittgenstein. The explanation is that he said so himself in a postscript to letter R 28 to Russell.

PS Ich baue mir jetzt hier ein kleines Haus in der Einsamkeit. Hoffentlich war Deine Reise erfolgreich.

His sister Hermine (in her contribution to Personal Recollections) said that he bought it. But on page 136 of Monk, in taking his leave of a Dr. Max Bieler, who is introduced on page 132, he puts the matter quite plainly: he had had a house built beside a fjord.

See letter M 31 to Moore on page 169 of the Letters, 3.11.36.

I don’t know if I wrote to you that when I came here I began to translate into and rewrite in German the stuff I had dictated to Skinner and Miss Ambrose. When about a fortnight ago, I read through what I had done so far I found it all, or nearly all, boring and artificial. For having the English version before me had cramped my thinking. I therefore decided to start all over again and not to let my thoughts be guided by anything but themselves. – I found it difficult the first day or two but then it became easy. And so now I’m writing a new version and I hope I’m not wrong in saying that it’s somewhat better than the last.

A few pages of the Brown Book were written by Wittgenstein in German, presumably before dictating it in English, on the same large loose pages as großes Format, and catalogued as MS 141. (It appears to start by revising the last loose page of großes Format.) Rhees added the Versuch einer Umarbeitung to Petra von Morstein’s translation of the parts of the Brown Book that Wittgenstein didn’t reach. To avoid an overlap Rhees failed to ask her to translate quite enough, and I hope she will fill the gaps one day.vii

15. See letters K 28, 29 and 30 to Keynes, and M 30 to Moore. Keynes must have had some influence in who would be appointed to Moore’s professorship. Wittgenstein was very anxious for him to read Rhees’s translation of Investigations as quickly as possible, but he did not like Rhees’s English. He held the translation back while Smythies helped him correct it. These corrections could be seen on the Cornell microfilm of the translation and are clearly visible in electronic facsimile. They are sensitive both to Wittgenstein’s

vii. Translation of German quotes:
PS I am building myself now a little house in the wilds here. I hope your journey was successful.
meaning and to English phrasing – which I suspect is a debt owed to Smythies. I also suspect that the spelling “Escalibur” is Smythies-Harrowian taken down by ear. Some evidence that now escapes me suggests that the idea of Anglicising “Nothung” as “Excalibur” was Wittgenstein’s own, but even if it was that is no excuse for adopting it in the official translation. Wittgenstein’s sense of English idiom was defective, to say nothing of legend, and Excalibur should have been a warning to translators not to let themselves be impressed by their own or others’ memories of what Wittgenstein said.

16. In Malcolm’s Memoir, on pages 78 and 79 (page 64 in the second edition), he mentions that he had seen a typescript, of which there were three, of Investigations, during the Cambridge academic year 1946–1947, but returned it before returning to America. Wittgenstein could not spare him a copy to send to him subsequently, but he did take one with him to America in 1949 and he left it with him. Malcolm gave it to the trustees after Wittgenstein’s death. However, on page 81 (page 66 in the second edition) he mentions a separate typescript, which Wittgenstein also brought with him to America. There is no mention of his leaving it with Malcolm, and if he had done Malcolm would certainly have returned it with the other. He specifies that it was the typescript that is now published as a second part of Investigations. This is one of a number of details of evidence for my belief that Wittgenstein always saw it as a separate composition, not a ‘Part II’. Monk, on page 544, says that Wittgenstein had told Elizabeth in Dublin that it was a preparation for a never achieved revision of Part I, but on pages 538–9 he explains what Wittgenstein had really meant in this Dublin conversation: what he had hoped would help him revise Part I was not the ‘Part II’ typescript, which he had not yet made, but the two Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology typescripts and the passages in MSS 137–8 that had escaped dictation. By the time he was writing the manuscript, MS 144, from which he dictated ‘Part II’, he had given up all hope of revising Part I.

17. Expressions of this doubt are frequent in Wittgenstein’s notebooks. In the early thirties it went with a conviction that Jewishness detracts from originality. For example, in MS 154, written in 1931, he hesitantly admits that he did have original ideas in Norway in 1913–1914. I quote two paragraphs which lead to others on much the same subject (starting on page 15v):

Das jüdische “Genie” ist nur ein Heiliger. Der grösste jüdische Denker ist nur ein Talent. (Ich, z.B.)

Es ist, glaube ich, eine Wahrheit darin wenn ich denke, dass ich eigentlich in meinem Denken nur reprodutivo bin. Ich glaube ich habe nie eine Gedankenbewegung erfunden sondern sie wurde mir von jemand anderem gegeben und ich habe sie nur so gleich leidenschaftlich zu meinem Klärungswerk aufgegriffen. So haben mich Bolzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger,

And on page 19r:


MS 156b, undated but possibly 1934, has on page 33


During the period of pre-war Investigations composition, self-pity of this kind modifies, though other kinds take its place. He has frequent doubts about his ability to work, but he is not obsessed about whether what he does write is original. Often his self-distrust is exasperating, but sometimes his manner of expression wins one over, as in this beautiful comparison of himself with a lady who went to Schiller’s Don Carlos under the impression that it was a comedy:

Es geht mir mit dem Leben beinahe, wie einer Dame, die in den “Don Carlos” ging, in der Meinung, es sei ein Lustspiel, und nach einigen Akten indigniert aufstand, mit den Worten: „Il me semble que c’est une tragédie.”

(from Volume XV, MS 119, page 130, 16.10.[37], written in his hut as winter approached; in code except for the French). However, in MS 162a (1939) there is a return to doubt as to originality:

… Originalität des Bodens, nicht des Samens. (Ich habe vielleicht keinen eigenen Samen.) Wirf einen Samen in mein Boden, und er wird anders wachsen, als in irgend einem anderen Boden.

This is followed by another remark suggesting that Freud received ideas from Breuer. To these quotations the following need to be added, for without the background of self-doubt one might conclude that they express confidence in his own genius instead of a fear that it is rather on the thin side (written on 4.4.1943 in MS 127):

Was Du für ein Geschenk hältst, ist ein Problem das Du lösen solst.

Genie ist das, was uns das Talent [Geschick] vergessen macht.

Wo das Genie dünn ist kann das Geschick durchschauen [blicken]. (Meistersinger Vorspiel.)
Genie ist das, was macht dass wir das Talent des Meisters nicht sehen können.

Nur wo das Genie dünn ist kann man das Talent sehen.\textsuperscript{viii}

18. Antony Flew, visiting Nottingham College of Education while I was lecturing there, expressed horror to me that these notebooks should have been published as 1914–1916. He regarded this as typical trustee sloppiness. I don’t pretend that I should ever have minded myself if he had not put the point to me, but once he had I could only agree with him.

19. This is now safely housed in Trinity, after an unnervingly romantic history. It was given by Wittgenstein to Yorick Smythies, who gave it to me in 1957 with some strings as to its possible eventual return. Because of these I explicitly \textit{lent} it to a Miss Flach in 1966, who unfortunately did not remember this restriction. From her it came into the hands of a gentleman who wanted to raise money on it to help him set up home with someone else. He tried to sell it to Cornell, where the librarian refused to buy it, doubting his title. At my urging, Miss Flach recovered it and brought it to England in 1978 and

\textit{viii. Translation of German quotes:}

Jewish “genius” is only \textit{that of} a saint. The greatest Jewish thinker is only a talent. (Me, for example.)

There is, I believe, a truth in this that, if I am thinking, I am really only reproductive in my thought. I believe I have never invented a movement in thought but it was given me by someone else and I seized on it passionately for my work of clarification. In this way Bolzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. Can one consider Breuer and Freud as an example of Jewish reproductivity? – What I invent are new similes.

Incidentally, when I was in Norway in the year 1913–14 I had thoughts of my own, or so at least it seems to me now. I mean, it does appear to me as if I had given birth to new movements in thought then. (But I may be wrong.) Whereas now I only seem to apply old ones.

It sometimes appears to me as if I philosophised just with a toothless mouth, and as if speaking with a toothless mouth seemed to me the real, more valuable, thing. I see something similar with Kraus. Except that I recognise it as a degeneracy.

My life goes almost like a lady who went to Don Carlos in the belief that it was a comedy, and after a few acts stood up indignantly with the words: “Il me semble que c’est une tragédie.”

… Originality of soil, not of seed. (I have perhaps no seeds of my own.) Throw a seed into my soil and it will grow differently than in any other soil.

What you take to be a gift is a problem that you have got to solve.

Genius is the thing that makes us forget talent [skill].

Where genius is thin skill can look through [peep]. (The prelude to \textit{Meistersinger}.)

Genius is the thing that makes us unable to see the Master’s talent.

Only where genius is thin can one see the talent.
handed it over to Dr. Gaskell at Trinity. When he asked me who the owner was I said “Yorick Smythies”, thinking he deserved a letter of gratitude from his old college, but he died in the same year and his family cannot tell me if he received Trinity’s letter. The correspondence dealing with this has gone to Helsinki, where it was in the custody of Professor von Wright. Believing that Malcolm, not the Cornell librarian, had been the person who refused to buy, I asked Dr. Gaskell to send him a photocopy, with my thanks. Malcolm passed this on to the librarian, thanking him for his help in the rescue, and suggested that it should be microfilmed. As a result it now constitutes the final Cornell reel, though there is no mention in that it was made from a photocopy. Although I have sometimes termed this typescript ‘mid-war’ it is very unlikely that Wittgenstein began work on it before February 1944 when he gave up war work in his second hospital, Newcastle (see a letter from Moore to Malcolm dated Oct. 13, 1944, and see Monk, pages 465–6).

20. TS 222 was a revision and improvement of TS 221, and Rhees naturally used it for the first section of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Between the two Wittgenstein had dropped the linking sub-paragraph that opens § 189 of Investigations. At the very end of TS 222, and at the bottom of the page, there is a remark about the logic of non (two of them make an affirmative) and the colloquial German ne (two of them an emphatic negative). Rhees did not think this important enough to include in the philosophy of mathematics book, but I believe von Wright is responsible for putting it back in the third edition. (Readers of the electronic edition will not find it, because as TS 222 the editors have chosen a set of ‘slips’, Zettel, obviously preparatory to the typescript published as 222 by Cornell.) Rhees made quite a few editorial errors because of his imperfect understanding of mathematics and mathematical logic.

21. There is an early passage declaring this as an absolute rift in MS 110 (Volume VI), page 87, 17.[2.31]:

Nur durch völliges Absehen vom Psychologischen können wir zu dem für uns Wesentliches kommen.

In dictated typescripts made for Schlick, discussed ahead in Chapter 5, Wittgenstein compares his philosophical method with Freud’s psychoanalysis, without implying that his method has anything psychological about it but giving the comparison a very reasonable slant. In Malcolm’s Memoir a very interesting letter about Freud (of December 1945) is printed on pages 44–45 (page 39, and in full as Letter 18 in the second edition). On pages 56–57 (48–49 in the second edition) a Wittgenstein explosion is described, dated to the winter of 1946–7, in response to an article describing his method as psychoanalytical. Wittgenstein had only himself to blame for this: in an earlier lecture, cited ahead in Chapter 6, he had made the comparison himself, without troubling to add the explanation made in the dictation for Schlick.\textsuperscript{xv}
22. The region in question is a fairly wide one, but its most striking passage comes on page 121 (MS 109):

Kann sich der Wesensunterschied zwischen “logischen und phänomenologischen Constanten” auch allein in der Grammatik zeigen? Ist hier nicht doch eine Theorie nötig?

Wittgenstein later became extremely resistant to the idea that a theory was needed anywhere in his philosophy. The strange formulation of this problem seems to sink quickly, and my old belief that the problem’s solution can be found in the late-1937 notebooks that provided the bridge between pre-war *Investigations* and its mathematical and ‘privacy’ passages derives from my failing to notice that in MS 109 the passage above is in a context dealing with another problem altogether, that of very general facts that we are tempted to think of as logical truths – facts that have lead some philosophers to the idea of a synthetic a priori.x

23. In the penultimate paragraph of the printed preface to *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says

Ich möchte nicht mit meiner Schrift andern das Denken ersparen.

and this attitude is reflected in his changing use of the word “Lehrbuch” (textbook). In the preface to the *Tractatus* he had used the word for a kind of didacticism he did not have in mind.


In a remark made in the summer of 1931 he says

Mein Buch könnte auch heissen: Philosophische Grammatik. Dieser Titel hätte zwar den Geruch eines Lehrbuchtitels, aber das macht ja nichts, da das Buch hinter ihm steht. (MS 110, page 254)

Finally, in a remark made while working on *Investigations*, he says

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ix. Translation of German quotes:

Only by completely refraining from the psychological can we get to what is essential to us.

x. Translation of German quotes:

Can the difference of essence between “logical and phenomenological constants” show up just in grammar alone? Isn’t, after all, a theory needed here?
24. While I had admired the short sections of ‘Part II’ from the very beginning, and eventually its long Section xi as well, it was only in my detailed re-examination of the original notebooks that I came to realise what a remarkable accomplishment on Wittgenstein’s part the condensation had been. He was very ill when he made it. It is not even clear whether he regarded making it as ‘work’. Having written the last paragraphs that contributed to it in March 1949 he had the typescript completed by that July and took a copy of it with him when he sailed in the *Queen Mary* to visit Malcolm in America (see above).

25. My belief that a new insight into the error of his primary language quest brought about his interest in this problem is corroborated by textual evidence. Admittedly, it took a long time for Wittgenstein’s penny to drop. On page 119 of Volume VI, for example, on the 25th of February 1931, he merely refers to the phenomenon of aspect, after describing an upside-down chair seen as such, compared with seeing it as a mere wooden construction. There is a difference of perception, but he gives no indication of what this could mean. In the next paragraph he simply says: “Think of puzzle pictures. A complex of lines is suddenly recognised and seen as the upside-down picture of a man.”

Yet when his trust in his quest was first beginning to waver he did offer an explanation. This passage comes at the very end of the left hand pages of Volume I, the fourth section of the two topsy turvy manuscript volumes, where he encroaches on the unlined end-pages and has to draw horizontal lines between paragraphs. Starting at the foot of page 133:

> Isn’t it possible that we see spatially with one [page 134] eye because our brain etc. calls up the very visual image that it is always forced to see by the constant use of two eyes. It is actually obvious, as the case of [sketch of a cube] shows.

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xi. Translation of German quotes:

I shouldn’t like my book to spare other people the trouble of thinking.

Perhaps this book will only be understood by those who have already thought its thoughts for themselves – or at least similar thoughts. – So it is no textbook. – Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to someone who read it with understanding.

My book could also be called Philosophical Grammar. This title would to be sure have the smell of a textbook title, but that doesn’t matter since the book is there behind it.

One could call this book a textbook. But not a textbook in that it imparts knowledge, but in that it stimulates thought.
In other words, our neurological mechanism forces a change in sense data on us. That this does not go without saying is first stated clearly in MS 123, page 21r, 16.5.41, when he takes this notebook up again after a gap. There is still, however, no solution, which only comes in the 1946–1949 notes that lead to *Investigations* Part II (in this case, Section xi).

Is the difference in what I see or in how I think about it? But how can one decide? How can I tell other people, or myself, what I see? By means of a sketch, perhaps? But then I must draw the same sketch in both cases. For [drawing of a hollow cube with a little window on one face] it isn’t the sketch that tells us that in one case the bright patch represents a sheet of paper [on which the sketch is drawn] and in the other the light that shines through the hole.

But where does the [page 22r] temptation come from to say that in one case I see this, in the other that? What if I were mistaken? And what I take to be a seeing is an interpreting? Or can’t I be mistaken?

Am I to say, then, that I am having different visual images, or that I have the same thing both times but interpret it differently? Or is it a matter of indifference which I say?

And doesn’t considering this imply a criticism of the idea of a sense datum?

In the 1946–1949 notes (MSS 130–138) Wittgenstein comes quite rapidly to the conclusion that our sense-data are unchanged when we experience a change of aspect, but later appears to retreat, finally accepting the common sense assumption that we merely view them differently. This is the final nail in the coffin of the phenomenological language. Sense data are not absolute. We can receive them, and without having to change them as a first step we can see them as changed, and may or may not have to make an effort of reinterpretation in doing so. They in themselves (if such a term is meaningful) do not determine what we make of them.

26. My first such memory is from the age of six, when I was taught to mix water-colour pigments. Mauve was taught as a variant of purple containing less blue, and violet as containing more. It was many years before I encountered spectrum violet, which actually leans towards red because of the re-awakening of the sensitivity of the red receptors at the high frequency (short wavelength) end of blue light. In terms of pigments and flowers, it is very reasonable to think of violet as more strongly blue than purple is. What came to give my thought about this a conceptual tinge when I was ten or so was asking myself why three red-blue mixtures came to have (and to need) different names in common speech while different greens only had different names in specialist catalogues, while I was not aware of different names for different orange tints at all. My next problem arose as I walked to school in the City of London past Rolls Royce cars with
black mudguards so perfectly polished that I could see myself in them. If they were black, I thought, they should reflect no light, and if they reflected some light they should be termed grey – and yet even to my ten year old common sense they were indubitably black.

And as to Wittgenstein, I was able to check the decline of his scientific curiosity in 1978 as a reward for getting back the Smythies typescript and giving it to Trinity. For three years I had been conducting colour experiments myself, but there was an important diagram in the textbooks, called the chromaticity curve, that I could make neither head nor tail of. In my correspondence with Trinity I asked, in addition to photocopies for myself and Malcolm, for help (I assumed from a post-graduate student) with this diagram. Instead, Trinity gave me an hour’s tutorial with Professor William Rushton, a year before he died. He not only explained the meaning of the diagram by telling me how it was constructed experimentally, which would have been grist to Wittgenstein’s mill, but many other details of colour science as well. At dinner afterwards I could not resist asking him whether Wittgenstein, with whom his fellowship at Trinity had overlapped, had ever asked him for any advice about colour science. The reply was a quite definite no.
The best preliminary for understanding *Philosophische Bemerkungen* is to read two sections of the Big Typescript (TS 213), on pages 437–528, headed *Phänomenologie* and *Idealismus, etc.* These are Wittgenstein’s own retrospectives of the ‘wrong turning’ that became an object lesson that he never forgot, perhaps not with the obsessive criticism that he devoted to the *Tractatus*, but still with a kind of obsessive nostalgia for its temptations.

For in the October of 1929 he changed his views radically. He had been searching for what he called a phenomenological or primary language, or what we might call a sense-data language, which would embody no assumptions about the structure of the world. From the beginning he acknowledged that the language of physics might be more practical because of its greater simplicity, but he nevertheless pursued his search, and with extraordinary pertinacity. Eventually he gave it up. He realised that there were still phenomenological problems, embodied, for example, in the fact that we use the same forms of words in saying that a table has a shadow on it as to say that it has some object on it. (This idea was still alive for him in *Remarks on Colour*, part I, page 9: “There is no such thing as phenomenology but there are phenomenological problems.”) Nevertheless, the search for a special language of phenomenology was misguided, and so was his assumption that if one found such a language it would represent any kind of philosophical desideratum.

In the Big Typescript passages recommended above, ideas about phenomenology are expressed from the point of view of someone who has tried to set up a sense-data language and abandoned it. Some use is made of remarks that were first written when the attempt was still fresh, but many are modified and some considerably expanded to make Wittgenstein’s new viewpoint clear. In contrast, in *Philosophische Bemerkungen* early remarks come raw.

This title, incidentally, was Wittgenstein’s own, and was shared with the typescript from which its paragraphs were cut – naturally, since one was a rearranged
‘carbon’ copy of the other. It was in fact one of his favourite titles. The very first of his new series of notebooks, MS 105, was headed

I. Band
Philosophische Bemerkungen

and while completing Philosophical Investigations after the war he told Drury that he might call that Philosophical Remarks.

The opening of Philosophische Bemerkungen, the cut up and pasted fellowship submission, is a kind of declaration, first of his philosophical aims, then of what he no longer proposes to spend time on, and then of his final views, in the form of a survey, much of it taken from passages written in late February and early March 1930. (From the bottom of printed page 52 to the end of Section I, the text is almost entirely from this period, some of it single paragraphs which are sole entries for a single day, expressing in summary his views on a single topic.) By way of introduction to my study of the manuscripts, I shall give the opening printed page and a half, but with the paragraphing and spacing of the manuscript books from which their items come, and with their manuscript references, to show how Wittgenstein confuses us with passages from different stages in his thought. One might object that he was always doing this. Parts of Philosophical Investigations give the impression of being composed by a squirrel. Nevertheless, his thought from 1931 onwards did have a certain consistency of development, even though it was still very far from homogenous, whereas “confuses” is a fair comment on his attempt to put his 1929–1930 development between a single pair of covers (assuming that he expected anybody but his examiners to read it, since he left it with Moore to be kept until the latter’s death).

A sentence is logically completely analysed if its grammar is completely laid open to view. Whatever mode of expression it might be written or spoken in. [From Volume IV, page 88, written 23.3.30]

The phenomenological language or ‘primary’ language, as I called it, does not appear to me as an aim now; I do not consider it necessary [“possible” in the manuscript book] any more. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential in our language from what is inessential.
That is to say, if one as it were describes the class of languages which achieve their purpose, one has thereby shown their essence and thereby given a representation of immediate experience.

Each time I say that this and this representation could be replaced by these others, we come a step closer to the aim of grasping the essence of what is being represented.

A knowledge of what is essential to our language and what is inessential to it for representation, what parts of our language are free-running wheels, comes to the same thing as the construction of a phenomenological language. [These three paragraphs are from Volume III, pages 205 and 206, written on 24.11.29, and comprise the second disavowal of the ‘primary language’ quest.]

Physics is distinguished from phenomenology by its wanting to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes possibilities.

It would follow, therefore, that phenomenology was the grammar of the description of any fact on which physics builds its theories.

Explaining is more than describing. But every explanation contains a description. [Those three are from Volume I, right hand sides, page 5, written on 4.2.29.]

Colour space is for example roughly represented by the octahedron, with the pure colours at its corners, and this representation is a grammatical, not a psychological one. To say that in these and these circumstances – perhaps – a red after-image is visible is in contrast psychology (that may be the case or again it may not, while the former is a priori; the one can be established by experiment but not the other). [That paragraph is from Volume III, page 279, written in Cambridge on 2.2.30 after the opening 64 pages of Volume IV, i.e. after the 1929 Christmas vacation in Vienna.]

The octahedron depiction [of colours] gives a bird’s eye view of the rules of [colour] grammar. [From Volume IV, page 89, written in Cambridge after the final pages of Volume III, immediately following the page 88 paragraph above, and also on 23.3.30.]

What our grammar lacks above all is a bird’s eye view. [From Volume IV, page 31, written on 23.12.29 in Vienna, before returning to Volume III in Cambridge.]
What Mach calls a thought experiment is naturally not an experiment at all. Basically it is a grammatical reflection [Betrachtung]. [From Volume III, pages 284–5, written 5.2.30.]

Why is philosophy so complicated? It ought after all to be quite simple. — Philosophy undoes the knots in our thought which we have stupidly made in it; in order to do this it must make movements as complicated as the knots are. And so although the upshot of philosophy is simple, its methods of arriving at it cannot be. [From Volume II, page 257, undated but on a left hand page written after the right hand pages of Volumes I and II but before the left hand pages of Volume I.]

The first section of Philosophische Bemerkungen is complicated by moving from topic to topic as well as from stage to stage in Wittgenstein's thought. The former is entirely reasonable in a survey section, and he had done the same in his first Tractatus draft (the manuscript of Prototractatus), and naturally, with the survey complete, the remaining sections are arranged in single topics. The manuscript books are not arranged in topics, but while their opening pages move from mathematics to phenomenology they do so in a way that was natural to his thought at the time; and when, later, abrupt changes of topic appear, they turn out to be related changes. From the second of February 1929 Wittgenstein pursued a complex of ideas which continued through until October. From that November until the 24th of March 1930 it is not so much that the complex changed as that he saw it from a different viewpoint.

I need here to comment on my use of “phenomenology” to translate Wittgenstein’s “Phänomenologie”. There was a philosophy called Phänomenologie founded by Husserl, and this may make some people reluctant to use the straightforward English equivalent, but Wittgenstein gave the German word his own meaning, and he had just as much right to do so as Husserl had. He meant more than phenomenology, or idealism as he called it: he meant the entire grammatical apparatus of his analysis of it, and of idealism as a descriptive possibility rather than as a philosophy (though one does encounter in these early manuscript pages some startling observations that give a strong impression of pure idealism). As he sorted his ideas out his aim became the avoidance of hypotheses, though what exactly he meant by this also changed (see my quotation in Chapter 1 of “this is a chair” as an hypothesis in an early lecture). As he began his investigation he appears to have considered the view that our sense data constituted the structure of the universe to be an hypothesis, and he certainly thought of its alternative as one (“The description of phenomena by means of the hypothesis of the material world …” on right hand page
102 of Volume II); but the essence of his change of mind was to consider idealism, and its realist alternative, not to have been hypotheses at all, but alternative descriptions of exactly the same state of affairs. All this, of course, took a long time, and readers of my textual account may well come to think that the thumbnail sketch I have just given is an extreme over-simplification.

The opening pages on the right hand sides of the first manuscript book do not give me the impression that Wittgenstein was searching for ideas in them, but rather setting down ideas he had already thought, and on his left hand pages he actually says that it is all “fades Zeug” (stale stuff). Where the element of philosophical struggle actually enters, however, is something I leave to readers to find. (There is the possibility, which various commentators have toyed with, that in this period of stale stuff Wittgenstein was actually working from notes already written in Vienna in 1928.) Volume I, right hand pages 1–11:

2.2.29

Is a space conceivable that only contains rational but no irrational points?

And that only means: aren’t the irrational numbers already presupposed in the rational numbers? [Both queries reappear, with a critical comment, on 16.6.31 in the early pages of Volume VII, and, taken from those, on page 18 of TS 211.]

4.2.29

If I can map space into rational numbers I can also map it into irrational numbers. And if the one mapping is given then the other form of mapping is already given too. Now the question is: is there a favoured, perhaps especially immediate form of mapping? I believe not. Each form of mapping is equally justified.

How are we (after all) to imagine a decision as to which form of continuity visual space has?

There seems much to be said for the view that the representation [Abbildung, in mathematics mapping, otherwise representation] of visual space by means of physics is really the simplest. That is to say that physics provides the true phenomenology.

But against this there is an objection. Namely that physics strives for truth, that is to say correct predictions of results, whereas phenomenology does nothing of the kind, it strives for meaning, not truth.
But one can say: physics has a language, and in this language it propounds propositions. These propositions can be true or false. These propositions constitute physics and their grammar phenomenology (or whatever one wants to call it).

But matters seem more difficult in reality because of the use of mathematical terminology. If for example science doubted whether the observed phenomena were correctly described by quantum theory or particles, then at first sight it seems as if what is at issue is a decision in the field of grammar. There is a definite multiplicity of meaning and another multiplicity of laws.

Physics is distinguished from phenomenology by its wanting to establish laws. Phenomenology only establishes possibilities.

It would follow, therefore, that phenomenology was the grammar of the description of any fact on which physics builds its theories.

Explaining is more than describing. But every explanation contains a description.

[The three paragraphs above have been quoted already from the opening of the printed book.]

5.2.29

Can one, then, describe the field of vision, or any part of the field of vision, at all?

One can certainly say: if you look through this tube you will see three luminous equidistant points. That, after all, is the description of a visual image.

Somehow it seems to me as if each monochrome patch in the field of vision were simple and as if its being composed out of smaller parts were only apparent.

One might believe that visual space was composed of minima visibilia, perhaps of nothing but little squares which one sees as indivisible patches. But in that case the choice of these parts is obviously arbitrary. I could not for example say how the grid of squares ought to be laid over a particular picture, for if one moves the grid by less than its unit distance the minima visibilia are different but the picture appears exactly the same.

It seems as if one cannot see a monochrome patch as composite – unless one imagines it not to be monochrome. Imagining a dividing line makes
the patch multicoloured, or else the dividing line must have a different colour from the rest of the patch.

That would be to say: the simple components of the field of vision are monochrome patches.

But how, then, is it with continuous colour gradations?

How can one describe the shape of a patch in the field of vision?

Can one do coordinate geometry in the field of vision?

6.2.29

Can one say that the smaller patch is simpler than the larger one?

Let us suppose they are circles – what is the greater simplicity of the smaller circle to consist in?

One could say that the larger can consist of the smaller and a further part but not vice versa. But why shouldn’t I represent the smaller as the difference between the larger and the surround.

It therefore seems to me that the smaller patch is not simpler than the larger.

What is the general form of spatial statements? [This group of three paragraphs is printed on page 252.]

It seems to me a peculiar property of spatial statements that one apparently cannot describe space without some kind of reference to time. I say, for example: I am now seeing a red circle on a blue background. But I cannot say “a red circle is on a blue background”.

Naturally one can, but one does so with an implied temporal reference – and here, in 1980, I broke off so that four illegible lines could be an opportunity to make comments of my own, but having deciphered them in 1991 I can quote them to corroborate my point about temporal reference. They form a complete paragraph.

It is really ab initio likely that time cannot come into the consideration of visual space as an afterthought [inserted as an afterthought], as an appendix [Anhängsel].

In other words, it has to be there already as an implication.

Above, there are two references to phenomenology as the grammar of physics, on page 3 and on page 5, from which the second also went into the fellowship submission. Since that one is actually printed on the text’s opening page, close to a disavowal of the phenomenological language quest, it strongly suggests that, as a
study of the language of sense data, phenomenology was over and done with before Wittgenstein began his new attempt to write philosophy, but it certainly wasn’t done with in these February pages. In any case, how can sense data offer us a grammar of physics? But while the first of these passages refers to the grammar of the propositions of physics, the printed one is about the facts “on which physics builds its theories”. One has to remember that it was the widely held view of those times, and not just in Vienna, that these facts were ultimately of sense-data origin – reported by observers reading from dials, or recording events in cloud chambers, or whatever experimental apparatus happened to be in question. And to call phenomenology a grammar of description, no matter of what, is in perfect accord with the word’s Greek origins, since the concept of ‘saving the phenomena’ only dealt with observations, and had no concern with arguments (of which of course there were plenty) about what they were caused by.

Ahead, an important thread in Wittgenstein’s idea complex is about to appear, namely considerations to do with Frege’s doctrine of cardinal numbers and its connection with what constitutes an object. At a naïve level Frege’s doctrine is explainable thus: here are nine aeroplanes flying overhead – but are they nine aeroplanes, or three flights, or one squadron? (I am describing squadrons as I saw them in my boyhood.) The answer is that this depends on what concept one wants them to be, as it were, tallied against. Consider, however, this case: here is a man, here is another man, here is a knife, and here is a murder. Is the murder one of the objects in the room that can be counted? Explicit questions about Frege do not arise for some time, but questions about objects are leading to questions about a murder (page 11–13).

It is certainly very strange that one is tempted again and again to address a complex in the field of vision, a patch, as if it were an object. [Not printed.]

In a certain sense an object is not capable of being described.

That is to say its description may not attribute to it any property whose lack would destroy the existence of the object itself. That is to say, the description is not allowed to assert anything that would be essential to the existence of the object. [This paragraph and the one above printed on page 119.]

Here I need to defend my translation, because in the second printed paragraph there is a difference between the manuscript and the typescript (TS 208), the latter (via its pasted cut-out, TS 209) being responsible for the reading found in print.
The difference is simply between “nichts” in the manuscript, in the second sentence of that paragraph, and “nicht” in the typescript. This gives a difference between “not allowed to assert anything that would be essential” (as I have it above) and “not allowed to say what would be essential” (the meaning followed in print). Now on page 31 of Volume VII (MS 111), written on the sixteenth of July 1931, the nicht-or-nichts paragraph is replaced by an entirely reasonable account of the laconic paragraph above it, which now, in double inverted commas, begins the paragraph. This new explanation and the laconic paragraph are both copied on page 20 of TS 211, with the laconic paragraph again in double inverted commas. This typescript was begun soon after the opening pages of Volume VII were written, and there is a reference to Wittgenstein bringing it to Schlick’s place in Vienna, in *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, page 166. By “object” he now means “Bedeutung [reference, not meaning] of a word that cannot be further defined”, and description means explanation in the strict sense of definition. Naturally, he goes on, he is not denying that whatever object is in question ‘can be described externally’, that is, have properties ascribed to it over and above its definition.

Knowing this in 1980 would have saved me a lot of anxiety, for, with a literal interpretation of “lässt sich nicht” and with the manuscript “nichts” in mind, I assumed almost the opposite, that what was forbidden was the ascription to any object, as definable or otherwise as you like, of characteristics which “would be essential to the existence of the object”. Somewhat romantically I remembered misty evenings when I could have said “Is that my cow scrambling down the bank? I thought it was a swirl of mist drifting down”. It is essential to cows that they can scramble and to swirls of mist that they can only drift, and only in a world of radical phenomenalism would one not be allowed to say so. If I am wrong in thinking that this manuscript reading is evidence for that having been the original idea, there is at least one unambiguously phenomenalist passage waiting for us ahead. And indeed, I do not think I needed to be so apologetic about my suspicions, for it is clear that the reasonable account given in Volume VII represented a change of mind.

On page 13 of Volume I the manuscript continues:

“The murder occupies the court” is clearly a sentence in which in appearance an event is designated by a name. That is perhaps not a case of Russelian “Descriptions” but one in which apparently a complex object is in question which however on correct analysis is represented by a proposition (the description of the complex). If the murder never happened, the sentence still remains meaningful.
There is a certain analogy with Russellian descriptions, of course. Except that here the complex is, so to speak, described from within itself with the help of a proposition [presumably the one posited at the foot of page 13].

Perhaps it would first be useful to think about the representation of *any arbitrary* space before moving on to visual space.

The question is then something like: how must one interpret an axiom system correctly in order for it to become the representation of a variable?

In 1980, out of my depth with what I took to be a change of subject in those two short paragraphs, I avoided quoting them, and I should like to do the same with some very puzzling changes of subject that follow. In particular, the question arises of a logic of equations or identities, by which Wittgenstein appears to have predicate calculus in mind, as distinct from a logic of tautologies, by which he certainly meant propositional calculus, giving the impression that this is a choice between near equals, except that predicate calculus has a little more to be said for it. It has always worried me that, in the *Tractatus* and well into the thirties in his notebooks, he gave to propositional calculus a status that quite overlooks its restricted nature; for on its own it is incapable of analysing the propositions that form its elements. Predicate calculus (which he did use when he needed to, as we see below) is not an ‘alternative which is possibly an improvement on’ propositional calculus but a necessary extension of it if any adequate logic is to be achieved.

The typescript (TS 208) jumps from “Ein Gegenstand darf sich in gewissem Sinne nicht beschreiben lassen” and its elaboration to a discussion with Ramsey about extensional versus intensional infinity, which I omit in spite of its interest, while, left out between these, the manuscript book has a passage of extreme interest which I must give in full (page 19–21).

Against my will, I am apparently being forced back to arithmetic.

A number is a kind of representation. If I say: four books are on the table, I could express the same without the help of the number four, perhaps with the help of another number. The number four comes into my representation by virtue of the fact that I express it in the form of a sentence about a, b, c, d.

A sentence treats of four things if it treats of a, b, c, d.

What is characteristic is that what is counted is symbolised by means of nouns.
Can that be achieved by introducing nouns as symbols for complexes?

Roughly: if I say that a couple is going for a stroll, I am saying something about each of its two members and also that they have a certain relationship to each other.

Perhaps $\varnothing (a) \cdot \varnothing (b) \cdot \psi (a,b) = \varnothing [ \psi (a,b) ] = \varnothing (C)$
complex

Here $C$ would be a noun.

This is the ‘correct analysis’ referred to on manuscript page 13, and small $\phi$ = strolls, small $\psi$ = love each other, while capital $\phi$ first expresses strolling and takes a proposition as argument but then, still expressing strolling, takes a noun as argument. Wittgenstein originally wrote a capital $\psi$ in front of his square bracket, and then wrote over it the first capital $\phi$, or he may have tried to do what I would have done, invent a composite Greek letter to combine meanings. All he has achieved here is to abbreviate a proposition into a noun, but from this context and an echo of it in *Investigations* it is clear that he was aiming at a contextual definition, as attempted by Frege in his *Grundlagen* (§ 62), not an abbreviational definition at all. Small $\phi$ took a name as argument, small $\psi$ a pair of names, capital $\psi/\phi$ would have taken a proposition, and capital $\phi$ the resulting noun, but this elaboration of symbols would simply have shown that the whole thing could never have worked.

The echo in *Investigations*, § 111, is only a vestigial one, breaking off with “Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.)”, but § 98 of pre-war TS 220 and § 117 of mid-war TS 239 have “What for example does the depth of the joke ‘We called him a tortoise because he taught us’ consist in? We suddenly become aware that such a derivation of a noun is impossible.”* (One copy of the post-war typescript, TS 227b, had a further relevant joke from Lichtenberg, crossed out by Wittgenstein, much to my regret, having read it in another copy, when it failed to appear in print, as I explain ahead in Chapter 8.) Deriving a noun was just what Wittgenstein had tried to do in February 1929 – namely the noun “Liebespaar”. His very first use of “Tiefe” comes in March 1931, on pages 176–7 of Volume VI (MS 110), after a reference to Lewis Carroll’s jokes:

* See Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*, Chapter ix, “The Mock Turtle’s Story” (editor’s note).
I could ask: Why do I feel a grammatical joke as in a certain sense deep? (And that is naturally philosophical depth.)

but this gives no hint of the impossibility of formally deriving a noun from the context of a sentence. He is merely burying a nut until he can dig it up to better effect.

Page 21 of right hand Volume I continues after a line space:

If I represent a fact by means of a proposition of the form o(A,B), then we can say that the representation includes a duality, and so on.

How does this theory relate to Frege’s and Russell’s? The first difference is that in Frege’s theory a one–one relation is constructed. That is forbidden and presupposes a false interpretation of identity. Secondly one class with a certain number of members is constructed and that is forbidden for the same reason. This basic class would in my theory be the class of nouns in a certain context (namely, viewed extensively).

On the other hand it seems as if one could formulate my theory in such a way that, as Frege puts it, a number assertion is an assertion about a concept.

A number assertion’s being an assertion about a concept is explained ahead, on [typescript] page 64 of the next chapter, elaborating my point about aeroplanes and squadrons. The Frege theory mentioned on page 21 will be his general theory of number based on the concept of one–one correlation and on a concept’s extension (Begriffsumfang), but for the thoughts that could have been at the back of Wittgenstein’s mind here one needs to refer to Grundgesetze, Part I, §§ 9 and 10, a special theory of identity that was eventually responsible for the Russell contradiction. Certainly it will have nothing to do with the Grundlagen discussion of contextual definitions (§§ 62–68), which is appropriate for the “Liebespaar” problem. The Grundgesetze theory is foreshadowed in Funktion und Begriff, pages 8–12, discussing the transformation of a generality into an identity. Frege there, one might at first suppose, is thinking in terms of what we should now call a set of ordered pairs \((x,y)\) corresponding to a function expressed as \(y = f(x)\), but a clue that he has something more far-reaching in mind is that on page 9 he declares that the switch he wants, from a statement of the general identity of \(y\) values for given \(x\) values to a particular identity between what he calls Werthverläufe, cannot be proved but has to be accepted as a fundamental law of logic. The seriousness of this requirement becomes clear where it is expressed in Grundgesetze § 9 as the conversion of an identity’s generality into an identity of courses–of–values (Montgomery Furth’s
translation of Werthverlaufsgleichheit). Because he is not dealing merely with function-expressions in mathematics but with absolutely any formula that will express a definite proposition once its variable is given a definite value, its Werthverlauf, if the existence of that is guaranteed by the ‘fundamental law’ (V, expressed in symbols at the end of § 20), will be liable to generate contradictions (see Potter’s concept of a property that is ‘collectivising’, page 25 in Chapter 2 of his Set Theory and its Philosophy, OUP 2004; and see Frege’s hint of doubt about V on page vii of his Introduction, pages 3–4 in Furth).

Wittgenstein’s discussion with Ramsey, already mentioned for its appearance in TS 208, follows next. After it comes a short but important passage, much of it in print but in two significantly different sections (IX and XX) and with significant omissions. Before explaining how Sections IX and XX differ, I will give the opening of this manuscript passage, beginning immediately after Ramsey and infinity (page 27).

If two objects have all their properties in common how can they have different names? For their having names is also a property in this sense.

Now I can after all be uncertain about the properties of objects. I can therefore doubt whether two objects have all their properties in common or not. How is it to go on? I should perhaps start by giving them different names …?

No, for once I give them different names they have eo ipso different properties. But that would mean that I cannot say at all of two objects that they have nothing but the same properties, for this proposition would contradict itself.

And yet that can’t be right.

At least it would follow that object ‘a’ was also called “b” and object ‘b’ also “a”. [Neither paragraph printed.]

Assuming that my field of vision consisted of two equal-sized red circles on a blue background: what is it that is present here twice and what once? And what does this question mean at all? [Printed on page 122 in Section IX]

One could say we have here one colour, one shape but two positions. But can one speak here of positions without thinking of them as occupied, in other words as mere possibilities?

An apparent escape would naturally be to say that red and circular are (external) properties of two objects which one could call patches and these
patches stand moreover in certain spatial relationships to one another; but that is nonsense. [This subparagraph is printed on page 253 in Section XX.]

What is this nonsense, and why is that subparagraph put in a different section? A change of colour at the boundary of a circle is, like a shadow, insubstantial; whereas a patch of paint can certainly be regarded as an object with the properties red and circular, and two patches of paint can be regarded as two such objects. The context of page 253 makes it clear that the former (insubstantial) interpretation is intended there. My term for the topic of Section XX is field of vision analysis. This might seem to be equally true of the single Section IX paragraph quoted above, but that section also includes the ‘object’ paragraphs quoted from manuscript page 13, which come (as one paragraph) in Section IX on page 119. The clue is that Section IX is an attempt to show the varied uses of object language in contexts which are more or less related to field of vision problems. Perhaps one could talk of pure (Section XX) and applied (Section IX) field of vision analysis. As if to emphasise the purity of XX, the subparagraph (‘apparent escape’) printed on page 253 as a paragraph is preceded by two subparagraphs (also printed as paragraphs) written later, and in these there is not even a change of colour. (I need to interpose here a point that also applies to Philosophische Grammatik Part I. These section numberings are Rhees’s, not Wittgenstein’s, but in neither text do I regard them as reprehensible tinkerings. They are a useful aid to the reader.) Page 67 of right hand Volume II:

Whether there is any meaning in saying “this part of a red surface (which is not bounded by a visible boundary) is red” depends – it seems to me – on whether there is an absolute place. For if there can be any talk of an absolute place in visual space, then I can ascribe a colour to this absolute place even if its surrounding is of the same colour.

I see, perhaps, a uniformly yellow field of vision and say “The middle of my field of vision is yellow”. But can I describe a shape in this way? Apparently not. [Printed on page 253 without “it seems” and without “apparently” and with “Gestalt” for “Form”, i.e. for “shape”.

Returning to Volume I’s page 29, after “Unsinn” and a line space the manuscript continues as the printed page now does.

It is clearly possible to establish the identity of a place in the field of vision, for otherwise one couldn’t distinguish whether a patch always stays in the same place or varies its place.
If we think of a patch that disappears and returns again we can certainly say whether it reappears in the same place or in another. [Printed at the bottom of page 253 and the top of page 254.]

(Physiologically one could explain this by the individual points of the retina having local characteristics.) [Not printed and not true.]

One therefore really can talk of particular places in the field of vision, and indeed with the same justice as one speaks of different places on the retina.

Would such a space be comparable with a surface each of whose points have a different curvature, so that each point is distinguishable?

This fascinating idea comes from Nicod, whose *Foundations of Geometry and Induction* was not published in English until 1930, so that Wittgenstein must either have read it in French or heard from Ramsey about its beings who could tell where they were by each cell of space having a different ‘feel’. A few right hand pages ahead (page 39) there is a spot which can tell which end of an egg it is on, and Nicod is mentioned on page 43. The retina has only loosely ascertainable connections with visual space, for the eyeball frequently moves without our field of vision moving. It was misguided of Wittgenstein to mention the retina at all, since he was dealing with field of vision analysis, not physiology. The message of Section XX is that the field of vision exists in its own right and has no need of explanation or analogy.

Some of these Section XX passages come from slightly later in Volume I, namely from pages 53 and 64 (where an unused and unnumbered left hand page has given right hand pages even numbers), but from the current context a paragraph in print deserves to be quoted because it is such a remarkable affirmation of the autonomy of the field of vision. Page 35:

We can also say that it is as if we saw in our field of vision, along with everything else, a directed coordinate system, against which we could fix all directions. – But even this is no proper way of representing the matter, for if we really saw such a coordinate cross (say with arrows) then we should actually be able not only to take a fix on the relative directions of objects against this cross but also to fix the position of the cross itself in [visual] space, as it were against an unseen coordinate system contained in the nature of this space. [Printed on page 255.]
This in its turn is no proper way of representing the matter either, because the nature of visual space seems to be that we manage without an unseen coordinate system just as well as we manage without a visible one, but this insight into our field of vision’s autonomy is just Wittgenstein’s argument taken one further step. My final Section XX quotation contains one of its few references to objects, pointing out that they are precisely not in question. It is from Volume IV (MS 108) and was written in Vienna during the Christmas vacation of 1929. Page 39 of IV:

What is the meaning of saying: Our field of vision is less distinct at the edges than in the middle? That is, when we are not talking about the fact that we see physical objects more distinctly in the middle of our field of vision. [Printed without italics on page 267, where it is followed by a remark about Mach that extends in the manuscript book onto page 40.]

Readers of the manuscripts need to be warned that in the middle of right hand page 37 of Volume I a paragraph from left hand page 36 has to be included, and in the same way a paragraph from left hand page 44 has to be included in right hand page 45.

As to Section IX, its notebook sources are a clue to its different viewpoint. They mainly come in Volume III (MS 107), from just after Wittgenstein dropped his search for a primary language, as well as from the very end of Volume III, written in Cambridge in January and February of 1930 and continued in February in Volume IV on pages 64–71. We shall meet these passages chronologically, and meanwhile I should like to recommend a passage on page 437 of the Big Typescript, TS 213, where object-field-of-vision problems are recollected in tranquility, and manuscript scholars can find them in Volume VIII (MS 112) on pages 242–3, written in November 1931.

Back in the manuscript pages of Volume I, we find that mathematics has returned, at first in the form of Euclidean geometry, with the admission on page 49 that we are now in the realm of rigid rulers (which in visual space we were not), while what is mathematical about what we say about rulers, or about anything else in geometry, is a matter of the grammar of inferences from one proposition to another (pages 51 and 53). On pages 55 and 57 we move to numerical systems, and Wittgenstein asks a question that comes in print on page 134 and again in a Rhees footnote on page 184. This leads in the manuscript book to an important problem that Wittgenstein discussed frequently in his notebooks of the thirties, and sometimes gave the code-name “der suchende Mathematiker”. Because he was convinced that mathematical meaning only came from proof, the meaning of something that had not been proved (whether by the particular mathematician
postulating it, or by any mathematician at all) was a problem for him. He even, in this period, believed that different proofs of what was on paper the same proposition proved essentially different propositions. Only in June 1941, on pages 61v – 65v of MS 123 and in the same month on pages 46–48 of MS 124, is there a significant softening of this dogmatism. With this explanation, I hope the following manuscript quotation will be seen to have a serious point that its apparently trivial arithmetical illustration seems to belie. Pages 57–62 of I:

What kind of proposition is “between 5 and 8 there is a prime number”? I would say “that remains to be seen [das zeigt sich]”. And that is right, but can’t one direct attention to this internal fact? Of course one could say: “Investigate the interval from 10 to 20 for prime numbers! How many are there?” Wouldn’t that be a clear task? And what would its solution be? That is, how should its solution be properly expressed or depicted? What does the proposition “There are four prime numbers between 10 and 20” mean?

This proposition appears to direct our attention to a certain aspect of the situation. [Printed down to here on page 134 as a single paragraph.]

Thus I can, for example, write down the number 5 so that one sees clearly that it is only divisible by itself and 1: perhaps like this: [Diagram to that effect reproduced incompletely by Rhees in his footnote on page 184.]

This aspect could say, perhaps, “5 is a prime number”; or “Look, 5 is a prime number.”

That would perhaps come to the same as I have already said before [Tractatus 6.1261, “In logic process and result are equivalent.” See MS 119 (1937), page 13: “Ich schrieb einmal ‘In der Mathematik sind Prozess und Resultat äquivalent’.”], namely that the real mathematical proposition is a proof of what is called a mathematical proposition. The real mathematical proposition is the proof: that is to say, the thing that shows how things are. [End of Rhees’s footnote.]

A proof is with justice also called a demonstration.

If I ask someone “how many primes are there between 10 and 20?” he will say “I don’t know at the moment, but I can find out anytime”. For it is as if it were already written down somewhere, and he only needs to look it up. [Also printed on page 134, but only down to here. Of course it is only as if already written down; what Wittgenstein has in mind is not looking up in
a list of primes but carrying out the ‘sieve’ procedure.] And if he now expresses what he saw there in the words “there are four primes etc.”, mustn’t the words then express precisely what he saw? [Again, I insist, not what he saw in a list but in his own ‘sieve’ diagram or calculation.]

One could also put it like this: the completely analysed mathematical proposition is its own proof.

Or like this: a mathematical proposition is only the immediately visible surface of the whole body of proof [des ganzen Beweiskörpers] of which it is the front boundary.

The so-called mathematical proposition is – in contrast to a genuine proposition – essentially the last member of a demonstration which makes it perceptibly correct or incorrect. [This three-member paragraph printed on page 192.]

But how in that case does it come about that by all appearance one can set up a mathematical proposition and ask “Now is that right or wrong?” In this case what one is demanding is precisely an analysis of the proposition in question. [In other words a proof – for Wittgenstein, as he has just said, a proof was an analysis.]

There do also appear to be propositions of mathematics of which one can say one doesn’t know whether they can be proved to be true or false or not. Such propositions deal with “all numbers” and what is typical of them is that numbers are considered in them as a collection and not as a result of given operations. It then appears as if the numbers could also have – as it were accidentally – properties which are not in their essence – that is to say not in their law of formation and which one cannot therefore also predict. [Exactly the same problem comes about for space.] [[Wittgenstein’s square brackets.] If for example I compare the decimals of $\pi$ with the series of natural numbers and ask whether they will ever again coincide after the first: what is that supposed to mean if one considers these series in extenso? Considered intensionally it can mean: “is it in the essence of the two rules that etc.?”

How does the fact that space is not a collection of points but the realisation of a law make itself plain? [And with that the subject turns to visual space, with a long series of attempts to give the phenomenological language a meaning, in one case by means of a diagram, on page 70.]
Two problems are hidden in the above passage. The divisibility test for primes was presented as an intuitive, picture test, and on Wittgenstein’s principles the question must arise whether it gave the assertion that 5 is prime a different meaning from writing down the multiples of 2 and then the multiples of 3 and finding that 5 has been omitted. Variants of this problem occur again and again in the notebooks of the thirties. Once one accepts the principles that provoked it there is no tidy solution. As a serious example, consider a mathematician who has investigated real numbers from an intuitive viewpoint and then examines a formal treatment. If he is asked to justify his working assumption that the two treatments answer to the same numbers, he must reply that from the nature of his comparison he can give only an informal justification. (This problem was also of lively concern to Imre Lakatos, who discussed it in his Doctorate Thesis. His treatment is in print as Chapter 2 of Proofs and Refutations. See in particular a remark on page 108: “How can you have a certainly true translation of a vague term into precise ones?” I once put this very point to him in a conversation and he was kind enough to say yes, I had got something there, but he did not mention that he had already dealt with it in his thesis.)

The other implied problem is the one whose code-name was “der suchende Mathematiker”. If a mathematical proposition can only be a proved result bound together with its proof (forming a Beweiskörper) what meaning has a would-be proposition waiting for a proof? What meaning, for example, did the early Greek quest for a trisection of an angle using only compasses and an unmarked ruler have? “One could say: because it is impossible one could never search for it.” (Left hand page 28 of Volume I.) The impossibility was only proved (algebraically) in the nineteenth century (see Felix Klein, Famous Problems of Elementary Geometry), although Archimedes must have been quite sure that no ‘pure’ construction was possible when he invented one using a ruler that was marked during the construction and then moved around in an improper manner called neusis. Another impossible classical construction, which some Greek must certainly have looked for, was of a regular heptagon. This comes in the 1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. In the Blue Book, on page 29, the discovery of the construction of the pentagon is contrasted with the discovery of the South Pole, but there is a much more pertinent contrast between the search for the construction of the heptagon and the search for the South Pole. The whole problem has importance over and beyond Wittgenstein’s dogmatic assumptions: it is the meaning of mathematical search.

The concept of a ‘Beweiskörper’ also has significance outside these assumptions. I owe this point (like most of my understanding of mathematics) to Imre Lakatos, who made a remark to me uncannily related to the concept in Cambridge
in 1957, soon after his escape from Hungary. Taking a formal proof (far from the
only kind recognised by either of them) consisting of a string of propositions
formed according to formation rules and following by transformation rules directly
from axioms or indirectly via previous members of the string, then, if one were to
write all this down on a strip of paper and arbitrarily cut that in two between prop-
ositions, the first half would also be a proof in the sense of strict formality, and its
last proposition would be a theorem. But what would the interest of this propor-
tion be in comparison with the final theorem that some mathematician had gone
to so much trouble to make his string of propositions lead to? The concept of a
‘Beweiskörper’ has no more to tell us than the concept of a formal proof as to what
the interest of its terminating face is. In MS 156a (undated but between 1932 and
1934) Wittgenstein asks “Was macht ein Kapitel der Mathematik interessant?”, but
he does not stay to give us an answer.

Why Wittgenstein gave the problem of mathematical search so radical a char-
acter can partly be answered by going back to the Tractatus period. In letter R 12
he wrote to Russell

I can now express my objection to your theory of judgement exactly: I
believe it is obvious that, from the proposition “A judges that (say) a is in
the relation R to b”, if correctly analysed, the proposition “a R b v ~ a
R b” must follow directly without the use of any other premise. This condition
is not fulfilled by your theory.

And later, in the *Tractatus* itself (5.5422),

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition “A judges that p”
must show that it is impossible to judge a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s the-
ory does not satisfy this condition.)

Wittgenstein’s meaning here is that what is judged must have content, for if some-
one misguided ‘went through the motions’ of judging a piece of nonsense to be
the case, he could not, in Wittgenstein’s language, be said to be judging. He would
have uttered a sentence expressing a would-be proposition without content, and
thus without truth-value. I use the term “empty sound”, inspired by Roscelin’s
“flatus vocis”, which meant the reference (non-existent in his view, of course) of
an abstract noun, a universal. Just as “empty sound” has no truth-value, neither has
“(empty sound) v ~(empty sound)”. But if a would-be mathematical proposition has no content outside its
proof, then it cannot express more than “empty sound”, and the whole of striving
mathematics is without meaning. Wittgenstein explicitly embraces this radical
stand on page 468 of *Philosophical Grammar*, i.e. from its Part II, where it is part of an essay on Set Theory in the Big Typescript (in manuscript on page 280 of MS 108, 1.8.[1930]): “In mathematics *everything* is algorithm and *nothing* is meaning”. Perhaps facing the issue of non-algorithmic mathematics, from which he does take examples but whose existence he scarcely admits, would have helped him. In this immediate context, however, I must defend him by pointing out that informal and intuitive mathematics is not necessarily non-algorithmic, and his ‘prime sieve’ diagram is a case in point. You draw this match-stick sketch and apply these rules to it and you automatically get your answer, so it counts as an algorithm.

The return to visual space on page 62 of this first notebook’s right hand sides leads, as I have said, to a diagram example of the primary language, and then to problems of colour that eventually lead to a breakdown of the concept of atomic propositions. On page 84 a short horizontal line marks an aside on time, and on page 88 there is a return to colour, but before these there is a hint of the breakdown, a propos of the difficulty (on pages 70 and 72) of showing that two colours cannot occupy the same place. Page 72, bottom, and page 74, top:

Saying that a particular colour occupies a place means describing this place completely.

If I say that there are four apples on this table, I intend that remark to exclude there being five apples on it. In that case, in symbol-language I say “4 apples and no more”. Can I do something analogous if I want to express there being only one colour in one place?

For it might be perfectly reasonable in other circumstances not to wish to exclude there being five apples, and so with colour. If we wish to we can state or imply that a colour is described completely, but we are also free to use such phrases as “this patch has a touch of red”. Now “this patch has a touch of red” and “the same patch has a touch of blue” are very easily compatible, whereas the same statements of red and green need ingenuity to reconcile, and this fact would have given him a more productively daunting task. For he continues on pages 76 and 78, taking up something like my own suggestion but concentrating on an addendum which on my terms would run “and those are all the colour-touches this patch contains”. Whereupon (and still near the top of page 78) this addendum provokes a problem that no one but the author of the *Tractatus* could have anticipated.

But how is this addendum to be made?!!
If in the form of a *proposition*, then the incomplete description of the colour must also have already been a proposition!

And if not in the form of a proposition in its own right, but only by means of some kind of indication in the first proposition, how can I then bring it about that a second proposition of the first kind contradicts the first one?

After all, two atomic propositions cannot contradict one another!

There is the unexpressed assumption here that if the addendum is not a proposition, then at least the description it is supplementing must be, and there is the unexpressed wish to test whether simple individual colour statements are atomic. It is easy to make propositions contradict each other by adding strong enough conditions – but the whole problem here is to find whether differing colour statements applied to the same ‘here now’ patch can mutually contradict on their own.

It is not until the right hand pages of Volume II, a manuscript book with twice as many pages as Volume I, that colour is again discussed in terms of atomic propositions (see its pages 71–77), and here an easily overlooked sub-paragraph at the foot of page 73 ought to have settled the matter. Ever since I read it in 1976 this sub-paragraph, with a paragraph that follows it at the top of page 75, has represented for me the doom of the concept of atomic propositions, but Wittgenstein spoils their effect by pasting them into his fellowship submission separated by a paragraph that expressly denies that colours have any relationship but an atomic one. This can be found in print at the foot of page 105. The sub-paragraph and paragraph separated by it are (MS 106, page 73 and 75):

And yet I can say, if I see two blues which are red in different degrees: there exists a still more reddish blue than the redder of these two. That is to say, I can construct something not given out of what is given.

That makes it seem as if a construction is possible inside an atomic proposition. That is to say, as if there existed a logical construction that worked without the help of truth functions.

If we see two slightly different reddish blues we can argue that beyond the redder of them there is a still more reddish blue; but what if that happened to be the last colour that we *in fact* called a reddish blue and beyond it we said we only saw varieties of bluish red? We are certainly not aware of a boundary dividing bluish reds from reddish blues; and even if an experimenter establishes that whenever our input is ever so slightly more red we always declare that what we see is a bluish red, we are still entitled to maintain that it is *meaningful* to suppose that there is a more
reddish blue than the one we have seen: for even if it is the last colour we in fact declared to be a reddish blue, what we could never have done was to declare it to be the last reddish blue.

Wittgenstein’s next paragraph, however, omitted in print, is

That is just what I wanted to say with my [colour] relations that are expressed by numbers.

(in the coordinate geometry of visual space expressed in the diagram on page 70 of right hand Volume I and its preceding paragraphs). This is an avoidance of my essentially non-numerical argument, and also of the escape I offered independently of that, for at the top of page 77 of right hand Volume II, in print as a sub-paragraph, is

That goes with the idea of a complete description:
The patch is green describes the patch completely and there is no room left for another colour.

Atomic propositions were not abandoned until the first of January 1930, with

The concept of the “atomic proposition” now loses its meaning altogether.

This is on page 52 of Volume IV, and it is not clear to me exactly what thoughts in the previous days had led to it. On page 30, on the 22nd of December, there is a reference to “the uncertainty as to the analysis of atomic propositions”, and, on page 35, on Christmas Eve, he had written

The new interpretation of atomic propositions brings with it that a proposition can be more or less close to the truth. (Since red is nearer to orange than to blue and 2m is nearer to 201cm than to 3m.),

which seems to me to be trying to put numerical sugar round the non-numerical pill. In any case, Wittgenstein was still clinging to some vestige of atomic propositions, because on the second of January, at Schlick’s and taken down by Waismann in shorthand, he elaborated by saying that his old concept had had two components, mutual independence, which he was now giving up, and the idea that our analysis of propositions must eventually bring us to propositions that are immediate combinations of objects without the assistance of ‘logical constants’, i.e. truth functional connectives, whose function is to join propositions, not objects. Waismann’s shorthand is defective here (see page 74 of Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis). The explanations that follow take us right back to right hand Volume I and right hand Volume II, including a diagram resembling the one on page 70 of right hand I and another on page 53 of right hand II.
To return to those manuscript books (and left hand II and left hand I following them) I will mention only a few details to help readers find their way. One that I cannot forbear is one of Rhees’s careless reproductions of diagrams. This is printed on page 156, incomplete, inaccurate and upside down. The original, on page 92 of right hand I, can be seen properly printed on page 25 of Volume 1 of the *Wiener Ausgabe*. On page 39 of right hand II a most important section begins, where Wittgenstein begins to plan the paper he was proposing to read to the coming joint session of *Mind* and the Aristotelian Society. The print of this, not actually read at the joint session, in Nottingham in the summer of 1929, but handed out for members to read, was the only thing available to us in print between the *Tractatus* and *Investigations*, and I spent many frustrated hours as an undergraduate trying to guess from it what ideas had formed Wittgenstein’s bridge towards his later ideas. The full plan for the paper begins on page 77 of right hand II, immediately after the “Idee der vollständigen Beschreibung”, and its importance for us is that its truth function diagrams are only given in abbreviated code in the 1929 *Proceedings* of the joint session.

Before this, on page 43, is a paragraph and diagram that intrigue me personally because they echo an idea in one of my favourite books when I was learning mathematics, Clifford’s *Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*. Wittgenstein points out, as Clifford does, that one can in fact see lines and points in the strict geometrical sense if one looks at colour boundaries and colour corners. This diagram is well reproduced on page 49 of the *Wiener Ausgabe*’s first volume.

The notes for what Wittgenstein actually said at Nottingham, on real versus theoretical infinity, could begin on page 230 of right hand II with a suggestion that he could countenance a “progressive” proof that there is no greatest prime – I assume something like a constructive proof proposed by Hilbert for the irrationality of the square root of 2. These notes continue not only into but right through left hand II, and, including other mathematical ideas prompted by them, with very occasional personal asides, well into left hand I. On page 244 of right hand II, beautifully encapsulating Wittgenstein’s views, there is a joke about a man who has lived for eternity while calculating the decimal places of $\pi$ backwards, until he reaches the 3 and then stops. Rhees has sadly printed this on page 166 as 2, in spite of Wittgenstein’s carefully putting in the decimal point (but unfortunately only in his manuscript). “That seems to be complete nonsense and a reductio ad absurdum of the concept of an infinite totality.”

Right hand II ends on page 296 – its page 298 has to wait unused to become in effect the last page of left hand II, which begins on its page 6, after personal
remarks left in the air like those written in February 1929. On page 30 there is the charming remark, a propos of infinity, “Die Mathematiker are constantly going out of their depth”. These left hand pages start taking odd numbers with page 113. On page 171 there is an intriguing paragraph that reads like an aside from infinity and yet grows out of its problems.

The things themselves are perhaps the four [visually] primary colours, space, time, and other such given [i.e. immediate] things.

I leave to readers the pleasure of finding how this minimalist ontology relates to infinity and also to atomic objects, to say nothing of phenomenalism. On page 197 a long paragraph begins, both expressing common sense and bringing space into the question, of which I quote just the first sentence.

We all, naturally, know what it means to say that there is an infinite possibility and a finite reality, for we say that time and physical space are infinite but we can only ever see or experience finite portions of them.

On page 201 there is a paragraph which has affinity with a remark of Einstein’s in his Relativity, The Special and the General Theory, in a note to the 15th edition, dated June 9th 1952, that physical objects are not “in space” but “spatially extended”.

Space has no extension, only physical objects are extended, but infinity is [my italics to express the distinction between “sondern” and “aber”] a property of space.

(That already shows that it [infinity] is not an infinite extension.)

And the same goes for time, etc.

Immediately below that, on the same page, Wittgenstein turns to infinite divisibility, and on page 213 summarises his ideas thus:

We see a continuous colour change and a continuous movement, but that is precisely when we do not see parts, nor jumps (not infinitely many of them).

To me that seems quite sufficient, but he feels obliged to go on:

The above explanation of infinite divisibility does not hit the essential. That is rather that even the smallest visible parts are divisible (when not actually divided), and this consists – as already said – in the fact that a proposition describing a smallest-visible piece as divided – say halved – is meaningful.
I take this as backing my argument about the last reddish blue. He then turns to mathematical examples of the same problem. These take on a new philosophical significance when on page 245 he defends Brouwer’s rejection of the law of excluded middle in respect of empirical facts and anything resembling them in mathematics, but not in respect of pure logic, where he believes it holds but cannot tell us anything about the real world. I remember driving with my elder son down the many-bridged Usk and claiming that the laws of topology could tell us which side of the river we were on. I had to pacify his sense of reality by admitting that the laws of topology could not stop Welsh engineers from boring a tunnel under the Usk, nor us from driving through it without noticing. Things become less simple on the next page when a Brouwer invention called the *Pendelzahl* becomes an illustration. This is a number which cannot make its mind up whether it is greater or less than zero, and it will reappear on page 22 of left hand I, lying in wait for scholars who have not noticed the page problem and do not realise how much water, by then, had flowed under Wittgenstein’s bridge. (Scholars who use the electronic edition are liable to find the same trouble. A Bourbaki dangerous bends sign is needed to warn them. The best thing here is to keep to the safe roads of Nedo and the *Wiener Ausgabe*.)

On page 257 of left hand II there is the paragraph quoted at the beginning of this chapter asking why philosophy is simultaneously simple and complicated. Mathematical details then become very technical, and on page 271 there is a criticism of recursive proofs which on page 77 of left hand I begins an even more technical criticism of Skolem and in turn becomes something of an obsession. On page 285 of left hand II there had been the much-quoted English remark “Whatever one can tackle is a problem (so mathematics is alright),”, and this prompts me to point out that, however obsessive, the Skolem passages deal with a very simple and important problem. This passage (the first of many in the following manuscript books) runs from I’s left hand page 73 to left hand page 105, and much is in print from page 193 to the top of page 200. The omissions are Wittgenstein’s and not Rhees’s, and in particular it would have been helpful if he had not cut out, at the very beginning, two paragraphs giving the investigation’s theme and background supposition. Bottom page 73, top page 75 of Volume I:

> What is the relationship of \( a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c \) [the general statement of associativity for addition] to the definition \( a + (\xi + 1) = (a + \xi) + 1 \) [which serves Skolem both for a recursive definition of addition and as a basis for his proof of associativity].

Calculation with cardinal numbers is prescribed for me by reality.
It would also have been helpful if he could have anticipated the clarity with which he expressed himself in a lecture quoted by Goodstein in an Ambrose and Lazerowitz volume, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Language*, on pages 280 and 281 (apparently from Goodstein’s own lecture notes): “In his lectures Wittgenstein analysed this proof in the following way. He started by criticising the argument as it stands by asking what it means to *suppose* that \((a + b) + c = a + (b + c)\) holds for some value of \(c\). If we are going to deal in suppositions, why not simply suppose that it holds for any \(c\)?” I have been itching to ask this very question ever since I first read these manuscript books in 1976.

After these mathematical pages, and still on left hand page 105 of Volume I, Wittgenstein writes

I have not worked for 14 days. Now we shall see whether things will still go. I have still not come to peace. And my thoughts *flutter* around their object.

Then, jumping to the page number 108 but apparently not skipping a page, he returns to the phenomenological language, his expositions of it gradually becoming criticisms. This, therefore, rather than the approaching opening of the next manuscript book, is where I shall make my break.
An advantage of making our break at that point is that much of what follows at the end of left hand I and the beginning of (normally written) Volume III is put by Wittgenstein into a single section, printed in Rhees’s editing as VII, of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. In one important respect, however, this section gives a significantly different impression from its manuscript origin. VII’s opening paragraph suggests that our memory of sense data could be collected and described, forming a *Lebensbeschreibung* which contains nothing hypothetical – the word used in the spirit of the remark already quoted about the hypothesis of the physical world. What immediately follows the personal remark quoted at the end of the previous chapter, however, and not printed, gives the opening paragraph of VII a different slant. This is page 108 of left hand I.

The phenomenological language describes exactly the same as the ordinary, physical language. It just has to restrict itself to what is verifiable.

Is that at all possible?

Don’t forget that physical language, too, only describes the primary world and not some hypothetical one. The hypothesis [in question] is only an assumption as to what kind of representation is practical. [Marked as fit to print but not printed.]

Now is this hypothetical [aspect] essential to every representation of the world?

Suppose that I had such a good memory that I could remember the totality of my sense impressions. Then there is nothing to stop me describing them. That would be a biography. And why shouldn’t I leave everything hypothetical [i.e. everything to do with the above hypothesis about practicalities of representation] out of this description? [This is the first paragraph
printed in VII, inevitably giving the impression that it concerns hypotheses about the material world; and what follows is also mainly printed.]

A paragraph then suggests our making small plaster models of exactly what has been seen, with their unseen portions coded in some way to show that they are not in consideration. But in the next paragraph time becomes a problem. We have to make these models at the same rate as we are remembering what we have seen. But then I pause and ‘read through’ this depiction (which Wittgenstein considers equivalent to a description). Is it not hypothetical then? An emphatic “doch” (and German grammar, like English) expects the answer “yes”, yet in his manuscript volume (omitted in print) he writes “And why not?”

It is not hypothetical because no claim has been made as to the accuracy of our memory. We, however, and Wittgenstein opts for this in his editing, naturally consider the patent fact that our first memory could have been inaccurate, let alone our later ‘reading’ of it. We have come, therefore, to a distinction: between our instinctive assumption that people who call themselves idealists are entertaining a view of the structure of the world, as Wittgenstein did give some impression of doing in February 1929, and what he presents us with in his manuscript of some months later, a language which merely records sense data and asserts nothing about their relationship with the world. By the time he made his selection of paragraphs for his fellowship submission, indeed by the time he dictated the top copy, he had come to think that idealism and realism were not competing hypotheses but ‘alternative descriptions’, alternative views of the world. What is intriguing about these mid-1929 notes is that they are a step towards his 1930 view, while in his 1930 editing he seems to be delineating (for the sake of rebutting, of course, not advocating) his abandoned view.

The ‘language’ of plaster models does not seem to us to have anything to do with sense data at all, but Wittgenstein insists (print and manuscript agree here) that it gives the most immediate description that we can imagine: anything more immediate must cease to be a description. All that would be left then would be an inarticulate sound (or nonsense exemplified by a quotation from Driesch; it is quoted again on page 30 of Diktat für Schlick, but only revealed as by Driesch on page 1306 of TS 212). His meaning here can be found on page 13 of the Bouwsma conversations: “One could just gape. This!” It can also be seen in a paragraph in Section VII (the opening of its § 70) taken from the opening pages of Volume III (MS 107):

With our language we are not in the realm of the projected image [at the cinema] but in the realm of the celluloid. And if I want to make music for
what is happening on the screen, what produces it [namely the sound track] again works in the sphere of the celluloid.

In other words, our actual use of language plays itself out in the real world, and if we try to reduce it to the fleeting images on the screen we shall only be able to gape and say “This!”

On Volume I, page 116 there is a paragraph marked as fit to print but not printed, which would have come at the end of § 69 except for two paragraphs put there from elsewhere. It reads like a premonition of, or perhaps a preparation for, a purple passage that opens Volume III, also unprinted, which I shall quote ahead.

With the phenomenological language it is as if I came into a fen with a magic spell on it, where everything that can be grasped vanishes.

The German word here is “Sumpf”, the swamp of my chapter title, but I have always felt that “fen” was more appropriate for magic spells, and for the bewitchment that Wittgenstein was beginning to feel he had been under. Three paragraphs follow, also marked with approval but unprinted, the third of which is another hint of bewitchment. It is on left hand I page 118.

But then what importance can this description of immediate experiences [des gegenwärtigen Phänomens, singular in German] have? It seems as if the preoccupation with this problem were positively childish and as if I had stumbled into a dead end. And yet it is a dead end of significance, for it entices everybody to walk into it, as if the final solution to the philosophical problem were to be found there.

After a diagram on left hand page 120 which is printed with another one (of a sine curve) added in TS 209, we reach two startling unprinted paragraphs which bring us to the next left hand page, 122.

The verification of language – that is, the act by which it obtains its meaning – does to be sure take place in the present.

From the preceding [I assume in general, rather than the immediately preceding paragraph] it follows – what is incidentally self-evident – that the phenomenological language portrays the same as our normal physical form of expression and just has the advantage that one can express many things more briefly with it and with less danger of misunderstanding.

The second is a contradiction of two paragraphs we have already met, giving physical language the advantage of brevity. The first contradicts Wittgenstein’s well known later view that what gives language its meaning is the use we make of it as
an instrument of human life (as a calculus, as he expresses the idea when he first embraces it), not our sensations as we give utterance. Overcoming this error, as he comes to term it, will be seen to require much effort in the early summer of 1931.

Two strange paragraphs follow that are in print. The first suggests that we could give people’s individual hands proper names and refer to them without speaking of their owners. A hint as to the private meaning that this had for him can be found in item 303, a supplement to the Diktat für Schlick. The second (short) paragraph explains why that seemed attractive to him, for he had put it in solely to prepare us for this (left hand I page 122 and page 100 in print).

Visual space has essentially no owner.

Nobody thinks of visual space like that, but Wittgenstein is determined to, and he embarks on a series of weird thought experiments aimed at reinforcing his view – until, on page 132, he momentarily questions it, and then reverts to it, in three paragraphs which are compressed into sub-paragraphs in print, at the head of § 73 on printed page 102. Does that mean that his thought experiments tell us that our visual image does contain or presuppose a subject? Immediately denying this he asks whether, rather, they have only geometrical implications, which give objective information about reality (without, I am quite certain, considering it to be about the geometry of objects in an external world).

In the following paragraph, however, the perversity of his view comes to light. In my visual space there is no distinguishing eye that belongs to me. Only in physical space, he says, is there anything that can be called my eye. But in fact I have no need to look for an eye belonging to me in my visual space, because its being the space that I am conscious of is what makes it mine.

Here, textually, we come to a page numbered 133, because Wittgenstein has moved on to the volume’s unused and unlined fly leaf, so that he has to draw horizontal lines to mark paragraph breaks, continuing to do so on the reverse of the fly leaf (134) and finally for two lines at the top of the inside cover (135). Those are the end of a paragraph pointing out that when we close our eyes we do not cease to see. That could be taken as an argument on my side, but Wittgenstein argues that our seeing what is visible to us of our body as something distinguished as our own comes from other feelings, such as, mentioned in his thought experiments, our feel of our muscles (Muskelgefühlsraum). This argument is pursued in a paragraph from the next volume (III, on its page 4), which closes § 74 on printed page 103. “The very term ‘visual space’ is inappropriate for our purpose, for it contains [etymologically] a reference to a sense organ that is just as little essential to this space as it is essential to a book that it should belong to a particular person [our inessential
hands having been tactfully abandoned].” Here again, the whole point is that the reason why our acquaintance with our eyes is irrelevant to whose visual space we are talking about is that we know our own visual space to be our own.

There is an important unprinted paragraph at the top of page 134 which I must quote in full, to justify my claim that the importance of ‘aspect’ in Wittgenstein’s last years is that it contradicted his assumptions at the time of his phenomenological language quest. (There is further evidence of this in MS 123, in a passage written in May 1941 which I have quoted in a note to Chapter 1, where the following is also quoted.)

Is it not possible that the reason we can see spatially with one eye is that our brain etc. evokes the visual image that is again and again forced upon our vision by the continual use of two? This is indeed quite obvious, as the case of [sketch of a cube] shows.

Wittgenstein has been reported by Elizabeth Anscombe (viva voce in Cambridge, when the Wiener Ausgabe was introduced in 1994) to have insisted that we can get three dimensional vision with one eye, and I have often wondered where the myth that we cannot do so ever came from. Anyone who closes one eye can ascertain the simple truth – that with one we see three dimensionally but with less vividness than with two. Whether people who have never had the use of two eyes can do so is an empirical matter, but I should be very surprised if they can’t, and my guess is that the ability comes from our three-dimensional tactile experiences. The question here is: what made Wittgenstein guess otherwise? His assumption that sense data are, as people say, a given. They cannot be anything other than what they momentarily are. He consequently had to assume that monocular three-dimensional sense data are given us like that as a result of neurological intervention. What fascinated him in his late work on ‘aspect’ is that the obvious alternative assumption that sense data can change, can as it were jump around, isn’t needed either: we see an image first in one way and then in another without its needing to change.

Volume III, MS 107, opens with three pages of what I have promised is a purple passage, and so I shall quote it entire, leaving out just the one paragraph already quoted, on the difference between celluloid and screen. This, incidentally, is the point at which the four sections of the first two manuscript volumes at last come to an end, and requires me to mention the editing of them in the Oxford-Bergen electronic edition. This gives them a false order. To repeat my advice to anyone
wishing to study them: buy Volume 1 of the *Wiener Ausgabe* as well, and use it to keep properly in step.

It is not necessary to make experiments that exclude certain possibilities (thought experiments, perhaps). Visual space as it is has its self-sufficient reality.

It does not itself contain any subject. It is autonomous.

It can be described directly (but we are far removed from knowing a mode of expression that does describe it). Our normal physical language relates to it in a very complicated way that is known to us instinctively.

The decisive moment for a language is its application. Thinking with its aid.

The way of considering things that leads us down, as it were, into a devil’s punch-bowl from which no road leads into open countryside, is the consideration of the present as the only thing that is real. This present, gripped in constant flow, or rather in constant change, cannot be caught. It vanishes before we can think of grasping it. We are stuck in this punch-bowl, enchanted by a vortex of thoughts.

The mistake must be that we are trying to grasp the fleeing present with scientific method. That must be like wanting to grasp the rigidity of a beam as a thing separated from it. So to speak distil it from it.

What must save us from attempting this impossibility is the knowledge that we talk nonsense as soon as we try to make use of our language in this enterprise.

What I may not think, language cannot express. That is our comfort.

But if one says: a philosopher must simply climb down into this punch-bowl and grasp pure reality for himself and draw it up to the daylight, then the answer is that he would have to leave language behind him and so come back up with nothing accomplished.

And yet there can be a phenomenological language. (Where has this got to stop?)
If we want to imagine this language, then what is characteristic is that we at once begin to imagine the world as simpler than it is. But that does not speak against but for the possibility of this language, for we walk a particular path to come to it.

Or is it like this: our normal language is phenomenological as well, only understandably enough it doesn’t permit the sensory domains whose total multiplicity is part of it to separate from it.

Its space is the combined sight and touch and feel-of-our-muscles space – that is why I can “turn round” in this space and “look at what is going on behind me” etc.

It is obviously possible to describe the field of vision. For if what normally goes on in it is too complicated, then that in itself shows that the description is possible in principle. And it is easy enough to think of events in this space that are simple enough to be easily described.

It is worth drawing the reader’s attention to the ideas ‘total multiplicity’ and ‘combined … space’, because it is easy to lapse into thinking of the phenomenological exercise as conducted only in the visual.

Page 4 comes into print on page 103, with the last paragraph of § 74, “The very term ‘visual space’ is inappropriate …”, quoted above, in which Wittgenstein thinks the German word “Gesichtsraum” refers inconveniently to the eye, and doesn’t want it to hint at the eye’s owner, either. Another, on page 5, is incompletely printed on pages 103 and 104, and the incompleteness goes with leaving out the paragraph above it, while the sub-paragraph following it includes a reference which I find welcome, not just to the strip of celluloid in the projector and the images on the screen but to the whole film that we pay to go and see.

Wasn’t it my intention to describe only the verifiable? Oughtn’t the very difference between this description and an ordinary one to be that it avoids everything hypothetical? And have I succeeded in that?

I believe in a certain sense yes and in another not. – [That line, like the paragraph above it, unprinted.] Suppose this description [one has been mentioned in the previous paragraph printed, but it does not fit] is a prediction and the question of verification then arises. Say I know the prediction by heart and I now compare it with what actually happens. Everything hypothetical is avoided now except for what is implied by the presupposition that the description was given me independently of the part of it that has just become present to me.
The whole is a talking film and the spoken word that goes with the events on the screen is just as fleeting as these events and not the same as the sound track. The sound track doesn’t accompany what is played out on the screen.

There is no contradiction between the words coming from the screen being fleeting and our language being as stable as the sound track, as we were told a little before.

I need to make one point about a paragraph towards the end of the purple passage. It contains an idea that became significant for Wittgenstein: something being simpler than things really are. This is how he describes Augustine’s picture of language learning in *Investigations*. What is too simple in the unprinted paragraphs at the beginning of Volume III is *visually isolated* phenomenological language, and I want to argue at the end of this examination of 1929–1930 that stripped of its philosophical status as a desideratum it can still be a useful and exiting linguistic adventure (and fully embrace ‘total multiplicity’).

After some further paragraphs on visual space, Wittgenstein turns, on page 7, to mathematics, at first dealing with cardinal numbers essentially from Frege’s point of view but with criticism of his explanations of it. In my remarks in the previous chapter about squadrons and aeroplanes I have tried to put Frege’s viewpoint in my own over-simplified manner. When I say that there are so far five *Wiener Ausgabe* volumes reprinting the first nine and a half of Wittgenstein’s Bände, I am not analysing the concepts ‘*Wiener Ausgabe volume*’ or Wittgenstein’s concept of a ‘Band’, but as it were *tallying* printed and manuscript volumes against those concepts. Neither Frege nor Wittgenstein would disagree with that, and his first relevant remarks on page 7 do not disclose his criticism. They are to the effect that an extensional theory of classes leads to his own view of number, and, contrariwise, his view of number to an extensional theory of classes. If there is disagreement with anyone it would seem to be himself in his opposition to Ramsey, who, in the discussion mentioned but not quoted on pages 23 and 25 of right hand I, had argued rather spuriously for an extensional interpretation of infinite classes. But at the end of page 10 of this third ‘Band’ there is the unprinted paragraph:

My resistance to Frege’s interpretation was always that it seemed to me too special [perhaps ‘specific’].

And that amounts to this, that not every number-assertion is an assertion about a genuine function. [To Frege the concepts ‘concept’ and ‘function’ were part and parcel of one idea.]
On the next page, after a paragraph ascribing Frege’s ideas to a vestigial remnant of subject-predicate theory, there is the more explanatory (and also unprinted) paragraph:

I feel this: in our ordinary language every number-assertion is to be sure an assertion about a concept, i.e. a predicate, but I believe that the most varied logical structures disguise themselves in this predicate form, and that only an artificial process of representation can make it seem that concepts are in question here.

Perhaps the next paragraph, which I cannot find in print, is a hint that Wittgenstein takes concepts to go with generality.

A number assertion does not even require a certain generality. For example, if I say “I am seeing three equal-sized circles arranged at equal distance.” [With a diagram.]

Frege would be quite happy with the concept ‘equal-sized circle’ and to be told that it is answered to in Wittgenstein’s field of vision to the tune of three and with the extra detail that these circles are equidistant. The only generality he would require is that the same concept could be answered to in other people’s fields of vision in the same or in different ways, but Wittgenstein immediately rejects this simple possibility by denying that it can be expressed in formal predicate calculus with existential quantification. It turns out that what he is objecting to is Frege’s wide acceptance of kinds of objects that can be counted (as with the query aimed at Frege in early right hand I, as to whether, in a courtroom where a murder is being discussed, that murder is one of the objects present). On page 13 of III he cites a flash of lightning, the simultaneity of two events, the intersections of a line with a circle; and on page 14 says that in a conversation Frege maintained that the simultaneity of a lunar eclipse and a trial was an object. All that is wrong with that, Wittgenstein says, is that we are using the word “object” ambiguously and thus confusing logical analysis. In two intermediate paragraphs on pages 13 and 14 he has explained what he meant by this. Such ‘name-generating’ expressions work by pressing sentences into norms, and this is the opposite of analysis. Colloquial language presses into norms, and Frege’s theory explains number perfectly well in a colloquial setting. In two further paragraphs on page 14 he says it would be quite in order to use these dubious objects as values for variables and apply quantification to them provided one didn’t provoke confusion by analysing sentences in that manner, but, he goes on, since colloquial language doesn’t bother with quantifiers we should do better to follow its example.
Further paragraphs follow until the top of page 27, with particular examples of this line of argument that I find much less interesting than that general account, and with the next paragraph on that page the subject turns to visual space. The paragraphs on this are certainly interesting, and deal mainly with its divisibility, ending with two paragraphs at the top of page 36, the first denying that it has invisible parts, the second asserting that it is dividable, as he puts it, meaning that in effect it is infinitely divisible. At the beginning of this section I need to record either an error in Nedó’s editing or a slip of Wittgenstein’s hand. There is a drawing of a long line $a$ and one half its length called $b$. The query is, can one see that to be the case without seeing, surely, $a$ as divided, but the *Wiener Ausgabe* text has $b$. (So, it turns out, has the Bergen-Oxford electronic edition, so the slip is Wittgenstein’s.)

At page 36 the subject moves to real numbers, beginning with a square root of 2, modified by having every 5 in its decimal expansion changed to a 3. I find these discussions deeply unsympathetic, and as they continue to page 151 with only occasional paragraphs on more natural considerations about real numbers I shall just quote a few of those that seem to me especially significant, and a few more dealing with general philosophy or diary-writing. One of these, on page 39, could be taken as a reason for his long preoccupation with real numbers.

(I cannot invade the land of psychology with the unconquered enemy fortress of arithmetic behind my back.)

Reading this in the west of Scotland near two beautiful deserted brochs, I could not help thinking that the particular fortress of mathematics he kept attacking (remember that “Arithmetik” has a much wider meaning in German) had long been left empty by its defenders. On page 59, however, he asks a question (unprinted) that indicates a more particular reason for his preoccupation with real numbers that he then seems determined to disguise.

Could one not say that a rod has the length 0.101001 etc. i.e. that it is longer than 0.1 and shorter than 0.2, and longer than 0.101 but shorter than 0.102 etc. But what does this “etc.” mean?

This is the only place, not only in this real number section but in others that interleave with visual geometry, which relates a physical object to the possibility (or rather impossibility) of its having a real-number length. He actually seems to have a psychological reluctance to face the issue. For his essential problem can be expressed in ratio symbolism: visual geometry : Euclidean geometry : : inexactitude : real numbers, but the inexactitude of the third term could have been of
three kinds. He has discussed visual inexactitude and will go on to discuss probability inexactitude, but this is his only (passing) reference to physical object inexactitude, which would have done just as well there. If it is meaningless to say “the ratio of this visual length to that one is exactly 1:π and not any rational approximation” and “the probability of this biased die giving 1 or 6 is exactly 1/π and not any rational approximation”, then so, too, is it just as meaningless to say “this piece of machined steel is exactly π centimetres long and not any rational approximation”, as he eventually acknowledged in a remark left out of § 98 of Investigations, but it can be found in § 91 of pre-war TS 220, and it can be seen crossed out in § 105 of mid-war TS 239: about a wheel “so genau gearbeitet” that its circumference is just 2πr. Or he could have used a musical example: a piano so perfectly tuned that every one of its semitones has exactly the ratio 1: the 12th root of 2 and not any rational approximation.

The next paragraph I must quote is on page 61 and enclosed in square brackets, with an elongated s, for “schlecht”, which was as likely to indicate that it was not to be included in whatever book he was planning as he thought it bad.

[Perhaps there is yet another interpretation of real numbers than the one I am chasing here, but this one is still a possible and important interpretation, out of which everything must be justified.]

My inclination is to think he means an interpretation that he is chasing in order to set it up, rather than a mathematicians’ interpretation that he is chasing to defeat.

Starting on page 74 there is a remarkable series of private, coded remarks, in the first paragraph of which he says that back in Berlin, before he went to Manchester, let alone Cambridge, he began writing thoughts about himself on slips of paper, and later began to imitate diary writers, first Keller and then Pepys. In a further paragraph he actually says that these very paragraphs are being copied from slips of paper.

On page 87 there is the first date since February, 11.9.29 (the 11th of September, of course, in case American readers are confused by 9/11). On page 98 there is almost an inverse of his remark about fortresses that have to be conquered before he can make philosophical progress:

With my full philosophical rucksack I can only climb the mountain of mathematics slowly.

On page 134 there is an observation that contradicts Frege:

The generality of an identity is not an [the definite article in German] identity between generalities [on pages 9–10 of Funktion und Begriff Frege
had said that a transition from a generality to an identity was always possible, though this could not be proved and had to be accepted as a fundamental rule of logic.

On page 143 are two short paragraphs on verification and Einstein, quoted in one of my notes to Chapter 1. They actually come after a brief reversion to visual geometry.

On page 149 there are three paragraphs about associativity of addition, the first of which shows how lacking in mathematical sensitivity Wittgenstein could be. It is prefaced by an appropriate question mark.

If one wanted to ask “is \( a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c \)” it would have to be because I no longer remembered whether it was \( that \) or perhaps “\( a + (b + c) = (a + b) - c \)”.

A mathematician asking that question would mean “is this algebra one in which associativity of addition holds?” Queries about associativity (and induction) continue on page 150, but without any mention of Skolem.

After this mathematical section ends on page 151 there is an intriguing paragraph bringing in the will, and one on page 152 that relates the will to a problem that will be met in 1930 passages. The second is marked with an asterisk, which indicates that it is about a subject apart from the general trend.

The essence of what we call the will is directly connected with the continuity of the given.

…

The essence of the will has something to do with the essence of understanding an order.

I cannot explain the first of these at all, but the second will become clearer with a complex of ideas concerning orders, intention, wishes and their satisfaction, the passages that I have promised will come in 1930.

On page 153 there is a second new date, 6.10.29, after which they come frequently. This precedes, and the whole day is devoted to, two private paragraphs, the second in code, which together indicate considerable uneasiness. The first describes a dream about commissioning a water turbine from someone who is incompetent and not intelligent enough to understand an explanation of what is wrong, like many of the people he has to deal with. This turbine reminds him of gas turbines he tried to design in Manchester. (In the Nedo and Ranchetti volume it is said that his Manchester turbine was a simple matter of jets positioned at the
ends of a propeller, but in confirming this on his page 33 Monk also says that it
required a combustion chamber, which must be why this dream, quoted on his
page 276, is reminiscent of what we now think of as a gas turbine.) The second
paragraph confesses that his work is making no progress, and is much too interest-
ing psychologically for me to try to summarise. On page 159, at the end of the
10th's entries, is the code paragraph:

Today I feel an especial poverty of problems around me; a certain sign that
ahead of me the most important and hardest problems are in wait.

while the next day opens with two unprinted paragraphs, significant for ideas that
will develop out of them shortly:

The immediate is gripped in constant flow. (It actually has the form of a
river.) [With a diagram indicating flow.]

It is quite clear that if one wants to say the last thing here one must come
right to the boundary of the language that expresses it.

After a coded paragraph, there follows on page 160 one already quoted in German
in my notes to Chapter 1, so I will translate it here. These three, together with two
further paragraphs on page 160, mark a step forwards in Wittgenstein's thought
that quite belies his recent pessimism. The three are printed on page 88, in a con-
text that I mention ahead.

The most dreadful philosophical mistakes always arise when one wants to
apply our – normal – physical language in the realm of the immediately
given.

If one for example asks “Does the box still exist if I don’t look at it?”
the only right answer would be “Of course, if no one has taken it away or
destroyed it”. Naturally the philosopher [Wittgenstein of a few months
earlier, naturally] wouldn’t be satisfied by this answer but it would quite
rightly take his formulation of his question ad absurdum.

All our forms of speech are derived from the normal physical language, and
they cannot be used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting
slanting lights on the subject matter.

The mere form of words “I observe x” is already taken from our physical
form of expression and x is supposed to be a physical object here – for
example a body. It is wrong to use this form of speech in phenomenology
where x must mean a datum. For now “I” and “observe” cannot have the
same meaning as before.
What is wrong, of course, and I shall give enough later quotations to show that Wittgenstein comes to agree, is to use this form in *dogmatic* phenomenology, where $x$ is forced to mean a datum. Talking of a lamp on a table and a shadow from it on the table is fine so long as one understands, but at this stage of his philosophy the difference was still dangerous, and on page 161, after the subject has turned to visual geometry (of the ‘pure’ variety, contributing to Section XX), we find, marked as being apart,

These are the dangerous shunttings of meaning: “I hear the music”, “I hear the piano”, “I hear him playing the piano”.

We are now in a criss-crossed net of printed and unprinted passages which form a philosophical watershed. It continues for twenty-two manuscript pages, up to page 183, and contributes substantially to the ‘pure’ visual geometry section, XX, but is also about real numbers, starting on page 174. After only a few lines Wittgenstein turns to probability, but as I have explained this is complementary to real numbers. Then, on page 176, written on 22.10.29, there is the first explicit rejection of the phenomenological language quest, quoted ahead, as distinct from expressions of dissatisfaction with it. The second does not come until page 205, written on 24.11.29, and unlike the first is in print, quoted at the beginning of Chapter 2. After the first, problems related to it include a paragraph put in the printed book in a significant place. It is the second of three ‘summary paragraphs’ coming at the head of Section XXII, the book’s last. It follows another significant paragraph, and both, on page 177, occupy single days, the 25th and 26th of October, so I shall quote them both.

Every sentence is an empty play of marks or sounds if it has no relationship to reality, and its only relationship to reality is the manner of its verification.

All that is essential is that symbols relate to immediate experiences (in however complicated a manner) and not to something intermediate (a thing in itself).

The first rejection will be seen to have a very common sense sound, and I am quoting these paragraphs here to forewarn the reader that it does not indicate what we should regard as a full retreat. By using Kant’s phrase “Ding an sich” Wittgenstein is giving a metaphysical appearance to our common sense assumption that experiences that are immediate to us are intermediate between the objects that cause them and the words we use to describe them.
Real numbers return on page 178 and continue until page 183, with a paragraph on infinity that spreads into page 184, where prime numbers take over. Originally I quoted nearly all of these twenty-two pages, but I do not think this necessary any more and will mention only a few details.

One is on page 163, unprinted, and it echoes a quotation in Chapter 2, giving me the pleasure of naming a source that no one has noticed, Clifford’s *Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*.

(A line is a boundary between two colours. A point is the place where three colours meet together.)

Another is on page 173, where a diagram is printed on page 264, above instead of within its paragraph, and much more tidily than Wittgenstein has drawn, while, between subparagraphs, an interesting aside has been left out in his editing:

(If I close my eyes and see an after-image of an object I have seen, for example a window, the sight of this after-image gives me a strange joy. It is as if I were entirely in *my* world.)

I am entirely on his side here (why are children trained to need a night light instead of being told what beautiful after-images they will see if they close their eyes in the dark?) but it also disappoints me that he never mentions open-eye after-images, a visually fascinating subject that eventually Rushton would have been happy to teach him about (as he did me). And a paragraph further on (that is, after the printed sub-paragraph following the diagram) we get in English:

(Keep on the safe side.)

The opening of the real number section starting on page 174 is printed as the numbered paragraph § 192 on page 273. And unprinted on page 175 there is

Probability and Gallston photography.

corrected by Nedo to “Galtonsche”, but, with a printed elaboration on the next line corrected by Rhees on page 293, it is one of Wittgenstein’s jokes. He got it right on page 17 of Volume X, MS 114, with “Gallstone” photography.

The explicit rejection of the primary language quest already mentioned comes in Volume III, page 176:

The assumption that a phenomenological language might be possible and that really nothing short of it would say what we must express in philosophy is – I believe – absurd.
We must get by with our ordinary language and just understand it correctly. That is to say we mustn’t let ourselves be led astray by it into talking nonsense.

Short daily entries, two of them already quoted, mark the remainder of October and the first two days of November, with a brief interlude on prime numbers, and then, on the 5th and 7th of December, before they take over from real numbers, there is an interesting overlap between the two. I regard this as an avoidance of an issue I have mentioned, whether real objects can be meaningfully said to have exact real-number lengths. On the same page, 183, we are asked, on the 5th, whether an engineer could use machine parts with prime number lengths, and then, on the 7th, whether one can construct an irrational number using primes, but there is no mention of the impossibility of making a machine part correspondingly. Real-number construction using primes is the easiest thing in the world. The continued fraction

\[
\frac{1}{2 + \frac{1}{3 + \frac{1}{5 + \ldots}}}
\]

or its reciprocal

\[
2 + \frac{1}{3 + \frac{1}{5 + \frac{1}{7 + \ldots}}}
\]

are examples, and Wittgenstein’s objection that prime numbers cannot be indefinitely foreseen is irrelevant, provided one knows that one can always take them as far as one wishes, and that one can thereby approach a limit, again as closely as one wishes. Wittgenstein had himself, incidentally, on page 127 before dates reappeared, given a simple example of an indefinite series of continued fractions, which had the advantage over irrational decimal expansions that one could see the law of its continuation. Normal mathematicians would, I am sure, say the same of my pair of continued fractions.

On page 186, at the beginning of the 8th of November, is an important indication of the way his philosophy is developing. It is marked with approval, and it comes in print at the foot of page 153, as the numbered paragraph § 133.
What is always at issue in philosophy is the application of a series of utterly simple basic propositions which every child knows, and the enormous difficulty is only: applying them amid the confusion that our language creates. It is never a matter of the latest results of experiments with exotic fishes or mathematics. Yet the difficulty of applying the simple basic propositions makes one err with these basic propositions oneself.

On page 187, at the end of the 8th of November, and with a new symbol to show a separate issue, a problem is introduced which also exemplifies Wittgenstein’s use of code words (and is printed on page 90).

Has it a meaning to say that two people have the same body? That is an uncommonly important and interesting question. If it has no meaning, that is as much as to say, I believe, that only our bodies are the principles of personal individuation. It is obviously imaginable that I might feel a pain in the hand of another body than my so-called own. [It is not obviously imaginable at all, and Wittgenstein finds an ingenious way of giving it a meaning, in respect of teeth, in the Blue Book.] But what if my old body became completely insensitive and immobile and I only continued to feel pains in another body?

The code words are “important” and “interesting”, which henceforth indicate non-analytic propositions that we find so convincing that some philosophers might be tempted to call them synthetic a priori. Ahead, on the 13th of December in Vienna, and on page 4 of the next manuscript volume, this one having been left in Cambridge, the interesting proposition of great importance is that one person cannot have two bodies.

Manuscript regions dealing mainly with prime numbers often include discussions of simple arithmetic as well, and on the 10th of November on page 190 are two such paragraphs of interest.

The sentence 2 x 3 does not equal 7 is what we say in school when a child has answered that 2 x 3 = 7.

Connected with that is that it can interest me that 145 is divisible by 5, but if instead of this proposition I write down the whole disjunction 2 x 5 = 145 v 3 x 5 = 145 etc. etc., it looks silly.

But this is probably only because I recognise most of the terms of the disjunction as false without further ado. If I only write down the terms that don’t seem to me prima facie out of the question, then the proposition [i.e. the disjunction of just those terms] would be in order.
A third paragraph says that this is more significant than it seems, and to me this significance is a pre-echo of ideas in the *Certainty* notes: what meaning has an assertion that has no context that makes it required or to the point? See, for example, §§ 347–349 of the printed *Certainty* volume.

After a long discussion of a logical point starting on page 193 on the 15th, illuminated best by a joke in Vienna discussions about who is wearing trousers (see *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, pages 38–41, 44–45 and 51–53), there is a paragraph on page 196 that becomes the first of the three ‘summary’ paragraphs printed at the top of page 282, the beginning of the printed book’s last section, XXII.

A proposition, an hypothesis, is coupled with reality, and more or less loosely. In an extreme case no connection is left, and reality can do what it likes without coming into conflict with the proposition: then the proposition, the hypothesis, is meaningless.

One cannot lead people to the good, one can only lead them somewhere; the good lies outside the space of facts [not printed].

16.[11.29]

If one considers ideas about probability and its applications, it is always as if ...

and a long section on probability starts, to be interrupted on page 199 by two short paragraphs on toothache occupying the whole of the 19th. Probability is an only recently introduced member of Wittgenstein’s idea complex, and I must try to do it justice separately, but what connects hypothesis and toothache is another matter.

Why do I call toothache *my* toothache?

If I say someone else has toothache, I mean by “toothache” as it were an abstraction from what I normally call “*my* toothache”.

The whole point of the query in the first paragraph is that his aim in the previous months had been to talk down the person having experiences, on the grounds that experiences are just ‘being had’, which would certainly make them hypothesis-free, while the second paragraph is an admission that it is natural to talk of one’s own toothache as one’s own, leaving in the air a problem – namely that to anyone in the grip of toothache the pain is paradigmatically hypothesis-free – that would never have arisen without the ideas he is growing out of. On the 20th and mainly on page 201, there is a long and quite strange paragraph on toothache, which I leave to readers to find and agree that it could never have been written except by
someone in the quandary I have summarised above. To my surprise, it is in print in Section VI, on pages 91 and 92, forming § 62 together with a paragraph from page 204 which has nothing wrong with it except the strange implication that we need to compare our statements about our pain or its absence with reality. This context of paragraphs, slightly reordered in print, includes the haunting

But could one say: I seem to be sad, I do so let my head hang low.

which certainly gains significance from a quandary that is about to be shed. Its final departure is marked by a long paragraph from later, which is put into Section VI as the whole of § 58, and so prepares us for this context of problematical paragraphs (by letting us know that they have meanwhile been solved). It includes a beautiful joke comparing Wittgenstein with an Oriental despot and replacing ego-centricity by language-centricity, and it was not written until the 14th of December, in Vienna, on pages 8, 9 and 10 of Volume IV. The context above in Volume III also includes a paragraph that I noticed was present in Rush Rhees’s typed version but not in the printed book. The photographs (in the Wren, and now in the electronic edition) of TS 209, made before it was lost, explain Rhees’s omission. In the margin of this paragraph, apparently marked after it had been pasted into the minute book, is a badly formed “S” for “schlecht”, inspired perhaps by a quite meaningless claim of a formal relationship between being in pain and being clear of it.

If I say “I’m not in pain now” I am obviously describing my present state.

And therefore “out of pain” describes another state. And the formal relationship between the two expressions means a formal relationship between the states.

Prime numbers intervene briefly on the 22nd and 24th of November (and in sole entries for those two days) and then, on the 25th on page 205, we find a particularly sane paragraph (the third of the ‘summary paragraphs’ mentioned as coming at the head of Section XXII), an unprinted paragraph with which one can hardly disagree, and then the definitive disavowal of the phenomenological language quest, already quoted in full at the beginning of Chapter 2.

All that is necessary for our propositions about reality to be meaningful is that our experience should in some sense or other, on the whole, agree with them. That is to say, immediate experience only has to verify something or other about them, some facet or other. And this image is, indeed, taken directly from reality, for we say “here is a chair” when we can see only one side of it.
It is very difficult to talk about the relation of language to reality without talking nonsense or saying too little.

The phenomenological language, or primary language as I called it, does not …

And here I find an intriguing example of Wittgenstein’s self-editing technique, for on printed page 282, immediately under the three ‘summary paragraphs’, is a paragraph written well ahead in this manuscript volume, on 7.2.30 and on its page 287, in a context of whether there is a difference of hypothesis between someone feeling pain and someone behaving in all possible respects as if in pain.

According to my principles the two assumptions must be identical if all possible experience that confirms the one also confirms the other, if, that is to say, no decision is conceivable between the two by means of experience.

Yet the two assumptions we are led to by the context of the summary paragraphs and their context in the escape from the phenomenological language quest are the pseudo-hypotheses of idealism and materialism.

Starting on manuscript page 207 and occupying the 26th of November, is a poignant paragraph which is logically concerned with the Vienna existential quantification of people wearing trousers (x is, y is and z is, and those are the only people present – see *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* again), but emotionally is about Wittgenstein’s brothers and sisters, of whom three brothers had committed suicide.

If I say “All my brothers and sisters are among this company”, is that the same proposition as “P. M. G. H. are among the company”? No, for in answer someone could still ask “and are those all your brothers and sisters?” I therefore also need the proposition “P. M. G. H. are all my brothers and sisters” …

On page 210, on the 27th, is a paragraph that may have been left out of print because of a rather dogmatic requirement for the concept ‘Wortgattung’, in spite of its otherwise fitting well with our understanding of Wittgenstein’s later ideas, and in spite of being marked in the manuscript with approval.

If it is held against us that language expresses everything with the help of nouns, adjectives and verbs, then we have to say that at any rate it is necessary to distinguish between quite different types of nouns etc., since different grammatical rules hold for them. This is shown by the fact that one isn’t allowed to substitute them one for another. By that it is shown that their substantival character was only a superficiality and that we really have
to do with different genera of words. A word’s genus is only settled by all the grammatical rules that hold for it. And considered like this, our language has a monstrous number of kinds of words.

Wittgenstein has in mind (and later develops) a very wide idea of a grammatical rule, embracing idiom and common sense and expecting subtle application, and what I find dogmatic here is his assumption that all those subtleties have to be taken into account before a word can be assigned to a type for practical purposes.

On page 212 on the 28th, there is a paragraph about the impossibility of precision in descriptions of visual impressions. Of course, there is also the impossibility of absolute precision in any measurement, which as I have mentioned Wittgenstein acknowledged in the pre-war Investigations, and readers will find in MS 166 a vivid picture of when one might measure to the nearest millimetre but not the nearest micron, and the same, mutatis mutandis, can be said of any stage of practical precision. This paragraph is printed on page 263.

As soon as one wants to apply exact concepts of measurement to immediate experience one bumps against a peculiar vagueness in this experience. But that only means a vagueness relative to those concepts of measurement. And it now seems to me that this vagueness is not something preliminary that more exact knowledge will later eliminate but a characteristic logical peculiarity. If for example I say I am now seeing a red cross on a blue ground and remember seeing one of the same size or perhaps somewhat smaller and a little paler a few minutes earlier, then this experience cannot be described more exactly. [A subparagraph follows and is in the printed book, but on the next manuscript page is an unprinted paragraph that deserves to be quoted here.]

The philosophical task with respect to visual space consists precisely – as always – in nothing but rejecting false philosophical theories about it.

On page 216 passages on toothache take over from visual geometry, and on page 218, at the end of November, passages on probability begin again. The last November paragraph, on page 219, is in print at the head of § 60 on page 90, and I quote it for agreeing with me that feeling a pain in someone else’s hand or tooth is not self-evidently meaningful.

Not only does epistemology not bother itself with the truth and falsity of genuine propositions, but it is actually a philosophical method to focus precisely on those propositions whose content appears to us to be the most meaningless of all (for example that someone has a pain in someone else’s
tooth). Epistemology emphasises by this, as it were, that its domain embraces everything that is thinkable at all.

Only on the 11th of November (on page 160) Wittgenstein had said “epistemology or phenomenology”, and before that would have been saying just “phenomenology” here. Yet this paragraph is followed in print by the very one I am glad to see it putting right – the one that asked on the 8th of November whether it is meaningful to say that two people have the same body. Intriguingly, the third paragraph of printed § 60 comes from well ahead, on the 6th of the following February, on page 286 of this manuscript volume, and could be a self-commentary on Wittgenstein’s composition methods.

One could say: philosophy continuously collects a stock of sentences, without bothering about their truth or falsehood; only in the case of logic and mathematics does it have to do with ‘true’ propositions.

December opens with a long and disturbed description of a dream, but still on the 1st philosophy begins with a second comparison of reality with a river (the first is quoted above from page 150 without its diagram). This is now page 222, and is printed on page 81.

The river of life, or the river of the world, flows on its way [“alles fließt” [in Wittgenstein’s brackets]] and our propositions are so to speak only verified from moment to moment / in (flashes [Wittgenstein’s English word]) moments /.

Our propositions are only verified by the present.

They must therefore be formed so that they can be verified by it. They must have the stuff for being verified by it [this sentence not printed]. It follows therefore that in some sense or other they are commensurable with the present, which they cannot be in spite of their spatio-temporal nature, but, rather, that nature must relate to the present like the corporality of a ruler to its extension, by means of which it measures. In which case, neither can one say “yes, a ruler measures length in spite of its corporality, to be sure a ruler that only had length would be the ideal, would as it were be pure ruler”. No, if a body has length there can be no length without a body.

– And even if I do understand that in a certain sense only a ruler’s length measures, the fact remains that what I put in my pocket is the ruler, the body, and not its length.
Certainly, if physics changes its hypotheses this only happens because they do not agree with some observations or other. And if they do agree with the observations that is all physics asks of them; and thus all they achieve, too.
[Not printed.]

After this unprinted paragraph there is one about “the newer physicists (Eddington)” along much the same lines, printed at the foot of page 282, and then two short paragraphs printed as one at the top of page 283. These are startling. Had I met them at the beginning of right hand Volume I they would have confirmed my suspicions as to the phenomenalist purity with which Wittgenstein intended his search for a phenomenological language.

A phenomenon [“das Phänomen”] is not a symptom for something else – it is reality.

A phenomenon is not a symptom for something only with the help of which sentences are made true or false – it is precisely what verifies them.

In *Investigations* § 436 he expresses very clearly what his “dead end of philosophising” had been, and with a typical use of a single word to mark a change he talks of the phenomena of every-day talk as what he ought to have been dealing with. My favourite example is one I found in the old Oxford dictionary, T. H. Huxley saying that everyone was familiar with the phenomenon of the rusting of metals. There is quite enough in the remainder of the month we have reached to show that, at this point, Wittgenstein is about to give up identifying sense data with reality, but he is still to be found calling them phenomena on page 45 of *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*. One must avoid the trap of thinking that giving up a special language for them had entailed giving up considering them. After all, we are still entitled to talk about sense data if we wish to – they are very interesting; and Wittgenstein continued to inflict sense data diagrams on Schlick and Waismann (on pages 52 and 75 of the same book). There can be no doubt that he had changed his mind by the time he cut those paragraphs out and pasted them into his fellowship submission, but as he wrote them, I am sure, he meant the word fully in his old sense, as ‘sense data reality’ and not just as sense data simply.

Probability ends what Wittgenstein left behind when he went to Vienna, in particular three paragraphs printed on pages 291–2 as § 234, but one is left out (manuscript page 228 and the 4th of December).

The theory of probability says that everything will happen at *some* time or another, and that says nothing at all.
Can happen, surely – but if I can quibble with one of its words it cannot mean nothing at all. This is one of Wittgenstein’s war cries.

Arriving in Vienna Wittgenstein began a new manuscript book, Volume IV, MS 108. Putting the date “13.12” at the head of its first page he reverts to “alles fliesst”, but turns ‘saying nothing at all’ into something more significant than a mere war cry.

Language cannot say // express // what belongs to the essence of the world.

Therefore it cannot say that everything flows. Language can only say what we can also imagine to be otherwise.

Except for two, these opening paragraphs are printed on pages 84–86 as § 54. The first one omitted, from page 1, is one of the ‘missing’ verification remarks. The second, on page 3, is intriguing for trying to give usefulness, if not meaning, to what he has decried, and thereby introducing what later became a very useful metaphor, that of idling wheels.

And this laying of language [onto reality, like placing a ruler] is the verification of propositions.

If that sentence [“Only the experience of the present moment has reality”] has a good meaning, it must serve to cut out idling wheels in our symbolism. In that case it would have to say: we really mean only that, everything else is superfluous extra.

And this attempt is meaningful because it gets idling wheels removed from our language; but not so very many of them.

The next manuscript paragraph after printed § 54 opens § 55, and it is the query as to whether one person can have two bodies. It is followed by the declaration that I promised in my ‘thumb nail sketch’ in the previous chapter, that realism and idealism are only pseudo-hypotheses.

“Realism”, “idealism” etc. are from the very beginning metaphysical names. That is to say, they betray the fact that their adherents believe they can assert something definite about the essence of the world.

The next illumination follows immediately, again in manuscript as in print (where it opens § 56); it is the beautiful common sense refutation of “only present experience is real” (except that Wittgenstein does not believe that this kind of nonsense can be meaningfully rebutted) by appealing to Caesar’s crossing of the Alps.
Whoever wants to contest the proposition that only present experience is real (which is just as wrong as asserting it) will perhaps ask whether that means that a sentence like “Julius Caesar crossed the Alps” only describes my present state of mind in considering the matter. And the answer is naturally: No! …

Four shorter manuscript paragraphs follow this to complete § 56 and printed page 87, but the next manuscript paragraph (this is now dated as the 14th) opens Section VI on printed page 88, followed in print and manuscript by another – but beware if you are reading from printed *Bemerkungen*, where they are sub-paragraphs. In print, paragraphs previously quoted as showing that he had recovered from an episode of pessimism follow, and then print returns briefly to manuscript, with Wittgenstein turning a story about his language-centred toothache into one about an Oriental despot. With this, Section VI becomes what one could call (except for its last three paragraphs) the toothache section, but in doing so it leaves this Vienna period of the manuscript altogether and returns to what I have called a context of problematic paragraphs, beginning at the foot of Volume III’s page 200 (and taking a slightly different order in print), but moving on to much later contexts besides.

The remainder of the Vienna period does correlate with print but in a rather tangled manner, whereas it is very interesting to read it as it was written, giving an impression of the way Wittgenstein’s ideas are jumping around while he changes them. For example, he asks a question on December the 16th which he takes up again on the 10th of March when he is writing in Volume IV for a second stint. What kind of discovery, for example, is Sheffer’s, that one can take all truth functions back to p / q? … As a result, two very similar paragraphs appear in print, on pages 182 and 191. Neither question, December’s or March’s, means “what kind of contribution to mathematics was Sheffer’s stroke?” but “how was it discovered?” The point Wittgenstein is making in both is that there is no algorithmic process for finding a new algorithm. There is incidentally a moving reminiscence of Sheffer in the Author’s Preface of Isaiah Berlin’s *Concepts and Categories* (pages vii and viii).

On the 21st of December, after many paragraphs on mathematical search, there is an “alles fliesst” paragraph, and further on on the same day a third declaration about the phenomenological language, so I quote the two together.

How is it that I have any wish to say that everything flows? Do I just mean by it that my immediate experience is [i.e. happens to be] engaged in constant change (making it possible for me to assert)? Or do I want to express its being able to be engaged in constant change, even when it isn’t?
There isn’t – as I believed earlier – a primary language in contrast to our familiar one, the “secondary” one. But to this extent one could talk of a primary language in contrast to ours, in that it wasn’t allowed to express certain phenomena in preference to others; it would have, so to speak, to be absolutely factual.

On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} there is an unprinted indication that atomic propositions are about to come under scrutiny, as I forewarned in Chapter 2:

To what extent is logic uncertain because of the uncertainty over the analysis of atomic propositions? – What holds fast?

while on the 23\textsuperscript{nd}, printed on page 83, there is this on “das Phänomen”:

It is remarkable that we never get a whiff in ordinary life of the feeling that the phenomena are escaping us, the constant flow of experience, but only when we philosophise. That indicates that the trouble here is a thought that is suggested [“suggeriert”] to us by a false application of our (ordinary) language.

On the 25\textsuperscript{th} there is a long paragraph on stomach ache, or rather on not having any, followed by two short ones, all three printed on pages 110 and 111. We are in a space of possible stomach ache, but at a zero point in it, which is something quite different from saying “the colour of this rose has nothing to do with Caesar’s conquest of Gaul”, which Wittgenstein regards as not a proper negative description at all. It is intriguing that in print these three paragraphs are followed immediately by “The concept of the ‘atomic proposition’ now loses its meaning entirely”, which as I pointed out in Chapter 2 turns out, in Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, not to be the entire truth. That, in manuscript, does not come until the 1\textsuperscript{st} of January, 1930, on page 52. On the 3\textsuperscript{rd} negative descriptions come back in the form of not dreaming, and seven manuscript paragraphs on this are printed as two on pages 113 and 114, but the subject is kept up with intermissions until the 5\textsuperscript{th}, when Volume IV is taken to Cambridge near the end of page 64 and writing is continued in the unused pages of Volume III.

The intermissions are what deserve mention here. For example, on the 3\textsuperscript{rd}, after six paragraphs, printed as three on page 57, on negative descriptions, there is another, printed at the top of page 58, on the sentences of our grammar not being ‘primary’, i.e. not dealing with the immediate, followed by one on neither subject, and included in this early section (II) because of its general subject of meaning.
It is a naïve interpretation of the meaning of a word that in hearing or reading it one ‘imagines’ its meaning …

This is followed (in print immediately, in manuscript on the next day) by a short paragraph saying that can’t be entirely wrong – and indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, it is not until June 1931 that Wittgenstein admits explicitly that it is entirely wrong. One thing that is interesting about this pair of paragraphs is that they introduce (without any further ado for now) an idea, namely that a better explanation has to be found, which, via June 1931, became the foundation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of meaning (see “the meaning of a word is its use” in the Blue Book) – but it is remarkable how long it took him to get this straight. What is even more interesting, however, is that the first and longer of these paragraphs gives no hint whatsoever as to how a better understanding might eventually be reached. It draws attention to the palpable fact that once the recognition of, for example, the colour sky-blue is supposed to depend upon our ability to visualise it, the accuracy of our visualising it comes into question, but it responds to this problem with a red herring, namely that visualising and actually seeing a colour are, in normal common sense, different kinds of things, and so how can they be compared? In real life we simply compare them, just as I can compare two gloves in front of me or one glove with my memory of one I have lost, without saying “but a glove in my sight is a different kind of thing from a glove in my memory, so how can I compare them?”

The Vienna paragraphs between and following this pair all reward inspection, and the very next one, at the top of page 64, with only two more to go, is a seed for an Investigations paragraph I have mentioned as encapsulating Wittgenstein’s retrospective view of his phenomenological wrong turning. This one can hardly be said to do as much as that, but it is the first use of his word “Sackgasse”.

The dead end is the (real) danger. That is, the danger of thinking about something that doesn’t concern one.

The return to Cambridge and Volume III, on the 10th of January, takes up the subject of meaning (“If one says, only in the context of a sentence …”), also printed on page 58), but on this day and the next there are also three personal paragraphs. The first, on aesthetics, prompted by a visit to the cinema back in Vienna, I leave readers to look up, and the second likewise, on good and bad architecture, while the third deserves quotation (Volume III, page 230).
Meaning continues, with the first three paragraphs of § 13, printed on page 58, which prompt two remarks. The first is that in the second of those paragraphs Wittgenstein repeats himself, from page 152, as mentioned above, and in manuscript says so, but not in print. This is where will is said to have something to do with understanding, because understanding an order before carrying it out is related to wanting to do something before one actually does it. And in the first and third paragraphs the word “Stellwerk” appears, whose dictionary meaning is “signal box”, but in the third paragraph the description of what one finds in one is remarkably like a description in Investigations (§ 12) of a steam locomotive’s footplate. It was a relief to me to find, on page 38 of the numbered but undated pages of Volume X (this is its second half, not printed in the Wiener Ausgabe, Volume 5) the phrase “das Stellwerk einer Lokomotive”, putting Wittgenstein unambiguously in the cab, even though he then crossed “Stellwerk” out. The paragraph here, written on the 12th, is preceded in the notebook by an unprinted admission that Wittgenstein is still having difficulty with the 1st and 2nd system (significantly in the singular, as if one composite), and followed by an unprinted negative remark about a book that isn’t green, and then by the following, marked with approval but apparently not printed, after which the 13th begins a region which eventually comes quite tidily into print, but only after some unprinted thoughts that are less so, and some printed ones that are hardly tidier. Here we are at the end of the 12th (page 232).

If I talk of words and their syntax, that happens “in the 2nd system”, and must do so equally if I talk of the symbolising relationships between propositions and facts. That is to say we are again talking here of something spread out in time and not momentary.

Clearly, either he is admitting that he had been wrongly assigning these symbolising relationships to the first system on the grounds that they are not material, or I have been simple-mindedly assuming that the business of the first and second systems ever had been one of immaterial and material.
And precisely a propos of that point I can single out another unprinted para-
graph, written on the 13th, to show where Wittgenstein's doubts were going to
lead him (page 233).

Considered as spread out in time, the application of words is easy to under-
stand, but against this it is infinitely difficult to understand meaning [as tak-
ing place] in the moment of application.

Giving up his feeling that meaning did have to be understood as something that
took place in the moment of application was still to take him effort. Yet only a few
paragraphs above, the second of that day, and printed on page 59, he had written a
paragraph that one can easily interpret as in accord with his later understanding of
meaning. Try, instead, to read it as concerning only the momentary (page 233).

A word only has meaning in the complex of its sentence: that is as if to say
that a stick is only a lever when used. Only its [momentary] application
makes it into a lever.

And consider this triple of sub-paragraphs, put into the fellowship submission as an
ordinary paragraph (also printed on page 59), where it reads as entirely consistent
with the later understanding, from the same, i.e. momentary, point of view. It is
written immediately after the difficulty of understanding how meaning comes in
the moment of application (page 233).

What does it mean, for example, to understand a sentence as one member
of a sentence-system / system of sentences /?

(It is as if I should say: the application of a word does not happen in a
moment.)

(As little as that of a lever?)

Moreover, consider this pair of paragraphs, printed on the same page nearly as writ-
ten, except that the first, though it seems to bring us home to the later understand-
ing, is written but not printed as a question, and is not marked in the manuscript
with approval, while the second, which appears to contradict it, is so marked (page
234).

Can one say: the meaning of a sentence is its purpose? [Or of a word “its
meaning is its purpose”.] [[The quotation in English and the brackets
Wittgenstein’s.]]

But the natural history of the use of a word cannot concern logic.
The tidy printing is prefaced by an unprinted paragraph, written on the 14th, that, while he dismisses it, seems to hint at the distinction he came to draw between psychology and the philosophical analysis of psychological concepts. It also has a second use of the word “Sackgasse” (page 235).

There is a kind of philosophy, – one could call it psychologistic philosophy but I haven’t yet found a really good name for it – which always speaks of associations and the simultaneous or roughly simultaneous occurrence of events A, B and C, of the similar component parts of two events that have the consequence that the whole comes to mind when a part gains our attention. A typical philosophical dead end. The mixture of precision striven for and actual irrelevance.

The ‘tidy’ printing begins at the end of page 59 with the opening of § 16 and completes Section II. Some omitted paragraphs and quite a few differences in paragraphing do not need to be detailed, whereas the printed paragraphs do require comment. The very first asks how an awaited event can be compared, when it happens, with one’s expectation of it, rather as there had appeared to be a problem in visualising a blue sky on a rainy day. It is not until the 8th of February that this query takes on the philosophical gravity of an argument with Russell (and Ogden and Richards), which is expressed in Section III, by which time the original apparent problem of visualising what isn’t there has dropped out of consideration. Next needing comment is the origin of § 17, written on the 14th of January. This is where the obsession with the momentary as the basis of meaning seems to be given up. “It is clear that here we are in a region that does not concern us at all, and that we should retreat from as rapidly as possible.” His “schleunigst retirieren” is one of those Wittgenstein phrases that stick in the mind forever. Someone (presumably colour blind) asks if a red curtain is green, and one simply looks and says “no, red”; one doesn’t need to visualise green and make a comparison first. Clearly, logic doesn’t concern itself with this query one way or the other, and so the “lively play of mental images that accompanies our uttering the sentence” is irrelevant – but as will be seen, it still remains relevant to Wittgenstein.

On the next day, the 15th of January, a paragraph compares “what is a word?” with “what is a chess piece?”, another step towards the Investigations concept of meaning, but on the 16th there is a step backwards. The two outer paragraphs are combined as one to make the final paragraph of Section II, and the middle one is omitted (page 242).
If I see two patches of colour side by side, and say they have the same colour, and if I say this patch has the same colour as one I’ve seen before, then the latter statement of identity means something different, because it is verified in a different way.

One can say: that is not the colour \textit{that I mean}.

Knowing that it \textit{was} the same colour is something different from knowing that it is the same colour.

I have already said that Wittgenstein modified this kind of dogmatism in respect of alternative mathematical proofs in 1941, but a similar watershed for colour identity escapes me. To be sure, in the final colour notes there is a denial of identity to transparent green and opaque green, but that is not dogmatism – it is colour common sense.

The opening paragraph of Section III was written on the same day, but the second was not written until the 8\textsuperscript{th} of February, just before Russell, Ogden and Richards appear. The first, on drawing a plan to correspond to a description, is echoed many times in the second half of Volume IV and the earlier parts of Volume V, and in meeting these remarks, about thinking being like making plans, one has to remember that this means \textit{drawing} plans, not making plans for the holidays. The second paragraph tells us that a false interpretation of the functioning of language destroys the whole of logic, and the next two declare the importance of intention to language’s function and the essence of intention being to have a picture of what one intends. This idea is much refined in work that bridges this present effort, aimed at obtaining a grant and then a fellowship, and the analysis of intention in \textit{Philosophische Grammatik}, but here Wittgenstein caricatures the Russell theory by saying that if one gives someone an order and he does something that gives one pleasure, then that, whatever it may be, constitutes carrying out the order.

Not until printed page 67 does Section III return to these January notes, on the nonsense of saying that we can never be sure what we really expected, and then in a paragraph that is split between its first half written on the 19\textsuperscript{th} and its second on the 26\textsuperscript{th} (pages 247 and 256).

The \textit{agreement} of signals always contains a generality, otherwise the agreement is unnecessary. It is an agreement that has to come to be understood in the particular case.

If I say to someone that \textit{tomorrow} the weather is going to be fine, he testifies to his understanding me by not trying to verify my proposition \textit{now}. 


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What has been keeping Wittgenstein from the subject of intention is mainly a preoccupation with hypotheses, but other things besides. On the 20\textsuperscript{th} he had noted, in code, that he had given his first scheduled lecture: “so, so”. On the 21\textsuperscript{st} he drew a diagram which in print (on page 283) is one of Rhees’s worst misunderstandings. He prints it skew, but it is a standard diagram of a sine curve approximated by additions of the terms of $x - \frac{x^3}{3!} + \frac{x^5}{5!} \ldots$, and Wittgenstein sketches it very competently, and copies it well on page 130 of TS 209. In this context of hypotheses it is a rather fanciful illustration of a point made in the paragraph above it, about the course of an experience being represented by the course of a curve.

The viewpoint from which Wittgenstein is considering hypotheses in this region is best expressed by a paragraph on page 249 that had been written on the 20\textsuperscript{th} and is also printed on page 283.

Talk about sense data and immediate experience has the significance that we are looking for a non-hypothetical representation.

Even after giving up his phenomenological language, and after declaring that realism and idealism are mere pseudo hypotheses, he retains a wish to interpret matters in a way that led him in a later lecture to classify “this is a chair” as an hypothesis. On the 17\textsuperscript{th} he had said for the second time that he might be confusing I\textsuperscript{st} and II\textsuperscript{nd} systems, and in an unprinted paragraph written on the 18\textsuperscript{th} he says (page 247):

> It is probable that my whole interpretation (up to now) of propositions must as it were be turned through a small angle in order to be correct, – to really fit.

On the 20\textsuperscript{th}, after recording that his first lecture was so, so, he continues (page 247):

> Sentences, that is to say what we normally call them, the sentences of our daily life, behave, it seems to me, differently from what logic understands by propositions, if there are such things at all.

Namely, because of their hypothetical character. Events do not seem to be verified or falsified in my original sense: rather, there is as it were always another door left open. Verification and its contrary are not definitive.

Now might it be possible that everything I believe I know for certain, such as: that I had parents, that I have siblings, that I am in England, that all that should turn out to be false? That is to say, could I ever recognise a piece of evidence as sufficient to show that? And could there then be some stronger evidence that the first evidence had been a deception?
If I say “over there is a chair”, then this sentence relates to a series of expectations. I believe anyone around will be able to touch the chair and also be able to sit on it, I believe it is made of wood and I expect it to have a degree of hardness, inflammability etc. etc. If certain of these expectations are disappointed I shall regard that as evidence that there wasn’t after all a chair over there.

Here one sees how the pragmatic interpretation of true and false can get in. A proposition is true so long as it turns out to be useful.

Every sentence we utter in everyday life seems to have the character of an hypothesis.

An hypothesis is a logical structure. That is to say, a symbol for which certain rules of representation hold. [This paragraph is in print, unlike the previous ones, on page 283, where it is followed by the remark about sense data already quoted and paired with one written on the next day. This in turn brings us to the context of the diagram for the sine series.]

Altogether, we are encountering a perplexing mixture of common sense (there are even resemblances to passages towards the end of *On Certainty*) and a dogmatism which is difficult to specify. It will still be found in place in September 1930, when these notes have led to a typescript and that in turn to the fellowship submission (though the actual date of its cutting and pasting has not to the best of my knowledge been ascertained), and when Volume IV has been completed and Volume V reached its hundredth page. A sentence in the general sense is a group of words that will normally be found to have justified the terms “true” or “false”, but a proposition in the strict sense is one that justifies one of those terms unambiguously and immediately. Such, for example, is “That is red” when uttered by someone looking at something red (or a liar looking at something blue or a colour-blind person looking at something green). “That is a chair” must wait for a committee to carry out an inspection before it counts as a proposition, and meanwhile is only an hypothesis – except that prefacing it by such a phrase as “It appears that” means that the committee can declare it a proposition at once, knowing that it is already unambiguously true or false, and can only be false if uttered by a liar. (See page 120 of Volume V, written on the 10th of September.)

My interpretation of Wittgenstein’s almost private meanings for “hypothesis” and “proposition”, which I have reinforced by paraphrasing September remarks to show that it was not going to be quickly abandoned, is also reinforced by the first
paragraph written on the 21st of January (page 250), marked with approval but not printed. If it had been it would presumably have joined Section XXII.

If an hypothesis cannot be definitively verified, it cannot be verified at all and there is no truth or falsehood for it [to take].

Yet, bewilderingly, on the 15th (p. 240) he had written a paragraph that could have gone straight into Investigations (see § 108):

I do not believe that logic can talk of sentences in any other way / meaning / than we ordinarily do if we say “what is written here is a sentence” or “no, that only looks like a sentence but isn’t one” etc. etc.

Of course, this is less bewildering if one remembers that in German he had only one word, “Satz”, to do duty for “sentence” and “proposition”, and is here clearly not talking of propositions. In contrast, in the second sub-paragraph of Investigations § 108 he gives a strong impression of wanting to embrace both. And perhaps I should also say that while it seems natural for me, and I assume most contemporary philosophers, to call Wittgenstein’s meanings for the two terms “hypothesis” and “proposition” almost private, it was by no means so then, being quite in accord with the views of Schlick, Carnap and the Vienna Circle.

Wittgenstein returns to the problem of intention (joined by expectation) before January is over, and two paragraphs in particular lead us towards the analysis that he finally opposes to Russell’s, polishing it in the large manuscript books and small notebooks that prepare the ground for Philosophische Grammatik. These are written on the 27th and 28th respectively (pages 260 and 265), and are printed on pages 69 and 71.

Could we think at all of a language in which the expectation that p will happen was not described with the help of p?

Isn’t that just as impossible as a language that expressed ~p without the help of “p”? I believe so.

and

The expectation of p and the occurrence of p perhaps correspond to the hollow and the solid shape of a body. p corresponds there to the three dimensional form, and the different styles in which this form appears correspond to expectation and occurrence.

If these seem mysterious, they will be less so when we meet the final polishing, but meanwhile, written on the 30th (page 266) and printed on page 72, this paragraph expresses the problem in a way that any non-specialist will surely find meaningful.
What is strange about expectation is that we do know that it is an expectation. For this situation, for example, is unthinkable: I am having some visual image or other and say “at the moment I don’t know if that is an expectation or a memory or just an image without any relationship to reality”.

And that, really, shows that expectation hangs together immediately with reality.

For one naturally couldn’t say that even the future that expectation speaks of – I mean the concept of future – does nothing but represent the real future!

For I expect with exactly the reality with which I wait. [The German verbs are respectively “erwarten” and “warten”.

In contrast I often find myself (perhaps as a result of reaching an age well beyond Wittgenstein’s) saying to myself “am I remembering doing that or only remembering intending to do it?”

Then, on the 31st, there is a “two hypotheses” paragraph which, unlike the one we have already met, is not removed from a toothache context but printed in one in Section VI, on page 93. I find it difficult not to read it as ironical, for it says that he would speak in a sympathetic tone of voice of someone who had no toothache but behaved as if he had. Yet on the 7th of February, the day before Russell enters, he writes a paragraph suggesting that he had meant this seriously but was now having doubts, followed by the very paragraph that in editing he applied to idealism / realism, and in a third he gives a reason for thinking he had been wrong, with a sub-paragraph about pain in chairs which I find meaningless (page 287).

But isn’t there a difference after all between the assumptions that other people are in pain and that they aren’t and are merely behaving as I do when I am in pain?

According to my principle the two assumptions must be identical in meaning if all possible experience that confirms one also confirms the other. If, in other words, no decision between the two by means of experience is conceivable.

But to say that they are not in pain presupposes that it is meaningful to say that they are in pain.

I believe it is clear that one says in the same sense that other people are in pain as one says that a chair isn’t.
What has kept the subjects of intention and expectation in abeyance (later joined by related psychological concepts) is mainly paragraphs on colour and visual space, some going into Section IV and others into Section XXI, most of whose contributions were written later in February, when Volume III had been filled up and Volume IV used again, and early in March, prior to a return to Vienna for the Easter vacation. Cambridge entries ended on the 13th of March, and there is a textually significant point to make about them. They end with two paragraphs on probability that are printed as one, in two subparagraphs, at the very end of the book’s last section, XXII. This suggests to me strongly that Wittgenstein had already planned how the book was to end before going to Vienna. Once there he had various items still to write and would then dictate his typescript, but before travelling he had tried to give Russell, in Sussex, a viva voce account of his philosophical progress, promising him a synopsis.

When this was delivered in early April (in Cornwall) it was not a synopsis at all but what Russell described as “a large quantity of typescript” (letter to Moore of 5.5.1930, on page 236 of the Nedo and Ranchetti book) – in other words TS 208 in its original form. In the form of TS 209 it was presented as an application for the fellowship that was awarded on the 5th of December, but meanwhile Wittgenstein used the “large quantity of typescript” to apply for a grant of £100, obtained in May. I had always seen this as pulling a fast one on the College, but if the cut and pasted TS 209 was already planned before TS 208 was dictated, one must conclude that he fully intended from the beginning to use his efforts to apply for both, and must have given some indication of this to Russell.

Nowhere in the notes written from April to November have I found any clue to when the cutting and pasting was actually done, but I can at least offer a reason why nothing from those notes was inserted into the fellowship submission. Written in the second half of Volume IV, on page 160 and on the 5th of May, is a parenthetical paragraph which indicates that he sees himself as guilty of philosophical dogmatism but has still not discovered a method of overcoming it.

(I fight again and again – whether successfully or not I do not know – against the tendency in my own mind to set up, (to construct), rules in philosophy, to make assumptions (hypotheses) instead of only seeing what is there.)

Before leaving the notes that led to TSS 208 and 209, however, I must mention a few individual paragraphs that offer markers for anybody reading them, without any pretence of providing a comprehensive summary. This paragraph, written on
the 16\textsuperscript{th} of January on page 243 of Volume III, contains overtones that are not apparent.

The problem of representing.

For if I wish that p were the case, p isn’t the case, and in the very wish itself \([\textit{in dem Sachverhalt des Wunsches}]\) p must be represented, as after all it is in the expression of the wish.

This, slightly cut down, is in print on page 66, and readers may find illumination in paragraphs written the next day and printed with it as subparagraphs, but to me the explanation comes in three further paragraphs, written on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of January and the 1\textsuperscript{st} of February, and finally, after this work was completed, on the 31\textsuperscript{st} of July on page 277 of Volume IV.

The expectation, the thought, the wish etc. that p will occur is only that if these processes have the multiplicity that expresses itself in p, and thus only if they are \textit{articulated}. But then they are what I call the interpretation of symbols. [Volume III, page 262]

Certainly the thought of ordinary people takes place in a mixture of symbols, in which perhaps the really linguistic ones form only a small part.

I call thought what can be expressed by means of a language. For it must be translated into this language from some \textit{other} one. I mean: all thinking must take place in symbols. [Volume IV, page 277]

Wittgenstein only admitted the possibility of wordless thoughts in the post-war manuscript books that provided him with material for Part II of \textit{Investigations}, but as an undergraduate I took for granted the dogma that all thought was conducted in language, partly from reading his contraband typescripts and partly from what was in the air in those days. Of course, if one has a wordless thought one can then express it in words, but the half-way house, expressed in those four paragraphs, that in so far as a thought is wordless, or partly wordless, it must still have taken place articulately, or in symbols of some kind, and that a sentence expressing a wish must have been ‘represented’ in the very wish itself – all this is quite unnecessary to finding, as one frequently does, that one has had a wordless thought.

The first thing written in Vienna was a last ‘whole day’ summary paragraph (it is on Ramsey’s theory of identity, reminding one of a joke of Lewis Carroll’s about a stationary clock that tells the right time twice a day, and is in print on page 143), but there is one other summary paragraph, written among paragraphs on arithmetic and printed unobtrusively on page 281 among the colour passages of Section XXI.
The danger that lies in wanting to see things as simpler than they are in reality is often overestimated these days. But the danger does actually exist in the highest degree in the phenomenological investigation of sense impressions. These are always taken to be much simpler than they are in reality. [Volume IV, page 115]

I am leaving readers to find for themselves the February colour work of Section XXI, which Wittgenstein appears to think conforms with that criticism, but in my view even the much more ambitious colour work of the final notes is simpler than colour impressions really are. I shall add two observations of my own at the end of this chapter to try to make my point.

Probability is an important component in the ‘complex of ideas’ that came with and followed the phenomenological language quest, and there is one aspect of it that I must draw attention to. Wittgenstein had already discussed this in a paragraph written on the 3rd of December 1929, printed on page 291 just beyond some late paragraphs that bring it up again. Is it a contradiction of his general ideas on probability if the following happens? Someone finds that he repeatedly throws ones with a die that has no detectable faults and that other people throw normally. He will resist strongly the explanation that there is some law of nature that applies only to him, because so much previous evidence argues against there being anything special about him, to say nothing of previous evidence about dice without detectable faults being ‘long run reliable’.

On the 10th of March 1930, just before moving to Vienna, he begins the late paragraphs in question, introducing them with an abstract diagram of a differential gear that unfortunately Rhees gets wrong in printing (on page 288, with the arrow marked “drive” pointing in the same direction as “intended movement” instead of opposite to it). The relevance of this is vitiated by the fact that even with Wittgenstein’s correct arrows the mechanism does not have the freedom needed for a differential, but on the next day the logical point he is making does become clear (and comes into print on pages 295–297). Here he draws a linear diagram that I believe derives from a rectangular one drawn by Bayes (in illustrating his assumption, as distinct from what came to be known as his theorem). This assumption was that the probabilities met in statistics were equiprobable, illustrated here by a line AB cut unequally by a point C, the probability that a point of light should land on CB rather than AC being the proportion CB:AC. Wittgenstein disputes this with what becomes a rather tortuous thought experiment, which I leave readers to look up, but it comes down to earth with “the case of the die”. Unlike the former die, this one has five sides that are jointly paired against the sixth. Contrary, apparently,
to all common sense, he asks what, apart from experience, prevents him from considering the two alternatives as equiprobable.

Now the first mathematicians to investigate probability took for granted that the six sides of a die or the two sides of a coin were equiprobable if they had not been tampered with. The earliest quotation I have found to the contrary comes in Laplace’s *Mémoire sur les Probabilités* of 1778, published in 1781. He discusses “a coin which is not quite symmetrical”. I have not found anywhere a discussion of a coin which is symmetrical in all physical tests but turns out to be slightly biased in long run statistical tests. The assumption that *either* physical tests must eventually reveal flaws or long run tests must eventually confirm equiprobability is a statistical superstition, and readers of Ian Hacking’s books on the logic and history of statistics will know it as Queteletism. In general this is the assumption that in any phenomenon that lends itself to statistical enquiry there must always be some hidden background probability that causes the observed results, and which the statistician’s task is, not to discover, because it is undiscoverable, but to estimate the reliability of any guess as to its measure. Once one has abandoned this superstition one can see that Wittgenstein did not need his tortuous thought experiments, based most imaginatively on the curved mirrors one finds in fun fairs. It is simply not an a priori truth but a matter for experience and experiment to make the common sense assumption that a well made six sided die will have all its sides roughly equal in probability and that the only way to achieve a die that gives one side the combined probability of the other five is to insert into it a substantial lump of lead.

The paragraphs on arithmetic (and more interestingly cardinality) which begin on the second day of Vienna notes, the 21st of March, look as if they hark back to notes written on the 16th of February, and they may be given their theme in a one day entry of the 23rd which never reached the printed book (Volume IV, page 118):

Critique of the Fregean theory of cardinal numbers. It must begin with the critique of the concepts “concept” and “object”.

The opening paragraph of the 21st (page 114) is the following, printed at the top of page 130 without its introductory line, without its diagram and without its final sub-paragraph:

The introduction of cardinal numbers.

Do I count horses in a stable with the same numbers as the kinds of ani-
mals in the stable? Or the dashes along a line as I count the kinds of groups of dashes (by their cardinalities)?

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The fact that I can count people and races of people, patches of colour and colours, is what is remarkable.

Whether they are cardinal numbers in the same sense depends of course on whether the same syntactical rules hold for them.

It is conceivable that there is no person in a room, but not that there is a person in it of no race.

If that is an essential difference it must naturally carry through the whole of arithmetic.

The February paragraphs, if this one and its successors do hark back to them, and if they explain the relevance of Frege, are (Volume IV, page 64):

To what extent is the concept of cardinal number connected with the concept of subject and predicate? [Not printed.]

Russell and Frege interpret concept as it were as a property of a thing. But it is very unnatural to interpret the words person, tree, tract, circle as properties of a substratum. [Printed on page 120. Compare page 125 of the Ambrose Lectures.]

The principium individuationis must have the property. Must be its bearer. [Not printed.]

If a table is painted brown, one can easily think of the wood as the bearer of the property brown, and one can imagine what remains if the colour changes... [Printed on page 120.]

We shall again have to keep to ordinary language, and that says that a patch has the form of a circle.

It is clear that the word [i.e. phrase] bearer of the property gives a quite false – impossible – idea here. – If I have a lump of clay I can think of it as the bearer of a shape and that, roughly, is what this idea comes from.

“The patch changes its shape” and “the lump of clay changes its shape” are, precisely, different forms of proposition. [The two paragraphs printed as one on page 121.]
But the words “patch” and “Fleck” alike can be used for a daub of paint that spreads as it dries, like a lump of clay sagging as it dries, equally with meaning a shape that has a certain colour. A projected shape can change its colour (by changing colour filters in the projector), a daub of paint can change its colour (by the chemical action of air on its pigment, or by bleaching in sunlight) and a lump of clay can change shape as it sags. One might say in English that these are the same form of sentence but different forms of proposition, if one means by this that different explanations can be given of what is going on. The extreme difference that Wittgenstein is driving at is between all of those and the fiction of saying that some substratum has the property of being a table. He has simply been rather too clever in illustrating this fiction. And I am sure he has been unfair in ascribing it to Frege, who did, as I have put it, treat subject and predicate, object and concept, and argument and function as part and parcel of the same idea, but who would surely have found a way of distancning himself from the absurdity that Wittgenstein puts on him.

In trying to put the ‘primary language’ quest into perspective, I need to mention an article by David Pears in the second Wittgenstein Studien of 2000. He points out that in 5.64 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that solipsism, strictly carried out, coincides with pure realism, as well as saying, in the 15.10.1916 entry of the 1914–1917 notebooks, that idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out. Pears also points out that in 5.62 of the Tractatus he says that solipsism ‘means’ something that can only ‘show itself’ or ‘make itself manifest’ (different translations), which complicates matters by introducing an asymmetry (examined by Pears in detail in his article). Nevertheless, one cannot help wondering why, if he had come so close to finding an identity in 1916 and the final Tractatus, it took him so much effort in 1929–1930 to declare that idealism and realism are equally meaningless pseudo hypotheses.

Further evidence that some kind of leaning towards idealism began long before 1929 can be found in the Bouwsma conversations. On page 13, a propos of Descartes, there is the metaphor of the image on the screen and the frames on the roll of celluloid, and on page 10 the fact that this metaphor occurred to Wittgenstein when he was visiting Frege. He takes Descartes’s cogito to mean “I am conscious”. Quoting in Bouwsma’s inverted commas:

“I always think of it as like the cinema. You see before you the picture on the screen, but behind you is the operator, and he has a roll on this side
from which he is winding and another on that side into which he is winding. The present is the picture which is before the light, but the future is still on this roll to pass, and the past is on that roll. It’s gone through already. Now [my italics] imagine that there is only the present. There is no future roll and no past roll. And now further imagine what language there could be in such a situation. One could just gape. This!”

(referred to by me at the beginning of this chapter).

As to the reverberations which Wittgenstein’s language quest left with him after he had given it up, there are many pieces of evidence. This one comes from page 496 of the Big Typescript, in the ‘Idealismus’ section, where it echoes a ‘magic fen’ passage already quoted.

(For, what importance has this description of the present phenomenon which can be a kind of idée fixe for us? That we suffer under the fact that the description cannot describe what goes on as the description is read. It seems as if the preoccupation with this question were positively childish and as if we had stumbled into a dead end. And yet it is a significantly dead end, for it entices everyone to go in; as if the final solution to the philosophical problem were to be sought there. – It is as if one came with this way of representing the present phenomenon into a spell-bound fen in which everything graspable disappears.)

I have already mentioned § 436 of Investigations in which his former special use of “phenomena” is replaced by the normal use. Then there is its § 98, with “… as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense and a perfect language awaited construction by us”. Like most readers, I originally took this perfect language to be a formal one, but Wittgenstein will have had both kinds in mind. In Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, on page 45, spoken (in effect dictated, since Waismann was taking shorthand notes) on the 22nd of December 1929, there is

I believed earlier that there is a colloquial language, in which we all normally speak, and a primary language, which expresses what we really know, in other words the phenomena. I also spoke of a first system and a second system. Now I would like to explain why I no longer hold this view.

I believe that essentially we have only one language and that is ordinary language. We don’t still have to invent a new language or to construct a symbolism: colloquial language is already the language, assuming that we rid it of the unclarities that are hidden in it.
Our language is already completely in order, if one is only clear what it symbolises. Languages other than the ordinary ones are also valuable in so far as they show us what is common between them. For certain purposes, for example for representing the relation of inference, an artificial symbolism is very useful. Frege, Peano and Russell actually only ever had the application to mathematics in mind in constructing symbolic logic, and weren’t thinking of representing real states of affairs [but Wittgenstein did find the artificial representation of real states of affairs a valuable comparison in his earliest language games].

An explicit reference comes in MS 152 (also called C 8), written in 1936, where, after a pessimistic preface that seems to be for the doomed Versuch einer Umarbeitung of the Brown Book, and well into a region of Investigations sketches, we find on page 92:

“Phenomenological Language”. Belief in its necessity. It seemed as if language were, somehow, coarse, an imperfect representation of the facts and only to be understood as a coarse, imperfect portrayal. As if philosophy had to improve it, refine it, in order to understand the structure of the world. Then it became clear that it must understand language as it is, that is recognise it, because the aim isn’t a new clarity which the old language doesn’t give, but the elimination of philosophical mistakes [“bewilderment” added in English].

In the February 1937 notebook MS 157b (page 11r) there is the phrase “Phänomenologische Spr.” (Wittgenstein’s inverted commas), but nothing is done with it – perhaps it is a mnemonic for the above. In the 1938 Volume XVII (MS 121), mainly mathematical, there is a beautiful aside which became my favourite as soon as I found it. For its poetry I quote it in German, from page 11r, 13.5.[38].

Wir sehen die Fata morgana einer Sprache vor uns die nicht existiert.
(“Komm, lass mich dich fassen!”)

(“Fata Morgana” is standard German for a mirage, but it also has poetic and legendary overtones. I quote this again in its context ahead, in Chapter 7.)

An even later echo (3rd of January 1948) comes on page 51a of MS 136, which Wittgenstein called Band Q, reminding one of the devil’s punchbowl (“Talkessel”).

In philosophy one must climb down into the old chaos and feel good there [sich wohl fühlen].
I should also like to quote two more *Investigations* paragraphs, one written before the war (§ 90, or § 87 in the pre-war TS 220, § 94 in the mid-war TS 239) and the other only included after it, though drafted in 1931 (it is the opening of § 120). They are respectively:

It is as if we had to look through the appearances: our investigation, however, is directed not towards the appearances but, as one could say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of appearances. We direct our minds, that is to say, towards the *kind of statement* that we make about appearances. [“Erscheinungen” throughout, taking over the old meaning of “phenomena”.]

If I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of everyday. Is this language too coarse or material, perhaps, for what we want to say? *And how is another one to be constructed, then? [Und wie wird denn eine andere gebildet?]*

The whole of § 120 was first drafted on the 29th of June 1931 in Volume VI, but without the tell-tale italics of its first paragraph, when Wittgenstein had been copying from a preliminary notebook, MS 153a, but had paused to correct an error in his thought. This error, of explaining meaning as coming from images that accompany words, already much mentioned, is discussed at the end of Chapter 4.

Penultimately, I must add a discovery from Monk’s biography. On page 71 there are two quotations dating from November 1912 and the following vacation. The first is “Can we, therefore, know an object satisfying the hypotheses of physics from our private sense-data?” and the second

Physics exhibits sensations as functions of physical objects.

But epistemology demands that physical objects should be exhibited as functions of sensations.

Thus we have to solve the equations giving sensations in terms of physical objects, so as to make them give physical objects in terms of sensations.

That is all.

These, however, are not Wittgenstein’s but Russell’s, and in January 1913 Wittgenstein writes to him “I cannot imagine your way of working from sense-data forward”.

And finally, I want to offer two quotations of my own. In both of these I found that I had used an object-language word to describe an *appearance*. My excuse for the first is that on page 98 of Volume VI, on the 21st of February 1931, Wittgenstein had written “But I can certainly also ask: what does a sunset look like? even if I ignore everything hypothetical”. The following is my description of a sunset seen
from the foothills of the Cambrian mountains early in 1980, as the failure of my ‘improbable wood business’ was returning me to Berlin’s wishes that I should make a serious study of what Wittgenstein actually wrote.

The sun had left an orange glow in the west beneath a clear sky. In the east, a smoky magenta spread up from the horizon. Between, against a short ridge of the Cambrian Mountains, the two colour effects were bridged by a strange, luminous olive sheen which I do not remember ever having seen before.

The word “smoky” is the crux. In itself it is a physical word, but I intended no hypothesis as to the existence of smoke in the sky. I used the word to draw attention to the different impressions of light between the western and eastern skies. Light was diffusing from the western sky, and in the east it appeared rather to be reflected from the sky. The smoky magenta was thus not a light-source effect but a reflected one, while over a spur of the Cambrian Mountains there was a betwixt and between effect that I could find no description for. In text books of colour science it is claimed that certain colours (drab ones, olive green among them) are never seen in the first manner. It is said, for example, to be impossible to see brown as a light source: that is why I was so interested to see an olive green ‘sheen’ midway between the two effects. Grey is another such colour, as Wittgenstein must have known when he wrote in his late colour notes that there is no such colour as a glowing grey. He died before it became quite common to see glowing greys – in a context where bright fluorescent white lights are seen with less bright ones, which appear as glowing, because that is what they are, and also as grey, because of the context of the brighter lights.

I offer no excuse for the second quotation, in which, also, an object-language word sprang to my lips for a phenomenological purpose. I was in the allotments behind my Aberarth cottage watching a red kite flying in bright sunlight in a cloudless sky. For a moment it flew directly over me, and with the sun shining through it all I could see was glowing colour. “Jewel of a bird!” I said to myself. Now “jewel”, like “bird”, comes from object-language, but I was using it to express a purely visual experience. There are many examples to be found by the visually adventurous, and the linguistically adventurous may find ways of describing them without using object-language. Dark vision is a fascinating region of experience waiting for people to leave their torches at home and describe it. And of course, sight is not the only sense offering such possibilities.
Chapter 4

The Genesis of Philosophische Grammatik

Philosophische Grammatik is far less distant from us in philosophical time than Philosophische Bemerkungen is. We begin to feel at home with it. It is possible, therefore, to treat it quite differently: we can try to take a bird’s eye view of it – overlook it, as Wittgenstein said in some English lecture notes (in MS 153b, page 5r, which would mean page 9 in a normally paginated book). I hope that my detailed examination of the manuscript origins of Philosophische Bemerkungen will help other scholars to take a bird’s eye of that. In the case of Philosophische Grammatik there are three stages to consider: first, how Wittgenstein’s ideas grew towards the ideas of that book, second how he expressed them once he had arrived at them, and thirdly how he drafted the book – in an extremely complicated manner which I can only give an outline of. The present chapter deals with only the first of those three, and the reader needs to be warned that while we may feel at home with the ideas arrived at, the manner of arriving at them will often entail surmounting problems that we had assumed to be already well settled.

As a preliminary, I need to clear away a possible misunderstanding about the relationship between Grammatik and Investigations. The opening of the former was written on the 20th of June 1931 in Volume VI (MS 110), copied from a smaller notebook; the opening of the latter (Augustine’s over simplified notion of language-learning) was written, directly, on the 15th of that July in Volume VII (MS 111). This might suggest that the two books developed side by side, but in fact the idea of the more didactically designed Investigations grew only slowly, out of Wittgenstein’s teaching experience and his dictation to students of the Blue and Brown Books, the latter in particular. The Augustine idea was used (rather briefly) in Grammatik and gives no impression of standing out from the other ideas of the book.

After dictating TS 208 in Vienna and leaving it with Russell in Cornwall on his way back to Cambridge, Wittgenstein began writing again in Volume IV (MS 108) on the 24th of April 1930, mainly on mathematics and logic. A general
remark written on the 13th of May has already been quoted towards the end of the previous chapter. On the 11th and the 14th there are remarks about the Sheffer stroke that do concern its logic and not merely the manner of its discovery. Then, after entries dated the 25th, there is a pause, presumably while waiting for the grant and travelling to Vienna, and on the 12th of June on page 176 there is an entry beginning “Zur Frage nach der Existenz der Sinnesdaten”, self-contained and consisting of three fairly long sub-paragraphs. There is an interesting comparison with them in an English lecture preparation on page 9v of MS 159 (marked as apparently 1938), which uses the phrase “immediately aware”. The problem is the same in both: if one has a fleeting image that later does not seem to tally with reality, then at least one had that image. The question is how one expresses this simple matter. In June 1930: “One says, if something seems to be red, then there must have been something that had been red.” In this and the following sub-paragraphs he makes an important point, that in declaring something to appear to be so we always have some idea of testing whether the thing in question is so, compared with which any idea of testing whether the appearance had been so is a chimera. Nevertheless, he seems reluctant to give this chimera up, a reluctance expressed by three dashes at the end of the third sub-paragraph.

… then at least there was something in the appearance that corresponded to being red. – If it seems as if a physical object were brown and round, that naturally doesn’t mean that there has to be something in the physical sense brown and round, but [still] something that corresponds is the case. But how far can one speak of something that corresponds? – – – [running onto page 178]

Whereas, in a paragraph written on the 20th of July, these very dashes seem to be answered:

I am expecting to see a yellow patch and now [i.e. when it appears] I say “yes, I imagined it like that, that’s what I was expecting”. And [suppose] someone asked me then “how do you know you were expecting that, after all you didn’t see it?” It is obvious that this question means nothing (and that this contains the solution to my problem).

Returning to the 12th of June, there are also three interesting paragraphs which might seem to presage Wittgenstein’s dismissal in Investigations (§ 114) of the Tractatus’s “this is how things are” as the general form of a proposition (and in § 134 with the joke “this is how things are, and that’s why I need an advance”). In 1930 he compares “sentence” with “event” as a word so general that there is no point in
trying to specify what counts as an event and what doesn’t. Even “experiment” is such a word, in spite of its scientific air of being more specific. The third of these paragraphs reads:

“With that an event happened … – ”: that doesn’t mean “an event” in contrast to something else.

These criticisms, however, restrict themselves to the over-generality of the word “sentence”, while “how things are” will be found ahead, on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of September, still hardly criticised. Paragraphs on set theory follow, criticising its ‘doctrine’ as distinct from its calculus, meaning presumably by doctrine what he usually dismisses as mathematicians’ prose, but however misleading that can be it does not seem to me to deserve the comparison between the rules of chess and mere descriptions of the shapes of chesmen. It is not until the 17\textsuperscript{th} of June that a subject is noted that contributes to the emerging programme of \textit{Philosophische Grammatik}, namely intention. It is a puzzling observation, because it includes the word “Phänomen”, one might guess in Wittgenstein’s old sense, when the point is made that our intentions are known to us with immediacy and do not need to be checked (only in the late notes on the philosophy of psychology is there any hint that disturbed people can fail to know their own intentions clearly, and then only by implication, in stories about his friends).

Intention must naturally be a phenomenon too.

That is to say, if one brings all phenomena into consideration and intention isn’t one of them, then neither would it exist.

This metaphysical-sounding claim is brought down to earth by a comparison with anger or annoyance, which follows next. A faulty brake pedal is described as sometimes working and sometimes not. That might put into doubt whether it was really intended as a brake pedal by its designer, but one thing is clear: when it works it causes the car to stop, and when it doesn’t it causes the driver to be annoyed, but between these cases there is a difference: the driver knows what is annoying him and is not merely experiencing a caused effect. Wittgenstein says that this ‘knowing what is annoying one’ is of the same kind as being afraid of something, wanting something, expecting something, “etc.”, but a difference between these does emerge in later passages, and it is important for what I have called the \textit{Grammatik} programme. Annoyance and fear are over and done with when their occasion has passed, but wish and expectation bring with them the further problem of how we know, when the wish is granted or the expectation fulfilled, that what happens is the very thing that we wished or expected. On 17.6.30 Wittgenstein does not dis-
tistinguish between the two cases. What is important for him is that we know at the moment of wishing what we wish, just as we know what is annoying or frightening us, and the same with intending something, and this appears to mean that intentions etc. can only be recognised by the person concerned, as it were from within, and cannot therefore be phenomena. At least this settles that he has been using the word in his new, not his old sense. The matter is very unsatisfactory and takes many weeks of writing to clarify. No allowance is made for the fact that we can properly talk of the phenomenon of a child frightened by a snapping dog, or of the phenomenon of disturbed people not knowing their own intentions. There is another detail that stays in these discussions for more than weeks: Wittgenstein expresses the problem in the phrase “the harmony between world and thought”, and continues to do so frequently. I have always thought that the problem of how to compare an original expectation with its eventual fulfilment was clear and simple, while clothing it in phrases about harmony of world and thought was merely a distraction – as, indeed, he admits on page 152 of MS 114 (in the second section of Volume X, the opening stage of the “extremely complicated” drafting of Philosophische Grammatik): “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be uncovered in grammar”.

Two paragraphs that I find confused, both repeating the word “phenomenon”, are separated by a second “17” date, but in the second an expression of a clear idea seems to emerge. If one has a thought one doesn’t need to interpret it – one has it as that thought. And if interpretation is in question (presumably in the case of ordinary people whose thoughts are unclear) then one is thereby regarding the thought from without, not from within, one is experiencing it, and as such it is a phenomenon. The phenomena of the phenomenological language quest, in contrast, were essentially experienced with immediacy, and not ‘regarded from without’.

The remainder of this day examines expectation’s relationship with the present, something it shares with anger. And the idea above is extended to a distinction between thought and language. We have to understand language, while thought is something we just have. Indeed, thought is the understanding of language, and naturally our understanding of language doesn’t have to be understood all over again. Similarly, an order is understood independently of being carried out (contrary to the causal interpretation of meaning ascribed to Russell), and “an order not understood is not an order” (I think one can make this sound reasonable by saying that an order isn’t an order until it gets through to one). On the 21st of June we reach a remark that puts these considerations into the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophical strategy.
“He hasn’t completely carried the order out”, with that one ought to be able to refute the causal theory of meaning.

– because after all, one has to understand an order given by one person to another before one can judge its causal consequences, while if one has given the order oneself one has the choice of saying “it isn’t quite what I meant but it will do”.

On the 28th there is the first of four possible references to the Tractatus that seem to imply both a preoccupation with it and criticism of it.

A sentence is an object of comparison – but how does the comparison proceed?

The essence of the Tractatus theory of meaning as a comparison between a picture and a state of affairs is that a sentence is itself a kind of picture, a configuration for the state of affairs to be compared with. A longer paragraph following this claims that the fact that I can only discuss the comparison by using language ensures that the truth of “p” is true tells us nothing but p. This is to identify the sentence “p” with the proposition p that it expresses, an idea which, even if valid, neither English nor German grammar suffices to put clearly, let alone to defend.

Two manuscript pages beyond we find a version of a Wittgenstein war cry, which I used to believe showed that he had already solved his problem of the relationship between intention and its fulfilment. In fact, there was still some work for him to do on the subject, and when the cry reappears later, as it were in triumph, there will be found to be a difference in underlining.

It is in language that everything is carried out.

On the 29th, after a paragraph criticising the idea that what verifies or satisfies the thought “that p is the case” deserves to be called p, and declaring that this identification is tantamount to conceding that if I ask for an apple and am given something else that makes me happy I must call that an apple, and another that points out that after all I can talk about what would satisfy a thought or expectation before anything has satisfied it, there is a paragraph that needs to be quoted in full to show its closeness to the Tractatus. It also appears to have a reference to the uncle (Paul) with whom Wittgenstein stayed while on leave towards the end of the first war. In his uncle’s house he wrote what is now known as Prototractatus, and then, his leave up, went to the Italian front, there to be captured, in spite of the chaos in Austria which meant that only duty required him to do so.

For one could think: How is it? A thought and its fact are different; but we call the thought the [thought] that the fact is the case, or the fact the [fact] that makes the thought true. Does that make the one a description with
the help of the other? Is the thought described by means of the fact that makes it true, in other words described according to an external property, as if I say of someone that he is my uncle [presumably in contrast to his having an interior identity of his own]? Or the fact [described] by the thought in the same way?

Later on what could be the same day there is an expression of an idea that stayed with Wittgenstein almost to the end. It is only in the late manuscript books preparing for *Investigations* Part II that he admits the possibility of a wordless thought, and here he maintains that all thought is conducted in words, or at least in symbols. I can give no explanation at all of the addendum in all of the addendum in square brackets.

Thinking is using symbols. [Naturally not using symbols in order to think.]
[[My optimistic italics in order to make some sense.]]

And still before dating jumps to July, an explicitly *Tractatus* paragraph that must be quoted in full:

> I came upon the picture theory of language in those days through a newspaper notice which said that in Paris, in a court case about a street accident, the accident was presented by dolls and little omnibuses. What distinguishes such a presentation from a game with dolls etc.? (Naturally the meaning does) but what does that consist in? (Some people would say: in its effect, which is all the meaning there is.)

This origin of the picture theory of meaning has been known for a long while. The story was told in a post-graduate seminar conducted by Ryle in my first term at Oxford (autumn, 1948). It was a pleasure to see it confirmed when I found this passage in 1991.

For a last June quotation I give two paragraphs which I think are badly expressed but indicate a theme that Wittgenstein has been driving at.

What is essential about thought is that it does not work as a means to an end, as an instrument that one could replace by another, but as something incomparable, autonomous.

That is why one cannot imagine any kind of spare-limb for thought / a spare-limb for thought is unthinkable.

Under the date 8.7 Wittgenstein expresses his problem of expectation and then comes a step towards solving it.
In expectation one expects precisely what is not given in the signs [an alternative word for “symbols”].

Expectation and the fact that satisfies the expectation obviously fit together in some way. One has got to describe an expectation and a fact, which fit each other, so that one sees what this agreement consists in. One thinks there at once of the fitting of a solid shape into the corresponding hollow shape. But if one wants, now, to describe both, one sees that in so far as they do fit one description holds for both.

A little further in this day’s notes he distils out of this another (much repeated) war cry:

Expectation and satisfaction relate to each other like hollow shape to solid shape.

And after one more paragraph there is what one could think is the final solution, leaving only polishing rather than philosophical effort to come – but while he later repeats the problem in a way that at first seems mere polishing, there is no doubt that he still feels that the solution requires effort.

The expectation of the satisfaction of the expectation that p will take place is the expectation that p will take place.

The thought of the content of the thought p is the thought p. And that contains the truth about all the questions that are raised in this matter.

On the 21st of July there is a re-expression of a point that has been made previously:

What is characteristic about thought, what makes it so important for us, is that when we think we don’t have the feeling of interpreting anything.

and I must also mention a paragraph already quoted as solving a previous problem, though it is also related to the matter in hand here – the meaninglessness of asking how one knows what one was expecting to see. And on the 25th the matter in hand is extended to orders: someone who complains that an order has not been properly carried out must have at his linguistic disposal the means to describe both what he wanted to happen and what has actually happened.

I mean: If he is not in agreement with the carrying out of the order he must be able to say what the fault is. But if he can say that at all, i.e. make himself understood to me, he must make his description relate to the way in which I understand him. He must, precisely, give me more signs.
This use of the word “Zeichen” introduces an idea which becomes very productive, not only in Philosophische Grammatik but in the first 315 pages of Volume XII (MS 116), which opens as a polishing of Grammatik and continues with ideas towards Investigations. The opening paragraphs of Bemerkungen I, used in the post-war reworking of Investigations, put the point beautifully.

If I give someone an order I feel it quite enough to give him signs. And if I am given an order, I should never say: “this is only words, and I have got to get behind the words”. And when I have asked someone something and he gives me an answer I am content – that was just what I expected – and I don’t raise the objection: “but that’s a mere answer”.

(The deep aspect escapes easily.)

But if you say: “How am I to know what he means when I see nothing but the signs he gives?” then I say: “How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?”

In Grammatik these can be found on the second printed page, from which the deep aspect has escaped altogether, and in Investigations, where the deep aspect has become § 387, in §§ 503 and 504; while in Volume XII (MS 116) their substance can be found on pages 5 and 6.

Aside from the leading problem of expectation and its fulfilment there are two paragraphs on the 25th and 26th of July with Investigations and Tractatus echoes respectively, namely

The results of philosophy are the discovery of simple nonsense and bumps that understanding has acquired by running against the boundaries of language. They, the bumps, make us recognise the value of that discovery. [See § 119.]

and

What can’t be expressed can’t be talked about either [merely an echo in style].

On the 26th there is a small contribution to the leading problem.

For the wish or will to do something is after all of the same kind as expectation, belief etc.

On the 29th there is an indication that the problem is still there.
Bear in mind that between the sentence that expresses the expectation and the one that describes it – as perhaps a thing of the past – there is a difference.

It could be said: For how can one expect an event, it isn’t there yet [to be expected]?

The strongest expression of its being a problem comes on the 30th.

A step is needed that is similar to relativity theory.

A little later on the same day a group of paragraphs, of which I quote three, really do, at last, seem to show that Wittgenstein is at ease with his solution, after a confession that his thoughts are shoving each other around like crabs in a pot.

One could say, this is how I check whether an expectation has been fulfilled: if the expectation was expressed by the proposition that p will be the case and the thing that has happened is described by the sentence “p”, then the expectation has been fulfilled.

Language can only say: I made use earlier of the sentence “p” by way of preparation and for the description I make use of the sentence “p” again.

Language has, indeed, already said everything in expectation that it could say. It hasn’t described a circumstance (of being put ready) but, rather, put itself ready. And then [i.e. after the event] it still doesn’t describe the fulfilment’s circumstance but confirms its own readiness. [The first italics my own to express Wittgenstein’s emphasis.]

My third quotation there may seem rather poetic, and may show that Wittgenstein is not at ease with his simple solution, for we find later that the problem has not gone away after all. I consider the poetry here to be an example of his tendency to look for subtleties that his thought does not need. He warns against this frequently (for example “One always forgets how simple and natural everything is” on the 21st of the same month) and he still succumbs even in Investigations (for example in § 429 on the harmony between thought and reality, in which there is no admission that the idea is metaphysical).

The last day of July introduces a topic that becomes important in later work, what makes a portrait into one of a particular person (in the main by the intention of the painter, but there is also a reference to the judgement of the viewer), but only one paragraph, applying the same idea to another subject, catches my attention for comment.
So can I expect without language? But if I can’t, how do I know what kind of meaning the sentence [expressing my expectation] has for me, assuming this question means anything at all?

The fact is that we do frequently have wordless thoughts, expressing expectation and many other things, but having had one we can always, in simple cases, put it into words if anyone asks us what it was. If the thought was incoherent we recognise that it was in our struggle to express it. The very fact that, out of fatigue or senility, we sometimes lose a thought that we thought we had had, demonstrates that we normally take this ability for granted and only miss it when it fails us. Even the fact that certain philosophers have thought incoherent thoughts without realising that they were doing so does not detract from the simple norm. Ambivalence as to his question’s answer muddies this problem for him nearly a year later, just as he appears to have solved it.

August notes have two paragraphs on logic and then take up mathematics, with a paragraph that I have already quoted (“In mathematics everything is algorithm, nothing meaning”). Much of this mathematics is interesting in itself and not merely philosophically. On the 6th a subject arises which I have prepared the reader for, thinking being making plans, not by dreaming about what one is going to do but by drawing sketches, a propos of which he makes an interesting point about thinking with his pencil (nearly all his notes were written in pencil in this period). Finally, I must mention a paragraph written on the 8th, the day before this notebook ends, making a point that is taken up in the next one. Outside an inn the word “Gasthaus” acts as a sentence (as it were “come in here for food”) and is thereby a nail in the coffin of the Tractatus, since it is not composed. “That shows us how far composition is a characteristic of sentences [des Satzes]” – not very far, in other words.

Manuscript books V and VI (MSS 109 and 110) form a bridge between the old and the new. While the first third or so of the former was being written, Philosophische Bemerkungen, in the form of the Moore volume, was used to apply for Wittgenstein’s fellowship and, apparently while the College Council were deliberating, some preface passages were written which seem to anticipate a book that isn’t quite ready to be written. Towards the end of the latter, starting in June 1931, entries about Frazer were made which symbolise his view that languages contain remnants of old grammatical myths, while what becomes the opening paragraph of the new book was copied from a missing notebook. On the 25th of June copying starts from
a notebook that has survived (MS 153a) and on the 30th of June and 1st of July the essay *Komplex und Tatsache* was written, almost certainly directly and not copied. On the 6th of July Frazer notes are wound up and a new subject is introduced (just after some convenient Latin quotations from Augustine to help one find the place), namely genre paintings, which Wittgenstein takes to mean pictures of the *sort of things that might have happened*, with no implication that they actually did. This continues into the next Volume, VII, MS 111, and then Augustine’s theory of language learning is noted, which, as I keep emphasising, does not mean that *Philosophical Investigations* has begun.

Volume V had opened on the 11th and 12th of August 1930 with logical notes, and then, on the 13th, there is a difficult paragraph expressing a logical idea which Wittgenstein returns to again and again. The first thing that must be said is that Wittgenstein uses the term “general”, and continues to use it, contrary to its normal use in predicate calculus, for he is talking here of a linguistic analogy of existential, not general quantification. There is a sketch of a small circle inside a larger square. At issue is the statement “the circle is in the square” and whether a specification of its position there constitutes a closer qualification of the original, purely existential statement, though a parenthesis complicates matters, bringing in visual space. One feels, he says, that the existential statement requires no further qualification, and while this naturally isn’t so there is still something in it. The way this idea keeps returning in subsequent manuscript books (and there are anticipations of it in previous ones) requires that, having interpreted it to the best of my ability, I must quote it in full. Wittgenstein’s apparently final treatment of the problem, occupying essays 5 and 6 of *Grammatik*’s Part II, taken by Rhees from §§ 70 and 71 of the Big Typescript, pages 312 and 317, seems quite out of proportion to its origin, making it even more important to at least get the problem right.

If one considers general propositions of the type ‘the circle is in the square’, it always seems to one as if the [further] ascription of its position in the square is *not a closer specification* of the ascription that the circle is *in the square* (at least not in so far as visual space is in consideration) but rather that this “in the square” is a complete specification that essentially needs no further specifying. Just as an ascription of colour gives no closer specification of a material’s hardness. – Naturally, that isn’t the relationship between the [two] ascriptions, and yet the feeling has got a basis.

On the 16th of August there are three interesting logic paragraphs. The first points out that grammar is not infinitely complicated just because it allows an infinite formation of numerals, to which I want to respond that neither does its allowing an
infinite formation of sentences make it infinitely complicated. In other words one must look elsewhere for grammar’s complications. The next paragraph (which I précis here) reinforces my response, but in a way that exemplifies Wittgenstein’s radical interpretation of logic. Whether one proposition follows from another must depend solely on grammar. Consequently, any consequential proposition could have been constructed in advance without knowing the truth or falsity of either. If one should find a new meaning in such a consequential proposition and if that meaning follows from the original proposition, then thereby the original proposition’s meaning has changed.

The last paragraph of this day has already been quoted by me a propos of Wittgenstein’s claim in a lecture that “this is a chair” expresses an hypothesis.

I call hypotheses those propositions of which it is true that one can always be mistaken.

This seems quite harmless until one remembers that by “always” Wittgenstein means “there is always a theoretical possibility” of being wrong, not a practical possibility. This notion of hypothesis comes to a kind of crisis (without actually being resolved) on the 9th and 10th of September, a hundred and four manuscript pages ahead.

On the 20th of August we meet a new criticism of the Tractatus idea that sentences are of necessity compounded (in order to play their part in the picture theory of meaning). Like “Gasthaus” mentioned already, the sign “Gemischtwarenhandlung” (general stores) brings problems. Outside such a store it seems to act like a sentence, and encountered within an ordinary sentence we understand it too, but what does it mean written by itself on a slip of paper? He draws a strange analogy. An engine driver has to learn in advance rules about railway signs such as “halt” (general rules), and this means learning a grammar in addition to words, without which the word “halt” on its own would not tell us which train had to stop. And on board a ship the signal “stop” is just such another one-word sentence, but where is its composition? He seems to suggest that its use on board gives it composition. Then a brewer’s sign “Bass, Ales and Stout” (which he misremembers as “Bass and Ale”) makes a further point. It distinguishes houses where stout and various ales brewed by Bass can be drunk, but what if every house in a village had that sign? Fine, if Bass were to be had in all of them, but our grammar must allow for some houses being without the sign or it would indicate no distinction. This is followed by a very odd remark indeed about a word that exists in a dictionary and nowhere else, giving it not no meaning, as one would suppose, but a tautologous one, i.e. applying whatever might be the case (like 2 + 2 = 4).
This region brings another contrast between remarks that make us feel philosophically at home, because they sound so late, and indications that Wittgenstein still has a lot of way to make. On the 21st of August he writes:

There is nothing hypothetical in what joins a sentence [den Satz, of course] with the given fact.

This has to be ‘unpacked’ carefully. The sentence in question is something like “This is a chair”, and it must still be expressing an hypothesis. The given fact is the ‘primary’ datum that leads us to believe that we are looking at a chair. That is not hypothetical at all. Nor, Wittgenstein now says, is what joins the two. But what is that? If it is some empirically reliable assurance that a chair is what that datum indicates, then, in empirical common sense, no hypothesis is left for it to join, and the old terminology can be left behind. Yet the following paragraph, which I leave readers to find and unpack for themselves, certainly does not support this reasonable interpretation, and I can only conclude that his “nichts Hypothetisches” refers to some joining that he has imagined.

On the 22nd there is a reminiscence of his friend Engelmann describing finding old manuscripts in a drawer. This kind of thing gives us a charmed feeling of being given a privileged view of reality, but why? We see reality all around us every day and never give it a second thought. The task of the artist is to bring this charm alive while, as it were, flying in survey over reality without in any way changing it. Philosophical remarks on the same day stay in the same region of thought as before, but one shows the way he is trying to go, namely

The most everyday thing, the sentence, is the object of our investigation.

(Sentences as everyone speaks them.)

and yet the first paragraph written on the 23rd is

I still haven’t grasped the machinery of hypothesis and proposition.

Nevertheless, further ahead on the same day is a paragraph that I have always thought one of the most significant steps towards new ideas, and it is followed by an interesting companion.

“Do you see a deer there?” “Oh yes, clearly!” What a complicated object, how many views are possible and yet I understand immediately. Or at least I can immediately respond to the question.

For I have used language instinctively. As an instrument, like the stick with which I knock aside something that tries to hinder me as I walk.
But what is the business of logical investigation, is it to investigate the working of the neural mechanism, how, by what processes, the reflex comes about? No.

Then there is nothing left for it [to do] but to research language’s own laws, for those are the mirror image – by whatever way – of the laws of the world [the last phrase marked as unsatisfactory].

This second paragraph is significant because, over and above its general bent as a declaration of aims, it introduces the concept of *business*, the down to earth examination of technical details which reminded Wittgenstein of the detail with which his father supervised his office books. He then warns of the psychological abyss that threatens his task, and goes on to take up his word “instinctively” – to consider degrees of instinctive response is to fall into another swamp, that of gradual differences, instead of staying on the hard ground of logic.

A confession on the next day that he is still in an enormous confusion comes in a context that is itself confused – one cannot put in a nutshell what is confusing him. In particular, on the 25\(^{\text{th}}\), 26\(^{\text{th}}\), 27\(^{\text{th}}\) and 28\(^{\text{th}}\) there are queries about the relationship between expectation and its fulfilment, a problem one would have thought already settled. On the 27\(^{\text{th}}\) he actually asks how it is possible for him to expect, and for the expected thing to happen. How could he expect it when it didn’t exist? A long paragraph about this is followed by one that confidently starts “The whole answer to my problem lies in this” but is unfortunately impossible to construe. The 28\(^{\text{th}}\) begins more promisingly:

Intention can only be expressed by showing what is intended.

which is either a complete avoidance of the problem or an over-compression of the solution. On the same day a shorthand war cry is attempted, with a change in emphasis from a previous attempt:

It is in *language* that expectation and occurrence touch.

This is copied on page 349 of TS 211 with the whole opening phrase emphasised. A variant comes into print on page 143 of Philosophische Grammatik, and just how much should be emphasised in English is a matter of taste.

It is in *language* that it’s all done.

This was added in manuscript on page 379 of TS 213 and typed on its page 383. On page 160 of MS 145, called C1, the first of a series of notebooks mainly written in Cambridge, this passage coming in October 1933, the variant is

It is in *language* that everything comes to its issue.
While, on page 6 of MS 156b, which seems to have been written in 1934, we find an elaboration:

What is it supposed to mean, that everything is carried out in language? For us everything is carried out in language.

I call this idea the self-sufficiency of language. It is also expressed by quotations already given (e.g. “What has he got but his signs?”). Just how it is to be applied to Wittgenstein’s nagging problem of expectation and intention on the one hand and fulfilment or achievement on the other seems by no means to be settled in the remainder of the notes for the 28th.

On the 30th there is another use of the word “Geschäft”:

What is the business of thought?

and in subsequent notes, moving into September, the comparison between thought and drawing plans is followed, without its leading to any productive conclusion. On the 3rd, it seems to let him down by failing to offer enough distinction between assertion and denial, as if they were merely mutually opposed in the way that right and left are. After all, different rules hold – two denials make an assertion but two assertions don’t make a denial. This doesn’t, however, put an end to the thought / plan comparison. What it does do is establish that a proposition does not consist of a picture, a rule of projection and then something put in front like a disk with a right or left hand arrow on it.

On the same day there is a somewhat mysterious claim, followed by an immediate criticism of it that Wittgenstein clearly regards as important – indeed, it brings in one of his favourite words of disapproval.

p occurs in ~p in exactly the same way as ~p in p.

The words “occur” etc. are just imprecise like all such prose. Exact and unambiguous and incontestable are only the grammatical rules that, in the end, have to show what it is all about.

On the 4th of September, these ideas give him an opportunity to give credit to Frege for the truth-functional rules which his own truth-table notation had merely set out schematically (a point that I believe he was always ready to make – in particular see Lecture XVIII in Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics). Language has only one purpose, its application. Once this is fixed by grammar there is nothing more to say about it. An explanation is in turn only language, and if one explanation is better understood than another, it is the better explanation, and that is the only difference between Frege’s words and his own notation.
Much is written in the next few September days without apparent progress. The existential circle-in-a-square problem reappears as a patch in a square. On the 7th there is a vehement assertion that philosophy is in danger of using “explanation” in logic as it is used in physics. Elizabeth Anscombe always insisted that for Wittgenstein “explanation” meant exactly the same as “definition”—I can offer no other hint as to what he meant here. Then, on the 9th and 10th, a crisis manifests itself, connecting the problem of hypotheses (as distinct from propositions) with one for which Wittgenstein introduces an intriguing new term. This episode is so important that an extended quotation is required, four paragraphs from the 9th and the remainder from the 10th.

Can we imagine a language that only works with primary propositions and not with hypotheses?

(Could one, say, imagine human beings who do not know hypotheses but possess a language?)

But does that mean something like, *we* [the emphasis from the sentence structure] form hypotheses not from some new source of knowledge but from our propositions, and propositions without the possibility of hypotheses are as unthinkable as multiplication without the possibility of drawing square roots.

Does the essence of hypothesis depend upon the concept of time? I.e., would there be any hypotheses without time, and what, at all, does this question mean?

How is it to be expressed that time belongs to phenomenology but the truth functions don’t? And how to express what we feel, namely that the truth functions are more fundamental than the phenomenological? For, I believe, that too can only be expressed in grammar.

One also sees that an hypothesis doesn’t add anything new to its [corresponding] proposition from the fact that an hypothesis is turned into a proposition by the expression “it seems” (or an equivalent).

If grammar were given to us in the form of a book, it would not consist in a series of merely neighbouring chapters but would present a quite different structure.

And in this one would, if I am right, also have to see the difference between phenomenological and non-phenomenological. Where there would perhaps be a chapter about colours in which the use of colour words
was regulated; but what was said in grammar about the words not, or, etc. (the “logical constants”) would not be comparable to that.

For example, it would follow from the rules that these latter words can be applied in every sentence (but not the colour words). And this “every” would not have the character of an empirical generality; but the incontestable generality of a supreme rule for a game. It seems to me similar to the fact that chess can easily be played, or at least carried on [after they’ve been taken], without certain pieces, but never without the chess-board.

The important question is simply: can the difference in essence between “logical and phenomenological constants” also be shown in grammar alone? Isn’t a theory really needed here? One perhaps that distinguishes between two types of grammar? (I should like to say: from the rules of chess follow not only the difference between knight and pawn but also between the pieces and the chess-board.)

And consider: the theory was to say something about negation and the colour red that made their difference clear? Or is it just to say that different kinds of interpretation of signs are in question here? Then that would be something that could be expressed with the help of different indices and it would only bring us to an extension of grammar [along its old lines].

I always want to show that what is business in logic must be said in grammar.

Just, perhaps, as the progress of a business must be able to be read completely from its ledgers. So that one must be able to say, pointing to its ledgers: Here! Here is where everything must be shown; and what isn’t shown here doesn’t count. For in the end everything must come to light here [with alternative expressions to the same effect].

Everything that is really to do with business – that is to say – must play itself out in grammar.

In subsequent notes the phrase “logical and phenomenological” does reappear but not combined with the term “constants”. I assume that a gradual resolution of the proposition / hypothesis problem is responsible for this. After all, while it is true that propositions without hypotheses are as impossible as multiplication without the potentiality of square roots, we do form hypotheses (remember that “this is a chair” is one) from new sources of knowledge, no doubt very general ones such as our experiences of Muskelgefühlsraum, and not from manipulating the primary propositions that Wittgenstein has in mind. So, while they are still in his mind, it is
right for him to distinguish between the ‘local’ grammar of departments of the primary, such as colour, and the ‘global’ grammar of truth functions. Indeed, that distinction will remain pertinent when colour, taste, tactual and muscle sensation, smell, pain and sound are no longer radically set apart as ‘primary’.

On the 11th there is an explanation of why time, in the third and fourth of the paragraphs quoted above, is tied to this almost private concept of hypothesis. Time plays no part in the formulations of logic and mathematics, therefore it is not fully ‘global’, but the terms of logic do play a part in all of language’s ‘local’ departments. Consequently, time lacks full generality, and the only way Wittgenstein can sum up this conclusion is to say that time is only concerned with the content and not with the essence of propositions. In this context (which extends over four paragraphs) there is a reappearance of “this is how things are”, without the criticism that was to come in Investigations but at least saying that it is nothing but a handle for the application of truth functions.

Also in this context there is a second use of the word “theory” (“What my theory comes down to is that in a certain respect language cannot explain itself.”), which one thinks of as a Wittgenstein hate-word, but here he still seems to regard a theory of language as a proper aim. And on the same day there is a clear account of what is important to him about his concept of ‘business’.

Grammar is the ledger of language; the ledgers from which one must be able to perceive everything that concerns, not feelings, but hard facts.

Little inspiration is to be found in the remainder of September’s notes, which end on the 19th. On the 7th of October they are taken up again in Cambridge, a gap that is now explained in the diaries published as Denkbewegungen, edited by Ilse Somavilla. Wittgenstein left Vienna on the 26th of September, to stay one night with an aunt and then move to Switzerland to visit Marguerite Respinger (now de Chambrier) with whom he apparently failed to see eye-to-eye. She saw him onto his Boulogne train at Basel station and he arrived in Cambridge (or at least recorded his arrival) on the 2nd of October.

Such gaps for travel often gave Wittgenstein an opportunity to move ahead in his ideas, but I find little evidence for this until November is under way. On the 30th of October there is a brief remark that includes the word “Disposition”, which could possibly indicate that he had not seen eye-to-eye with Ryle in a walking holiday with him some time during the previous summer.

Understanding as a disposition of the mind or the brain does not concern us.
A pause does come on the 5th of November when he writes about Renan’s *Peuple d’Israël*. This seems to evoke in him the same interest in primitive people as he later found in Frazer. He is annoyed with Renan for suggesting that only a very few scientifically enlightened people can view natural phenomena with detachment, because they are everyday. In fact they were just as everyday then and are just as worthy of wonder now as two thousand years ago. “To feel wonder, people – and perhaps peoples – must wake up. Science is a means for putting us to sleep.”

On the 6th he starts writing the preface passages that Rhees edited to form a preface for *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. These are interleaved with a few remarks on philosophy and one paragraph in which he relates an idea of Renan’s to one from Paul Ernst’s preface to the Grimm *Fairy Tales*, to the effect that philosophy purifies thinking of its misleading mythology. An important philosophical statement is made in a paragraph on the 23rd, perhaps a propos of that.

If philosophers use a word and investigate its meaning, one must always ask, so is this word ever actually used like that in the language it was created for?

One will then usually find that that isn’t so, and that the word is being used contrary to its normal grammar. (“Knowledge”, “being”, “thing”.)

On the 24th there is something apparently trivial but important for later developments: the first language game, in the form of a simple code, the letters a, b, c, d for unit moves in four directions. The earliest language games were artificial codes intended as a comparison with language, not the isolated segments of natural language that they often were later (see *Investigations* § 130 for the term “Vergleichsobjecte”). On the 2nd of December entries in this volume are suspended, on its page 271, for the somewhat un-philosophical reason that on the 5th Wittgenstein was awarded his fellowship and wanted to travel to Vienna as soon as possible. There, he opened a new volume, VI, MS 110, and one might wish to read into the first paragraphs, written on the 10th, confidence that his work has direction, but, if so, one would be inferring this more from their style than their content.

All that language can do is say *something*: say the one thing. (Say the one thing in the space of what I could have said.)

One could also express that like this: Language works relatively and not absolutely.

The second is the easier of the two to decipher. One has to remember that Wittgenstein had called on relativity in his problems over expectation and its eventual fulfilment. Normally, a single sentence can do duty for both. It relates to each, nat-
urally in a different manner. This difference is what makes it relative. And our only
guide to our meaning is the sentence itself – together, naturally of course, with our
knowing what we mean by it. The self-sufficiency of language in our use of it, one
could say, in an attempt to make the idea a little less tautologous. At all events, if
this new volume marks a new start, it is the only one in this textual neighbour-
hood: on the 12th of January 1931 he comes back to Cambridge, continuing with
the new volume, on the 28th he remembers that he has thirty pages of the old one
to finish, and on the 3rd of February he moves to the new one finally, in mid sen-
tence. Then, on the 5th, we at last reach serious progress in the problem of hypothe-
sis and proposition.

During the volumes’ protracted overlap, however, there are at least hints of
what is to become important. For example, on the 12th of December 1930 there is
the first use of the word “private” for sense data. On the 13th there is a revealing
reference to a desired book.

If I do not know exactly how to start a book, that comes from the fact that
something is still unclear. For I would like to begin with what is given with
philosophy, the written and spoken sentences, as it were the books [in
which philosophy is expressed].

And here one encounters the difficulty of “everything flows”. And that
[difficulty] is perhaps what one should begin with anyway.

And on the 18th there is another, revealing in a different way.

If I say that my book is only meant for a small circle of people (if one can
call that a circle) I don’t mean by that that this circle is in my view the elite
of humanity, but that they are the people I turn to (not because they are
better or worse than anyone else) because they are my cultural circle, as it
were the people of my fatherland, in contrast to the others who are foreign
to me [the English, I presume].

There is also a third on the 31st of January 1931.

[I could choose as my book’s motto: A fool can ask more questions than
ten wise men can answer. Really that would have to be “ten clever ones”.

On the 22nd and 23rd of December 1930 (and on the 1st and 3rd of February again)
the simple little language game of letters for direction arrows reappears, and on the
23rd of December there is a remark in square brackets that is most revealing of all.
[I know that what I have been writing here for many weeks is bad; but I write it in the hope that better might follow again. If nothing better follows, well then, it will just have to be the end.]

Just before the final change of volume, on page 298 of the old one and opening the 3rd of February, the little language game is used to give point to the concept of the self-sufficiency of language.

If the rule is “where you see a À write a ‘c’”, then that tells me what to do, in so far as anything can tell me at all.

For nothing can be better specified than by an exact description. For specifying can only mean describing something.

For this seems to be the simple answer to my long difficulties.

But this is only one problem solved, and ‘hypothesis / proposition’ has to wait. The step forward of the 5th of February, if such it is, is prefaced by two paragraphs that open the previous day and set that problem.

One cannot say of a proposition (in the narrower sense) that the truth of another one corroborates it – without [admittedly] proving it. [The concept of a narrower-sense proposition here is remarkably reminiscent of the old concept of an atomic proposition.]

One says: “If I say that I am seeing a chair there then I am saying more than I know for sure”. And then that usually means: “But one thing I do know for sure”. But if one then wants to say what that is, one gets into a certain embarrassment.

And the third paragraph actually reinforces the problem by giving as a paradigm assertion “I am seeing something brown, – that is for sure.” The step forward of the 5th is also prefaced on the 4th by a resolve to do better.

We lead words back from their metaphysical to their correct use in language.

The opening paragraphs of the 5th are important but on different problems, so I leave them to readers to investigate, and jump ahead so as to continue with our muttons.

To someone who says “but there really is a table here” one must answer: “of course there is a real table here, – in contrast to an imitation one”. But if he then goes further and says that visual images are only pictures of things, then I should have to contradict him and say that the comparison
of visual image with a body’s picture is completely misleading because it is
essential for a picture that it can be compared with its object.

But if someone says: “visual images are the only real things”, I have to say
that I don’t understand the predicate “real” here and do not know what
kind of property one is really using it to ascribe to visual images and – per-
haps – to bodies. I just cannot conceive how one can meaningfully –
whether truly or falsely – ascribe a property to visual images and physical
bodies [alike].

Wittgenstein then turns to his closely related problem of “everything flows”, and I
must record a first doubt as to whether his old problem really has been properly
settled. What he says here sounds very like what he had said in October 1929 on
page 160 of Volume III, quoted above in Chapter 3. There he countered an idealist
who said there wasn’t really a chair here by saying “Of course there is, unless some-
one has moved it”. Here, he is countering a realist who protests too much that a
table is really there, and goes on to counter the idealist in his second paragraph.
Certainly, one is entitled to wonder how it had taken him so long to sort his prob-
lem out when he had come so close to doing so sixteen months earlier. Neverthe-
less, there is no doubt that this pair of paragraphs does mark a watershed in Witt-
genstein’s ideas. There is very little more about hypotheses being in absolute
contrast to propositions in the remainder of this volume or the four more (strictly,
three and a half) that lead to the final drafting and editing of Philosophische Gramma-
tik. The only fly in this tidy ointment is the lecture of Michaelmas (i.e. autumn)
1931 in which he told his students that “this is a chair” was an hypothesis (see page
66 of the Lee lecture volume). Perhaps, in the stress of delivering a lecture, he
found himself playing a gramophone record. In the remaining pages of this note-
book and in the ones that follow, the terms “hypothetical” and “hypothesis” always
seem to have their recognisable meaning, with one possible exception, already
quoted: the 21st of February on VI’s page 98, about a sunset “von allem Hypothe-
tischen abgesehen”.

A more subjective watershed is for me to say that, after reading these note-
books time and time again, I find them much less tiring from here on, even when
I find an idea that I disagree with or that I think is a reversion to ideas that Witt-
genstein ought to have grown out of.

There is a paragraph on page 53 (on the 8th of February) that takes on signifi-
cance in later years, but here seems to be expressed rather dogmatically.
We can interpret everything we want from a behaviouristic (frightful word) standpoint, since it is quite indifferent to us what happens and we are only interested in the multiplicity of what happens.

He became quite touchy at the accusation of being a behaviourist (for example see *Investigations* § 307), and in the following months he does draw attention to ‘what happens’ (in the less than behaviouristic sense of what goes on in our mind, for example, when we mean one thing by a word rather than another), eventually drawing the conclusion that these incidental mental events are irrelevant to what we mean. Here, “multiplicity” means the wide variety of what might happen, while later it means the linguistic complexity of an idea as against such mundane matters as how many syllables one needs to express it.

Better is a paragraph on pages 58–59, on the 10th. One hopes (but later notes disprove this) that when he says “Ich sage” he means that he feels tempted to say it but actually means something quite different.

I say: Understanding consists in my having a particular experience. –

But that this experience is the understanding of that – what I understand – consists in this experience being a part of my language.

On page 62 on the 11th there is a contribution to a series of remarks on his concept of depth that recur over a long period of time.

A proposition gains depth for me when I understand it.

Still on that day and on pages 64–65 there is a contribution to the discussion about wishes and their satisfaction, to go with expectations and their fulfilment. The problem has been flagged by an unclear paragraph on page 63 and is immediately followed by a critical paragraph that I find unconvincing, but I leave readers to find these and quote just the one paragraph that, to me, expresses the solution that Wittgenstein has been after.

I could say: The wish [I take this to be a particular wish and not ‘the wish’ in general] is not satisfied and indicates its own satisfaction in advance. –

Indeed, that is the only way we can say that it is unsatisfied. – And certainly, the wish that p should be the case shows us that it would be satisfied if p were the case. And what else can we mean by that advance indication.

In contrast, on page 71 on the 13th, Wittgenstein deals with something that does not answer to this analysis, prophecy.

It is as if as if the mere prophecy (irrespective of whether true or false) already anticipates a shadow of the future. – Whereas it knows nothing
about the future, and less than nothing it can’t know. [Emphasis from sentence arrangement. Compare *Investigations* § 461.]

Many people have said or written things that many other people have taken to foreshadow the future, but when something happens that further people take to be a fulfilment, the striking characteristic is always how slender a resemblance the event has to the supposed prophecy – even though, after the event, and the thinness of the resemblance evident, this very thinness can seem uncanny to people who are determined that prophecies shall be significant.

On the 15th, on page 79, there is a single line paragraph that shows that even after abandoning his phenomenological language quest, Wittgenstein still hoped to find some kind of language for philosophy to operate in.

Philosophy is not set down in propositions but in a language.

One might well interpret this in the light of his later ideas as meaning that philosophy comes alive within the to and fro of language, but we shall see ahead that, some months later but still in the same manuscript volume, he explicitly embraces that natural interpretation as a rejection of what he hopes for here.

On the 17th, on page 87, there is a remark about psychology that might be thought to be eventually outgrown but never was: his later interest in psychology as grist to his philosophical mill never contradicted this statement that, as a philosopher, he must never engage in psychology.

Only by a complete disregard of psychology can we get to what is essential for us.

And on pages 89–90 there is a very interesting account of an idea of Drury’s that Wittgenstein made use of in *Investigations*, to argue in § 342 against William James and the deaf-mute Ballard. While one can have visual and other images in one’s memory of a time before one could speak, one cannot remember being aware of lacking speech, because one can have had no concept of language and its lack without words to express the thought of lacking it.

On the 18th, three paragraphs later, Wittgenstein formulates his philosophical ideal, that nothing needs explaining because everything is open to view, and what isn’t doesn’t interest “us”, i.e. real philosophers.

On the 21st, and just before the sunset / hypothesis remark already quoted, there is a parenthesis about ideas and keys that comes back to him in his very last notebooks, about philosophers he believed to have stolen from him.

(I can only offer the keys, everyone must do the unlocking for himself.)
Another remark about psychology on the same day gives us a serious reason for not being concerned with it philosophically.

Interest in what is psychological in thought is suspended for us by the fact that we are only interested in the relationship of thought to itself and that makes the psychological fall away, it short-circuits itself.

Wittgenstein was of course interested in psychology, just as he was in mythology and physics. Indeed, he came to see himself as a kind of philosophical therapist (as in Investigations § 255) and in an English lecture note of 1938 in MS 158 he writes “What we do is much more akin to psychoanalysis than you might be aware of”, and he says much the same (but this time with a convincing explanation) on page 28 of Diktat für Schlick (item 302), – but this does not mean that he expected psychoanalysis or any other kind of psychology to contribute to philosophy.

He is coming close to leaving this manuscript volume to one side, which he does on the 17th of March on page 147, to write in smaller notebooks until he begins copying out of these (in the first instance from a lost one) on the 5th of May. I only wish to draw attention to two paragraphs in the meantime. The first comes on the 26th of February, on page 119.

Think of puzzle pictures. A complex of lines is suddenly recognised and seen as the upside-down picture of a man.

There is no hint whatever of what this intriguing phenomenon, later to be called aspect or ‘seeing as’, came to mean for him. The second paragraph I want to mention comes on the 3rd of March on page 130 and harks back to when he said that chess could not be played without a board. He has clearly remembered that it can be, by means of code messages sent by telephone, for example. He asks us to imagine that chess was actually discovered in such a form, and later, to the ease of players, found to suit a board. This new model of the old rules would [formally] be on an identical level with them and merely be easier to take in. Compare this, he says, with talk of how physics no longer works with mechanical models but only “with symbols”. (He does not offer any advice as to how explanations of physics might be improved by the use of symbols or images that are freed from misleading models, mechanical or otherwise.)

The first of the notebooks from which Wittgenstein copied (Nachtrag 3.5.), the lost one, may of course have been destroyed by him. At all events, these first copied notes are not especially inspiring. They include an interesting Tractatus allusion (on page 154).
Is it like this: Language (talking) only interests us when it portrays, depicts, something.

This is by no means the last example of the *Tractatus*'s hold on him. One in particular comes on page 164, paired with a question that is echoed by *Investigations* § 118, but only after being much polished in notebooks that did survive.

To say that a sentence [*der Satz*] is a picture brings to the fore certain features in the grammar of the word “sentence”.

Where did the old philosophical problems get their significance from?

A start to the train of ideas that led from this simple-sounding query to § 118 comes in the very next paragraph, with what is in effect a *Tractatus* reference.

The proposition of identity [in the *Tractatus*, 4.243, the paradigm for this was “a=a”; in Volume V, on the 16th of August 1930, it had been “[Jedes Ding ist sich selbst gleich”], for example, appeared to have a profound significance, but the proposition that this ‘proposition’ is a piece of nonsense has taken this significance over.

Two paragraphs on page 166 give a further example.

In what sense can I say that sentences [*der Satz*] are pictures? If I think about this I am inclined to say: it must be a picture in order to show me what I am to do so as to act accordingly. But (the answer comes) in that case all you mean is that you act in accord with the sentence in the same sense in which you act in accord with a picture.

Is every picture a sentence? And what does it mean, perhaps, to say that every one can be used as a sentence?

A paragraph on page 176 intrigues me.

If we say that philosophy is not supposed to consist of empirical propositions, that is already to say that it must not consist of propositions about space, time, substance, negation etc.

Fine (though I am not sure what negation is doing in that company) – but philosophers can take in the first half of that edict and still be tempted to pontificate about space, time and substance precisely because, having been trained by Wittgenstein, they do not regard their pontifications as empirical ones.

On the same page we are told to think about the witty meaning we give (he means that he gives) to Lewis Carroll’s grammatical games, but this leads no further than to introduce the concept of philosophical depth. Shortly after this there is a
new date, 19.6, and a reference to notes written since 3.5, which still need transcribing. Frazer follows, and comments on him are interleaved with transcribed notes until the end of this volume, in which all Frazer comments, like the *Komplex und Tatsache* essay, are written directly. (Monk, on his page 310, tells us that Wittgenstein read Frazer with Drury, and never got beyond the first volume of the full work, but I have read elsewhere that it was the one volume summary edition that he read.)

On the 25th of June (on page 223) copying from a surviving notebook, MS 153a, begins, and on the 29th, on page 228, it suddenly stops, to be taken up again on the 30th on page 235, with the very next notebook paragraph (from its page 8, now called 8r). The intervening seven pages of Volume VI are instructive, because they reveal that Wittgenstein has come to realise that he has been making some mistake.

This newly written interpolation opens by merely elaborating the theme from where the notebook was left: with negation, as with chess, it is the rules that matter. Then a subject appears, intention, that harks back to the third copied paragraph. There, incidental mental events that a sentence can be accompanied by may be irrelevant to its meaning, but meaning there must be, because we organise our actions in accordance with it, and whether they are in accordance with it can only be known from the meaning. As to intention: can one have one without expressing it? We have met this query at the end of the previous June in respect of expectation, and Wittgenstein is still unwilling to admit that we can, for a reason that anyone who has had a wordless intention, expectation, thought, wish or anything else will find spurious: it appears to open the possibility of objecting “How do you know that *that* was what you intended?” In coming to terms with the spuriousness of this response he considers a corollary, that someone who declares an intention to play chess and finds he has forgotten the rules would be unable to insist that he had known them as he said what he wanted. To us, who have nearly twenty more years of Wittgenstein’s *Klärungswork* (page 16r of MS 154) under our belts, it seems clear that actually saying “at last I am getting my game of chess” (whether to oneself or out loud) is no requirement for knowing what one wants to play or even for feeling confident that one can play it (seconds before finding that the rules have gone out of one’s head). One can know what one wanted and feel full of confidence in one’s ability without saying a word – but of course, mere confidence is no sufficient ground for saying “but I did still know the rules as I sat down to play”. The question is, was Wittgenstein’s unwillingness caused by some mistake that can be put in a nutshell? He tries to do so in a sub-paragraph on page 230: “I believe that
The mistake lies in the idea that the meaning of a word is a mental image \([Vorstellung]\) that accompanies the word”. This is the very idea that I said, above, one hoped he didn’t mean, and it is a relief to find that, whether or not he meant it then, he doesn’t now.

Rather, however, than its being the one thing that was wrong, I think that something like the concept of a syndrome (a family of signs and symptoms) is needed for the errors that Wittgenstein was trying to grow out of, and for the sound understanding that he was trying to grow towards. It seems appropriate that he himself (this is corroborated by a footnote to Letter 7 in the Malcolm Memoir, and more fully by Monk on pages 445-447) helped apply this medical concept to the description of shock, in company with colleagues at his Newcastle hospital in the second half of the war. Indeed, to return to 1931, what follows (on the same page and the next) hardly makes sense from the viewpoint of one simply specifiable error, but is certainly a step towards the family of his ideas that we now feel familiar with. Leaving aside a second sub-paragraph which seems merely to express guilt about his old concept of the primary, and suggests how defective it was by his needing to write “Bewusst-Sein” instead of, as he first wrote it, “Bewusstsein” (consciousness), I quote the remainder.

If, namely, I talk about language – word, sentence and so on – I have to talk in the language of everyday. – But is there another one, then?

Is this language perhaps too coarse, too material, for what we want to say? And can there be another one? And how remarkable that if that is the case we can get anywhere at all with our own.

It is certainly clear that every language that achieves the same must be the same. In other words that our ordinary one is no worse than any other.

The fact that in explaining language (in our sense [of language]) I already have to make use of the whole of it (not a preparatory, preliminary one) shows in itself that I can only say superficial things about language.

Yes, but then how can these expositions satisfy us? – Well, your questions were put in this language too; had to be expressed in this language if anything was to be asked!

And the scruples you have are misunderstandings.

Your questions relate to words, so I have to talk about words.

This corresponds closely to *Investigations* § 120, and here is where Wittgenstein abandons the hope I quoted from February the 15\textsuperscript{th}, and sketches the programme
that he is henceforth to follow. Philosophy is not set down in a *philosophical* language but lives and breathes in the context of our normal language. If there is one place where this programme can be said to take effect it is in the next manuscript volume, with the Augustine picture of language learning, eventually to become the opening of *Investigations*, but here, after returning to his copying (on the 30th of June) and inserting his *Komplex und Tatsache* essay, the last entry of the 5th of July takes up one of the 8th of February on behaviourism, and offers a comment on my own comment on that.

What is behaviouristic about my treatment only consists in the fact that I make no distinction between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’. Because psychology does not concern me.

In other words, what goes on in one’s mind as one utters a word (I called it “less than behaviouristic”) is in his view just as behaviouristic as what gestures one accompanies it by.

On the next day a bridge passage takes us towards Augustine’s language picture, including a brief quotation from him copied from the notebook, and settles on the subject of genre paintings, with which I shall open the next chapter.
With this passage on genre painting and things logically related to it, in the last pages of Volume VI and the opening of Volume VII (MSS 110 and 111), Wittgenstein moves at last towards expressing his ideas in book form. The notebooks from which he copied (and items that he added without them) form an integral part of the story. The revealing remark about behaviourism just quoted, for example, is composed straight into Volume VI. There is even one entry taken from the missing notebook that has resonance because of its inclusion in *Investigations* (§ 118). As copied onto page 164 of VI it is simply “Where do //did// the old philosophical problems get their meaning from?”, already quoted a propos of “a=a” in the *Tractatus*. This jumps over to the second surviving notebook, 153b, on its opening inside cover, with “Philosophy takes its whole emphasis from the propositions that it destroys. [from the viewpoint that it destroys]”. (This inner-cover page was not photographed by Cornell, and having discovered it at the Wren some twenty-five years ago it was a great relief to find it in the electronic edition, where it appears to be only in ‘text’ but is in fact in facsimile too.) Another approach to § 118 follows on pages 2v and 3r, and both can be seen where they are copied into Volume VIII, pages 225 and 229. The whole idea is tidied up on pages 1123 to 1127 of TS 212, and undergoes further revision on page 54v of MS 157a, *after* that notebook was put to use in 1937 for *Investigations* revision.

Contributions from 153a, the first surviving notebook, interspersed with many other things, including the language-learning episode, continue through to the end of Volume VII, where, as in the notebook, there are notes on a play about Orpheus by his friend Engelmann. Other contributions to *Investigations* come at the beginning of Volume VIII. As to VII, one might well feel that it ‘really’ began at the end of VI with the remarks about genre painting, or, just above them, the first quotations from Augustine (from page 58v of 153a), but the fact remains that when Wittgenstein began dictating TS 211 (which becomes another important part of the story) he did so from the opening pages of VII (following them quite
closely). The opening there, on historical drama, is at one with the problem of genre painting, because it makes no pretence that what it depicts actually happened; and neither (Wittgenstein does not mention this but it is the classical example) did Schiller when he had Elizabeth meet Mary Queen of Scots in *Maria Stuart*. The question for Wittgenstein is what exactly the intention of depicting an invented episode consists in, evoking queries of a kind we have already met. Similarly, on pages 3–4, there is a maid who has to say that her mistress is not at home. Here, my interest would be whether the girl is being forced to lie, and my answer is no, she is applying a convention of being allowed to mean no more than that her mistress does not wish to be visited. Wittgenstein’s, however, is what connects her knowledge that her mistress is actually at home with her utterance. Is it something that accompanies it like a musical accompaniment? Is it something that mysteriously occupies no time? He goes on to point out that the connection is very complicated: our knowing something to be so is neither a state that is somehow hidden behind thought’s symbolic processes (whatever he may have supposed those to be) nor something that happens, occupying time.

Intriguingly, in saying here that knowledge (etc.) are not activities he says “(like washing)”, which is fascinatingly echoed in the Lee lecture volume, on page 92, showing that even when giving a lecture his mind still worked like a word processor.

Are words like grammar, proposition, rule, calculus, mathematics, logic and so on on a different level from others? We discuss these in philosophy but not words like table, chair and so on. Are the second type on a different level? No. Language as opposed to what? Washing?

The next paragraph in VII gives us a clue as to why this is a stage where Wittgenstein is still finding his way, for it harks back to the problem expressed in the seven page pause in his copying from MS 153a.

Namely, we have to give up the attitude that, in order to talk of the immediate, we must talk of a state at a moment of time. This attitude is expressed by saying: “all that is given us is our visual image and the data of our other senses, together with memory, in the present moment”. That is nonsense; for what does one mean by the “present moment”? What is at the bottom of this idea is much more a physical picture, namely of the flow of experiences which I cut straight across at one point. Here is a similar bias and a similar error as with idealism (or solipsism).

But where do we get this bias from, to want to reach “the immediate”?
Doesn’t it come from our compulsion to want to understand a proposition’s verification, which our language completely disguises. 

Saying that this compulsion, the very one that started the phenomenological language quest, is what is at fault is only a diagnosis, not a cure, and the status of “believing, meaning, knowing, wishing, seeking, thinking etc.” still awaits clarification. A paragraph just ahead, and left unddictated into TS 211, declares how this is to be attained.

That bias too must be put an end to by understanding the grammar of our language and the causes of our misunderstandings.

Left out, no doubt, because it sounds so weak, but it does very conveniently summarise the new programme, even though it brings it no further than the hints already given in the seven page interpolation. While Wittgenstein no longer thinks that meaning consists in mental images that accompany sentences or their words, his very interest in what might be going on in the maid’s mind shows that, at least up to there, he had not fully digested his new insight.

I do not think this matters, because his programme gets under way on the 15th of July (and on page 15) with Augustine’s over-simplified picture of children’s language-learning, and the work of philosophy takes over. I take this picture to be so well known that I do not need to summarise it. This calculus, as he calls it, really is a part of language, but it is not the whole of it. And incidentally, in case my claim that the little code of four direction arrows and four letters was the first language game seems improbable, Wittgenstein sets it here immediately below the building-block language game.

Still on the 15th, however, the question of “what goes on in one’s mind as …” does seem to have been digested.

“I was of the opinion that Napoleon was crowned in 1805”. – “Were you of this opinion the whole time, without interruption?”

and in a paragraph further on:

“But surely, with the word Napoleon, as you utter it, you are indicating this very man”. – “How, then, in your opinion, does this act of indicating take place? In a moment? or does it take time? – But for sure, if someone asks you ‘did you just now mean the man who won the battle of Austerlitz?’ you will certainly say ‘yes’. It follows that you meant this man when you uttered the sentence in which his name occurs!” – Fine, but perhaps only in the sense that I also knew then that 2+2=4. Namely not in the way of a
particular proceeding taking place that we could term this ‘meaning’; not
even, perhaps, if certain images accompanied the utterance that are charac-
teristic of this ‘meaning’ and would perhaps have been different if the word
Napoleon had meant something else. Much rather, the answer “yes, I
meant the victor of Austerlitz” is a further step in the calculus …

On the 16th a new stage begins in Wittgenstein’s confidence that his new work
is under way: what Kienzler calls his Wiederaufnahme, taking up paragraphs from his
old 1929 – early 1930 passages and changing them or commenting on them from
his new viewpoint. He begins at the beginning: the question about a space of only
rational points (see 2.2.29, in Volume I’s right hand pages). At first he recasts this,
with a paragraph copied from pages 113r and v of 153a, but then, much more ele-
gantly and without using the notebook, he quotes the original directly, simply
adding two sub-paragraphs that change an expected answer “yes” into a “no”.

Is a space conceivable that contains all rational points but not the irrational
ones?
And that only means: Aren’t the irrational points already presupposed in
the rational ones?
Just as little as chess is in draughts.
The irrational numbers do not fill out any holes that the rational num-
bers leave open.

Two pages further on in VII (from 29 to 31) two problematical paragraphs are
recast and merged into one, with the first in quotation marks. On 6.2.29 they can
be found on right hand page 13.

“An object cannot, in a certain sense, be described” (in Plato too “it can-
not be described (explained) but only named”). By “object” one means
here “the reference [Frege’s Bedeutung] of a no further definable word”, and
by “description” or “explanation” one really means “definition”. For natu-
rally, no one denies that the object can ‘be described externally’, that prop-
erties can be ascribed to it.

This does, I believe, vindicate my assumption in Chapter 2, illustrated by a story
about a cow and a patch of mist, that Wittgenstein originally meant the very oppo-
site of what he says here.

On page 48 of VII there is one of those tantalising paragraphs that one is sure
one has read long ago elsewhere, though I have only found it, and recently, in
TS 212, a typescript cut up into many ‘slips’ in preparation for the Big Typescript,
213. Quoting from page (i.e. slip) 959 of 212, it opens “The danger is naturally to
fall again here into a *Positivismus* …” and ends “… but we must recognise everything that any person has ever said about it [the infinite possibility of carrying on a series] except in so far as he himself had a special interpretation or theory.” This, perhaps, is where “theory” became one of Wittgenstein’s hate words, in respect, at least, of what he ought to be doing in philosophy.

On page 53 there is a new date (30.7.[1931]), and a few paragraphs further, on page 54, the subject of the logic of a circle inside a square is taken up. On pages 58 and 59 there are three separated paragraphs which eventually appear in Wittgenstein’s final working of this problem, essays 5 and 6 of Part II of the *Philosophische Grammatik* volume. They are the first, second and fifth paragraphs of essay 5. This final working does not appear where one would expect to find it, in Volumes VII, VIII, IX or the first sixty pages of X but only in typescripts 212 and 213 (see pages 879 and following of 212 and pages 312, 313 and 317 of 213). On the opening page of notebook 155, together with some rather odd examples of ‘seeing as’, there is a paragraph that could indicate what this problem’s hold on Wittgenstein was: “I see the patch only [as] still in the square but no longer [as] in a particular position”.

Notebook 155 must have been closely contemporary to 153a and their intermediates, 153b and 154. For one thing there is a reference to it in 153a on page 141r, in an instruction to go to the “black notebook”, which 155 was; on page 164v of 153a there is a similar reference to a “small notebook”, which can be identified from the context as 153b, on its very first page; and 155 also contains on its page 21r, just after a note on associativity of addition, an amusing paragraph that is copied into VII page 132, from the *Simplicissimus*. Two Hochdeutsch-speaking professors are standing under a bridge that is still being built, and from above come almost inarticulate instructions given in Schwitzer Duetsch. “It really is incomprehensible, Herr Kollega [colleague], that such a complicated and exact piece of work can come about in this language.” On page 154 of VII, in the middle of much more on associativity, Wittgenstein has an echoing paragraph in his own voice.

(It is almost unbelievable that the analysis of such a simple matter should be so difficult.)

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* A satirical magazine published in Munich 1896–1944 (editor’s note).
Notebook 154 opens, after mentioning a confession he had made to various friends about having formerly disguised his Jewishness, with an important indication of what Wittgenstein meant by his various titles for his proposed books. The title offered here is “Philosophical Reflections [Betrachtungen]. Ordered alphabetically by its subjects [Gegenstände] //themes// … ordered by headings.” This uncannily anticipates the Big Typescript, TS 213, a text ordered by headings if ever there was one (though not alphabetically).

On pages 9v and 10r there is an explanation of the subtle implications of “Betrachtungen”.

To promise less than one wants to deliver is often fine, but it can also spring out of arrogance; for, even if one is dreaming somewhat that one is promising less than one is going to deliver [sentence incomplete]. – Is it right or wrong not to call my book “Philosophical Reflections etc.” but: “Philosophical Remarks ordered by their subjects”? [ordered alphabetically by headings]?

I have always interpreted this passage (Rhees’s excuse for publishing the Brown Book in German as Philosophische Betrachtungen) as meaning that “Bemerkungen” was a modest word, “Betrachtungen” an over-confident one.

On page 137 of VII, dated the 25th of August 1931 and headed “[Nachtrag]”, a section of copying from 153a starts (from page 81r of that onwards). Its second paragraph is a well-known one from Investigations, § 466. “What does man think for?”, with its carefully designed steam boiler that might still explode. This ends “Oh ja.—” for “Oh doch.” in Investigations. (See also Grammatik § 67.) This copying ends on VII’s page 154, 153a’s 85r, to give way to a long treatment of algebra that includes Wittgenstein’s echo of Keller, and comes back on VII’s page 164, on the 12th of September, from page 86r. With a number of interpolated paragraphs written freshly into VII, this copying extends right beyond Engelmann’s Orpheus and into Volume VIII, coming to a temporary stop on page 6 of that, from page 137v of 153a, when Wittgenstein is writing VIII in Cambridge as the autumn term of 1931 is about to start.

Three particular paragraphs are important for illustrating Wittgenstein’s identification of thinking with calculation at this time. The first does not seem to come from a notebook and is on page 121 of VII, simply “Thought is a continuous calculation”. The second, from page 86r of 153a and on page 164 of VII, is

From the expectation to its fulfilment is a step in a calculation. Yes, the product
stands to its result 625 in exactly the relationship of the expectation to its fulfilment.

The third is from page 98r of 153a and is on page 177 of VII.

Can I say: Language only interests me in so far as it is a calculus.

The middle quotation puzzled me for a very long time because, believing that Wittgenstein had settled the relationship between expectation and fulfilment at a common sense level (the expressions of expectation and fulfilment are, mutatis mutandis, equivalent) I could not believe that he meant this analogy with the calculation of a product absolutely literally. The three quotations taken together show that he did. Even more puzzling now is that he had apparently already modified his dogmatism, by accepting a point I suggested in Chapter 4: that circumstances can lead one to say “It isn’t exactly what I expected (intended, wished, hoped, ordered) but it will do”. This comes on pages 19v – 20r of 153a, and except for the opening illustration is repeated in typescripts 212 and 213 (pages 1031 and 371 respectively).

“I ordered him to p” – “Well, and what did he do?” – “p” – . “Well, then that’s all right, isn’t it?”
“l said ‘leave the room’ and he left the room.”
“I said ‘leave the room’ and he left the room slowly.”
“I said ‘leave the room’ and he jumped out of the window.”

Indeed, Wittgenstein keeps the 25 x 25 illustration in the final version of Philosophische Grammatik. It comes in § 111, on pages 160 and 161, with comments that in no way modify his dogmatism and have remained unchanged through notebook, manuscript volume, typescript and print.

Notebook 153a must have had a special significance for Wittgenstein. So far as I have been able to check, only in quoting from that and its missing predecessor does he mark his copyings with “Nachtrag”. To find quotations from its three successors one just has to be on the qui vive, as one sometimes has to be with 153a. And it is thick, with over three hundred pages, even though its page size classifies it as small. Copying from it returns in VIII on page 198, with an arrow diagram separated from the previous copied passage by a poem. Copyings that follow include a remark about Russell and Whitehead and their Pseudoexaktheit (on VIII’s page 202)
and one about the simplicity of differential calculus on page 223 (from 153a’s page 160v, very close to its end). This region of the notebook also includes a remark about Jewishness in art, a subject that returns frequently in the subsequent notebooks. While on page 141r there had been a direction to the black notebook, 155, there is now, on page 164v, one to notebook 153b. The last subject of 153a is primary and secondary signs, and its last page is 169r.

The first copyings from 153b come on pages 225, 229 and 230 of VIII, the contributions to § 118 of *Investigations* that begin on the notebook’s inside cover. They also include a remark about Eddington, entropy and the ‘direction of time’, on page 231, from pages 21r and 21v. These copyings continue after a paragraph about Dirichlet that is split between the end of VIII and the beginning of IX, and they follow it immediately, on the subject of probability, from 153b’s 41r to 43v, ending with a diagram of a parabolic shot from a gun. (This copied passage provides the last five paragraphs of the probability essay in the supplement to Part I of *Philosophische Grammatik*, not part of that book as Wittgenstein intended it at all.)

Volumes VIII and IX deserve to be studied in facsimile because their good handwriting is an indication of the quantity of copying they contain, not just from notebooks but from earlier volumes, in pursuit of the technique called by Kienzler *Wiederaufnahme*, in which Wittgenstein copied early paragraphs, sometimes modifying them and sometimes commenting on them. He did the same in many of the first sixty pages of Volume X. *Wiener Ausgabe* readers have the advantage there of Nedo’s reproduction of a page (written as 21 by some librarian, but printed by Nedo as 40) that includes three paragraphs from 1929 volumes, cut out of typescript 208 and pasted into the otherwise manuscript page. Bergen readers who use facsimile will find that there are two pages in VIII where Wittgenstein has done the same. For Bergen readers I must also mention that the editors use the librarian’s page numbering for these two manuscript volumes in distinction to Nedo’s numbering, which is what I have been giving here.

Wittgenstein set Volume X aside and turned to dictation, first of TS 212 and then, based on that, TS 213, the Big Typescript. When these were (presumably) complete he used the remainder of X to start drafting the book he had been hoping to write for so long – or disappointed, perhaps, that the Big Typescript had failed to become that book. The last date in the first sixty pages of X had been the fifth of June 1932, on page 44. At the top of the sixty first page there is the undated heading “Umarbeitung”, and under it “Zweite Umarbeitung im großen Format”, both
apparently written after the reworking had begun. At the head of the volume there
are two headings, first “Philosophische Grammatik”, and second, clearly written
after the reworking, or at least after starting it, and partly in code:

In the event of my death before the completion or publication of this book
[and here the code starts] my writings are to be published in fragments
under the title

“Philosophical Remarks”

and with the dedication:

“for FRANCIS SKINNER”

He, if this remark is read after my death, is in a position to know my inten-
tion, at the address: Trinity College, Cambridge.

This might give the impression, since “Bemerkungen” is written after “Gramma-
tik”, that it was meant to replace it as the title of the book. The intention, how-
ever, is quite clearly that “Philosophische Bemerkungen” was not to be the title of
the book but of whatever selection of remarks made from its sketches Skinner
might have put together if Wittgenstein happened to die first. Wittgenstein did
indeed eventually complete the book, and he survived Skinner, who died early in
the war. (He is mentioned in Letter 3 of 22.6.40 to Malcolm in the 1984 Memoir as
being ill and in Letter 5 of 5.7.41 as sending his regards. He died – see Monk page
427 – on 11.10.41.) The completion appears to have received its final details in
1934, and it took exactly the form that Rhees printed it in, except for section
numbers and his addition to it of an ‘Anhang’ and a Part II (with a further appen-
dix inserted in that).

For some time, scholars doubted Rhees’s claim, and very understandably,
because the printed version did not seem to tally with the available manuscripts.
Wittgenstein’s procedure had been an extremely complicated one. After all his
work in sketching material for it, he began in the remainder of Volume X to draw
it together in a draft. His calling this an *Umarbeitung* was probably not in reference
to its scattered material but to the use he had already made of that in dictating his
Big Typescript (via TS 212). What he was beginning to rework in Volume X was
the majority of the opening 404 pages of the Big Typescript. In reading those one
would not immediately be aware that they were distinct from the rest, though this
might be guessed from the richness of the corrections and additions written into
the pages destined for re-use, and confirmed by their separate manuscript revisions, leading to the final Grammatik. The other sections, hardly revised at all, were selectively used by Rhees to pad out the printed volume, leaving out three important sections altogether. I have already mentioned two of these, called Phenomenology and Idealism etc; the other, coming in front of them, was called Philosophy and is extremely interesting, and much of it was used in the final Investigations.

When Wittgenstein continued his reworking in Volume XI he did put a date, 14.12.33. At some much later date he added a mysterious note in code saying that this volume would not be easy to condense, but that this did not refer to the Umarbeitung at the end (a quite separate one made in Norway in 1936 when he tried to rework the Brown Book in German). The mystery is why he should have even thought of condensation when he had long since carried out a careful condensation in the large undated loose-leaf manuscript that he called großes Format. This gives us the actual beginning of Philosophische Grammatik as printed, or very nearly as printed.

Now above I have used the word “exactly”. Readers of großes Format will notice a small discrepancy on printed page 45 where at the end of § 7 (I don’t count these § numbers put in by Rhees as inexactitudes) a paragraph starts “Wir sagen auch” in print but “Und wir sagen auch” on page 8 of the großes Format. However, on page 4 of that an instruction mark had been written with an upside down capital A telling someone (an obedient typist, I always assumed, and eventually Rhees) to go to page 12, where the next printed paragraph will be found, beginning “Das Verstehen eines Satzes”, with a reference back to page 4. These upside down A marks are Wittgenstein’s instructions for what deserves to be called a dritte Umarbeitung, termed by Nedo a virtual version of the book. I have described in Chapter 1 how I discovered these marks in the Wren in 1976 and showed them to Elizabeth Anscombe. This was when I had out at the same time not only Volumes X and XI and großes Format but a set of smaller manuscript pages called kleines Format, to which there is an instruction on großes Format’s page 38, carried out on printed page 82. At the time of writing the present book, this set (of about a hundred loose pages written on both sides) has disappeared and not been recovered. My, Elizabeth’s and (later) Nedo’s assumption was that in preparing Philosophische Grammatik for the press Rhees had followed these instructions, which in the face of Elizabeth’s scepticism about the intelligence of typists I still took to be intended for typing.

In 1994, when he introduced the Wiener Ausgabe in Cambridge, Nedo told me that a typescript had been found by the inheritors of Schlick’s papers which had
been dictated by Wittgenstein for Schlick’s benefit, and which vindicated Rhees’s editing. In 2003, having rediscovered the discrepancy mentioned above, along with some others, I was willing to guess that Rhees knew the typescript made for Schlick and used it for his editing. This typescript is not included in the electronic edition, but a copy of it is safe in Konstanz, where it is catalogued as D.5 in the Schlick Nachlass, but the original is held by the Vienna Circle Archive in Haarlem. Dr. Pichler thinks it is identical with “Mulder V” (oral communication). I owe a Xerox copy of the entire 57 pages of D.5 to Dr. Brigitte Parakenings of the Philosophical Archive of the University of Konstanz. This copy settles that Rhees cannot have done his editing from the original Mulder V, avoiding the need to struggle with the upside down A’s, firstly because it only goes just beyond the insertion from kleines Format (on pages 180 ff of that) and secondly because the “Und”, noted above as dropped from the printed text, is present in Mulder V as well as in großes Format. The same is true of other discrepancies, which must therefore come from Rhees.

The kleines Format section ends on printed page 84, where page 38 of großes Format comes into play again with “Wie verhält es sich mit dem Erinnern an die Bedeutung eines Worts?” Großes Format is then left aside at the end of § 42, and Mulder V then ends with three paragraphs from elsewhere that, if in print, are not in § 43. Once kleines Format is rediscovered it will be possible for scholars to reconstruct the intended text completely, remembering of course that Volume X from its sixty-first page onwards and Volume XI up to its reworking of the Brown Book are also rearranged by the instruction signs. Meanwhile, the three paragraphs that I cannot trace are a hint that in ending this dictation with them Wittgenstein was embarking on a significant change in his plans.

For großes Format ends in effect on page 39, corresponding to page 57 of Mulder V with its extra three paragraphs. Its page 40, its actual last, is a reworking of paragraphs in §§ 14–22, mainly from MS 114, Band X, and in particular of §§ 19–20, on Augustine and language. I cannot help feeling that this final page of großes Format expresses Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with what I called at the beginning of Chapter 4 the rather brief treatment of Augustine, and a wish to use him for a fresh start. Then, MS 141, written on the same large format paper, is a further reworking of him, comprising the first draft, in German, of the opening of the Brown Book, out of which the pre-war Investigations was eventually constructed. I find it astonishing that after the enormous effort of making his virtual dritte Umarbeitung by means of his editorial signs in the four manuscripts, and then following those signs closely in his dictation of Mulder V, Wittgenstein should apparently
have given up, turning his painfully achieved minor masterpiece into what many people now see as a mere stage on the way towards *Investigations*.

As a last twist to all this there is the puzzling fact that *kleines Format* was never given a von Wright number, even though it must have been alive and well at the Wren long before they were first assigned.

(Monk, on page 319, puts *Philosophical Grammar* with executors’ compilations, and so I shall end this section by repeating my conclusion: the printed volume as a whole is just such a compilation, but its first item, called Part I, is respectably close to what Wittgenstein intended to call *Philosophische Grammatik*, and intended, I am convinced, to be a separate work in its own right before it turned into a mere stepping stone.)

The Mulder V typescript dictated for Schlick must not be confused with item 302, termed *Diktat für Schlick* (and presented by McGuinness just in time for it to get into the Cornell microfilms). I have always assumed this was dictated after the ‘virtual Umarbeitung’, but re-reading the later sections of *Philosophische Grammatik*’s Part I, I suspect there are some second thoughts in them that 302 might have influenced, so it may have been dictated in the middle of *Grammatik*’s composition. It consists of thirty-two closely typed pages, and its opening certainly reads like a commentary on the opening of the *Grammatik* text. It was one of the better-reproduced items on the Cornell microfilms, and being intended for Schlick I always regarded it as caviar to the general – though the reader will find, in the pages that follow, that it was not always easy caviar.

Its destination does have one illuminating textual result. On page 22 there is a passage which asks why we bother to calculate the thickness of the walls of a steam boiler, since after all the thing can still explode however well calculated. He already had a paragraph about this, which eventually became § 466 of *Investigations*, quoted above, with a trivial difference, from the first of its many drafts (pages 81v and 82r of MS 153a, copied into page 137 of VII), and it also became, with yet another change at the end, the first paragraph of *Grammatik*’s § 67. Dictating for Schlick, however, he is not concerned with drafting a book, and the result is a fresh version, embedded in a discussion of the difference between fear of fire and a ‘scientific induction’ assessment of its dangers.

The dictation begins almost identically with the printed opening of *Grammatik*, but it takes no notice of an admission, in that, of our meaningfully suspecting that a planter of trees intended them to express a sentence when fully grown, even
though we have no notion of what this sentence might be. This is a fanciful expression of something that must happen quite often to people deciphering a lost language, when one guesses that this group of signs constitutes a sentence, that one a name, but one has no way of telling what the sentence means or whom the name names.

It becomes clear that the idea seemed a side issue by the time of this dictation, as Wittgenstein goes on to elaborate points made in the opening section of *Grammatik* on the meaning of understanding. This occupies seven tightly typed pages and the top of the eighth. At the end of the first he rephrases the opening question as: does it only become a sentence when it is spoken with the correct emphasis, or is what is being emphasised (already) a sentence? His answer is that one can say what one likes. Then a second reformulation: do we have to interpret a sentence for it to become a sentence? The answer is no, on two separate points, but then he suggests that the original question could be taken as analogous to: does it only become a sentence when its punctuation is put in, or do we put the punctuation into what is already a sentence? This is so banal that one wonders if Wittgenstein is pulling his own leg for Schlick’s benefit, but the first answer returns: we can decide arbitrarily what we say.

He has, at least, in his very first paragraph following his opening question, committed himself to a standpoint which he never gives up, except, in the following years, and indeed in this dictation, to express it more as an analogy and less as an absolute: understanding is like being able to play chess, and understanding a word is being able to use it. In the remainder of these seven-plus pages, however, he considers various alternatives, the first of which he puts forward as the contrary to this interpretation, and all are difficult to follow. They are collected under a heading that states that understanding a sentence is analogous to understanding a tune as a tune (as distinct, I assume, from such things as its telling a story). This does not seem to have anything to do with the alternatives dissected, though, as will be seen, the idea returns later.

The first of these is that understanding is a matter of stepping outside language so as to set up the connection between language and reality. This idea comes to him from the practice of ostensive definition (explaining by pointing). This, rather improbably, is called replacing one symbol by another, in so far as it replaces verbal language by a sign language. A possible explanation of why the latter might deserve to be so called is that it apparently shows that words only serve to call up mental images, these being the real symbols. But in that case, words are only a matter of psychological cause and effect and don’t need to interest us (i.e. us philosophers,
Wittgenstein and Schlick), who can use instead pictures painted ad hoc to replace them. He is clearly not advocating that mental images are the real symbols, but their sometimes acting as symbols is an idea that does not leave him finally until after the war. After a critical reference to the *Tractatus* concept of words representing objects, he brings to bear his serious objection to the idea he is examining. An ostensive definition is only a preparation for language, and so belongs with the theory of language, not with language. And even if our language did consist only of mental images, our sentences in it could be false as well as true — a supposition that I find meaningless except for solipsists or telepaths, for the purely mental can have no truth conditions in reality. And even in pure sign language (one must remember that he is thinking of a kind of extension of ostensive definition, not the sophisticated sign languages we see used now) there would have to be (what is no problem with real sign languages) a distinction between my saying that something is true and its being so. The whole idea that with *any* explanation, let alone an ostensive one, we step outside language, comes, he says, from a confusion between ostensive definition and an actual use of language.

Next is a view that the use of a word, its rules, follow from its meaning. This is another misunderstanding of ostensive definition: that the sort of ostensive definition of a word we give children settles its meaning definitively, once and for all. One only has to think (readers of the *Blue Book* will know this) of the fact that one often has to specify: this colour is … (or whatever type of attribute one is drawing attention to).

Wittgenstein goes on to characterise this misunderstanding as expressed by an image that one might well have thought he approved of, the “Bedeutungskörper”, namely a word’s being the visible face of an invisible solid body hidden behind it. The word comes in double brackets at the end of *Investigations* § 559, where the only clue to disapproval is speaking of a word’s function in a *particular* sentence instead of “in the course of the calculus”. This image is the occasion of a series of observations that are by no means obviously connected with it, and I must excuse myself from detailing them. Only with the next section, on page eight, headed “Understanding a genre picture”, are we on familiar ground. Incidentally, this is the last section title, and after it one has to check oneself for changes of subject. Here, the simple distinction between genre picture and fiction on the one hand and portrait and factual statement on the other is complicated by the possibility of failing to understand a genre picture or understanding it in some unintended manner. For example, if one can only see it as a meaningless configuration of daubs of paint, or if we cannot understand why the painter has a table balanced on a plant,
or if the picture is intended as purely ornamental but we fail at first to recognise its symmetry or pattern. Wittgenstein then declares that causal explanations based on familiarity (with tables, plants or chairs) are not relevant to understanding, that we do not have to compare a genre painting with anything in understanding it, but that, rather, comparison with reality is “a further step in the calculus”. Without explaining what he means by this he puts a horizontal line of dashes under the section and moves on to what one must suppose the remarks about genre painting were intended to introduce, the understanding of what he later came to call aspect.

Perhaps it is also what the heading about understanding a tune as a tune was intended to introduce, for one of his examples is understanding an ecclesiastical mode as such (the musical modes that only survived the Middle Ages vestigially in the face of major and minor), mentioned in *Investigations* § 535. Others are seeing a sketch of a cube as representing a cube, alternately with seeing it merely flat, and seeing four dots inside a circle as representing a face alternately with seeing them as a mere pattern. This is clearly an extension of the concept of meaning that Wittgenstein began by investigating, but he takes it seriously and subdivides it: on the one hand it is an experience to interpret a picture in a particular way (and if students of Section xi of Part II of *Investigations* feel too sophisticated to call this an experience, I suggest they try to remember what a startling experience it was suddenly to see the solution to a puzzle picture as children) but on the other it is an ability, as when I might see a marlinspike (designed for splicing rope) as a potential jemmy (for unpacking crates). Strangely, the latter is called upon as a justification for saying that understanding a picture means being able to say what it represents – something that one would think needed no justification. And strangely again, the procedure (of saying what a picture represents) that is a criterion for understanding does not bring us closer to reality but further from it, since we demonstrate understanding a picture by means of words, and understanding words by means of pictures. Which is an opportunity for Wittgenstein to repeat that we only ever did think of understanding as a stepping out of language into reality because we had been led astray by ostensive definitions. These are a stepping out of verbal language into another language (vice versa, surely, since for the recipient the pointing comes first).

These perplexities suddenly become clear with an illustration from music. If asked to justify a particular interpretation of a piece, it is useless to try to say what it means. One might produce some real process (like the sound of a steam locomotive?) as a comparison, or, more likely, one merely plays the piece again and lets it speak for itself. In this sense every language has in the end to speak for itself. There
(this is on page ten) the subject stops, with no horizontal line or heading to mark the change, and another subject starts.

The inclination to say that only the person concerned can know whether he understands something (contrary to our commonly assessing someone else’s understanding) obviously corresponds to saying that only the person concerned can know whether he has toothache (and it does indeed correspond, even if misleadingly). Yet neither dubiously introduced understanding nor toothache is the new subject (toothache does not take over until the supplementary dictations 303 and 304) but a gambit that could justify either if we adopted them as norms: in other words, if we made them part of the grammar of the verbs “understand” or “suffer from toothache”. What he won’t allow is the appearance that such rules flow from the nature of toothache or understanding. What might be allowable is an arbitrary decision to treat understanding as a personal experience like misery, toothache or joy, and he suggests a startling comparison between that decision and declaring that one can never know if there is a chair here or not. The Vienna-plausibility of this is that one has the choice between accepting a definitive criterion for there being a chair and having no such criterion in view. Of course, rejecting any given criterion as definitive is not at all the same as admitting that the question must always be open, but at least one can agree with him that a decision to go for no final criterion is a decision (not to be bullied by dogmatic philosophers, for example), and not an empirical fact – yet I still want to say with Aquinas “distinguo”, because it is part of our general experience of life that questions of empirical fact can be settled without our needing to specify in advance what criteria we regard as final.

With another dubious remark, that the grammar of the verb “understand” is similar to that of the verb “think”, Wittgenstein moves on to the latter, or rather to the noun “thought”. Saying that a sentence expresses a thought could mean something like its expressing a feeling, but we also say (with Frege, incidentally, in his late essay Der Gedanke) that the thought expressed by a sentence is its meaning. This is sufficiently exemplified by saying that “it is raining” tells us that it is raining – we philosophers aren’t interested in thought as a mental procedure. A propos of this and the competing view that thought is comprised in the visual images of the person thinking, Wittgenstein declares that sense data are not ‘owned’ by anybody, and promises to prove this. I have said in Chapter 3 that nobody thinks of sense data like that, and I am still hoping to come across a passage where he purports to show it to be true (at least, in dictations 303 and 304, there are passages that show why he wanted to say it).
What other people mean by saying that a sentence has a meaning is that behind it there is a shadow-picture of the reality it depicts. It is true enough that we do sometimes have a visual image of what we describe, or of what we hear described. We can decree that the meaning of a descriptive sentence is a painted picture of the complex that it describes, and this does give the word “meaning” a clear meaning (“Sinn” and “Bedeutung” in the German respectively, but we do not need to call Frege to aid – this is just elegant variation), but it has little relation to what one wants to achieve with the word “meaning”. We do want to say that there must be something behind a sentence, but what this is is the calculus, the language in which the sentence is used. Speaking of anything else behind a sentence arises from a primitive and obsolete interpretation of language, but just as we want to be told what this is we find the story of the French politician (Briand, spelt “Brian” in Volume V when he is first noted), who said that the excellence of French comes from the fact that its word-order is exactly the order in which words are thought. “The correct, penetrating criticism of this dictum would provide everything that is of significance for us in the grammar of the verb ‘think’”. Grammatik’s §66 points out that Briand’s idea comes from thinking that thought is a process separated from speaking or writing, so that some languages might and others might not keep step with it, but this simple observation hardly counts as correct, penetrating criticism. Investigations’ §336 does admit that German has a remarkable word-order but takes for granted that educated Germans do think in it – perhaps this patent but still perplexing fact makes penetrating criticism unnecessary.

He goes on to call a family of psychological phenomena that we already know he is interested in (namely expecting, fearing, hoping and believing) kinds of thinking. He immediately brings in his image of solid and hollow shape as showing the way the fulfilment of an expectation relates to it. “One description must be valid for both (that is the answer)”. He contrasts this a priori answer with the empirical question of what colour of coat goes with a pair of grey trousers, but this leaves me uneasy with his overlooking the empirical question of what physical solid fits a physical hollow. The physical hollow needs to be a little larger than the solid it is to receive, and how much larger depends on the materials both are made of and their function. Admitting this would have saved him the problem of how exactly a sentence “p” expressing an expectation has to match a sentence formally termed “p” expressing p’s fulfilment.

This discussion leads (via knowing what one expects) to knowing one’s motives, and to the fact that in considering a motive one will often cast one’s mind back over thoughts one had had. The temptation then is to believe that these men-
tal events must have had something in common that justified us in saying what our motive was. I find it very difficult to think that anybody has ever suffered any temptation of the kind, but the idea is an opportunity to expound a linguistic temptation that we really do suffer from, resulting, he says, from a primitive interpretation of language, namely to look for an object for a noun to refer to. (The ways we do this, and the sometimes very sophisticated excuses we make, are of course extremely varied.)

Wittgenstein sums up his viewpoint with a well-known disagreement with Socrates, which is put rather more briefly in the last paragraph of *Grammatik* § 76: that if asked what knowledge is he would give examples of particular kinds of knowledge and add “and such like”. (There is an equally brief variant on page 219 of TS 212, while on page 69 of Volume VII we are happy if we understand shoe-making, geometry etc.) This leads to the important admission that language is not a game played according to rules: to assert this would be an untruth, and he only *compares* language with a rule-governed game. The two are only “more or less similar”, and his approach to language is consequently one-sided. This is the loosening of his ideas that I promised at the beginning of my account of the Schlick dictation (and it is expressed later in § 81 of *Investigations*, at greater length and at sufficient distance from his earlier ideas for him not to need to confess one-sidedness).

I find a new idea on page 16, which leads nowhere, followed by a second new idea that has interesting consequences. The first, which seems to be given with his tongue in his cheek, is expressed with more plausible examples in *Zettel* § 70: there is no one sitting on this chair, but there could be, and so it seems to be more the case than if it were an impossibility. The second is also expressed more plausibly in *Zettel* (§ 320). Grammar determines which word-combinations are meaningful, but since this is independent of what is the case, and since this independence could be called not being responsible to reality, grammar could in a certain sense be termed arbitrary. In *Zettel*, it is perfectly possible to change the rules of chess, but the result would be playing a different game. Here, Wittgenstein gives a poor example and obstinately says that the rules could be changed at our whim but gives no clue as how the new ones might work. A line cannot simultaneously be 1 meter and 2 meters long. His word is “Strecke”, translated in *Investigations* § 174 as “line”, but it concerns a physical line as drawn, while the basic meaning is a stretch of railway line or road. All we have to do is give the rule up, and say that the line has both lengths, whereupon it cannot be called unsayable because it has been said. Perhaps he was thinking of the mathematical law of distances, which ordains that the distance from a to c via b can be at most equal to but never less than the dis-
tance from a to c direct. Inspired by this, he might have wanted to rule that the
stretch from one place to another via a detour and the stretch direct should be
called the same stretch. Even if he thought Schlick did not need to be reminded of
this, he raises the problem that we might not be able to visualise or sketch an
example, and answers that we could if we only knew what we were expected to
do. There is no hint as to what instructions to this effect might be given. There
had, however, been an admission that our immediate response to such a statement
would be to reject it as nonsense, and the whole gambit outlined above seems to be
an over-clever attempt to avoid this obvious conclusion.

Even the distinction between “chair has and” (which cannot be visualised
because there is nothing to visualise) and “this line is both 1 meter and 2 meters
long” is vitiated because the former, equally, could be visualised if we were told
how. Wittgenstein’s attempts to wriggle out of a problem he has put himself in
become more and more difficult to make sound reasonable, and the same is true of
the next problem, which appears to begin on page 18 without even a paragraph
break to mark it. The connection is the difficulty of constructing new but analo-
gous rules dealing with line and length, because our mind cannot distinguish pos-
sibility from impossibility, as it shows in its ability to think what is not the case (but
is still possible, one would have thought). This becomes the new theme, and it is
exemplified tediously, until, at the end of page 19, an explanation of this process
appears: “We are no longer tempted to assume a secret and barely comprehensible
process, constituting the belief that something is the case, a process that might
relate to physical processes as processes in living matter do to those of lifeless mat-
ter. It therefore no longer seems as if the mind were a protoplasm in which things
appear to happen in ways unknown to physics or chemistry …” In other words,
Wittgenstein has been conducting his own self-therapy on his philosophical errors.
Later, on page 28, in a crossed out paragraph, this is corroborated by a much
clearer remark (I have quoted two others in earlier chapters) than he usually gives
on his method’s relationship to psychoanalysis: a comparison working in the unconscious
becomes innocuous if it is made explicit.

Accordingly, meaning is not something in the realm of the mind that lies
behind a sentence, and the reason for a belief relates to the belief like a calculation
to its result (open to view, in other words). And if we can substitute for a belief its
expression, we can substitute for a belief’s reasons the process of deriving that
expression. This leads Wittgenstein to a remarkable analogy: the question “how do
you come to be here?” can be answered by giving the causes of one’s coming, or
the path one took, and the latter corresponds to giving one’s reasons. Causes may
require the mention of various factors, but the path was a unique experience, and
having identified it with our reasons we reach our aim of being able to say that we
can know the reason for a belief with certainty, and similarly our motive for a deed – but not the cause of belief or deed. This is to reduce to absurdity the strategy of
making everything open to view. He does admit very reasonably, and without any
need for that strategy, that while we do not guess our motive by observing our
activity that is precisely how we guess other people’s motives.

In further pursuit of considering only what is open to view, he suggests that in
comparing the depth of one of our beliefs with its content we can substitute
expression for depth (which itself does not have to be private or interior either). If
anyone says that an inner experience is required for belief, he asks what is wrong
with the inner experience of uttering or hearing a sentence? The words “interior”
and “exterior” are nothing but misleading terminology derived from terms related
to the human body. For mental arithmetic we can talk of written calculations,
since “our” considerations give us no reason for thinking of the experience of fan-
tasies as being on any different level from the experience of seeing real objects,
including written symbols. And describing an arrangement of objects in our view
is much the same as describing our experience of seeing them, but Wittgenstein
expresses this simple fact by saying that we are free to interpret the former descrip-
tion as being the latter, a reversion, I would have thought, to the primary language.

If we substitute the process of speech for that of belief, and strength and
emphasis of speech for depth of belief, then the grammatical relation between con-
tent and depth of belief can be represented simply. The deep sound of conviction
performs the same service for us as conviction itself, it offers us a simple and per-
spicuous picture of the grammar of the term “conviction” that will almost always
correspond to the term’s use. As an illustration he uses his example of chess
invented in terms of its shorthand and only subsequently as a board game: that
makes its rules simply and perspicuously describable. On the other hand (and at
first this really does seem to be on the other hand, the contrary of what he has
been arguing) the belief that something is going to happen is like the fear that it
will, and if one thinks of being dragged into a fire and asked if one has reasons for
one’s fear, and whether one remembers past bad experiences and assesses probabil-
ity, then one can see what kind of issue inductive reasons for belief are (clearly, in
comparison with immediate fear, a hollow one). For it is equally true of expecta-
tion, belief, fear, hope etc., that none of these words is used for a particular process
but for a variety of related processes. These can be articulate or inarticulate, and
one can ask if one can substitute the expression of fear for fear itself, as with belief
above. Fear, he has made clear, is a reaction. Its expression in striking out with hands and feet is merely an inarticulate version of the articulate “I am afraid it will burn”, and each is equally part of his fear-provoked behaviour. One would never call a cry for help a description of one’s state of mind – and so neither, the implication seems to be, is the articulate sentence.

This is the context for asking why we bother to calculate the strength of a steam boiler. We refuse to neglect this precaution just as we refuse to put our hand in a fire. In neither case do we appeal to probability or experiment. People who have carried out the appropriate calculations may counter scepticism with a stereotypical appeal to probability, but the very predictability of their response shows that it was superfluous – it should have been (in my words, not Wittgenstein’s, but I want to show which side of the fence he is on) “Blow yourself up if you want to”.

The top of page 23 brings us to an old question newly posed. “I am convinced that we are moving towards a new world war.” When do I have this conviction? Always, or when I express it? And at each word? “But I can’t change my conviction at will. I am convinced once and for all, even though I might have said something different.” “I could have said the opposite of my conviction.” But how can what I say be the opposite of what I am convinced of? “I could have said the opposite, but not with conviction.” “Well, not with any kind of conviction, but surely with the opposite conviction.” Conviction accompanies speech, that’s to say not in some way like stomach ache; in other words “I couldn’t have said that if I’d had stomach ache” [and a little more].

On page 24 of Volume VII the question had been: “I was of the opinion that Napoleon was crowned in 1805.” – “Were you of this opinion uninterruptedly, the whole time?” and in Grammatik this paragraph was combined on page 103 with a long one that followed in the manuscript volume. There, meaning the victor of Austerlitz, like getting the date of his coronation wrong, was only simultaneous with the sentence in the sense that knowing that 2 + 2 = 4 was. Here, instead of one’s answers narrating a step in a calculus, they carry on from the stomach-ache comparison, much as above. Conviction, and whether it can be simulated, and the way in which our feelings of grief can intermingle with our sensation of crying (an idea taken from William James, whom he quotes much in the manuscript volumes leading to Investigations Part II) lead to different kinds of attempts to do different kinds of difficult things, with the lesson that a word like “attempt” is not like a label on a bottle with unvarying contents.
This extra complication, I think, is evidence for my assumption that this dictation was made after the earlier sections of Grammatik had been edited, if not the whole of it. And the label image leads to the logical “all” having different meanings – in “all people in this room are wearing hats” and “all cardinal numbers …”, for example. The same lesson applies to concepts in general, and a similar variability to circumstances in which one says one knows but can’t say. Again, with orders to produce or imagine certain colours – all sorts of different things can go on in one’s mind. His reason for giving Schlick all these boring examples (his own word) is not to show that we still haven’t found what they have in common but to show that they do not need to have anything in common.

Finally (before his comparison of his own method of therapy with Freud’s) he turns to the concept of language, and defends his use of invented language games and his fictitious tribes who practice one (perfectly real) language game but not another. Elementary cardinal arithmetic might be called complete but arithmetic in the wider sense isn’t, and still less mathematics. What mathematics consists in is not determined in advance. Its concept is fluid, as is that of calculus in general, and it is the same with language. This is his justification for his language games. An example he suggests to Schlick is to be found in Investigations §19, a tribe whose language consists only of orders of a very restricted kind (in Investigations, orders and despatches in battle). And he is entitled to invent a tribe whose counting goes “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, many”, as he already had on page 152 of MS 108, i.e. Volume IV. (He did not need to invent one – Borges has a story from his grandmother, of Pampas tribes in her day whose counting went “1, 2, 3, 4, many”.) Language is neither made complete by the inclusion of one language game nor incomplete by the subtraction of another, and pointing this out is merely to comment on the grammar of the word “language”. This thought saves us from going down useless wrong turnings, and even (Wittgenstein’s transitions are sometimes like those in a dream) girds us to deal with a sentence like Heidegger’s “the nothing noths”. This, no doubt, was what prompted him to interpolate his therapy comparison.

(He does not name Heidegger, whose original words were “Was tut das Nichts? Das Nichts nichtet,” as quoted to me by Ryle in a Jowett meeting in 1949, and I assumed he had encountered it in reading Heidegger, and only now, in my second reading of the Schlick Diktat, has the probable truth occurred to me, that Wittgenstein had told him about it. Had I suspected this I might have told Ryle my own Heidegger story, from a 1948 lecture on him in Hamburg: his interpretation, from the principle that all sentences were subject-predicate, of “es regnet” as meaning “das Hier und Jetzt regnet”, since “es”, being the sentence’s subject, had
to have something it could denote. Now I have found confirmation that Ryle’s quotation came via Wittgenstein in Ayer’s *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.* On pages 228–229 he gives Heidegger’s actual words, and in *Was ist Metaphysik?*, not in *Sein und Zeit* as I supposed from Ryle, as “Wie steht es um dieses Nichts? Das Nichts selbst nichtet.”

After a quite charitably poetic explanation of Heidegger’s image, Wittgenstein cites “A = A” as a sentence which induces anxiety in us by appearing to have a deeply significant meaning, from which we free ourselves by ruling it to be improperly formed – whereupon that deep significance transfers itself to our gratitude for our new, clean notation. Similarly, we need have no anxiety about being told that the nothing noths if we can put to the author telling and indeed devastating questions about its function in our language. We don’t mind his introducing into that a wheel that spins idly provided he tells us how it fails to contact with our working wheels.

Wittgenstein draws an illuminating comparison. Some people make a habit of eating less than they feel they need, but if, from time to time, they eat too much, they will mistake the pain of surfeit for hunger, and eat too much again. Our analogous habit is reducing propositions to more fundamental ones, and when our unease is caused by unclarity as to grammar we look around, out of habit, for fundamental propositions, which would be no bad thing if it were in the down to earth sense of a house having foundations, but instead we go for something out of which all later science and philosophy can be spun. Hence our need to start philosophy with an inarticulate sound – like “the nothing noths” or Driesch’s (also not named) “in knowing consciously around my knowledge I attain something”. In comparison with these would-be impressive phrases I find Wittgenstein’s own confession (to Bouwsma) of having wanted to start philosophy with something really inarticulate, a grunt, far more honourable.

Pages 31 and 32 (the last) open with a new critique of the idea of replacing belief by its expression. This passage, incidentally, seems to have been prepared in notebook 156b, on page 28r. On the face of it, the idea is as useless as wanting to replace toothache by the expression “I’ve got toothache”. For “I believe etc.” is only a description of a mental process and as different from it as a description of a horse race from the race itself. Call the belief in question the belief that p will be the case. Wittgenstein wants to be able to say that we know that this is what we believe, but if we say that our belief is that p will give us satisfaction when it occurs, experience could prove us wrong, namely if p takes place and we are still dissatisfied. This is like Russell’s confusion of wishing for an apple (which one can’t
be wrong about) with hunger for an apple, which might be satisfied by a berry. While it is no kind of tautology to say that hunger for an apple will be stilled by an apple, it is a tautology to say that belief that p is the case is confirmed by p’s taking place.

The philosophical temptation is to think that the process of believing that p is the case has two ways of describing it. Let p be the supposition that a certain house will shortly collapse: then one description is of elements of one’s mind and will have nothing to do with the house, while the other expresses my belief that the house will collapse and has everything to do with it. Consider the analogy of a picture of a house to be built on a site. One description of it relates to a configuration of lines on paper and says nothing about a house (and the other, involving the house, is left to Schlick’s imagination). He moves to an analogy of a description of a painting. The painting is supposed to please the eye; the description won’t. But the picture (say) is of Napoleon’s coronation, and the description is equally a representation of that, so to this extent the picture and its description perform the same task. Similarly, the description of a verbal expression can always, qua expression, be used instead of the expression it describes. Apply this to a description of the process of belief, if (conveniently, he omits to say) it has the form “I believe that p will be the case”. But what, I want to ask, if the description is of neurological processes? Wittgenstein escapes by assuming that the expression of belief can be read off immediately from the process of belief – precisely, one would have thought, what is in question. Or if not immediately, we can just derive the expression of belief from that process with the help of linguistic rules – in that case the process can serve as a linguistic one. After all, nothing has been laid down as to what counts as language except that it must be able to be translated into our language according to definite rules.

At first it seemed to us as if there could be two descriptions of the process of belief, one telling us what goes on in our mind, or in our brain (my “neurological processes”), or elsewhere. The way we thought of this kind of description didn’t allow us to read off from it what was believed, thus failing in the requirement (he means his requirement) that such reading off should be possible. We cannot therefore derive an expression of belief from contemplating the process of belief – unless rules are given us with whose help we can do so. With them, the process of belief does fulfil his requirement as to what we can call an expression of belief, just as a description does (presumably he means a simple description of belief, the second kind promised above, unfortunately left unspecified).
With this extremely unsatisfactory begging of the question the dictation ends. Its very faults are clues to lacunae in his thought that only come to be filled with the work that led to Part II of *Investigations*. We need to be grateful to his willingness to let his hair down with Schlick, and the difficulty of following his condensed arguments is rewarded by the insight they give into philosophical labour still incomplete. Four short dictations followed, of which I find the first two, 303 and 304, especially interesting, and so I shall end by giving an account of those.

303 begins by comparing “I have toothache” with “so and so has toothache” and says that they are put grammatically into one form, but instead of declaring this to be misleading he puts forward a remarkable analogy: the form fits the facts much as different geometries might fit physics, but one of them does so more simply. The moment philosophy looks at toothache there is a problem, but this is like looking at a familiar door through crooked glass, making it look crooked itself, but if we just go through the door we find we can do so as easily as before. One can hardly help wishing that, having made this common sense point, he had let the matter rest.

He leads up to it, however, in a passage that deserves separate consideration. It is no wonder that certain facts concerning our bodies are so familiar to us that they steer our grammar into definite paths. As familiar as the hardness of iron – but what he has in mind is the sort of very general facts to which in November 1929 he gave the code word “interesting” (though he has no need of code words, of course, in dictating for Schlick). That we see with our eyes, for example, and hear with our ears; that one’s hand looks much the same today as it did yesterday; that when he wakes up in the morning he doesn’t see at the end of his arm a hand that he recognises as his friend’s, nor his own hand on his friend’s arm. (This remark is what I mentioned early in Chapter 3 as explaining the giving of names to hands.) Naturally, it isn’t problems of toothache that trouble him, calling for a dentist, but the consequence of looking from outside at a word’s use, giving the false impression that there is a scientific problem, which one (equally falsely, of course) attributes to the essence of pain. Whereas (in his fun-fair image) all one has to do is ignore the distorting glass and go through the familiar door.

Instead of taking his own hint and letting the matter drop he follows it up in the most tangled way, sometimes illuminatingly and sometimes perversely, and I do not pretend that I have always correctly distinguished one from the other.

There can certainly be a problem as to whether a particular person has toothache, and this can be difficult to find out. One sometimes says that one can only suspect, sometimes that one knows for certain that he has. Then, on the other
hand, one (the philosopher) says “I can never know whether the other chap has toothache, I can only suspect”. What drives one to this is the need to draw attention to a difference between the grammar of “I have toothache” and “the other chap has”. The way I do this is misleading, because it gives the impression that I want to say that in the one case I cannot attain the (logically attainable) ideal of knowledge, whereas what I ought to say is that I want to exclude the word “know” from this context. Applying this rule does not make knowledge a boundary value of suspicion. Nor does the rule say I was making a mistake when I said “I know he’s got toothache”, as against just suspecting. On the contrary, the new idiom (of disallowing the word “know”) will have to give us some other means of expressing that very distinction. This is a promise that I do not think Wittgenstein ever keeps, and neither does he ever satisfactorily explain why his new idiom, having come to birth against a background of so much common sense, was needed in the first place.

Since this new idiom is simply to exclude the word “know” from all language dealing with toothache (and naturally with pain in general), it is (he confesses) misleading of him to express the difference by saying “Whether the other chap has toothache is something I can never know, only suspect”. For one thing this raises the Vienna question: then how is it possible to suspect something I can’t know? And doesn’t it in any case make assuming that the other chap has toothache completely superfluous? Shouldn’t I just say “Only I have toothache, the other chap is merely behaving like me when I have toothache”? To be sure, this is liable to make me feel a little embarrassed. I shall want to say “It really is true but other people won’t let me say it”. And I shall be put under pressure to admit with common sense that other people can have toothache even if I don’t feel it, and that this is easy enough to imagine because it is a matter of their having the very thing that I have when I have a toothache. Which seems to clear everything up and leave no difficulties.

But it doesn’t, because the idea that comes to mind as a model (it is difficult to imagine who these people are who have these ideas that Wittgenstein invents for them) is that when one speaks of people having what one has sometimes oneself, this is the use of the verb “have” in sentences like “he has my old watch” or “I have bad teeth and so has he” or “I have white hair and so has he”. In this usage one can say “my right hand has what my left hand had yesterday” (eczema, perhaps), or that this tooth and the other in my mouth both have fillings, and also that this tooth and that one in my mouth both hurt (note that in English it is quite easy to avoid the verb “have” altogether when talking about pain). “And if I now say in
this sense [the old watch sense, one might call it] that the other chap has what I had had, the transition isn’t from my toothache to his toothache but from (as I should now have to say) my toothache in my mouth to my toothache in his mouth.”

This is astounding. One has to remember how Wittgenstein gave a meaning to feeling pain in someone else’s tooth in the Blue Book. I feel toothache but cannot locate the tooth that is hurting. I close my eyes and move my finger to where I feel the pain. It lands on someone else’s tooth. Nowhere here does Wittgenstein mention this, but it is reasonable to assume that he had told Schlick about it in some unrecorded conversation, of which he must have had many. In the following arguments he takes some such possibility for granted.

At first he considers talk about feeling other people’s pain rather than feeling pain in other people’s bodies. Someone who says the former is impossible isn’t summing up human experience of pain. If we declared the impossibility from that point of view, we should need to first give a closer account of “A is feeling B’s pain”, perhaps describe appropriate experiences that count as criteria. No: the impossibility is being proclaimed as a logical one. It concerns a rule about the use of language and should run: “It is meaningless to say ‘A feels B’s pain’”. But then [in Vienna logic] it should be meaningless to say: “A feels his own pain”. Things would be much the same with the expression [which he hasn’t used yet, but it was doubtless current in their discussions] “I know my own pains directly, other people’s indirectly”. One can admittedly reserve the words direct and indirect for one’s own and others’ pains [respectively, he omits], but then the words “I” (or “my”) and “direct” form a linguistic unit, they are indissoluble, as it were correlative; and similarly “the other chap” and “indirect”. The rule says, as it were, that it’s a good idea to talk of “direct” of one’s own pains, and so on.

This double distinction is consequently unnecessary, and one might as well use one of each pair on its own, in other words speak of direct and indirect pains simply, instead of my pains and the other chap’s pains (but surely, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander and I can talk of my and his pains and leave out direct and indirect?).

Our saying (ignoring that simplification) “I feel my own pains directly, and experience the other chap’s only indirectly” can count as a sign that we are inclined to give up any idiom that indicates possession in this kind of case (i.e. the ownership of experiences, and I have drawn attention to passages that show that he had for some time wanted to give that up). That disguised grammatical proposition really introduces a new idiom, but what it appears to do is express the metaphysically unique position of the I (as against the experientially unique position of some
human body), whereas in neither idiom making use of the sentence just quoted does the I have any unique position. We find it difficult to avoid believing that there is something secret about the I and the he and the relationship of my feeling to his, something that opposes our mind’s comprehending it. We seem to have to **overcome** a resistance, though the fact is that it disappears if we get our language right. On the one hand a door that needs great force to open it, on the other a safe with a combination lock.

(If the location of my pain were someone else’s tooth, I could easily find myself saying: I’m feeling his pain. But this isn’t what one wants to say, so much as: Nonsense! – I can only feel *my* pains, even if they are in someone else’s tooth. What this shows is that one would like to separate place of pain from ownership of it. Although the place (the “bearer” – a new use of this word incidentally) of the pain is another body, I have got to be its owner, it has to be *meaningless* to say “I am feeling someone else’s pain”. But that makes it meaningless to say “I can only feel *my* pains”; for this could only be meaningful if things could *logically* be different (if that “can only” were an empirical impossibility). If, therefore, it is meaningless to say: “I can’t feel another person’s pain”, in other words if pain and its ownership essentially coincide, then it has no meaning whatever to speak of a pain’s owner. This could only be meaningful if a pain could swap owners.) [This must be the ‘proof’ of sensations’ having no owners that Wittgenstein promised Schlick in the original Diktat.]

“I observe my own toothache directly, someone else’s indirectly” looks like a statement of objective fact but is only a way of establishing an idiom. Reality cannot agree or disagree with it, and therefore it cannot put the I in opposition to the ‘other’, cannot give it a special position.

The perception “I cannot feel the other chap’s pain, only my own” could be expressed as “my pain does not differ from his by its location”. Which [i.e. if it did so differ] would enable me to say: “I have pains in the other chap’s hand, be it A’s, B’s, C’s etc.”. So if I call bodies A, B and C, there is no indication of a pain’s owner if I say it is in the hand of body A. It must at least [normally] hold of *my* pain that it isn’t characterised as located in a particular body other than my own.

Then what is it characterised as? The answer [conditioned by our re-training] is: my feeling it directly. But what would it be like to feel it indirectly? Is this to have no meaning? If so, I can leave “I” out of “I feel it directly” and say my pain is characterised by its being directly felt. My pain is therefore the one that is felt directly, and someone else’s being in pain is something I know only indirectly from his utterances.
But this is something we have laid down. It sounds as if, when we say that those utterances are signs of pain, we had contrasted our indirect knowledge of the other’s pain with a direct knowledge of the other’s pain [sic, one is forced to say]. The natural use of this language is saying that we know directly that someone is in the next room if we can see him, indirectly if we can only hear him – giving us the possibility of just opening the door.

This tempts us to suppose that the [common sense] grammar of the case of the next room is also the grammar of other people’s pain. The way we are speaking makes it seem as if we can’t [quite] manage to observe the other person’s pain directly, as if the door were too firmly locked, whereas the truth is that we have laid down that certain phenomena are to be called “signs of another’s pain” and have in no way contrasted observation of another’s pain with observation of the signs. All the misunderstandings in this region spring from the fact that we are not using “direct” and “indirect” as alternative arguments of one function, in other words not as contrasts.

Wittgenstein then deals with Siamese twins, very clearly but I believe with a failure to face a fundamental point. Assuming that some pains in the joint body can be felt by both, he asks if this means that one pain or two is being felt, and answers that sometimes the answer can be “one” and sometimes “two”, if common sense criteria are applied that make those answers mutually exclusive (and equally meaningful). One twin might call a pain (understood, in the same part of their joint body) dull, the other sharp, making the answer “two”. Or their descriptions might coincide, making the answer “one”. Or, a possibility he doesn’t mention, one twin might feel no pain at all, also making the answer “one”. But this common sense response is not what he was after: he wanted to come to a metaphysical decision (of course, he really means that he was tempted to but has pulled himself together and made a linguistic decision), not distinguishing similar experiences from different ones but declaring: “Each of the two has her own pain even if both pains are indistinguishable in strength, location etc.”. This is not to set up a contrast with a case where the two have a common pain, and so in the sentence “A has her own pain” the phrase “her own” is superfluous.

The fundamental point that I believe he overlooks is the individuality of consciousness. Suppose that I am assured by a neurologist that consciousness without neural activity is possible but memory without it is not. Then I am free to believe in the survival of my consciousness without memory after death, and must assume this to be meaningful. But while I can talk of my consciousness now I cannot talk of my consciousness then, for reasons that have nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s gram-
matical arguments but with what we mean by a person. So I can suppose my consciousness to continue but I cannot call it mine, and yet I can meaningfully assert that it will never be a continuation of your consciousness, let alone merge into what some optimistic people make sound like a kind of consciousness soup. This example of “my” falling out of use, for a reason that is neither grammatical nor metaphysical but gives a meaning to the individuality of consciousness, argues that it can properly stay in use in ordinary circumstances where that individuality comes simply from our concept of people being different from one another.

He then sets up a deliberately confusing and asymmetrical language game as a comparison. There are four would-be potters, A, B, C and D, trying to make clay pots. The first makes good pots but the other three are useless and console themselves by making drawings of the pots they would like to have made. We, in describing these odd circumstances, introduce the idiom of calling a pot made by A “A’s pot”, while “B’s pot”, “C’s pot” and “D’s pot” mean the drawings made by B, C and D of the pots that broke in the kiln. If A makes a drawing of a successful pot, we have to call it, perhaps, A’s pot-drawing. There is no need to explain how misleading this would be, but would it be false? No! The worst you can say of it is that it assimilates things that are different, but why shouldn’t it? (He might have said, that is something philosophers have to live with when they speak ordinary language.) If all four had tools that they used and described in the normal way and never made drawings of, matters would be even more misleading, and he gives examples. The ad hoc idiom is still not impermissible. What it does is show us how asymmetrical language can be, and it could inspire us to invent asymmetries that really do mirror those of ordinary language. His most startling application of this idea, however, is to argue that if (not, it seems, in ordinary language but where reforming philosophers have been at work) the word “I” is not used in contrast to its normal contrasts, because the (reformed?) grammar of those and of the remaining sentence-parts does not allow them to be meaningfully substituted for it – in such a case the use of the word “I” itself would become obsolete.

Can a machine think? Remember that thinking is not necessarily a series of mental images but can be said to consist in writing, reading, drawing and calculating (which, remember, he also insists can take place on paper). Well then, a machine can think if it can for example write or draw. (Compare this with *Investigations* § 359, in which there is no mention of writing or drawing.)

Perhaps we aren’t satisfied and say “But the machine has no idea that it is writing. By thinking we mean the personal experience of writing, reading and so on, which the machine hasn’t got”. If we say that, then the exact analogy to “can it
think?” is “can it feel pain?” If one can say one, one can say the other. To which one wants to answer: “But one’s body can’t feel pain either!” But insofar as the body is not the bearer or owner of pain, pain has no owner. To this one objects: “But I have pains, not my body, for I can have disembodied pains (in an amputated hand), and in any case I can change my body [he doesn’t say ‘swap’].” But in that case why do I call it my body? In contrast to what? Here (he says) I refer to the investigation above.

The expression “red and green at the same time in the same place” … and a new discussion begins, which I leave to the reader to find.

304 opens with one of the ‘interesting’ questions of late 1929, is it meaningful to say that two people have the same body? It appears, however, also to relate to the companion question, can one person have two bodies, and then to a third, can two people with distinct bodies interchange experiences? Further on, another late 1929 image is reintroduced, that of the Oriental despot with linguistically self-centred toothache, who, Wittgenstein then pointed out, could just as well be himself if other speakers of this language co-operated, and indeed any person whatever – but now subtly different conclusions are drawn from 1929. I will paraphrase the first paragraph in full and give summaries of the remainder.

Is it meaningful to say that two people have the same body? What experiences might we be describing by saying that? Naturally, it is conceivable that what I call my hand, and move as such, is on another person’s body, because while I am writing now the connection between my hand and the rest of my body is invisible to me, and I could easily discover that the previous connection had undone itself and so, equally, that my hand is on someone else’s arm. Suppose I and my friend are sitting side by side without looking at each other and I am writing without being able to see my right arm. Suddenly I look round and realise that my hand is on the end of his arm. I point this out to him and he says: “I’ve just been writing with this hand, admittedly without looking at it, and I didn’t know it was looking like yours or that you had feelings in it”.

Wittgenstein then says that the difficulties and confusions arising out of that can mainly be brought back to assimilating the [unequal] pairings “I am in pain” / “he is in pain” as against “I have grey hair” / “he has grey hair”. “I can see his hair but not mine” is meaningful, but “I can feel my pains but not his” is nonsense. Naturally, there is nothing untrue about the way we express the two pairings but it is misleading.
Remember that the way a proposition is verified is what it says, and compare “I am in pain” with “N is in pain”. But what if I am N? In spite of that the two propositions will [still] have different meanings.

“Quite simple: I can’t detect his toothache, but he can (and so everything is symmetrical [since he can’t detect mine but I can]).” But this proposition is just nonsense.

In order to bring out the asymmetry of experience relating to me and the other chap, Wittgenstein permits himself to set out a new (actually 1929) scheme of expression, ending with “I commiserate with N because he behaves like LW when there is pain”. As far as unambiguosity and comprehension are concerned, this scheme is equivalent to the old one. Then surely one can construct an equally asymmetrical scheme of expression for having grey hair. Instead of trying to do so (replacing “LW has grey hair” by “there is grey hair” but “N has grey hair” by “N has hair like LW’s when there is grey hair”, showing that while this can be done the wit of the 1929 scheme has evaporated) he argues quite mysteriously. The whole point of 1929 was that any name would do, provided the linguistic community played the game consistently. Wittgenstein reiterates this, but says that if this is not so no name needs to appear in the scheme, because if one replaced LW by another person’s name one could find oneself saying that he himself was feeling pain in the hand of another body than his own. More, it would become conceivable that he could swap himself for another body, wake up and see his own body sitting on the sofa, and looking in the glass see that he had taken on the face and body of his friend. Then, treating a proper name as the name of a body, it would become meaningful to say: “I have toothache in body N”, or using the asymmetrical scheme “in one of N’s teeth pain is going on”; but it won’t have any meaning to say “I have grey hair on N’s head” unless that is supposed to mean “N has grey hair”.

But is the asymmetrical scheme just proposed correct? Why do I say “N is behaving like LW if …”? What characterises LW? The shape etc. of his body and its continuous spatial existence. But are these things essential for the experience of pain? Couldn’t I imagine that I wake up with pain in my left hand and see that it looks like my friend’s hand? And so on. But what characterised LW in 1929 was that he had enough friends to get them to play language games that would otherwise have required the might of an Oriental despot to enforce.

Forgetting that origin, he goes on to correct “N is behaving like LW if …” to “N is behaving like the person in whose hand pains are going on”. This is to attempt to separate two different kinds of experience (feeling pain and seeing its
signs), and nothing can be more different than feeling pain and the experience of seeing a human body writhing and groaning, etc. “And to be sure, there is no difference here between my body and somebody else’s, for there is also the experience of seeing the movements of one’s own body and hearing the sounds forced from it.” Well, yes – if one can be so detached from one’s pain as to be able to observe those things.

Or one might think that what Wittgenstein is describing here is completely disembodied observation by a hovering eye which shares none of the other senses but hearing, but the thought experiments that follow always seem to retain a sensation of pain, and various other sensations with it. First our body is made completely transparent, so that there is nothing of it that we can see. Then we are given a mirror in which we can see it. We still feel (and presumably smell, hear and taste) what we usually do. The visible signs of our toothache will look like those of another person, except that we shall be feeling them in the normal way. Now imagine that the mirror and its frame melt away but we still see the mirror image in it – continuing however to feel our feelings etc. What makes what I see my body? The fact that I feel those feelings, but not feelings correlated with the other bodies I can see. Remarkably, he now says that it is not essential that the mouth underneath the eyes in this mirror image should be speaking my words, contrary to the fact that ex hypothesi I can feel my invisible lips moving just as I can see the visible mirror-image lips moving, and presumably I can also feel any emotions evoked by these words, as implied by the “etc.” (admittedly that was mine and not Wittgenstein’s). And even more remarkably, if I am now given back my ability to see my body through its eyes, as distinct from those of the mirror image, “it is conceivable that I should exchange that body for another one”. I simply cannot see what this means, even in the terms of this extraordinary thought experiment.

Wittgenstein says that this experience (of body-swap) would consist in nothing but an instantaneous (sprunghaft – “with one bound” perhaps?) change in my body and its surroundings. He details this in a further thought experiment which seems to drop the magic mirror. There are five bodies A, B, C, D and E. At one moment I am watching the first four from E’s eyes, and watching what is visible of body E from those eyes. Suddenly I see, let us say, A, C, D and E from B’s eyes and B from those eyes. And so on. Then he makes matters “still simpler” by making me see all bodies, my own as well as the others’, from no eyes at all, so that as far as sight is concerned they are all on the same level. This makes it clear what can be meant by having toothache in another person’s tooth, assuming that I am going to
persist in calling one body “mine” and thus another body “someone else’s”. For perhaps more practical would be to give all bodies proper names.

Now, therefore, there is an experience [to be described], namely that of pain in the tooth of a human body; and it isn’t what I’d describe normally with the words “A has toothache” but “I have a pain in one of A’s teeth”. And there is another experience, seeing a body, my own or anybody else’s, writhing in pain. For we must not forget that pains in teeth do indeed have a location in a space, in so far as one can say that they move around and can [can they?] be in two places at the same time, but their space is not visual or physical space.

So now we really have achieved a form of expression that is no longer asymmetrical. It no longer gives precedence to one body, one human being, at the expense of others, it is therefore not solipsistic. – In this way, therefore, all experience is distributed without respect of person.

But that is not how we do distribute it. Things are put together differently in our way of considering them. Wittgenstein’s meaning is that it is no more than a very interesting general fact that we see matters as we do and not as he has gone to such lengths to make meaningful. (If, indeed, he has succeeded.) He gives a number of comparisons concerning different ways of seeing matters, emphasising that this is very definitely not to do with facts as to what is the case but as to how we see things. One is two ways of considering the moon’s path – as revolving round the earth while the earth takes it round the sun, or as following a single wave motion of its own, for which the earth could be invisible; and if it were, the hypothesis of an invisible object whose circular motion enabled the moon’s circular motion round it to give the effect of its wave path would be a most remarkable new way of seeing things. This is a recipe for destroying superstitions that were based on our current viewpoints. The character of the alternative viewpoint (elaborated above) becomes very clear if one thinks of the analogous change of boundaries (i.e. boundaries between people) if one introduced the concept of memory-time (into his highly artificial thought experiments – making them, in other words, closer to our accepted viewpoint). This would be very similar to the normalising effect of assuming an invisible earth for the moon to travel round in the absence of a real one. A boundary that previously had nothing to distinguish it is suddenly emphasised and brought to the fore. As I have suggested, the concept that is needed to keep our feet on the ground in respect of personal boundaries is consciousness rather than memory.

These details, fascinating to those who are fascinated by them (and I apologise to those who are not), prepare for a problem that will punctuate my remaining
chapters, and I need to get a point out of the way in advance of them. An article by Vu Hao Nguyen in *Die Wiederkehr des Idealismus*? and one (with more detail) by David Pears in *From the Tractatus to the Tractatus and Other Studies* (both from Peter Lang) make it clear that the solipsist of the *Tractatus* is not the solipsist of supersticism, and similarly that the idealist of the *Tractatus* is not Berkeley. Yet I am sure that Smith the solipsist whom we shall meet ahead and the idealist who appeared late in 1929 and will reappear until at least 1948 *are* precisely those standard cases. I say this now so that philosophers who disagree can be prepared. Both Pears and Nguyen cite *Tractatus* 5.64 and quote a *Notebooks* entry of 15.10.16 on which it is based. The latter says something quite startling: not only does realism coincide with idealism (with solipsism in 5.64) but *nothing* is left over (in 5.64 a point). I believe this can be explained by taking the diagram of 5.6331 of what the field of vision is *not* like and removing the eye. Where nothing is left – there is consciousness.
While the first appearance of the Augustine game of language learning early in MS 111 (Volume VII) does not mark the beginning of *Investigations*, its coming on the last page of *großes Format*, where it looks remarkably like a preparation for MS 141, itself a preparation for the *Brown Book* and thus for *Investigations*, does seem to be such a beginning. Before reaching those, however, there are intermediate passages still to discuss, and I should like to begin by mentioning a long and elaborate one in 153b, starting on page 24v.

It played no part in *Grammatik* but it is the origin of a well-known phrase in *Investigations*, and typical of the way Wittgenstein uses ideas without giving us any clue as to how they began. *Investigations* § 123 is where he says that the form of a philosophical problem is “Ich kenne mich nicht aus”. This first came at the foot of page 27v of 153b, in the middle of a discussion of proper names and their abbreviations and *names of their abbreviations*, which begins quite clearly (and in the accurate spirit of Frege) but suddenly turns into a tangle in which most readers would lose their way too. It continues as far as page 38v, after interruptions for general philosophy and English lecture notes. The proper name in question is “Moore”, and the phrase used in § 123 appears here as an aside: “(*I don’t know my way. And that is the formulation of every philosophical problem.*)”, but *Investigations* gives no hint that a particular problem had originally made him lose his way, let alone what problem it was. In 153b Wittgenstein does not close his parenthesis and I have had to guess where he intended to. The entire passage, except for its interruptions, is crossed out with faint diagonal pencil lines, and is easy to recognise in the ‘text’ of the electronic edition.

However, before his clear exposition of his problem in Fregean terms, Wittgenstein indulges in a gambit which must have disenchanted many people who approached his philosophy with good will. “Definition and naming correlate a sign with a state of affairs (in the first case, with a sign). – But a name is given to a thing so that I can speak about it. – That sounds as if a name were like a telescope and as
if the sentence above were analogous to: a telescope is given to me so that I can see him.” Now giving an object or person a name to facilitate discussion is nothing like giving a person a telescope to facilitate his view of an object or of another person, and Wittgenstein immediately points out the differences: once the name (say “N”) has been introduced it goes into general circulation for talking about N and moreover for dealing with him (addressing him for example), while dealing with him can be completely non-linguistic as well (and could include looking at him through a telescope). One could think of all sorts of illustrations of the difference – but why does Wittgenstein think it helps to draw our attention to an analogy that no one else would have thought of and then demolish it? He could simply have started “Talking about N is different from an operation I might undertake with N, and different from operating with an object that represents N,” – his example of the latter being to use a piece of paper the size of a picture he wants to hang, to help him decide where to hang it. The stage would then have been set for his Fregean game with the name “Moore”, its abbreviation “M”, the intriguing but straightforward fact that “Moore” and “M” name the same person while “M” does not name “Moore”, the possibility of using the letter “A” as a name of the quasi-name “M”, and the intriguing but equally straightforward discovery that while “A” names “M” and “M” names Moore, “A” does not name Moore, a failure of transitivity. All goes well until Wittgenstein becomes over-subtle and loses his way, but in the end one forgives him for his illustration on page 32r: “And the name of N’s name is no more a name of N than the woman who washes my washer-woman’s washing thereby washes my washing”. It might be significant that a general philosophical interpolation on page 34r begins “The philosophical problem is a consciousness of the disorder of our concepts and it can be relieved by putting them in order” – perhaps expressing his dissatisfaction with the disorder of this particular discussion.

To clear away another point in what is basically a Grammatik notebook, in MS 154, page 11v, there is an important remark concerning dispositions that contradicts another on page 476 of the typescript, 212, which prepared for the Big Typescript, 213. The manuscript one is “One of the most important ideas among our ideas is the idea of disposition. ‘I can say the ABC if I want to’ etc.” The typescript one is “Understanding as a disposition of the mind, or of the brain, does not concern us.” The contradiction is of no significance if one remembers that typescript 212 was a preparatory anthology of ideas, and included many that had been abandoned (this particular item was first written on 30.10.30 on page 186 of Volume V, MS 109). Ever since I discovered that Wittgenstein and Ryle had shared a
walking holiday in the summer of 1930 I have assumed that Ryle aired his ideas about the importance of mental dispositions, to Wittgenstein’s immediate disapproval, but to which, as I discovered from the manuscripts, Wittgenstein slowly granted assent. When *The Concept of Mind* was published in 1949 I understood from Elizabeth Anscombe that Wittgenstein had at first taken offence that he was not acknowledged in it, but that she had acted as intermediary in forwarding Ryle’s assurance that he was indeed grateful but that public acknowledgements of academic indebtedness were not his style. Wittgenstein, she said, accepted this. I now think that one reason for Ryle’s reticence was his awareness of how much Wittgenstein owed to him.

There are two sets of intermediate notebooks, and they overlap each other: MSS 156a-157a, and what Wittgenstein called his C volumes, MSS 145-152. In the first of the latter, on page 37, there is an *Investigations* pre-echo which has a personal interest for me. “A tells me ‘teach B a game!’ I teach him roulette and A says ‘I didn’t mean that kind of game – but a board game’. When A *meant* a board game did something have to hover in his mind’s eye?” We have reached a stage in Wittgenstein’s thought where we can be sure his answer was “no”. In *Investigations* this corresponds to the footnote on page 33, originally a slip tucked in between pages of the typescript, in which children are taught to throw dice for money. In early 1952 when I was discussing her translation with her, Elizabeth Anscombe let this slip fall on the floor and replaced it as best she could, choosing the region of §§ 69 and 70 where games were being discussed. I was always convinced that it belonged much later, and I suggest the region of § 394 (very similar to the context of *Grammatik* § 75). MS 145 began with a date, 14.10.33, and the first date in 146, C 2, is 12.12.33, probably written in Vienna when he had arrived for his Christmas vacation.

In the other set of intermediate notebooks, the first important passages that I wish to draw attention to come in MSS 156a, 156b and 157a (the second portion of which was set aside and then used in February 1937 for revisions of the newly sketched *Investigations*). These are on the subjects of immediate mental images, solipsism, idealism and realism. What I find significant about these is that whereas, in passages of this kind that we have met previously, Wittgenstein was obsessed by rephrasing and revising his prose, in these notebooks he makes a fresh start and frees himself from his ‘word processor’ habits.

In 156a, page 10r has:

“Only the present mental image is real.” What makes anyone say that? One answer – just as false as this assertion – is: “past and future experience is just
as real except that it is past and future”. – I [page 10v] should like to say: “after all, we only know past experience from memory or from documents and such like; only present experience is before our eyes”. But one sees at once that the comparison with the film is seducing us. To say something like “after all, I can only see the present state of the table, not that of a minute ago” is just nonsense. We are aiming at making a [page 11r] picture of the world [that holds], in contrast to one that doesn’t hold. Compare: “the boundary of our field of vision is vague”.

To say like Russell: “the world could have been created five minutes ago as it actually was five minutes ago, with all memories and documents, which would then be completely misleading” would not mean anything, because then there would ex hypothesi be [page 11v] no way of verifying that proposition. It is a picture that cannot be used as a picture. A picture that does not connect …

This notebook continues in that vein, but takes in many other subjects as well, and this one is taken up again briefly on page 22v of the next, 156b, with “Realism is always in the right with what it says. But idealism sees problems that are there and which realism doesn’t see”. This remark, however, is isolated among various others on different subjects. One of these, on page 23r, is an important Investigations anticipation: “If philosophy has to do with the use of the word ‘philosophy’ as well, one might think that there must be a second order philosophy …” (see § 121). Another is quite Rylean, on page 26r: “One of the most misleading phrases is the question ‘what do I [i.e. you] mean by that?’ In most cases one could answer: ‘nothing at all – – I say …’” On page 28r comes the anticipation of page 31 of the Schlick Diktat mentioned in the previous chapter (on [typescript] page 142). The discussion of idealism and realism is reintroduced gradually, first on page 33v, where Wittgenstein discusses the philosophers’ notion, current just then, that objects were classes of sense data, and then, this time to be sustained, at the bottom of page 35r.

If one says: It [35v] seems to me that there is a tree there, one is playing a game of a different kind from a normal description of visual facts. That is to say: these games may well have certain moves in common but in the game in which people are specified other moves come into play.

It is almost as if there were apart from ordinary chess another game in [36r] which perhaps each of the pieces had an owner, and apart from the normal aim there were others; perhaps a particular piece had to be lost as late as
possible. (Indeed, in this game there wouldn’t need to be check-mate in
the ordinary sense; there would be winning on points.)

Instead of “do you see that”; “can you draw that?”

[36v] Who is it who has tooth-ache if I have toothache? The one whose
mouth moves if he says it? the one who has the bad tooth? the one who
twists his face? Whom is one supposed to comfort? which tooth to treat?
For comforting relates to a body.

Think of my body instead of the geometrical eye in the middle of the field
of vision, seen en face.

If I say: “only what I see is real” I am already using a different way of
speaking from normal. I am already using language in a way that deviates
from the normal. I am already giving way to the temptation to use it in a
solipsistic manner. And that is why I don’t really need to say any more, and
[why] what I say is only what the realist [37v] says if he says: What I see is
just as real as what you see except that it is me seeing it now and not you.
Which really doesn’t say anything except for emphasising a way of speak-
ing.

The solipsist sees his position as incontrovertible. “After all it is clear that my
experience is the only real one; it can’t be anything else”. Of course not, if
that’s how you use language. For you use it like that already; you don’t
[38r] put up a case for this use first. The temptation towards this use is
there; and you have already given way to it.

It simply couldn’t – in a certain sense – be that the solipsist (idealistic or real-
ist) might have been wrong. // that anyone so clearly convinced might
have been wrong.

It is important to appreciate this radically new introduction to the problem, in
terms of language, because the conclusion is hardly different from that of late 1929.
A very emphatic expression of his linguistic point of view that seems to include a
confession of his own past solipsism comes on page 41r: “If, now, my solipsistic
wishes were to be completely fulfilled – how would language be used?” Another
expression of solipsism begins at the bottom of page 45r.
Imagine that upon the assertion: [45v] “I see what is seen” someone asked “how do you know that you are seeing it?” (at this he perhaps touches my arm).

“A sentence consists of nouns, verbs and adjectives”. Corresponding to that is: “All tools are hammers, nails and pliers”. [See Investigations § 14.]

I seem to be speaking meaningfully to myself, in fact in a way that no one else would understand.

Thus, I say: [46r] “what is really being seen is that” and point with my finger to my surroundings. But I don’t want to point to [particular] objects but to my field of vision, which naturally doesn’t mean anything.

The conclusion, finally, is expressed on page 54v (and also linguistically).

The solipsist (but the idealist and the realist as well) wants to say something that makes no difference. Just like someone who says that our senses are always deceiving us.

If it is supposed to make no difference [55r], then it can be translated into what someone else says too, and it is therefore a matter of notation.

The notebook ends with colour and sense data from a solipsistic point of view on page 58r, and 157a opens in the same way, with the date 4.6.34 at the top of its first page (the inside of the cover, with the second page, on the right, properly termed 1r). The criticism of the solipsism continues to be linguistic. On page 1v, for example:

If I say: “that (what is described here) is the only thing that is really seen”, that is to give my description a title. But one [2r] that I can’t justify.

On page 7r the subject reverts to pain.

Then is my body in pain? – One would like to say: “How can your body be in pain? The body is after all per se something dead; a body doesn’t know anything about itself”. And here again it is as if we saw into the essence of pains and recognised as a fact of their nature that the body can’t have them, and it is as if [7v] we recognised that what is having them must be a being of a different kind, namely of a mental kind.
But to say that the ‘I’ is a mental kind of thing is like saying that the number 3 is a mental kind of thing (because one recognises that ‘3’ is not used to designate a physical object).

[8r] On the other hand this way of speaking would be justified too: this body is in pain and so, just as now, we should persuade it to go to the doctor, take its medicine etc. etc. as usual. But would this form of expression, even if we adopted it, [not] be an indirect one, like hitting the sack and meaning the donkey? – Is it indirect to say “let us write a ‘3’ here instead of an ‘x’” instead of saying “let us substitute 3 for x here”. It is only a question [8v] of how we go on to use our words. Don’t let us deceive ourselves that meaning is an occult process that contains the whole use of a symbol as a seed does a tree! Your proposition that what is in pain or is thinking is a mental kind of thing only corresponds to [the fact] that the word “I” in I am in pain does not designate a particular body [9r] because it cannot be replaced by a description of a body.

By a most intriguing comparison, continuity of experience leads to action at a distance in astronomy, and this ends the subject of sense data finally on page 11r.

While this new linguistic approach distinguishes its solipsism / idealism / realism from the similar sounding conclusions of 1929, the question of whether what those three terms meant to Wittgenstein was the same as in 1929 is one I cannot answer; what I am quite sure of (and said in my previous chapter other philosophers might disagree about) is that the terms are not used here as they were in the *Tractatus*, but in some way corresponding to what philosophers of the thirties meant by them.

There follows a discussion of freedom of the will that is to me intriguing for personal reasons. In 1990 I reconnected myself with Isaiah Berlin’s ideas by finding a reprint of the first edition of his lecture *Historical Inevitability*. In the last years of Wittgenstein’s life there was current in Oxford a dissolution (as Isaiah calls it in a footnote on pages 26 and 27) of the problem of free will. He might have expressed his feelings better by calling it a cop out (but I must admit that in my Oxford years I was quite convinced by it). It went something like this. Suppose we know someone so well that we can be certain, when he is faced with a choice between alternatives, which he will choose. He does exactly as we predict. Did this make him *not* free to choose the other? No, because to justify saying so we should need to prove that had he chosen the other some kind of dire constraint would have prevented him from doing as he wished. In normal life such struggles rarely take
place. We frequently choose without considering alternatives at all, and when we do we normally plump for one or the other with very little ado.

Modern determinists make that very fact their point of attack: the reason why we give so little sign of moral struggle is because all the time our neurological mechanism is settling the matter for us, as it were painlessly. Isaiah acknowledges this argument, but he is mainly much more concerned with ideas of our being controlled by specious social entities and influences, our class, our religion, our loyalty to our country, our upbringing and so on. What he maintains absolutely is that whatever the type of constraint, and whether or not we are conscious of being constrained by it, we cannot be called free if our entire behaviour is predictable. A happy unawareness of what causes are at work in our behaviour is not freedom. His reason for this is for him a very significant one: complete predictability entails that we cannot assign moral praise or blame for what people do. In order to justify moral judgement we must assume some area in which predictability of behaviour fails.

Wittgenstein is not troubled by predictability. To use one of his favourite phrases, he short-circuits the whole discussion at a level of simple common sense. His observations bring us near to where this notebook was put aside. There eventually comes a date, 9.2.37, on page 46r, but many notes prior to this seem to go with his Investigations revision (‘following a rule’) and my guess is that the new start was made on page 33r, where ink is first used (with “Eine Quelle …” – I shall quote it in full in English to close this section).

As to free will, my own instinct is to side with Wittgenstein, at least in so far as I am not troubled by predictability. The reason why there is no need to be defensive about claiming an area of unpredictability is because the very idea of complete predictability is a double misunderstanding from the beginning. Firstly, at what is called a ‘quantum’ level there is too much probability-leeway for it ever to be attained. Secondly, even supposing that at a more ‘macro’ level no such leeway remained as far as physical objects are concerned, it is a well-known empirical fact that arbitrary human decisions can intervene to (for example) substitute one physical object for another, which then changes the material set up. The determinist responds to this by arguing that any such intervention is itself predetermined by neurological cause and effect – but that, since it takes place at a ‘quantum’ level, is incapable of being absolutely predicted. Now as someone once said: “I decide to raise my right hand and my left rises instead as a result of quantum-level indeterminacy in my neurones – what sort of freedom of will is that?” A splendid point, but still two facts remain for people who think that an area of unpredictability is a desideratum. First, however disruptive of freedom neurological indeterminacy
might be in perverse cases (instead of reinforcing it as we hoped when we first heard about it), it at least ensures such an area, and this is just what Isaiah’s argument needs. And second, as I have said, we know from experience that we can interfere with the behaviour of material objects, and if a determinist tells us that our interference could have been predicted we are entitled to respond “so be it – but Isaiah wants to be able to praise or blame me for my intervention and I am happy to let him, because however biased my action was by neurological activity, I know what I did and why, and by that I don’t mean (or care) what caused it. In fact, I tie my flag to it, and am happy to accept moral responsibility for it.” For moral responsibility is more than something that requires a theoretical justification for assigning it, it is a part of our human life, and accepting it is part too.

To close this pre-Investigations section, then, I quote a selection of Wittgenstein’s notes on free will. They are somewhat repetitious, and not all are equally good. They begin on page 11r, and each paragraph has a tick at the beginning, except for those that are crossed out. Paragraphs frequently have double spaces between them, but I hope that readers who are interested will check such details from the facsimile edition. The final working of them can be found in Investigations §§ 611-633, and a paragraph in MS 133, on its page 86, quoted ahead in Chapter 9, gives a very common sense summary of their message.

My choice is free means nothing but: I can choose. And there can be no doubt about [the fact] that I sometimes choose. What one calls free is only choice in itself [per se]. To say “we only believe that we choose” is nonsense. The [11v] process that we call ‘choosing’ takes place whether one can predict the result according to natural laws or not.

“Willing too is nothing but an experience”, one would like to say (the ‘will’, too, only ‘idea’). It comes if it comes, and I can’t bring it about.

…

One says: Perhaps it will at some time happen to you that you see or hear something; but one doesn’t say [12v] perhaps it will at some time happen to you that you will something. For, one would like to say, if you will // (feel you’d like) // you can will at any time. For you do it yourself, not the body that is only partly dependent on you but you.

…

And one could say: “I can at any time will in so far as I can never try to will”.

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And to say that I cannot try to will is naturally no statement [13v] about the natural history of the will. The verb “will” is what tempts us to compare the activity of willing with the activity of carrying out what is willed, and to take the grammatical difference as a difference in properties.

Now ask: “does something happen to me, do I experience something, if I do something voluntarily?” Am I having an experience? Well, if for example I raise my arm and see [14r] how it rises, one can to that extent talk of my experiencing something. And as to my muscular sensations, they for their part will be called an experience too. And remember one thing now: that the activity of deliberating is independent of the experiences of actually carrying out the [intended] movement. I.e., this deliberating, considering, choosing could happen, even a decision be taken, and the [14v] voluntary action nevertheless not take place. And conversely, the voluntary action could be carried out without any preliminary considering.

…

“Willing too is only an experience – etc.” What is this remark directed against? And if the assumption that is being rejected was incorrect, how could one have made such a mistake? What seduced us into it [?] What is the mental image, the analogy, that [16v] is at the bottom of the view that there is one passive principle, the imagination, and an active one, the will? [crossed out] It just is completely different: raising one’s arm and feeling that it is rising, or [17r] observing that it is raising itself, and I believe that the dichotomy is dictated by this distinction.

…

What prompts the impression that there is a doing independent of experience is the existence of the expressions “I do that” “I raise my arm” in contrast to “My arm rises” or “I feel, see how my arm rises”.

We are being impressed by this contrast of expressions, [18v] if we see the immediately given as doing and observing [as divided between doing and observing, perhaps].

But don’t forget one thing: If ‘I raise my arm’ ‘my arm rises’; and the problem occurs: What is it that remains if, from the fact that I raise my arm, I disregard the fact that my arm rises . . [“absehen”, a word much used by Frege in Über die Zahlen des Herrn H. Schubert]
[19r] Ask yourself: “is the deliberating that leads to an action an experience or an activity?” And in general: is thought an experience or an activity? What are you going to call it? — (One often finds in stories the expression “suddenly he heard himself say the words …”)

“Is our wishing something that happens to us or do we do it?” Indeed, has this question any meaning? It admittedly has a meaning to say: Did you deliberately raise your arm [19v] or did it rise of its own accord? and the question of whether wishing is a doing or an experience can perhaps mean whether wishing is more like voluntarily raising one’s arm or experiencing one’s arm rising. (Lichtenberg: “es denkt”)

Nor has it any meaning to ask: “is willing properly speaking an experience?”

The peculiar difficulty of the question already shows that it isn’t properly speaking a question.

…

[Ticked but doubly crossed out] I should like to say: “Nor am I responsible for willing; it comes if it comes.”

[If that were] so, we wouldn’t speak of the movement of our arm. And here is the region in which we say meaningfully [20v] that something doesn’t simply happen, but that we do it.

…

Think of the paradox: “that really there isn’t anything soft; [21r] for even the softest thing on which I am reclining has a definite form, and this isn’t any more definite if it is made of steel.”

…

The action happens if I will [it]. “But are you also willing if you will [it]?” That doesn’t mean anything. And its meaning nothing derives from the fact that the word will is being incorrectly interpreted grammatically, like the word “time” if one thinks time has to move at a definite velocity.

[22v] “The will comes when it comes” and that means, it would really have to be something that is there before it is there.
[A paragraph on the possibility of putting oneself in a situation where there will be no choice, including the parenthesis “(swimming)” — see *Investigations* § 613 in particular and the whole context from § 611 to say § 632.]

“I can’t bring it [willing] about”? Of course I can bring it about, in the sense in which I can bring [23v] anything about. I can’t will it. And that means that there is no meaning in saying that I have willed anything voluntarily or involuntarily.

Paradox of softness and form not being able to be definite even if it were made of steel.

…

[24r] The philosophical problem seems insoluble; until one realises that there is a sickness in our way of expressing ourselves.

…

My expression came from my thinking of willing as a bringing about, but not as a causing but – I should like to say – as a direct, non-causal bringing about. And it is on this idea that the image [that I am propounding] is based.

Remarks about aesthetics follow this, but page 29v reverts to the above idea:

The thing one is frightened of doesn’t need to be the cause of one’s fear. It would be easy to think of a case where, perhaps, under the influence of poison someone was afraid of everything [30r] one put in front of him. One would then say that the cause of his fear was the poison.

If I say: I am afraid because it is looking at me the because doesn’t establish a causal connection.

One has to distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear.

There follow some remarks about mathematics and about memory and sense data until, on page 33r, there is a significant paragraph, already mentioned, which I assume to have been written in 1937, or at least considerably later than the passages just quoted.

A source of countless mistakes and wrong interpretations, in ordinary life as well, is: assuming one cause behind each appearance. One cannot bring oneself to say: many circumstances have contributed to that and that result. On the contrary one, occult, cause is put up.
The C volumes form a fascinating bridge between *Grammatik* and *Investigations*, along with the *Blue Book* and the Ambrose lecture volume, and all three should be studied by any serious Wittgenstein student. Here, I shall merely give pointers to how the C volumes led out of the *Blue Book* and towards the *Brown Book* and *Investigations*. Being largely written in Cambridge they include many brief (and some lengthy) lecture notes written in English. These are often insensitive to English idiom, but the penultimate C volume, MS 151, includes a long and fluent discussion of privacy. It is longer even than a small notebook devoted almost entirely to privacy, MS 166, apparently written in preparation for a lecture given in Turing’s absence during the 1939 Philosophy of Mathematics lectures, edited by Cora Diamond. Even this, written when Wittgenstein’s English had improved considerably, I suspect under the tutelage of Yorick Smythies, was not perfect. Elizabeth had grudgingly given me permission to show my copyings in general to Delia Macbeth, a pupil of Leavis’s, for the improvement of my own English translations, and so I was able to show her this in particular. She, with her uncanny eye for style, was convinced that Wittgenstein’s views on privacy were perverted by his entrapment in his own faulty English, and readers will find hints to this effect throughout my discussions of privacy.

After a few scattered phrases, Wittgenstein’s English lecture preparations begin to acquire some length in the third C volume, MS 147. This describes itself on its first proper page, 1r, as opening at the beginning of February 1934, when, according to Rush Rhees’s preface to the 1958 edition of the two, the *Blue Book* was still being dictated. On the inside of the front cover, however, crammed at the top and giving an impression of being written after the remainder, is a reference, “No 43”, which is § 43 of the *Brown Book*, dealing with a dot-dash code for hops and steps. Rhees says that that was dictated in the academic year 1934–35. Unfortunately there are no more dates in the later C volumes to help us check. With many paragraphs on mathematics, volumes C 3 to C 7 mainly deal with solipsism, idealism and realism, much as we have already encountered, but progressing towards the subject now termed privacy. This word first appears in that sense on page 44r of C 4, MS 148: Whence the idea of the privacy of sense data? Page 48r of this ends in German with: Ist eine Philosophie denkbar die das diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist? I suppose the answer to this is, it depends what you mean by philosophy. In so far as they have been given tenable meanings, idealism and realism are philosophical opposites to each other, but I can think of no opposite to solipsism but some kind of this-worldly equivalent of the other-worldly concept that I call consciousness soup, and I prefer not to dignify it with a name, let alone term it a phi-
losophy. (See a remark in the previous chapter, on TS 303, one of the smaller of the dictations made for Schlick.)

MS 149, the fifth C volume, includes on page 22 the phrase “The grammar of ‘private sense data’”. On the same page there is in German a remark that sums up what I find an entirely sane attitude, by which I mean that it seems to be admitting that this is the only kind of thing that can be said on the matter, namely: “The interesting thing is not that I do not have to consider my behaviour in order to know that I have toothache, but that my behaviour tells me nothing at all”. Yet on page 87 he is (in German again) far from satisfied: “The atmosphere that surrounds this problem is terrible. Thick fogs of language are drawn up around the problematical point. It is almost impossible to advance towards it.” And he does, in fact, in this region, entertain a number of problems that make his pessimism seem reasonable.

He also, on page 84, asks a colour question that may seem absurd to English readers but has a certain sense: is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary colour? He means, as a visual primary. For example green, which we are all familiar with mixing from blue and yellow, is visually primary because we cannot see a well-balanced green as composed of blue and yellow. Now there are many ways of mixing brown, and many kinds of brown in which we can visualise their components, but there are also browns that seem to be ‘just brown’, so the question is certainly not nonsensical. Wittgenstein, readers will find, deals with it quite differently from my own sketch here.

MS 150, the sixth, is more general. It alternates between German (in which it opens) and English. Its first topic is the power of the visual impression a word makes on us, encapsulating what we feel is its message to us much more strongly than its sound. He might, of course, have admitted that there could be other views about this. From this arises the question of what is common to a word’s primary meaning and to an extended one. An example that comes both in German and in English and will be found frequently is mental and physical tension, presumably recurring in his lectures. This volume also includes a point that I had always assumed he had taken from Locke, although alas I can no longer find it there, until I found (from the German Versuch einer Umarbeitung of the Brown Book – see ahead) that he ascribed it to William James: that in getting up in the morning, however much one might have deliberated, one does not conclude with any kind of act of will but just gets out of bed. Here, on page 46, in a context of involuntary action, simply: “All that happens is that I get out of bed”.

MS 151, the seventh, includes (among some mathematics and logic) what amounts to an extended essay, first on solipsism and then on privacy. Though a
paragraph or two can be found in the first two pages, the essay proper starts on page 3 with John Smith the solipsist saying “Obviously this Â is what’s seen”. This new start, incidentally, and the way it jumps from the end of MS 149, was badly edited by Rhees in *Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”*(1968). In testing Smith’s meaning Wittgenstein points out that his lecture listeners know perfectly well what he is seeing and what he can’t see. One might summarise what he is arguing for as John Smith’s *unprivileged* solipsism, which of course is no longer solipsism in any original sense. But at the bottom of page 4 there is a strange manifestation of Ludwig Wittgenstein the solipsist: he has no head but can still tap his chest and point to his ‘geometrical eye’ (the point from which his vision appears to emanate). Surely his tapping his headless chest still points to the person seeing – but, he says, pointing ahead to what he is seeing is useless (though, granted the extraordinary specifications, I cannot see that this is so), and so he writes a description of what he is seeing and, tapping both that and his chest, he now really can say “I am seeing this”. The question (for Wittgenstein) is, how he knows the identity of who is seeing, and his answer seems to be that his pointing hand establishes who is seeing. Given that he has reduced his visual consciousness to his geometrical eye, one would think that there was no need for this rigmarole, and Wittgenstein seems to agree, for he breaks into German and speaks of the pathological character of solipsism.

In addition to dropping John Smith, Rhees left out an interesting aside on page 6 which I think deserves to be quoted:

[A scientist says that he is only doing empirical science and a mathematician only mathematics and not philosophy; – but he is subjected to the temptations of language like everyone else, he is in the same danger and must beware of it.]

On page 13 Wittgenstein propounds what could be called one of his war cries:

A faked moan isn’t a moan without something and a real moan with something.

And he tries to reformulate this less laconically:

You say in one case the expression [14] corresponds to the feeling. But how does it correspond?

In discussing this the term “private experiences” appears, and also the question of cheating (above, failure to correspond does not appear to have implied dishonesty). This leads to a dilemma: a purely private experience can ex hypothesi not be
known to others, and our only recourse is to examine behaviour; but the normal
terminology of behaviourism is aimed at excluding private experience. It is a natu-
ral distinction of [our normal, uncorrupted] language to contrast simple behaviour,
behaviour prompted by feeling, and feeling expressed – but the terminology of
behaviourism reduces all this alike to (on page 15) “mere behaviour”. What wor-
ries him is the idea of ‘behaviour plus experience’, suggesting as it does that there
could be behaviour without experience. One would think that the question (in his
own single inverted commas) ‘Could I talk about moaning if there was no such
thing as hearing the moaning?’ settled the problem, but to give him time to resolve
it Wittgenstein writes a ‘continue on’ sign, turns to mathematics and games, and
finally, coming back, says that the continuation is on page 24. Isn’t talking of
behaviour talking of experience, which makes “talking about private experience”
a special case of “talking about ‘behaviour’”? In the light of his insight on page 15
he would have done better simply to have made “talking about behaviour” a spe-
cial case of “talking about experience”, dropping both “private” and single
inverted commas, but I take it this is what he means when he goes on (at the bot-
tom of page 24):

One might put it by saying: “Experience is at the bottom of everything we
say about phenomena; so if we call anything in particular talking about
experience it must be a special case of talking about phenomena as [I
assume “in”] the ordinary way[”].

If we say “toothache is nothing but behaviour” we seem to say that it is not
so and so, we seem to wish to exclude something. But that’s obviously
what we mustn’t do.

At the bottom of page 31 he sums up his view once more by:

The private experience is to serve as a paradigm and at the same time
admittedly it can’t be a paradigm.

The ‘private experience’ is a degenerate construction of our grammar
(comparable in one sense to tautology and contradiction). And [32] this
grammatical monster-show fools us: when we wish to do anything with it
it seems to us as though it denies the existence of an experience, say, tooth-
ache.

On page 36 there is a fresh start, clearly occasioned by a new lecture.

Privacy of sense data. I must bore you by a repetition of what I said last
time. We said that one reason for introducing the idea of sense data was
that people, as we say, sometimes see different things, colours e.g. looking at the same object. Cases in which we say “he sees dark red whereas I see light red”. We are inclined to talk about an object other than the physical object which the person sees who is said to see the physical object.

I hope that readers of my account of Wittgenstein’s 1929 work on sense data will agree that the above is nothing to do with the reasons he gave then for considering sense data. I believe he is rationalising. The fact is that he has moved to a new philosophical subject, namely privacy. The discussion here goes on to page 45 and is easy to follow, although it does not measure up to propounding a new subject. For that one has to wait for the privacy passages written in Norway in 1937 (in MSS 109 and 110) in preparation for the inclusion of the idea in *Investigations*, and MS 166, the preparation for a lecture given in Turing’s absence in 1939. On page 46 something quite different appears as an end to this notebook – the draft of a letter for a newspaper about area bombing written late in the war, in which “we” would I guess mean Wittgenstein and Yorick Smythies.

The *Brown Book* will have been completed by this stage, but more has to happen before we reach the *Investigations* story itself. As an English dictation the *Brown Book* was preceded by a few pages of loose large format paper in German, MS 141, and followed by the *Versuch einer Umarbeitung*, written in spare pages at the end of MS 115 (Band XI) in German. The whole thing, *Blue Book* and all, has been translated into German by Petra von Morstein, with Wittgenstein’s German *Versuch* up to where her German takes over. Supplemented (for convenience, I assume) by *Zettel*, this forms the fifth volume of the old Suhrkamp edition (but now – see *Working Papers* 8, page 204 – *Zettel* has been sensibly transferred to the eighth volume). The fifth Suhrkamp volume is invaluable for getting to grips with *Investigations’* growth. The next items in that growth come in the last C volume, MS 152. After that comes the first *Investigations* draft, occupying a manuscript volume, MS 142, that was both begun and finished in Norway in 1936, given by Wittgenstein that Christmas to his sister Margarethe and lost after the war for many years. Notes written in February 1937 (already mentioned) follow, after which a typescript was dictated – to Skinner, see Monk, page 373 – and presumably destroyed, followed by surviving ones that will be discussed in the next chapter. This, however, is to rush ahead, and to end this one I must explain the complexities of what at first seems like a simple sketch for *Investigations* in the last C volume.

After some real mathematics that include continued fractions, prose starts on page 5 of that, and immediately gives us a clue to its relationship to the *Brown Book*, with “Let us look back at the problem of case 47”. This turns out to be the
The genesis of Philosophische Untersuchungen paragraph corresponding to the passage in the Brown Book previously referred to as 43, with a different set of three orders but the same query as to the meaning of being guided by them. On page 6 we reach an actual contribution to the Versuch, printed in the region of page 181 of the fifth Suhrkamp volume. At the end of this section of notes, on page 12, there is a preparation for something that comes on page 234 of the Suhrkamp volume, where he mentions William James as the origin of the idea “auf einmal finde er, dass er aufsteht”. In other words, Wittgenstein is still tinkering with his Umarbeitung and does not seem to have abandoned it.

He is very close to doing so, however, because at the top of page 13 he notes: “Es ist vielfach Flickwerk und Stümperei” (patchwork and bodging) and completes the page with a pessimistic preface draft, incorporating both those words, which begins “This book represents my views on philosophy, as they have developed in the last ten years”. It has no other resemblance to the multiple Investigations preface drafts that began in Norway in 1937 and ended with an unused last effort written in Ireland in 1948. I see it rather as a farewell to the Versuch einer Umarbeitung than a preparation for Investigations.

On page 14 begins a remarkable analogy using patches of colour on a floor, so large that one might be misled into thinking that the patch one is standing on gives the colour of the whole floor. This analogy is both elaborated and applied for eight pages, and seems to stay at the back of Wittgenstein’s mind until page 29, where aspects of ‘aspect’ begin to be discussed.

The notes that follow that concern problems that had interested him for at least four years and continued to do so. For example, on page 31:

The mental processes during speaking play the same role as the sensations behind expressions [Ausdrucksempfindungen], that is the sensations that go with an expression of conviction, of doubt, of suspecting etc.

I.e., if someone speaks in these and these circumstances with this expression we say he [31] means what he says, while he is saying it. There is nothing there to give the lie to the expression.

On page 38 we find Augustine’s description of language learning, picking up from the beginning of the original Brown Book (and now from its Umarbeitung). Much polishing of this opening follows, and then various notes that appear to be a preparation for the first sketch of Investigations (MS 142), and on page 87 further redraftings of the book’s Augustine opening. On page 56, however, there is something much more definite: “I said in (47), rectangles correspond to the names ‘r’, ‘g’, ‘b’ and ‘w’.” This “(47)” turns out to be, not a reference to the Umarbeitung, but to
MS 142, namely its § 47 on its page 41 (see §§ 48 and 51 in *Investigations*). This new manuscript must therefore have been well under way by then. Going back to where it was probably in preparation rather than under way, on page 42 there is a preparation that, while not used directly, does express the spirit of *Investigations*.

What do the words of a language designate? But how do they do that? To what extent do they designate anything. That must surely lie in what we do with them? And we have described what that is and for different words it is [page 43] quite different and one just calls it the same word[;] applying it in the most varied cases may bend or break it if one describes the function of the word in all these cases by ‘it designates something’.

On page 44 there is a contribution towards the idea expressed in *Investigations* §§ 11 and 12.

Just as, if we look at a switchboard, we see handles that all look more or less the same (understandably, for they are all meant to grasped by hand).

Going forward again, there are many details contributing to the *Investigations* text (via MS 142, but I give *Investigations* references for readers’ convenience). For example, on page 65, the broom, the broomstick and the brush give us § 60; on page 66 there is the phrase “Du machst Dir’s leicht” (“you are making it easy for yourself”), which can be found in § 65, leading to § 66, differences between games, whose origin is on page 67. Pages 73 and 74 provide family resemblances, in § 67. On page 75 there is a list of topics: concepts with precise and imprecise domains, Frege on ‘domains’, games with exact rules and Moses defined. These then occupy the following pages and provide §§ 76, 77, 79 and 87.

On page 77, in the middle of Moses one might say, there is a subtly differing origin of § 71, which begins “One might say that the concept ‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges”, for page 77 has the emphatic (from its context of disagreement with Frege and precision-mongers) “The concept game is a concept with imprecise boundaries” (my italics).

On page 83 there is a paragraph out of which § 107 has been condensed (in which the word “sublime” does not occur – it does in § 38, and again in § 89 – and the word “Widerstreit” occurs quite differently).

Conflict of the sublime interpretation and the facts concerning the nature of words, sentences etc. One wants to resolve it by trying to break into personal imagination. There, in the momentary occurrence, the real word would have to be found, and there, perhaps, understanding too, etc. There the sublime would be found. But [84] our language appears to break down
there. We have come onto ice where friction is lacking and while conditions are in a certain sense ideal, for that very reason we can’t walk either. We want to walk; then we need friction. Back to concrete examples // to rough ground! // to real examples.

On page 86 the admission “[Perhaps there is still something missing here]” and on page 91 “[I am still not at the bottom of the question]”, and between them a pause while the opening on Augustine’s image of language learning is polished again, indicate that ideas are not ready for transcription, and correspondences with the final work are quite untidy. For example, on page 86, a few lines below its admission, “inexact’, that is really a rebuke (and ‘exact’ praise)” contributes to the end of § 88; and on page 88 this confident claim:

For the clarity we are striving for is to be sure a perfect one. But that only means that the philosophical problems are to disappear perfectly.

is tempered into § 91, where it may come to look as if, and perfect exactness can [misleadingly] appear to be a definite state to which we can aspire. § 123, which I have already complained of for disguising its origin, appears on page 91 in a form that is at least less brief (if also somewhat weak).

A philosophical problem does admittedly arise from the fact that we do not know our way in the grammar of our way of expressing ourselves. And one means of giving the use of our language a surveyable form is to introduce a specially suitable way of expressing ourselves.

A remark on page 92 on the phenomenological language and our belief in the need for it has already been mentioned in Chapter 3. Immediately after this there is a remarkable collection of nine words or phrases for one idea, the second of which is the familiar English “bewilderment”. The important § 109, however, comes well-formed on pages 94-95, ending:

Philosophy is a fight against the fascination of language [I have said it better]

Etc?

Finally, on the last page of MS 152, 96, there is a square-bracket indication of why a new start is needed:

[The question is, where I am to go to from these considerations].
The bridging-page at the end of großes Format, the MS 141 sketch in German for the Brown Book, the Brown Book itself and its Versuch einer Umarbeitung, the MS 142 first draft of Investigations, the pre-war typescript of that and the mid-war revised Smythies typescript (TS 239), as well as Investigations itself, all begin with Wittgenstein’s account of Augustine’s description of infant language learning, intended as a criticism of his own Tractatus theory of language. From the Brown Book onwards there are other similarities besides, and one of the most intriguing is what appears in Investigations as a puzzling episode in which a mentally deficient pupil (one would think) adds two successively, according to instructions, but from a thousand on obstinately adds four (in § 187). In the Brown Book the order (in § 5 of Part II) is to add one, and the pupil changes this to two at a hundred and then three at three hundred. In the Umarbeitung the order is to add one and the break comes at ninety, where the pupil adds two (and three at a hundred and eighty – see that book’s § 127).

In the Brown Book and its Umarbeitung Wittgenstein has two simple points to make about these instructions. In carrying out a repetitive order we do not have a fresh insight or new intuition at each stage; and when we say, for example, that we intended the pupil to write “103” after “102” and “125” after “124”, we are not implying that we thought of those very cases in advance. We are purely relying on the hypothesis that if we had been asked what we expected our pupil to write after “124” we should have said “125” – though in both versions Wittgenstein is unhappy that this hypothesis does not tell the whole story. In the Brown Book he talks of a curious superstition that our left-in-the-air intention “is capable of crossing a bridge before we’ve got to it”. The Umarbeitung puts this superstition down to the past tense of “I meant you to …” and goes on quite wordily. Investigations and its preparatory typescripts, following MS 142, attempt to condense.

The difference with the later versions comes at the end of § 187 and with the second sub-paragraph of § 188 of Investigations. In § 187 (sharing exactly the same
number with MS 142) the hypothesis has become an assumption, and the question-begging query is added: “Now what was the fault in your idea?”. This fault, in the first sub-paragraph of § 188, and staying close to the Umarbeitung, is that our act of meaning has already taken all the implied steps, while in the second sub-paragraph we concoct metaphors to make the idea acceptable, as if meaning’s ability to jump ahead in time enabled it to undertake any number of predeterminations on the way. There is of course no need for these metaphors – Wittgenstein has invented them on our behalf.

The first sub-paragraph of § 189 asks “But are the steps not determined by the algebraic formula?” and answers mysteriously that there is a mistake in the question. This is where the notebook draft (MS 142), begun at the beginning of November 1936 and given by Wittgenstein to his sister Margarethe as a present that Christmas, the typescript dictated in 1938 (TS 220) and the war-time Smythies typescript (TS 239) all ended. However, by the time the 1938 typescript was dictated a continuation had already been drafted in two notebooks written in Norway in August and September 1937. Examining these makes Wittgenstein’s views on continuing a mathematical rule seem much more reasonable, and so, if one examines it carefully, does the continuation as it now appears in print (the remainder of § 189, with § 190). The result of Wittgenstein’s passion for elegant condensation, however, is that the latter is something of a comprehension test, while even though the manuscript struggles are laborious they do explain his philosophical anxieties.

Wittgenstein took three large quarto notebooks with him, apparently bought in Bergen the year before, and a larger foolscap one. He called this “Band XIII” (now MS 117) but kept it aside for (initially) fair copying when he was satisfied that he had come to grips with what he had called his superstitions. He began, while still under way, by writing personal notes in the first quarto volume, which he called Band XIV (MS 118), mainly expressing his doubts as to how long he wanted to stay and whether he wanted to live in his old hut. Arriving, via Bergen, at Skjolden, he began by living with Norwegian friends and then moved in with an old woman called Anna Rebin, only moving later to his hut. His new attack on his philosophical problem starts on page 3r (for recto, a right hand page, followed on its other side by its verso), written on the seventeenth of August. He leaves aside his obstinate pupil and speaks only of himself.

How do I know that in pursuit of +2 I must write 200004, 200006 and not 200004, 200008?

The question is similar to: how do I know that this colour is ‘red’?
“But dammit, you know that you always have to write the same series, 2, 4, 6, 8, 0, 2, 4 and so on, in the ones column!” – Quite right! The problem must already come about in that number series, and therefore already in this, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 and so on ad inf. – For how do I know that after the 500th 2 I am supposed to write “2”? In other words, that at that point “2” is ‘the same number’? For do I know it? And if I do know it now, how does this knowledge help me later? I mean, how do I know later what I’m to do with this knowledge? [3v]

If an intuition is needed for carrying out the series +1, then for carrying out the series +0 as well (I mean, say, 1, 1, 1, 1 ad inf.).

Then what is the mistake that I want to warn against?

“But you know perfectly well that “64” is followed by “66”, you just aren’t in doubt about it for a moment.”

But consider: what reason do I offer for it? What do I say if I am asked why?

Don’t I just remind people that the chain of reasons [4r] comes to an end? And what does someone who takes this up remind himself of?

It is quite right: I don’t doubt for a moment what number comes after 64 in the +2 series, and I am certain that tomorrow I shall write the same as today, and perhaps that all normal people will do the same; and more besides. But are those facts that logic is supposed to establish? – On the other hand they are very interesting facts!

In other words they are empirical and not analytic facts (remember that “interesting” has been a code word since the end of 1929). After an architectural analogy for the problem he discusses again how long he can stay – certainly not until Christmas as he had the year before (not meaning staying for Christmas but in time to get to Vienna for Christmas – which in the end is exactly what he did this year, spending his last night in his hut on the 10th of December and taking a boat to Bergen on the 11th).

Then, on page 7r, there follows more, ending up to the same effect, namely that an empirical fact is what is in question.

“How do I know that in pursuit of the +2 series I must write … 200004, 200006 … ?” – indeed, must I?

“Of course –! if I understand it like that.” – If I understand it like what? What is the expression of this understanding, this interpretation? Perhaps
“+2”, or another algebraic expression? or perhaps the members “200004, 200006”?

“But – without sophistry – didn’t you, then, mean as you gave the order ‘+2’ that when he got to there he should write those numbers?” In the first place: I didn’t, when I gave the order, think of these numbers at all; secondly: if I had thought of them, I should certainly have declared this step to be the one ‘I meant’. Consider the reasons for this certainty. – And one does say in such a case, for example if the other chap writes ‘267’ after ‘264’, “I meant you to write ‘264, 266’” or even “When I gave you the order … – I meant …”. And in the same way one can say: “When we sat down at the chess board I thought we were playing chess and the one who took the other’s king would win”, even though you haven’t had thoughts of any kind about that eventuality. [8r] One also says in a case like that: “When we sat down at the chess board I naturally thought …”.

Now if one had thought no more of that eventuality than, say, of its opposite, what right has one to say that at the time one thought this. This no doubt has to do with our habit of playing the [language] game like that.

On the next day (21.8) and the next page (8v) there is a discussion of logical consequence which includes an example of obstinately bad logic in which someone asserts emphatically that something is always true but nevertheless not true in this particular case. It coincides almost word for word (I mention this lest anybody thinks such assertions are never made) with an argument produced by my first wartime landlord, to my great bewilderment, having been brought up in a particularly logical family. Wittgenstein goes on to make the perhaps defensive remark

The opinion that the laws of logic are an expression of ‘habits of thought’ is not so absurd as it appears.

and this dubiety seems to be the itch that stays with him until (on the eleventh of September) he is ready to use the large volume he had brought with him for fair copying, to enter a series of thoughts that became both the continuation of the pre-war Investigations and the opening of a typescript eventually published as Part I of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. At that point, to be sure, an itch that he felt to be more fundamental reveals itself.

These thoughts did not even approach readiness for copying into MS 117 until page 83r of MS 118, and the drafts continued through a second “11.9” date on page 85v, until, on page 89v, he says in code that he has begun to write again in the large manuscript, by which he presumably means to copy, because that is the date that begins that volume. It is not until the bottom of page 88v that Wittgen-
stein repeats the sub-paragraph where all the preliminary versions of *Investigations* came to an end, and a little into the next page, 89r, before its continuation, “We use the expression ‘the steps are determined by the formula …’.” How do we use it?” appears; and both the unused intermediate paragraph and the preceding notes of that day on the subject are relevant to how his thoughts have been moving.

11.9 had actually begun, on page 81r, on another subject, headed as “[Copied]”, namely logical necessity, leading to the fact that one can use a measuring rod to measure an object and the object to check the measuring rod. These give way on page 83r to the subject that had been holding up his progress on his book.

Does the ‘+2’ rule determine the step that has to be made after 200 or not? Does the function $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ determine the number that we obtain for $x = 5$? How is this query to be settled? Do we check whether the results that people obtain by this substitution is always the same? No. And yet the fact that the result obtained, given mathematically trained operators, is the same in the enormous majority of cases is of the greatest significance.

We shouldn’t use these methods of calculation if they didn’t, normally, constantly lead to the same result.

Wittgenstein goes on to contrast, with single-valued functions like the above, various examples of many-valued functions, eventually reduced in the version that made its way into print to the simple contrast between $y=x^2$ and $y \neq x^2$. Then, reverting to +2, he repeats that he is not in any doubt about the answer and claims that that is precisely why there is no need for it to be determined in advance. Many re-phrasings (on page 84v) indicate that he is still unhappy with his formulation, but his proviso that he might die before giving an answer which he would be certain of if he survived shows that what is still preoccupying him is the distinction between mathematical certainty and empirical fact.

On page 85v there is the second 11.9 date, perhaps another sign of preoccupation. On page 87r the propositions of logic are said to be ‘laws of thought’ (not “Denkgewohnheiten” as on pages 8v-9r – see above), in so far as they express “what thinking is, and also types of thinking” – perhaps a concession to the idea of habits of thought. On pages 87v and 88r there is an aside about a mathematical result that genuinely surprises us because of its originality, as distinct from one that is presented as such by a mathematical showman. His analogy of a telescope that shows us things we could never have dreamt of does not, to me, elucidate his meaning at all, and I suspect he is attacking Gödel. At all events, he goes on, on page 88v, to note
The mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer.

which becomes § 167 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics – and personally I regard Gödel as supremely an inventor in spite of the fact that he, terming himself a Platonist, would have been proud to be called a discoverer.

At the foot of that page we get the repetition of the sub-paragraph where progress had stopped, and on the next the intermediate paragraph that I have mentioned. Here the mistake ‘in the question’ is called ambiguous, but only one meaning is specified, with a new contrast between one-valued and two-valued functions, and then a new start is made where the first meaning is training people so that they will in fact give correct answers, and the second is again the distinction between single-valued and many-valued functions. The strange thing is that this brief sketch, to be elaborated when copied into MS 117 and thence edited into the continuation of § 189 in Investigations, draws a clear distinction between, on the one hand, single-valued and many-valued formulas, and on the other the different kinds of training that they might, respectively, require: “and [we can] say, the former determine the steps, the others don’t”. The word “steps” (“Übergänge”) shows that Wittgenstein is treating together single-valued functions and rules of the +2 variety – very properly, since the function x + 2 and the +2 rule are in mathematical common sense only formally to be distinguished. In the first of the new sub-paragraphs of § 189 and correspondingly in MS 117 they are also treated together (+3 being the rule example), and the empirical question of whether people have been trained properly in their use is also clear, but in the next deep confusion arises (now, whether y = x^2 is a formula that determines y for a given x “ist nicht ohne weiteres klar”). For while the sentence “the formula … determines a number y” is (properly) a statement about the form of the formula, subtly different sentences and questions are introduced. Yet all that these subtleties boil down to is whether a pupil is being tested for his understanding of the word “determined” or a mathematician asked (in 117) to reduce an expression in two variables to one in one by ‘multiplying out’, or (in § 189) to observe that a quadratic can have two roots in a system of positive and negative numbers but only one in a system of only positives.

§ 190 (and identically on page 3 of 117) reveals what the motive for all this has been (what I called above the itch that he felt to be more fundamental). “It may now be said: ‘How the formula is meant is what determines which steps are to be taken’. What is the criterion for how the formula is meant? Surely, the way we persistently use it, the way we were taught to use it.” There is an example of some-
one having to explain what he means by an invented mathematical symbol. Finally: “For that is how meaning can determine steps in advance.”

For it does seem very strange that someone who had been taught logic by Russell should have made such heavy weather of the simple distinction between the empirical question of how a formula is applied by particular people at particular times and the logical one of what it entails. The explanation is that Wittgenstein’s query had all along been how that empirical question related to the … semantic? … psychological? … intuitive? question of what particular people meant by it at particular times.

There were actually three typescripts to which the fair copying in MS 117 contributed: first TS 221, originally intended as a simple continuation of TS 220, the pre-war Investigations; then a carbon copy of that, cut up into separate paragraphs (or sometimes whole pages) and reordered, called TS 222 in the electronic edition; and finally a straight dictation from those ‘Zettel’ called TS 222 in the Cornell microfilms. The latter includes one important difference: at the bottom of its last page it had “non non p = p and ne ne p = ne p”, “ne” being colloquial German for “nein” and used by Wittgenstein for a negative that merely emphasises negation when repeated. In Investigations § 556 these differing negation signs become “X” and “Y”, perhaps to avoid a colloquialism. When Rush Rhees prepared TS 222 for printing as the first part of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956) he omitted “non and ne”, though I understand that von Wright is responsible for putting them back in the third edition. (If I can be allowed a biographical aside, while I constantly carp about Rhees’s failings in mathematics and formal logic I owe it to him to say that he was the most human of the three original trustees, in particular making himself responsible for Yorick’s son Danny by marrying his widow Peggy.)

One might think that a double typescript consisting of just 220 and 222 would have been a rather unbalanced form for Investigations to have taken, but in Norway in 1937 Wittgenstein was already planning a third section, which eventually led to the so-called private language argument of Investigations §§ 243–317. In MS 119 (Volume XV) this new subject begins on page 86, on 8.10. of 1937, where Wittgenstein conveniently writes “[Hier anfangen]”. Before turning to that, however, I must say something about Investigations as it continues between §§ 190 and 242. Only §§ 189 and 190 are common to MS 117 and Investigations as printed, but §§ 191–242 are in the spirit of the 1937-1938 texts and use some material from them, though they also show the influence of later work on the philosophy of mathematics, some of it actually written later in MS 117 (after three 1938 drafts for
the *Investigations* Preface), and I am sure also influenced by the 1939 lectures on mathematics. And as to MS 117 itself, it did not just use the 11.9.[1937] fresh start, but went back to the very first philosophical notes in MS 118 on arriving in Skjolden – the 200004 remark is on 117’s page 11, and it will be found with one less zero in § 3 of Part I of *Remarks on the Foundations*. Similarly, an ingenious diagram purporting to prove that $2 + 2 + 2 = 4$ comes on page 33r of 118, page 49 of 117 and in § 38 of *Remarks*.

Leading up to “Hier anfangen” and private languages in MS 119 much doubt is expressed about whether he is collecting remarks for his book in the best way, and there is a reference to the book as a ‘Lehrbuch’ quoted in note 23 of Chapter 1 (written 3.10 on page 64 of 119), and also an important declaration of faith on page 79, written on the seventh of October.

> We are always much too inclined to talk of occult, abnormal, unheard of processes, instead just of just everyday, well known ones.

> A certain ‘behaviourism’ is consequently invaluable, because it teaches us to think of what we know, what we are familiar with, instead of fictions of our language, via the schemata of our mode of expression.

In spite of that, the first two examples of the new idea (see pages 86–92, dated 8.10.) are exceptionally improbable and the very opposite of everyday; nor are they fictions of *our* language. The first is a tribe where at puberty boys are given individual measuring sticks, differing in length, but when they measure anything with them they always give the same answer as their elders in standard units – yet when asked what the standard unit is they hold out their personal sticks. In the second example children are given tabulated colour samples at birth and, as they grow up, taught to use them to identify colours. They always give the correct answer when asked what colour something is, but we (visiting anthropologists?) notice that when they move their finger over their samples they frequently settle on the wrong colour as they come up with the right answer. Wittgenstein gives no explanation of how either of these feats is achieved. He even asks (on page 90) why we should think of the sample a finger points to as a criterion for what a colour word means to the person pointing. This becomes all the more puzzling in that when, in inventing and elaborating rather fanciful private languages in this and the next Norwegian manuscript volume, he does sometimes assess them with exemplary common sense. One cannot help suspecting that some failure of understanding of human sensation and experience lay at the bottom of the entire enterprise.
Mathematics becomes the next subject, and then what might seem an interlude on page 100, on 12.10, where we sometimes do not bother to check where a sound comes from, for example where the loudspeakers are placed in a cinema (though he might have added that we check very carefully when it matters to us), which is a very good example of how we get along with rough and ready impressions. Then, on page 101 and on 13.10, noticing that a child has toothache, leading on page 102 to:

Similarly: we say: “Take this chair!” and it never occurs to us that we might be wrong …

and on page 106 to a discussion quite at odds with this common sense, suggesting that we could conceivably teach a child from the beginning that things may only appear to be what we call them. One has to dig carefully to find that he is not in disagreement with common sense here but only with the dogmatism with which it is sometimes asserted.

We teach a child: “That is a chair”. Can we … “Impossible! It must know what a chair is first, to be able to have doubts about it …” – But isn’t it conceivable that a child learns to say from the beginning: “That looks like … ?”

What is this: “One cannot start with doubt”? A “can[not]” like that is always suspicious.

On the fourteenth (a day on which much was written) the outcome, that a sensible person can, as required, take doubt or leave it alone, seems satisfactorily expressed, but apparently not to Wittgenstein’s satisfaction, because on page 108 there is a revealing aside, followed by another in English which ends on page 109, on the form he thinks his book will have to take.

This work is going for me as it does for many people who, when they try in vain to remember a name, say: “think of something else and it will come to you!” – and that’s how I have again and again had to think of something else, so that the thing I have long been searching for could occur to me.

This book is a collection of wisecracks. But the point is: they form a system. If the task were to draw the shape of an object true to nature, then a wisecrack is like drawing just one tangent to the real curve; but a thousand wisecracks lying close to each other can draw the curve.

Doubt, justified or irrational, about physical objects and about pain, is discussed at length, without any mention of private languages, whose only examples so far,
without the actual phrase being used, have been the strange episodes of boys with private measuring sticks that make no practical difference and people with private colour charts that make none; when we suddenly find, dated 9.11 on page 96r (Wittgenstein’s pagination having been dropped and taken over by Wren pagination), a paragraph that seems to hit the nail on the head, making one wonder why the subject is not dropped for good. Immediately above this, only private mental images have been discussed.

One could believe that there can also be a private language that a person, say, speaks only to himself and in which, for example, he can use the word “blue” for the colour that the word brings to his mind, without his needing to bother whether other people are in agreement with him about what he calls it.

But the question arises: what he can do with this language and whether we would go on calling it one.

The subject comes back on page 101v, dated 12.11, with memory providing possible privacy, and the crucial question of what constitutes communication is raised.

So what happens when one questions one’s memory? (Just don’t think: that is such a secret mental process that one can only say very rough things about it.) So what does happen? – I screw my eyes together, perhaps say the words: “how was it?” and let a series of mental images go by. And when I say “I let”, all that means is that I encourage the process by peacefulness, a certain attitude and the like.

What is communication, then [102r] (irrespective of whether I am informing myself or someone else of something)? What am I being informed of, what is being given me? Words, nothing but words, and perhaps pictures — but what do I get from a picture?

But somehow it seems to me that when someone, let us say, communicates with me in German he gives me more than mere words and sounds. Well, what more? Naturally, the meaning. But what do I get from a meaning, whatever that might be! It is still only an addition to the words. – So is the information “It’s raining” really nothing but these completely uninteresting sounds?! And the fact that it calls a mental image to mind, [102v] that isn’t anything better than a landscape picture. I could, after all, give you a picture of a rainy scene with these sounds too; but even that isn’t information. But what does make all that into information? Not something in addition to the sounds, but a process in which the words come into circulation like
coins in commerce. (Someone might ask: do I really only get round pieces
of metal with heads on them when I’m paid?)

On the next page, 103r, with the date 13.11, a new person enters, perhaps from a
small notebook, someone who is keeping a private diary.

Now can I say that the diary entries inform him of anything? If, that is, his
whole language is made up of them?

(Can my right hand give a present to my left? [used in Investigations
§ 268]) Why shouldn’t it give him pleasure to go through them and as it
were let them play on the keyboard of his memory and fantasy? – Or, why
shouldn’t they [103v] bring back into his memory something important
and long forgotten, say an injustice that was done to him and he now wants
to avenge. And then the symbols do give him information. [A choice of
example that betrays Wittgenstein’s psychology.] But if this information
turns out to be mostly fictitious or useless, is it still information? Can I say
for example that a dream informs him of something? Perhaps: “he regards
the dream as a piece of information”, if he behaves as we might if we were
informed of something.

Think of a book of pictures instead of a diary. Can’t it entertain him?

[104r]

Do I inform myself of something if I look at this piece of paper and say
“this paper is white”?

And what does “saying something to oneself” mean. Is everything one
utters while no one is around saying something to oneself?

But can’t one warn, order oneself, etc.? Oh yes – one can also play chess
with oneself, even win money from oneself – namely if one has given a
meaning to these words. For the “one can” in these sentences really means:
[104v] “doesn’t one do this and this, and doesn’t one call it so and so?” [A
contribution to the very first paragraph of the Investigations treatment,
§ 243.]

I suspend quotation here to move two paragraphs on to where, on page 105r, there
is a summary paragraph, marked, to be sure, by an elongated S meaning “not good
enough” but not indicating disagreement.

Don’t I want to say: one calls “information” what one so designates in our
complicated language and the technique of its use, and it is in excessively
simplified cases that it is difficult to say what we should still call that and
what not.
There is an analogy for what he is driving at on page 106v.

It is somehow as if we wanted to talk of a privy councillor among Eskimos, forgetting that a privy councillor is only that in a definite, complicated social structure. And it is no contradiction to that, that a privy councillor might take to living with Eskimos.

Similar testings of the concept of communication follow, but on page 107v memory is taken up as a candidate for privacy.

You are unclear about the grammar of the expression “a definite inner experience” because you have the vague idea [108r] that if you have it you could point to it within yourself (ostensibly define it – at least for yourself) and everything would be in order.

But don’t we judge that something is the same inner experience by means of memory? Memory, surely, is a further inner experience? – And so what does ‘judging’ according to memory mean? If judging is yet another inner experience, then I don’t know how I can get in the end to using words. But if judging means: saying something, then I don’t know what directing myself according to the inner experience with what I say is supposed to mean [108v], if the rule is missing according to which I am directing myself, and which after all would have to correlate the inner experience with the word – in the form of a chart perhaps.

On pages 109r,v there is a subtle division of behaviouristic evidence into con and pro.

Even if we have a criterion for his memory experience, perhaps that while reading his diaries he sketched his memories, we should still not say that the diary entries informed him of anything. But the reverse if we should find that he wants to bring something to mind, looks it up [in the diary], remembers, and now, perhaps, uses what he has looked up.

It used to be said that Wittgenstein’s typists would have nervous breakdowns over typing a succession of sentences which individually were clear in their meaning but collectively offered no clue as to what their significance was. I feel much the same about the pages that follow, but on 115v one finds telling significance, followed unfortunately by an admission that he is as lost as anyone else. Incidentally, this passage opens with a helpful example of his distinction between double and single inverted commas (about which he is by no means consistent).
I don’t say “I have pains” ‘because I am having a particular experience’ [–] that means nothing at all [–] but rather: because I have toothache, in contrast to a case where I say so in order to be treated kindly, or because it happens in a play, etc., etc. …

“Yet you can have an experience like that without expressing it. If you admit that, why shouldn’t he have the same experience [as you, presumably]?”

[Squeezed at the top of page 116r after writing the date, 15.11]

I admit everything if I only know what I’m supposed to admit.

But what is the ‘same’ experience here? How do we measure two such experiences against one another – this would certainly belong to my being able to say that this and this is the same ‘experience’! If someone says: “these two bank notes have the same value” I don’t understand him if I don’t know which he means out of the many possible criteria for the ‘same value’. Now here you have shut out the normal criteria for identity and the normal measures we compare with by saying that he [116v] doesn’t express it.

But at some later stage he could say: I experienced that and that then. Agreed: in normal circumstances this is a criterion for what he has experienced. [But not, according to his rules, for its being identical to an experience at a different time.] But not always. “I remember dreaming that and that before my birth [taken for granted as meaningless, without comment].” So his saying so later doesn’t necessarily mean that we take it as a sign of an earlier experience.

After claiming to mean the same as Einstein as to its being five o’clock on Mars, which spreads into page 117r, there is another admission that hits the nail on the head, which, unlike the hint above that a private language cannot be a language, gets into Investigations by contributing to § 246.

Indeed, we are so preoccupied with our speculations about grammar … words, that we completely forget the simplest facts of actual usage. For example one hears [from would-be philosophers]: Someone can only know that he [himself] is in pain but not that someone else is. Whereas no one on earth says: ‘I know that I am in pain’ but very likely “I know that he is in pain”. And to the question “are you certain that you are in pain” [117v]
one would answer (except in the most exceptional circumstances) “I don’t know what you mean”.

On page 118r the man with a diary of symbols but no language returns, and with him the subject of communication.

Well, suppose that the chap with the diary learns a language later and informs us that back then [118v], while reading [i.e. looking at] his diary memories passed before him, we would still take this piece of information with reserve if we heard no more of these ‘memories’, say of the ways he made use of them. For we know, for example, that a main element of what we call memories, language with all its extensions, is missing here [i.e., was missing in the days the man is speaking of].

And when I said that the information was to be taken with reserve, this meant that one couldn’t build, on this information alone (I am not bringing the possibility of lies into it), what one can build on a similar piece of ‘information’ [119r] in normal circumstances.

Here one must rather say: “He says these words (e.g. ‘I remember …’) and he isn’t lying but I don’t know what they mean.” I.e., I don’t know what I can do with them.

And after much code, this judgement of his quandary follows on page 121r:

The region in which we find ourselves here properly counts as one of the most difficult in philosophy; namely for the reason that our surface grammar is uncommonly misleading here, and the ground is so churned up by the many cart-tracks of philosophising people that it is almost impossible to recognise any roads here.

On page 122v there is a more explicit admission that a private language is not a language.

Isn’t the fundamental mistake everywhere [in arguments left unquoted] this: as if one could point to one’s private experience for one’s own purposes. As if language had two kinds of meanings: a public one and a private one.

The private one would only consist in giving vent to sounds in response to experiences, in making a to-do. For one cannot play a language game with the ‘private language’.

This admission is mysteriously missing from §§ 243–317 in Investigations, unless one argues that it is the background message of the whole episode. One of Wittgen-
stein’s most vivid expressions of it comes in MS 166, the English notes for a lecture given when Turing had arranged to be absent during the 1939 mathematics series. It comes close to the beginning (on pages 3v and 4r), in arguing against a misunderstanding of ostensive definitions, thinking one can point ‘inside oneself’ to an experience and thereby name it. “This is a kind of superstition. So it is no use saying that we have a private object before our mind and give it a name. There is a name only where there is a technique of using it and that technique can be private; but this only means that only I know about it in the sense in which I can have a private sewing machine. But in order to be a private sewing machine it must be an object which deserves the name sewing machine not in virtue of its privacy but in virtue of its similarity to sewing machines private or otherwise.” This echoes closely a long section in MS 119 that begins with the date 16.11 on page 125r, of which I quote only the opening.

The mistake embeds itself most deeply where we believe we can ostensively define, name an experience, a pain for example, *for ourselves*. I have, say, T[oothache] and say to myself: I will name that … We forget that this means absolutely nothing if no use is given for the word. If the act of naming in a [particular] case is sticking a name-chitty onto a body, in other words a piece of paper on which certain strokes are drawn, then it is clear that something like that can’t, in itself, interest us at all and only gets its interest from the use of these strokes in the game. [125v] But that is exactly the case here. In other words, giving the pain a name consisted in giving vent to certain sounds while we were in pain. How is that supposed to interest us. Again, only because of the use of these sounds.

Such arguments continue to the end of this (as it turns out) long day, on page 131r, where the message is reinforced, or intended to be.

We do not call giving vent to sounds *about which we know nothing else* “language”. And *that’s* all your ‘subjective language game’ would be. For even the person who gives vent to them does not ‘know’ anything more about them, – as we use the word “know”.

Subjective regularity is objectively defined (explained).

To clarify this, suppose that someone notices that he has been venting a quite particular sound whenever he felt a pain that anyone else would call knee-ache. He is so sensitive to the social implications of knee-ache (his mother was a char-woman) that he is determined to let no one know what is causing his odd groans. This corresponds perfectly to the private sewing machine and Wittgenstein can have noth-
ing against it. Now suppose that he decides to call his secret knee-ache (in conversations with himself) “cha-cha”. Since his secret mumblings can perfectly well include “my cha-cha is what other people call knee-ache”, his definition again falls entirely within the sewing machine rules – one could call it private but publicisable. Next take the pain to be one for which there is no normal name, perhaps a few inches below his bottom left rib and a little inwards, and he says to himself “I am going to call this pain Sammy, but I shan’t tell anyone”. The fact still remains that he could give, to himself or his doctor if he chose to, a description of its location, and so this is still a sewing-machine case. Then what should we have to suppose in order to achieve a contraband non-definition? The pain (or perhaps it would have to be a sensation so sui generis that it could not even be called that) would have to be non-locatable for a start. There would have to be no possibility even of a preliminary description (compare the early pages of the Blue Book on defining “tove”), making way for a final, clinching, private “of which this example is to be called Charlie”. If that were possible (which I really do doubt) Wittgenstein would have grounds for saying that it didn’t count as a definition or have any part to play in language, but the self-designed Aunt Sally that he wants to knock down is wider: that some interior pointing could substitute for all that, the preliminaries and the clinch as well. The question is, is it fair to accuse other people of a superstition that would never have occurred to them? What he is seriously arguing against is the belief that ordinary sensations like toothache can be called private, and in his 1939 lecture he gave himself the perfect war cry, if only he had thought of using it: all privacy is merely sewing-machine privacy, and if you can dream up anything that isn’t it won’t be language.

What follows in the remainder of this volume and the next (XVI, MS 120, which opens on the day 119 ends, 19.11.37) will, I believe, exemplify my contention, that all that is wrong with his case by now is his accusation of superstition against the rest of us, but I should like to quote a short paragraph that has another echo with the 1939 lecture notes. The Macbeth criticism of these was that Wittgenstein’s poor English trapped him in phrases that inclined him to a superstitious mental ontology, in particular “I have pain”, instead of “I have a pain” or “I am in pain”. In my 1952 copying I would add the “a”, making clear that it was an addition. Delia Macbeth’s conclusion was that these non-English phrases implied the existence of a mental entity. What I cannot be sure of is whether she realised that his whole point was to argue against this implication. A paragraph, dated 1.12, on page 27r of 120, makes this abundantly clear.
The dentist says “Have you got pains here?” The patient: “I haven’t got anything – ouch!”

Among Wittgenstein’s private notes before he left by boat for Bergen on the eleventh of December (page 48r) is the little adventure with a bird in a mousetrap, which in 1980 I took to be a sparrow but was a tit (Meise). There is a longer and quite extraordinary description of a misunderstanding with Anna Rebni, caused by his habit of shaking his fist or waving his stick in apparent threat as an expression of friendship. He eventually asked Anna why she had been so distant towards him and she explained. He could not understand why, even when he had told her that this was a standard greeting among the sons of Austrian millionaires, she still remained cool. There are also descriptions of a visit by Francis Skinner. And on his penultimate day in his hut there is a revealing expression of doubt as to whether his philosophical methods are achieving anything (used in *Investigations*, § 414).

You think you really must be weaving a garment because you are sitting in front of an – actually empty – loom and are going through the motions of weaving.

He arrived in Vienna on the nineteenth of December (on page 55v), and in Dublin, not via Cambridge, on page 57v, dated 8.2.38. He twice records visits (there could well have been more) to the mental hospital where Drury was studying. Drury, in a private seminar a few years after Wittgenstein’s death, by which time he had become a consultant, said how much he appreciated his sensitivity towards his patients. On page 121v, dated 12.3, there is the coded note “What I hear from Austria disturbs me”, but dated 14.3 on page 123r he writes, uncoded, the following:

I am now in an extremely difficult position. As a result of the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich [*Einverleibung* – he presumably could not bring himself to use Hitler’s term “*Anschluss*”] I have become a German citizen. This is a frightful situation for me, for I am now dependent upon a power that I in no sense recognise. For me, German citizenship is like a piece of hot iron that I must go on holding. In other words I want to throw the iron away. I could try to [123v] by trying to take up Irish or British citizenship. But if I succeeded it is excessively probable that I should not be allowed into Austria, i.e. not be able to see my family again! So I must hold the hot iron or not see my family again.

This was in fact the exact opposite of the truth, and Sraffa put him right when he arrived in Cambridge (in code as Kambridge, page 128v) on the eighteenth of
March. His British citizenship application succeeded. He not only visited Vienna on his new passport but Berlin as well, and (by ship) New York to raise family money, in order to bribe the Nazi authorities to classify his sisters as ‘Arian’. This was of course distasteful to him, but failing to persuade them to go to America (as his favourite sister Margarethe did) and knowing what danger they would be in if he did not fix things, he did as they wished. His success turned on convincing the authorities that the name “Wittgenstein”, adopted legally by a Jewish ancestor called Moses Meir, son of Meyer Moses, as a surname based on a place-name, in fact indicated illegitimate descent from the princely Sayn-Wittgenstein family (if so, it was Meir’s way of getting his own back on his wife’s seducer). In Marie Vassiltchikov’s *The Berlin Diaries*, Chatto and Windus 1985, in a photograph to page 72, there is a photograph of one Heinrich zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, a pilot who was shot down in January 1944. He bears a remarkable resemblance to our Wittgenstein. This visit to Berlin, of 5.7.39, is recorded in the Nedo-Ranchetti ‘album’ and in the Wiener Ausgabe *Introduction*. The Monk biography gives the extra detail that a junior relative had already applied to the authorities on the sisters’ behalf naming a princely Waldeck as the seducer (pages 397-400), giving grounds for sceptics to treat the whole story as an invention.

MS 121 (called by Wittgenstein XVII) starts with the date 26.4.38, the day on which 120 had ended. It has gaps, but these turn out to have no relevance to the Berlin visit. The first comes quite soon, on page 2v, with the date 8.5 and a change of subject from mathematics to privacy; the second is from the date 17.6 on page 41r to 12.7 on page 41v. The third is on page 48v, from 17.7 to 5.9.38. The longest is on page 60r; after some maths that had apparently been written on that same date, there is the date 25.12.38. The last date of this volume is 5.1.[1939], on page 91r, the last page being 93v, with dates that are hardly interrupted but with a considerable quantity written. The next volume, MS 122 (XVIII), did not start until 16.10.39, by which time Wittgenstein had been awarded his professorship and delivered his mathematics lectures and the war had started, and there is a final rounding-off to it in unused pages at the end of MS 117 (XIII).

Like its opening, MS 121 is eventually devoted mainly to mathematics and logic, but the break to privacy on 8.5.[38] is important. It deals at length with the steps (though he never acknowledges the first one) from the English “I am in pain” to the German “Ich habe Schmerzen” and un-English translations of that, and from those to the assumption that there must be a temptation to say “I have a mental entity”. It is always clear to him that this temptation is linguistic and does not derive from an examination of the nature of pain, and some of his examples are so
vivid that a reader can easily be lulled into believing that the temptation actually exists. I quote three illustrations, the first on page 7v in the middle of 10.5, the second running from the last entry of 10.5, on page 8v and including the next day’s date, and the third from a little later.

“Granted, I have no way of justifying calling what I am feeling ‘pain’, but it really is clear that something is there!” (“There really isn’t nothing there! There really is something going on; there really is something there!”) – ‘Why the fuss?’ – Is one right to say that or wrong? – How is one supposed to decide that?

“Something” [uttered by people in pain who when confronted by Wittgenstein insist that they have something] seems to come closest to an inarticulate sound. But after all it isn’t simply a cry of pain. If I just say “Ouch!” does that obviously describe something?

11.5.

“But I don’t cry ‘ouch!’ for no reason” i.e.: without something accompanying it – but then do we have to call pain an “accompaniment” of the cry of pain? Or better: is it clear that we have to use the image of accompaniment here? [Examples taken from speaking in monotone.]

It is as if we looked at our pains and said: [9r] “That is obviously something”, as if we read this off from the nature of the pain, whereas we are only turning back to another mode of expression in our ordinary language. We read one mode of expression off from the other, not a proposition from a fact. => One is making a pseudo-observation.

The third quotation, dated 15.5, opens on page 20v.

It is as if there was something incomprehensible here. – One asks: “Is there something here or nothing?” [21r] and nothing fits. The word “pain” designates neither a thing nor a void.

You must as it were sever yourself from the custom of idiom.

In between these quotations it is important for me to mention another, from page 11r on 13.5, already quoted by me at the end of Chapter 3, asking a mirage to let him embrace her. The context makes it clear that that what brings this image to mind is a confusion between languages that deal with pain, but the remarkable power of the image comes from Wittgenstein’s memories of his futile ‘phenomenological language’ attempt.
Dated 30.5 on page 27r this line of thought comes to an end, to be followed by 
mathematics and logic, with, fitted between them as a pause for breath, this obser-
vation:

The sickness of a period cures itself by a change in people’s way of life, and 
the sickness in philosophical problems could only be cured by [27v] a dif-
ferent way of thinking, not by a medicine discovered by an individual.

Imagine that the use of motor cars brought about or facilitated certain 
illnesses, and humanity was plagued by this illness until, from some causes, 
or as the consequence of some development, it gave up driving.

There is another fairly long non-mathematical section to come, quite separate 
from the previous one, beginning on 15.7 on page 45r and continuing past 5.9.38. 
On page 51r on the latter date there is a reference to a typescript, and on pages 58v 
and 59v there are three apparent contributions to Investigations, given § numbers 
188-190 but unrelated to any pre-war typescript known to me. A final return to 
mathematics comes on page 60r, with the last entry before the break in writing 
that ends on Christmas Day 1938:

Mathematics is not symbolic logic; rather, that is a small part of mathemat-
ics. The part that, by a misunderstanding, appeared to be the ‘foundation 
of mathematics’.

Imre Lakatos, in a conversation with me early in 1957, made a remark almost iden-
tical to the first of those observations, and I am sure he would have agreed, if he 
had met it, with the second. Wittgenstein is clearly referring back to that in the 
second paragraph of the section of Part II of Investigations, namely xiv, that was put 
at the end by Anscombe and Rhees because it sounded so impressive. There is also 
an entry of January 28th, on pages 111v-112r, that I must mention, in which he is 
working up to his modification of his dogmatic insistence that two different math-
ematical proofs cannot prove the same theorem. Here, he says that of course they 
can because that is what we say, but goes on to quibble that they can’t really be the 
same.

It was not until late in the war that Wittgenstein began to work seriously on taking 
Investigations beyond his pre-war additions to the pre-war typescript. His ‘mid-war’ 
typescript, TS 239, was probably not begun until he had left his second hospital, 
Newcastle, in February 1944 (according to a letter of Oct. 13/44 from Moore to 
Malcolm), but in notebooks written at various times during the war he wrote
many observations that eventually contributed to the continuation. One of these found a place in the private language section: § 307 (the behaviourist in disguise) comes near the beginning of a notebook (MS 124) that opens on 6.6.41. After some pessimistic coded notes that were written later (apparently on the 20th and 21st of June) on two overlooked pages, we return to the 6th and get the disguised behaviourist. Ahead I shall quote an expansion of that idea (in MS 161).

MS 124 opens on the subject of aspect, with which its predecessor had just ended. The pessimism of the two pages that had been left blank did not concern the death of Francis, who was still alive (see letter 5 in the Malcolm Memoir of 5.7.41), but guilt about his cold feelings for him could well have been the cause of his despondency. MS 123 had opened on 26.9.40 with similar coded pessimism, about not having been able to write properly for some six months. On page 16r, dated 16.10, in a long coded passage, he confesses to having spent the whole day thinking of … (un-named, but certainly not Francis, and possibly Keith Kirk – see Monk, page 426), which may be connected with this guilt, to which he still harks back in 1948.

An important philosophical entry in 123 starts on page 21r, with the new and later date 16.5.41. It is the reassessment of the aspect problem mentioned in a note to Chapter 1, and again ahead. This is one of various passages that interleave aspect with philosophy of mathematics, and some of the latter are so peculiar that I cannot pretend to interpret them, including an intriguing use of the term “Kaffee-satz”, meaning coffee-grounds, used like tea leaves for divination.

Remarks about the meaning of mathematical propositions with and without proof come in MS 123 on its pages 61v–65v and in MS 124 on pages 46–8, mentioned above in Chapter 2. An example given in 123 is Goldbach’s (still unproved) hypothesis that any even number can be written as the sum of two primes, and the upshot here is that it has meaning as the expression of a problem – the problem is the meaning. In 124 the subject arises out of two people getting different answers to a calculation. They clearly cannot ‘agree to differ’ – one has to convince the other that he is wrong. Extending this idea to proof, can competing proofs have the same meaning?

Admittedly, some people [like his old self?] would take issue by saying: ‘That means one can never find the proof of a proposition, for, once one has found it, it isn’t any longer the proof of this proposition.’ But that doesn’t mean anything.

The passages in the two notebooks form a unit, but the outline given here will be enough to show its gist.
On its page 101 the second of these notebooks jumps to dates in 1944. One of these, on page 108, under 18.3.44, is a brief return to a problem mentioned ahead, heterologicality. On page 139 (16.3.44) it mentions a notebook it calls Book F, which turns out to be MS 127, an important notebook mentioned in my note 4 to Chapter 1 for its Tractatus references and its Tractatus criticism. Its last 1944 date (3.7.44, on page 205) is followed by many undated pages that read as preparations for extending Investigations (including ‘private language’ contributions). Its final observation, on page 292, will be found to be relevant to the manuscript volumes that prepared for Part II of Investigations: “James is a treasure chest for the philosopher’s psychology”.

MS 125 starts on 28.12.41, after beginning his work in Guy’s Hospital, London, with very guilty remarks about Francis and his coldness towards him in the last two years of his life. Another coded remark, on pages 2r and 2v, follows this, dated 3.1.42 and set in the hospital, where he says he is doing manual work. Among philosophical notes we find the date 1.4.42, but this is followed on pages 36v,r by what must be the faulty date 9.2, definitely still in 1942, as a later date shows. This is an excessively miserable note fearing loneliness. On page 57v there are dates 26.4 and 18.5, and Wittgenstein is in what appears to be the outpatients department, still at Guy’s (where he stayed until April 1943 before moving to more specialised work in Newcastle at the invitation of Dr. R. T. Grant, himself moving there from Guy’s for research on shock – see a note to Letter 7 in the Malcolm Memoir). He finds it frightful, and the nurses are no consolation to him either. On page 60v there is the date 15.9.42 and on page 61r an important and rare use of the term “synthetic a priori”.

One could perhaps say that the synthetic character of the propositions of mathematics showed itself most clearly in the irregular distribution of prime numbers. [61v] // that the synthetic a priori of mathematical propositions …

On page 75v (16.10) there is an intriguing dream in code about his sister Gretl (Margarethe), which I leave to amateur psychoanalysts to disentangle.

MS 126, whose first dates, on its page 6, are 21.10 and 22.10 of 1942, is on mathematics and logic, except for another coded dream on pages 101-104, dated 25.11, concerning Smythies and with a sketch of a flat. There is also a little more code on pages 128-129 (he has too little peace). But on page 58, just before the date 10.11, the word “mathematisieren”, arising out of the context, does not make this remark a mathematical one:
We mathematicise with concepts. – And with some concepts more than with others.

On page 142 there is the date 31.12.42 and, on page 143, 2.1.43. The last date is 6.1.

MS 127 (F) is the 1943-44 notebook already mentioned in which the *Tractatus* is radically criticised, which I have commented on in a note to Chapter 1. Begun in 1943 when Wittgenstein was discussing the *Tractatus* with Nicholas Bachtin and conceived of publishing the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* in one volume, it continued with the 1.3.44 *Tractatus* references I have given in my note, and with this criticism, important enough for me to quote again:

The counter-linguistic use of the phrase “object and configuration”! A configuration can consist of spheres in certain spatial relationships, but not of the spheres and their spatial relationships. And if I say: “I can see three objects here”, I don’t mean: two objects and their mutual situation.

MS 128 is the notebook mentioned in note 4 as ending with a proposed title for an *Investigations* bound together with the *Tractatus*, but it has other details anticipating the final *Investigations*. Such dates as it has are all 1944, and a preface draft has date-clues, not perfectly consistent with my assumptions: both ‘writing down’ and occupying himself with philosophy are “sixteen years ago”; his first attempt (meaning the *Brown Book*) was ten years earlier, and it was two years later than that that he realised that he had to make a fresh start (MS 142, given to his sister).

MS 129 is also a 1944 notebook, except that the index pages at the front were used in 1945 for a preface draft. Then MS 130 is the first of the ‘penultimate’ large volumes in which *Investigations* was given some last touches and then an attempt to revise it further led to what we know as its Part II. These volumes end with MS 138, and they are the cause of the dislocation in the numbering of many notebooks that preceded them.

The pessimistic remarks in the first notebook following the ‘Bände’ series, MS 123, of 25.9.40, had been about trying to give up his teaching post and his life being a desert. It also included, dated 16.5.41 and on pages 21r and 21v, the beginning of a seriously critical interest in aspect, mentioned above and in my note 25, with a diagram of a hollow cube with a little window. MS 122 had of course been ‘Band XVIII’, not begun until the war had started, and one must not forget its continuation in spare pages at the end of MS 117 (‘Band XIII’). MS 122 itself began with a subject that is picked up from the 1929-1930 notebooks (see page 105 of MS 108, 9.3.30), and mentioned above as returning in 1944 in MS 124, the
‘heterological’ contradiction: anthropologisch-heterologisch one could call it, because in MS 122 Wittgenstein had invented a tribe who try to make the form of their words match their meaning – “blue” being written in blue ink and called a homological word, and similarly for “large” always written large. Words for which this would not be easy (e.g. “hot” and “cold”) are called, if the attempt is given up, heterological, and similarly if the attempt cannot even be made. These people then ask themselves what the words “homological” and “heterological” count as and construct the contradiction, but unfortunately no clue is given as to how those words could be written homologically. “Heterological” therefore becomes heterological by default, but the contradictory conclusion that it is therefore homological (and therefore heterological, etc., etc.) becomes vacuous, since neither conclusion has any actual meaning. It is clear that the words “homological” and “heterological” are simply not part of that game, as the MS 124 passage appears to admit.

One has to look for further ‘bridge-notebooks’ in another von Wright-numbered series. MSS 157a and b, completed in Norway in early 1937, were followed by 158 etc., of which 158 began on 24.2.38, overlapping with 120 (the Skjolden, Vienna, Dublin, Cambridge volume). In this, Wittgenstein is beginning to realise that going to Vienna on his Austrian passport (now counting as German) might not be so very safe, and he even considers combining British citizenship with living in Ireland. It opens with some very odd notes that seem to have been made in Drury’s hospital, and it includes, on page 14r, a further argument against taking being in pain as an example of having something. On page 36r this is expressed in English, in an apparent lecture preparation, perhaps for students he hoped to have under a lectureship he had still to apply for (see Monk page 401), which might explain its somewhat unreal air.

“Pain is something, pain isn’t nothing”. Is this correct?

What I do is: I draw your attention to certain things.

‘Is pain something or is it nothing?’

This question sounds rather silly (to us).

[36v] And that’s why I asked it. It sounds silly to us because we are at once inclined to give two answers to it. And it is not silly because under certain circumstances this question may be very seriously discussed.

“Don’t worry about this fool question.”

In philosophical puzzlement what plays a role besides disorder is a kind of mirage of [37r] a language which isn’t there.
What is your disease? You ask this question again and again. – How can one make you stop doing this? By drawing your attention to something else.

You are under the misapprehension that the philosophical problem is difficult, whereas it’s hopeless.

I want you first to realise that you are under a spell.

(“How different from the lecture-life of our own dear philosopher!” I feel like saying.)

MS 159, “apparently 1938”, opens with a memorable quotation from Russell, “logic’s hell!”, and continues, on page 1v, with another treatment of the idea that a child might be brought up to express doubt from the beginning, and this time there is a different reason for why this won’t do, on page 2r.

In other words one can say: in these circumstances doubt would have no meaning at all. But that merely means, we couldn’t, [2v] in these circumstances, really call that “doubt”; and wouldn’t know what to do with it.

This is also the notebook quoted in Chapter 4 for its phrase “immediately aware” (page 9v). On page 16r there is a discussion of “The laws of logic are habits of thought”:

What was false with that was the idea that such a habit of thought is the habit of taking as true certain unconfirmed things that one has found innumerable times to be confirmed. (In other words almost a laziness of thought.) And naturally there is some truth in that. For the choice of units of measurement depends on what is being measured. – But what is that supposed to mean?!

On page 33r there are notes, written in Cambridge, on his nationality predicament. On page 34r a new preface draft begins, in which, like one already quoted from MS 117 (XIII), there is dubiety between 9 and 10 years earlier as to when “writing down” began. On page 35v it is four years before that he made his first attempt (the Brown Book) and two years after that he gave it up (1934 and 1936 respectively). And on page 39v it is ten years since he first began to apply himself to philosophy.

MS 160 has September 1938 dates some way into it. It combines mathematics with general philosophy and includes some tentative preface contributions (or rather thoughts towards them). These include a remark with which the reader might well agree – that the things he says must be easy to understand, but why he
says them is another matter. It actually ends with some English phrases for the preface, inconclusively re-written. In a discussion of sense-impressions the following appears (on page 13v):

I know – one opens one’s eyes wide and makes a naming gesture. But has one named anything by doing that? But why does one perform this ceremony? Well, this is what we do if we want to impress on ourselves the meaning of a name. It is therefore a useful thing to do; it is only a ceremony when we philosophise.

On page 10r there is a very sane economics remark about why it is absurd to say that money has no value, only the things we exchange it for have. This is like saying that furniture has value but a carpenter’s plane is valueless except in so far as furniture is made with it. He points out the enormous difference between barter and proper trade using money – that difference is a measure of the value of money. He might well, remembering the Austrian and German hyper-inflations of the twenties, have added that money in itself is not enough – it has to be money that works properly.

MS 161 is on mathematics and clearly a preparation for the 1939 mathematics lectures (on page 4r there is a mention of Turing). On page 8r it has someone arguing that the empirically observable fact that prime numbers can come in pairs shows that mathematics is a matter of discovery, not invention, much as in his own remark quoted above about primes in general showing a synthetic a priori character of mathematics. It is of course important in mathematical education that pupils should be encouraged to observe mathematical patterns empirically even if they cannot prove them, and then look for proofs without being made to feel guilty by dogmatists. This notebook also includes some passages on aspect, and on page 17r this explicit dismissal of seriously private languages.

How do I know, for example, that the two words “so” do not mean [or, presumably, do, equally] the same (say, what is common to the two appearances). If this expression didn’t belong to public language it wouldn’t have any private meaning either.

Something important that needs quoting comes on page 40r. It takes up the “behaviourist in disguise” observation that appears near the beginning of MS 124 and reappears in Investigations § 307, but here it is much expanded.

But aren’t you after all just a disguised behaviourist? For you say that there is nothing behind the expression of a sensation. Aren’t you, after all, saying that everything apart from behaviour is fiction? So I’m supposed to

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believe, then, that we don’t feel real pains but only pull faces?! But what is fiction is the entity behind the [40v] expression. It is a fiction that in order to mean anything our words must indicate a something that, if for no one else, I can point to for myself.

On page 62r there is a remark about the names “Fortnum” and “Mason”, which also appears (misspelt) on page 56 of MS 124 (where it is a 1941 passage).

MSS 162a and 162b are mainly on mathematics and both have dates in January 1939, though the second continues into September and into general philosophy. 162b actually continues from 162a in mid-sentence. It has on page 6v a brief and intriguing (non-mathematical) lecture note written in German and addressing his pupils as “Ihr” and “Euch” (the familiar plural). On pages 14r and 14v there is the only other use I have found in Wittgenstein of the term “synthetic a priori”. This one is less telling than the distribution of primes, which impresses us in spite of the fact that we all feel in our hearts that a proof concerning it must one day be found (there are rumours that one has been by a mathematician reluctant to publish it). Here the issue is the difference between groups of strokes we can take in at a glance and those we have to count, which must be empirical because different people have different abilities. He had been fascinated since November 1929 by propositions that I have characterised by saying that they tempt philosophers to call them synthetic a priori, and this example simply does not tempt. On page 42v there is a remark that reminds one that he has just obtained his professorship and is about to deliver an extremely talented series of lectures on the philosophy of mathematics. He says that one mustn’t rest on one’s laurels; this would be like falling asleep during a walk in the snow and not waking up. This notebook also includes this coded and somewhat convoluted examination of talent and genius (starting on page 21v).

I have [22r] *Imagination* [the English word], and that distinguishes me from all teachers of philosophy here, but that doesn’t make me into a genius. The measure of genius is character, even if character itself does not constitute genius. Genius is not ‘talent and character’ but character that declares itself in the form of a special talent. Just as someone, out of courage, [22v] dives after someone into the water, so someone else writes a symphony out of courage. (This is a bad example.)

On page 58v there is another example of a paragraph that suffers in *Investigations* by being pruned too much, in this case § 610 on the aroma of coffee. After all, the smell of a particular coffee can be suggested to someone who knows the smell of other coffees. The origin here is a pair of paragraphs starting on page 58v.
Do you understand the sentence: “Describe the aroma of coffee”?

[an unconnected paragraph]

We call “describing the aroma” a particular application of language. For example: ‘The aroma of this coffee is similar to this one but more strongly roasted.’ If one believes that [59r] aside from such descriptions there is something else that might describe aroma in a more distinguished sense, one is running after a philosophical chimera.

On page 59v the coded remarks on originality, quoted by me in Chapter 1, begin, comparing his need for original seed to be implanted with Freud’s being inspired by Breuer.

MS 163 begins on 22.6 of 1941, but on the self same date he turns the book upside down and copies a passage on page 78v (the last) “composed roughly a year ago”, which works through the book backwards. This mainly mathematics and logic notebook includes a very uncomplimentary remark about the English, on page 14v, and a very miserable coded passage on pages 63r,v (ending, in English, with “I let myself go to bits”, after writing “pieces” and crossing it out). It is next door to impossible to understand the pagination of the final pages without reading them in facsimile.

MS 164 begins with a discussion of proof. It includes one of his many comparisons of his own ideas with relativity (on page 82, and not particularly helpful). It seems to deal with ideas that are due for inclusion in Investigations, in particular with the kind of ‘meaning’ that went with ‘what one meant’ in continuing a series (on page 152). The ‘private language’ appears too (on page 153). Finding it difficult to summarise, I quote just one paragraph (from page 169) that stands on its own.

But what if someone who held his hand over a flame and showed every sign of pain said, or cried out: “I don’t know if I’m in pain or not!” We should probably say that he couldn’t be using the word pain as we do.

MS 165 is given as ‘around 1944’. It opens with:

How does he come into these proceedings: I stabbed at him, I poisoned him, I was expecting him, I honour him.

(With “esteem” for “honour” this comes into typescripts from which it becomes § 18 of Zettel.) There follow lists of page and paragraph numbers from a typescript, presumably Bemerkungen I, and then, after “2/2 Language as an institution”, there is an address in Carmarthen, preceded by the admission “I, like everyone I know,
find it so much easier not to think than to think”. There are then further page and paragraph numbers. Of the ordinary paragraphs that finally return I quote a number of examples, both for their refreshing quality and for their hints of the coming additions to *Investigations*.

[page 28] ‘But how do I *know* that *mean* isn’t a sensation that accompanies its sentence?’

[page 36] I can’t describe language any differently from [describing] sewing, cooking, exercising. Nor can I describe ‘following a rule’ any differently.

[page 46] I want to say: “There is a something there”. But why do you want to be so modest and not say straight away that it is a pain. It isn’t any easier to recognise this something as a something than as a pain.

[page 52, actually providing, with butter substituted for cheese, the parenthesis ending § 693, the last paragraph of *Investigations* Part I] (Naturally, one could even call cheese’s rising in price an activity of the cheese, and this stupidity would be harmless so long as no problems were generated by it.)

[page 60] So say the sentence: “The nib is probably blunt. Well I never, it’ll do” first thinking and then thoughtlessly; finally just think the thought but without the words. How did you do it? Well, *as a start* perhaps test the point [61] of my nib wordlessly, pull a face like someone saying it isn’t particularly good and then write on with a gesture of resignation. [See *Investigations* § 330.]

On the next page there is a note “Beginning of the book” and then a paragraph on thought not being an incorporeal proceeding that gives speech life and meaning but can’t be separated from it (compare *Investigations* § 339). Wittgenstein did, in the manuscript volumes that led to *Investigations* Part II, admit the possibility of a wordless thought, but here he puts the cart before the horse. For one can have a wordless thought in all sorts of different ways, and then one might put it into words, which of course are not accompanied by the meaning-bestowing processes he is denying, and do not need to be. I return to quotation with a remark that puts very clearly the point that a private language is not a language.

[page 101] And here we are on the verge of a discussion about the [kind of] language in which someone speaks only to himself, makes himself understood only to himself, about his private experiences. [102] I will not enter
Manuscripts that prepare Untersuchungen here into this discussion, which belongs with the problems of idealism and solipsism. All I want to say is that no language whatever has been described here, although it appears to have been. [Not the end of the paragraph.]

It is not easy to find philosophical keys, but the most difficult thing is finding the locks for the keys.

James’s psychology shows how necessary the work of philosophy is. Psychology, he says, is a science, but he propounds almost no scientific questions. His efforts are nothing but attempts to free himself from the spider-web of metaphysics that he is caught in. [In English:] He cannot yet walk, or fly at all he only wiggles. [German:] Not that he isn’t interesting. It simply isn’t a scientific activity.

Then how can I arrive at knowing, from the concept of sensation that I have learned, that a sensation can continue without a bearer? That must surely rest on a misunderstanding of this concept.

To smell a rat is much easier than to trap it.

James is a treasure chest for the philosopher’s psychology.

“He speaks within his heart to himself”.

When I come to a decision I speak within my heart to myself, but not when I philosophise.

[And continuing onto page 196, the James / Ballard story in Investigations § 342.]

A bomb lands close to me. I run away; I naturally believe it is going to explode. No thoughts of any kind need to have gone through my head.

It could, of course, also be natural to describe this reaction as giving effect to a wordless thought. There are many experiences that can fall under this description – calmer ones, admittedly, falling under it a little more naturally than the above. MS 166 is the privacy notebook written for a lecture given in Turing’s absence. MS 167 was begun in Newcastle, and it includes (on pages 30v and 31r) remarks on aspect-blindness, a main theme of Section xi of Investigations Part II; and on page 31v a passage that actually contributes to Part II, in its Section vii, on evolution and the emergence of consciousness.
MS 168 finally brings us beyond the war. I knew it in 1952 and called it “the St. John’s Street Aesthetics” (Elizabeth Anscombe lived at No 27). It was Wittgenstein’s attempt to compile a collection of aesthetic remarks from his recent notebooks, and while its opening date is 16.1.49 some other dates are earlier and go with the entries from which they were culled. Presumably this is what inspired von Wright to compile *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, but he should have paid more attention to Wittgenstein’s last entry in it, on page 7, comparing what he had done to picking raisins out of a cake.

Raisins might be the best part of a cake; but a sack of raisins is not better than a cake; and someone who is in a position to give us a sack-full of raisins can’t bake a cake with it, to say nothing of whether he can do anything better.

A cake, that isn’t as it were: thinned out raisins.

A notebook which has no dates and has been given a code number standing outside both sequences is MS 179, I assume recently discovered (and certainly not included in Cornell). It opens with the problem of following a rule, just as if it was a new continuation from where pre-war *Investigations* had broken off, and one cannot help wishing that Wittgenstein had used it instead of keeping to the continuation worked out in the Skjolden notebooks. It does, however, go on to provide material for the post-war continuation where § 191 discusses grasping the use of a word in a flash. Even here one could wish that more of the fresh ideas of MS 179 had been used. And similarly with some contributions to the ‘private language argument’. One of these seems to me to put a finger on Wittgenstein’s failure to understand a particular aspect of consciousness. It comes on page 6v, where, after writing about the grammar of the verb “think” being radically different from that of an activity verb like “speak”, Wittgenstein breaks into privacy shorthand without having ended his paragraph.

… Private language for private experiences. Diary about sensations.

Symbols connected with the natural expression of the sensation [in question]. In that case the diary can be understood by everybody. But what if there isn’t a natural expression of the sensation? How do I know then when I am having the same sensation?

The hypothesis here is that I have decided to use a particular sign to mark a particular sensation. This is combined with a background assumption that is expressed in another of these newly discovered notebooks, 180a, at the end of page 1av:
Understanding a sentence means understanding a language. Understanding a language means mastering a technique.

So knowing that I am having the sensation that I have previously marked with a chosen sign must, to count as knowing, go with a mastered technique. But here I am merely experiencing a sensation and marking a sign and doing this with contentment ‘as a job well done’. We have already agreed (with arguments taken from Wittgenstein) that private sewing machines that we cannot introduce to the public, even if we wish to, have nothing to do with language; consequently, there is no point in our claiming that this symbol-marking has any connection with the language of knowing, and no victory for a philosopher who tells us that it can’t have. To be sure, it can’t have anything to do with the language of identity either. But why should we want it to? We simply lick our pencil and make our sign. There is nothing to stop us, and we have no need to make any excuses.

These late additions are helpful in other details. MS 181 is a set of loose pages on privacy and sense data. 182 has a list of paragraphs from TS 228 (Bemerkungen I) for inclusion in Investigations, showing that while (as Rothhaupt claims) Bemerkungen II is a closer source for that, Wittgenstein did use I for the purpose before he re-ordered it into II. 183 is the set of diaries scrupulously edited by Ilse Somavilla as Denkbewegungen, which enabled me to cure a misapprehension as to when in 1930 Wittgenstein went on a walking holiday with Ryle.
Strictly speaking, what Wittgenstein wrote does not include the typescripts he dictated, but as I have already said they formed one of the main melody-lines of his total counterpoint, and they deserve a chapter to themselves, in which, however, I shall try not to repeat what I have said about some of them in previous chapters. I shall also reserve the right to deal with them in my own textualist manner, drawing attention to details that may have little to do with their philosophical significance.

In the case of manuscripts, I firmly believe that textual details are part and parcel of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development (and even of his method). For example, a recent BBC programme his 1948-9 stay in Ireland went to great trouble to bring out the relation of his efforts to the thoughts of other philosophers, all of whom he believed to be trapped in their misunderstandings of their own language. Wittgenstein was convinced that this was so for all of us, not only philosophers, and of course he included himself, but in his manuscript writings a more particular consideration comes to the fore: as he wrote he was obsessed by the problems he was dealing with there and then on the page, and the language in which he was expressing them, or had expressed them in previous pages, or harking back for months or even years. To understand his philosophy there is therefore no escaping a minute examination of a net of thoughts that stretched over twenty-two years (and back retrospectively for another sixteen or so more). With his typescripts all that work had to a large extent already been done, though that didn’t stop him keeping it alive in his arrangements of them, and so one has an opportunity to take one’s ease and let one’s hair down and comment on details that appeal to one’s instincts of pedantry – to indulge, in short, in what I call textuality without needing to call on the excuse of philosophical significance.

As an example there is a typescript that I have mentioned before for its provenance, TS 239, the end-of-war revision of the pre-war *Investigations* typescript (220). When I finally got my photocopy of it and had time to examine it properly, my principle concern was not what light it might have thrown on Wittgenstein’s
philosophical development but what had happened to a joke that I had been particularly fond of when I first met it in the post-war *Investigations* typescript from which Elizabeth Anscombe was making her translation. This was a quotation from a book by Lichtenberg called *Briefe von Mägden über Literatur*. It was to illustrate the concept of philosophical depth, which comes near the bottom of page 77 in both of the earlier typescripts. The paragraph at the very bottom was cut out from a carbon of that page of 220 and put at the top of the next page of 239 (losing its number, while a paragraph on time had been pasted at the foot of 239’s page 77). The shifted paragraph began “What for example does the depth of the joke ‘We called him a tortoise because he taught us’ consist in?”. The answer is the impossibility of deriving a noun from a verb in that way, but if we say “why not?” the depth vanishes.

This unnumbered page is basically the old page 78 of 220, and all it had actually quoted from one of the maids’ letters was her calling a hundred “001”, which again has no depth if we just say “why not?” but reverberates if we are sensitive to decimal notation. Nearly the whole of this discussion is crossed out on the new unnumbered page and it looks as if Wittgenstein intended to drop it, but in the margin he has written, quite neatly, “In Lichtenberg’s ‘Briefen von Mägden über Literatur’ one maid writes to the other:”, indicating an intention to quote more fully in his next version. That was to be typescript 227, Part I of *Investigations* itself, of which it is now clear that there were three copies, a top and two carbons (information that I owe to Alois Pichler, citing David Stern, and confirmed by the Malcolm Memoir). The top copy was given for printing to Blackwells, who lost it, and Elizabeth Anscombe had the other two. Of these, what is now called 227a was her working copy, and she gave it to me in wadges, with corresponding wadges of her draft translation. Page 85 of this had the whole gloriously funny Lichtenberg passage, and so did her translation. It was a great disappointment to me when I found it to be missing in print. The explanation came to me when I examined a photocopy of 227b at the Bodleian in 1993, which had the passage crossed out in Wittgenstein’s pencil. Finally, I found 227a in the electronic edition, and its page 85 had the same passage crossed out in Elizabeth’s ink. She must have examined 227b and realised that Wittgenstein had changed his mind about including it and crossed it out in her working copy. (While both 227a and 227b were carbons, 227b was the better of them, and it is natural that she should use 227a for translating and for giving me to take home.)

The crossing out in 239 of most of what had been page 78 of 220 made me accuse Wittgenstein of more changes of direction than he had actually committed.
– first putting in only “001”, then cutting out even that, then putting the full joke in 227 and finally cutting that out. But the marginal addition to the page in 239 quite possibly goes with the crossing out, in which case his intention (expressed in the colon) will have been to cross it out precisely in order to make way for his full quotation. I still think it a pity that he removed that in the end. I assume that the marginal note and the crossing out date to 1945, when TS 239 was being polished and the Preface added to it, having been basically put together in the months following February 1944, when he left his Newcastle hospital.

This hunt for a favourite joke led to my finding significant rearrangements, both of 220 into 239 and of 239 into 227. The pages of 220 in question run from 77 to 93. Some of the paragraphs suppressed in the making of 239 reappear in 227, and thus in print, but important ones that do not appear include the Tractatus criticism embodied in the phrase “die sprachwidrige Verwendung” of the word “Komplex”. This fact may be related to a set of extracts from 220, numbered 237, in which that very phrase is included but crossed out (on page 92b) while paragraphs that survived into Investigations are left.

Another such item in the electronic edition, numbered 238, consisting of a more coherent set of pages removed by Wittgenstein from some carbon copy of 220, is very helpful in elucidating his 239 rearrangements. He had clearly removed them for precisely that purpose. Two pages (in both 238 and 239, but slightly differently arranged and numbered 82 and 84 in Bergen’s 239) are typed, like many other pages of the original 220, on a typewriter with a smaller typeface – its difference emphasised in the photocopy reproduction of 239 because of the difficulty of squeezing in the extra paragraphs pasted onto it, giving an impression of retyping on an even smaller machine. It is actually quite remarkable how much editing Wittgenstein achieved without retyping. The joke about 001 is not crossed out in 238’s page 78, and the paragraph pasted at the bottom of 239’s page 77 on time is written in ink at the bottom of 238’s, showing that it is no quickly abandoned afterthought. Readers of 239 in the Bergen edition need to know that the page numbers come consecutively, and because of their fewer number page 94, where 220 and 239 correlate once more, is numbered 88.

Further details are well worth the attention of enthusiasts, to whose care I leave them, but there is one that I must mention because it comes in 238 but does not belong there at all – indeed, it is only in the facsimile that it can be found there. It is the final, torn, page of 239, ending with “In der Frage liegt ein Fehler”. This page was already torn when Yorick Smythies gave me the typescript in its red spring binding in 1957, and it was torn in exactly the same way when Eliane Flach
handed it to Dr. Gaskell in 1978. The two previous pages were untorn in 1978, as can be seen in the photocopy that the Wren gave me in gratitude, and in the identical photocopy photographed by Cornell. Both these pages, however, can be seen to be torn in the facsimile edition, accidents which must have happened either at the Wren or at Bergen.

There is a final textual detail concerning Elizabeth’s working copy of 227 that I have mentioned in Chapter 6. As she was working on it with me one of Wittgenstein’s ‘slips’ fell out, which she and Rhees had decided would be printed as footnotes. She put it back where she thought it had come from, but in my view in the wrong place. It is now the footnote to page 33 (where games are discussed) – “Show the children a game!” – but I believe it went with § 394, on what was in one’s mind as one imagined something, since it is itself on what is in one’s mind as one says something (born out, as I said in Chapter 6, by the context of Grammatik’s § 75).

As to the Preface, it was retyped for the final (227) typescript so as to make way for a ‘motto’ (from Hertz, replaced in handwriting by the one from Nestroy) so that the pagination is slightly different from 239’s. On page 2 of that we find “vor zwei Jahren” for when he had looked at the Tractatus again, with Bachtin, and on page 3 of both 227 carbons (and one can be sure of the lost top copy as well) the “zwei” is changed to “vier” in what I have been taking to be Wittgenstein’s hand (but Pichler, on pages 33-34 of Working Papers 14, claims that it is in someone else’s). So the preface date, 1945 in both cases, and in print, gives us 1943 for the readings with Bachtin, and so does the possibility that the finishing touches were put to 227 in 1947 with a change from “zwei” to “vier” in the hand of an authorised amanuensis. Indeed, more than finishing touches to the dictation might have lasted into 1947, because time had to be made for dictating two other typescripts, called Bemerkungen I and Bemerkungen II, and to make matters more complicated there were two slightly different versions of each.

Elizabeth Anscombe showed me one such pair in 1952. They were housed in two near-identical box files, and she told me that Wittgenstein’s intention in making them was to show how philosophical ideas could connect in different orders. She had no idea, and would certainly have told me if Wittgenstein had suggested it, that they had played a part in the design of the post-war sections of Part I of Investigations. Order was what she emphasised. These box files are not photographed in the facsimile electronic edition. I am quite sure that they are preserved at the Wren, and I hope we shall be able to see them when the electronic edition is revised. Their contents may be better represented by the Cornell microfilms.
There is one small detail where that edition differs from the electronic: the parenthesis “(Der tiefe Aspekt entschlüpft leicht)” appears in the opening paragraphs of Bemerkungen I in Cornell. In addition, the electronic edition of these texts mixes them with another, the typescript, supposedly, from which Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume I, namely TS 229, was printed. This appears to begin with § 699 (actually a mistyping for 669, as the previous and following numbers show) of TS 228, on its page 186, coinciding with § 1 of the printed book. In 228 this is where paragraph references to Bemerkungen II cease, and the composite typescript that starts there derives from an equally overlapping stage in Wittgenstein’s writing that we shall meet in the next chapter.

Not only does the printed Volume I spread back into 229’s predecessor, 228, but between the printed paragraphs numbered 49 and 50 two typed paragraphs have been left out, numbered 719 and 720, and inserted near the printed book’s beginning as §§ 6 and 7. This convinced me that the editors had used a different typescript, and in their preface they admit that they had two; but the electronic edition made this problem even more complicated. For there is a second typescript in that, consisting of two overlapping ones, listed as 224 and 225. The first does end precisely where the displaced paragraphs were taken from, but the second, in overlapping, includes them there. The typescript used by the editors must, I thought, have been a third one, because in none of the electronically reproduced typescripts do those shifted paragraphs come where they do in print, but as will be seen in the next chapter they do come in their manuscript place, and this now seems to me a consequence of editing, and I believe a justified one.

TS 229, and the printed Volume I as well, end exactly where they should, a point in MS 135 where Wittgenstein wrote “bis dahin diktiert”. Volume II of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology comes from TS 232, of which an important paragraph, § 07, comes from page 46a of MS 136, where “Es ist nicht wahr dass” was originally written with the word “unrichtig”, mistranscribed in the electronic edition as “wichtig”. TS 232 (and with it Volume II of Remarks) also ends where it should, where Wittgenstein wrote “bis hierher diktiert” in MS 137.

The fact that electronic Bemerkungen I cannot have been the original is shown quite simply by its paragraph references to Bemerkungen II, which cannot have been added until Bemerkungen II was finished, or at least under way. In Bemerkungen I these references come at the beginning of paragraphs, while Bemerkungen II’s references to Bemerkungen I come at their end.

While it is clear that both played some part in the move from pre-war to post-war Investigations, they have, jointly, a quite different character from that. For one
thing they pick up quite a few paragraphs that went into Volume I of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. For another they lose *Investigations*' drive to teach us. They are more expansive. They are a pleasure to read. I can’t pretend that it was wrong for the trustees not to have published them long ago as printed books, for they are caviar to the general and might not have sold well; but I do hope they will be appreciated by anyone who has once bought the electronic edition.

There is another typescript that the trustees did publish, under the title *Zettel* (1967). This word means slips of paper, chitties one might say, the sort of slips that provide *Investigations*' footnotes, but “chitties” would have had the wrong sound, and “slips” would have given the wrong impression, while “cuttings” does not seem to have occurred to them, so they kept the German. These particular slips were found in a box, partly ordered, and Peter Geach put them into an order which will be found in the printed volume. He did this by pasting them onto the pages of two unused quarto manuscript volumes. Their von Wright numbers are 233a and 233b, and to my surprise I have notes in my printed copy that prove that I knew them from the Cornell microfilms, under the same numbers. I have no recollection of this, and my memory corresponds to what Elizabeth told me and she and von Wright say in the editors’ preface – that Peter Geach, Elizabeth’s husband, had sorted them out and, one would guess from both sources, put them back in the same box. The Cornell microfilms did not include photographs of the front and back covers, and it was seeing these in the facsimile versions that brought to my attention what exactly it was that Peter had done. It must have seemed to him the most natural possible way of establishing a convincing complete ordering out of Wittgenstein’s partial ordering – it had been, after all, his own method for constructing TS 209 (the Moore volume, *Philosophische Bemerkungen*) out of TS 208. Geach did make a terribly untidy mess of the very first page, and the editors have not been accurate in transferring it to print, and there are similar inaccuracies at the very end, which I shall mention, but the most important thing for me to discuss first is the simple question, were the trustees right to bring it out in 1967, and, secondly, what were Wittgenstein’s aims in making his selection of (mainly) isolated paragraphs?

When *Zettel* first appeared I read it hungrily as the nearest thing I knew to a bridge between *Investigations*’ two parts, and it is certainly true that a great deal of use is made in it of the two typescripts (229 and 232) whose dictation marked pauses before Wittgenstein drafted his final contributions to the second part, in MSS 137 and 138, which remained in manuscript. To that extent *Zettel* was helpful to me in understanding the second part, and I am sure it has been to many other
scholars. Its occasional early paragraphs, however (one that catches the eye easily is printed as § 452, the knots that philosophy has to undo, from early in Philosophische Bemerkungen but late in the manuscripts that led to it), suggest that Wittgenstein was not thinking at all of working towards ‘Part II’. My reading, from taking it afresh in the context of writing this book, is that it was his attempt to select from his typescripts a survey of what was homogenous in his (at that stage) nearly twenty years of philosophical results. As a whole they were not in the least homogenous, as my efforts should have made clear by now, but it is entirely understandable that he wished to present them as such. For him they were, after all, results. As Elizabeth said, a propos of some disagreement between us as to the translation of some word, he was very proud of the fact that other philosophers reached conclusions – he obtained results.

The editors did expressly allow themselves the right not to follow Geach in every detail, but some of their changes fail to take account of Wittgenstein’s own conventions. On the first page of Geach’s pasting, § 1 has the number “574” from whatever typescript it was originally cut from, but the next number, “12” from what looks like an early typescript, does not come until § 3, suggesting that that should be the second numbered paragraph, and the printed § 2 a pair of sub-paragraphs completing § 1. Those are a handwritten remark written above the typed “It is my intention to whistle this theme …”, and both appear to belong to the same slip as § 1, all three going with William James’s claim that a spoken sentence is already complete in our minds as we begin it. § 4 has the number “427” and looks as if it comes from a similar typescript to that of § 3. §§ 5 and 6 come from a further typescript, with the respective numbers “106” and “258”, of which the latter is much changed by hand, ending where a page break forces a fresh slip and completed by hand. § 7 begins the next pasted page, with the number “202”, while § 8 had the number “203”, obliterated by x’s and occupying the same slip, from which I infer that both should have been presented as a single paragraph.

Of these opening details, indeed of the whole of the first volume until we reach its split with 233b, there is just one more I must mention, at the bottom of page 3, § 16, with the number “591”. Its end in print is “The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in”, a free but accurate Elizabeth translation of a shorter manuscript original, amending the typewritten “The mistake is: that meaning does not consist in something”. If anybody can reconcile this apparent contradiction, or alternatively pinpoint a change in philosophical viewpoint, I shall be very grateful. The manuscript origin, with the second formulation, can be found in MS 130, where two paragraphs on pages 19 and 20 refer to
each other by upside down A’s. In other words, a manuscript meaning has been changed in typescript and put back in further manuscript, so one must accept Elizabeth’s instincts as correct.

The last paragraph of 233a, on its page 72, with the number “726”, is § 352. The first of 233b, however, printed as § 353, has no number and is clearly a continuation of the same slip, thus appearing to have been intended as a sub-paragraph of the one that happened to end 233a’s page 72. The next paragraph, on the other hand, footnoted as inserted on the editors’ responsibility, has been added quite properly, to give an antecedent to “dieser” in § 355 (namely “Leere” in § 354, a feminine noun indicating a visual gap between green and red, which can to be sure be filled by various yellows and oranges but still leaves a gap in our imagination if we see green and red alone).

§ 411 is interesting for the child who might be taught doubt from the beginning, this time because of being especially clever. § 414 has the child brought up by idealists who still use the word “chair” when they want a chair fetched, leading to the conclusion that whatever these people say to distinguish themselves from realists is just a difference of war cry. (This is a term that I have used frequently for observations of Wittgenstein’s that I thought fitted it, but he himself took it from Hardy, and I believe he uses it for the first time in the manuscript place this is taken from, page 139b of MS 136, quoted in the next chapter.) § 422 has the sensible reality of a child not being taught “it looks red to me” from the beginning, but why? Is it because it is not old enough to understand the fine differences between appearance and reality? The implication of this unanswered question is that such differences do not go with the first steps in learning a language game whether the learner is capable of understanding them or not. These (and related) paragraphs will be found on and around pages 10 and 11 of 233b.

Between §§ 436 and 437 in print are two pasted paragraphs numbered “454” and “455”, beginning “Nicht darum” and “Man ist geneigt” respectively, which the editors have omitted. One might suppose that they had found a more telling place for them, but I cannot find them anywhere else.

On the last full page (65) of 233b will be found the last paragraphs of the book. Page 66 is empty, and the end-papers have mainly incomplete observations that nothing could be done with, but there is also a complete paragraph which the editors did not need to reject. It has the number “296” and runs as follows.

The understanding [in manuscript, “mind”], I say, grasps for the one object; and then we talk of it – and according to its properties, its nature. [added in manuscript: The “und” might mean “und zwar”.]
The phrase “und zwar” is difficult to do justice to, embracing a variety of meanings such as ‘actually’, ‘namely’, ‘more precisely’, and ‘in fact’.

An early typescript which other people may find more textual significance in than I have myself is TS 210, in which Wittgenstein dictated much of the portion of MS 108 (Volume IV) that followed his return to Cambridge in April 1930. This was not included in the Cornell microfilms, and so I was anxious to read it in the electronic edition, but having squeezed everything I could out of the corresponding manuscript I did not find that the typescript gave me any extra illumination. However, it apparently had significance for Wittgenstein because he extracted a handful of pages from it (with one extra from TS 211) and they can be found as item 236. I wish anybody luck in finding why he did this. TS 242 is another of these extracted handfuls of pages, coming from pages 149 to 195 of the Smythies typescript, 239.

A typescript I must mention, having already referred to it at various points, is termed D.5 in the Schlick Nachlass, or Mulder V in the Wittgenstein Nachlass. It not only extends to where, at § 41, the großes Format manuscript, MS 140, directs the reader, or editor or typist or Wittgenstein himself, to the now missing kleines Format manuscript, but continues just beyond where großes Format comes into play again. As I have said in Chapter 6 it ends with three small extra paragraphs where properly speaking großes Format ends, the latter finally ending with a page that reads like a trial opening for the German first sketch for the Brown Book. While it does indeed corroborate the accuracy of Rhees’s editing of Part I, as Nedo told me in 1994 when he gave me the welcome news that it had been found, it does not constitute, what I took him to mean, a complete typescript of Part I. Rhees therefore has to take the credit for having done his entire editing by following Wittgenstein’s upside down A signs. Led astray by my assumption that Mulder V was a complete Part I and by noticing a few minor discrepancies between großes Format and the opening pages of Part I, I embraced the Fata Morgana, or will o’ the wisp or what have you, of supposing that this typescript had been known to Rhees and enabled him to do his editing without that very considerable labour: namely following the signs not only to and fro through großes Format and kleines Format but through MSS 114 and 115 as well.

Wishing, as many scholars do, that Rhees had published the Big Typescript complete, since it seems that for a short period Wittgenstein intended it to be ‘the book’ that he was always hoping to write, I cannot join them in regretting that he published the painstaking reworking of the majority of its first four hundred and four pages, which he could properly have called Philosophische Grammatik. He
could have included an account of its long development, from nine and a half manuscript volumes, through the TS 212 ‘album’ culled from them, the Big Typescript made from that, the reworking of most of its opening four hundred and four pages in manuscript volumes and loose manuscripts, and then the editorial signs that Rhees had finally followed. That would have left him free to publish the entire Big Typescript as the next item. Not knowing the Schlick dictation he could not have added the final twist: that having gone to so much trouble to polish his *Grammatik*, Wittgenstein suddenly dropped it and moved on to preparing *Brown Book* and *Investigations*.

In his introduction to the *Wiener Ausgabe* Big Typescript (Volume 11) Nedo says that the typescript itself, left in Austria by Wittgenstein because of the Anschluss, only came into the trustees’ possession “long after his death”. But it did so in time to be included in the Cornell microfilms, and thus before 1968, and I remember well the page proofs of *Philosophische Grammatik*, with its long Big Typescript passages, being delivered to me by Blackwells for review in January or February of 1970. And a propos of Nedo’s Volume 11, I owe it to him and his publishers to say that it is an extremely useful effort: not only does it save one from the eyestrain of reading the original in facsimile on one’s screen, its left hand margins include references to the manuscripts from which its individual paragraphs and sub paragraphs are taken. I should add too that the appendices at the end, including *Komplex und Tatsache*, are not in the typescript but are added by Nedo.

There is now a new Big Typescript edition published by Blackwells, edited and translated on opposite pages by Luckhardt and Aue, too late for me to comment on here, but some remarks about it will appear in a separate article in a collection to be published by Routledge.

A final typescript I must mention is something of a mystery. It is the original typescript made by Ambrose, Masterman and Skinner from their notes on lectures by Wittgenstein and discussions with him, which they called the Yellow Book. It is published partially in the Ambrose lecture volume, 1979 and 1982, and has the von Wright number 311, in spite of the fact that it is not one of Wittgenstein’s dictations – which one would not quibble about if it was included in the electronic edition, but it is not. Pichler lists it in a footnote to page 20 of *Working Papers* 8 as one of the items he has not been able to examine.
In reading the post-war manuscripts, following the end-of-war manuscripts already discussed, the first to examine is the final section of MS 116 (Volume XII), consisting of thirty-two pages beginning at page 316. They are headed “May 1945”. A passage on page 320 introduces something that came to play a large part in the manuscript volumes (MSS 130-138) that led to *Investigations*’ ‘Part II’. This is Moore’s paradox, the problem of whether it is contradictory to say that one believes something and also that it isn’t true. As very often with Wittgenstein, his first thought seems to hit the nail on the head and make later refinements otiose.

One might set up Moore’s paradox thus: The statements “Perhaps it is raining” and “It isn’t raining” do not contradict each other; but the [single] statement “Perhaps it is raining and it isn’t” is nonsense // incomprehensible.

Wittgenstein seems to be aware of this, because, on the fifth of October 1946, in Cambridge, on page 116 of MS 132, after parading the Moore paradox in various guises, he writes (with many corrections):

> It is an interesting and important question: what after all do we achieve by this piling up of examples and by the manifold formulations of the paradox, by the many exercises from different directions, and whether we are achieving *anything at all* by it or are just wandering around in despair of the problem because we can’t solve it. Are we just biting our nails, are we *doing* anything towards the problem’s solution?

In MS 116 there are also short remarks inserted into the general gist that must have been waiting to be put into an enlargement of *Investigations*. For example, on page 323:

> A philosopher treats a question like a disease. [See § 255.]
(where one is tempted to leave the opening German definite article for its Russell-theory-of-descriptions overtones) and on page 340:

The essence is given expression in grammar. [See § 371.]

Grammar says what kind of object something is. (Theology as grammar.) [See § 373.]

On page 344 there is a strangely spurious argument followed by something that I could happily endorse.

“Everything that happens must happen.” – For it can’t more than happen.
And that is why it cannot less than have to happen.

We are interested in the that, not the why. But in spite of that we don’t lose anything from the world.

And before these notes wind up at the top of page 347 there are ‘Investigations-like’ observations about Frege’s assertion sign and about what Wittgenstein calls psychological verbs, such as “believe” and “think”. It can happen that one of these gives the impression of having distinct meanings in the first and third person. But one can also say that this is precisely what distinguishes them – the fact that these distinct grammars combine into what we accept as a unity.

The bridge between those notes and the opening pages of MS 130, which are still Investigations-centred, would be helped if we knew anything about the lectures delivered in the academic year 1945-1946. Those for 1946-1947 are well documented, and I have a personal memory that establishes that Wittgenstein did lecture in 1945-1946, so any evidence as to what he said would be gratifying. In October of 1945 I was at last released from Friends Ambulance Unit duties that had held me in England while my colleagues were advancing through Europe hard on the fighting. One of these was Bruce Hunt, a pupil of Wittgenstein’s who attended the 1946-1947 lectures. Before setting out to join these adventurous souls I had time to visit Cambridge and see Erich Heller, who was to give me crucial help later in obtaining my New College scholarship. The conversation turned to Wittgenstein, and Erich assured me that it was all a load of nonsense, and he could prove it because he had been to one of his lectures and not understood a word. This must surely have been the very first lecture of the term, so tight was my timetable. Afterwards he had been to coffee with a group of listeners, among whom was a willowy youth (who must have been Yorick Smythies) who said that the only way to understand was to persevere and keep attending, but Erich declined to try. Fortunately, on my way to my posting further east, I met a colleague (later to
become a distinguished professor of psychology) who had a copy of the *Tractatus*, and gullibly repeating what I had been told I was forcefully told off for my ignorance. (In fact, there are references to 1945-46 lectures in Letters 16 and 20 in the second edition of the Malcolm *Memoir*, but no hint as to their content.)

The opening pages of MS 130 certainly belong to the time of extending *Investigations* and almost certainly to 1945. Written above them is: “This manuscript book contains almost nothing but bad propositions. But some of them can be a spur to better propositions. Most are mere rubbish.” In fact, beyond page 60, many were useful enough to incorporate into the typescripts that led to *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* Volume I. Nevertheless, it is true that very few paragraphs from this manuscript volume made their way finally into Part II of *Investigations*.

The first contribution to Part I comes on pages 12 and 13, and is not even part of its post-war extension but comes philosophically in the region of the pre-war typescript: § 125 of *Investigations* is not present in that at all but belongs to its arguments, and all its sub-paragraphs but the first will be found on these pages of MS 130, written as separate paragraphs and running over onto page 14. On page 22 there is a brief contribution to the preface, “[Ins Vorwort]”: “So this book is really nothing but an album.” On page 55 there is a longer one, beginning: “In what follows I am publishing thoughts that are the precipitation of investigations that have occupied me for the last 16 years.” This is the evidence for these pages being written in 1945 (1945 – 16 = 1929).

Whatever the date of a change in intention there certainly was one. On page 538 of his biography, Monk cites a conversation in Dublin during the December of 1948 in which Wittgenstein told Rhees and Anscombe that the work he had assembled there to show them, namely typescripts known to us as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* Volumes I & II and manuscript passages following those, in MSS 137 and 138, had been planned to enable him to revise *Investigations*, a task he was never able to accomplish, having to content himself with what I have called extending it.

On page 63 of MS 130 there is § 34 (on meaning) of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* Volume I, whose previous paragraphs dealt with aspect and were broken off where Wittgenstein was gathering his thoughts on the subject. Those begin, as far as MS 130 is concerned, with § 5 (much corrected) on page 88, §§ 1-4 having defeated my search for their origin. (They presumably come in whatever notebook gave the editors the date May the 10th 1946 in their preface, not the first date in MS 130.) §§ 6-7 are on pages 89 and 90. In TS 228, just before that is termed 229, they follow the printed § 49, where other subjects have taken over...
from aspect, the three having the consecutive typescript paragraph numbers 717-719. Early in the book is where, dealing with aspect, §§ 6–7 clearly belong, i.e. with § 5 exactly as printed, and I must assume that the editors put them there on their own responsibility. The last paragraph before TS 228 is re-named is printed § 11 and it comes in the manuscript on pages 93 and 94. It is a reference to the research on the retina by William Rushton, a fellow Fellow of Trinity, whom I have mentioned in the last note of Chapter 1. Rushton’s research dealt with our colour receptors, ‘cones’, but Wittgenstein imagines him helping him with his conceptual research on aspect. He first says that if a retinal difference were found to go with aspect it would be evidence for a difference of sense data, but then asks how that result can tell us anything about the nature of immediate experience. Certainly it can’t – only immediate experience can tell us anything about itself – but he was surely right to think a positive result would imply a difference of experience.

Picking up from the paragraphs before Rushton’s, § 12 on pages 95–96 begins a series of paragraphs that avoid the serious problem of aspect rather than tackling it. § 20 on page 101 deals with a diagram of a bicycle frame and its various interpretations, all left out in print. §§ 23–25, on pages 105–107, do have their diagram, a triangle, but it presents no problems. We can see any triangle as an arrow at one apex pointing away from its opposite side, and repeat this for the other two, and no one would think there was any question of the visual image changing. One is looking at the self-same triangle and merely reinterpreting it. The difficult case is introduced in a passage not dictated, on pages 107 and 108, exemplified by a surface that can be seen first as concave and then as convex – which can easily lead us to say that it has visually jumped from one to the other. This is followed by § 26, and then by the important paragraph, § 27, on manuscript page 109, going with § 28 on page 110. Its phrase “The somewhat strange phenomenon” of aspect difference is one that haunts my memory as having met it elsewhere, but its earlier occurrence would not invalidate its position here, because in these paragraphs Wittgenstein is, with the help of the undictated bicycle interpretations, leading up to his explicit admission in § 33 that nothing alters in the visual image even when there is a temptation to say that it does. In § 1 he had only said “that’s what we call it”. In §§ 27 and 28 three terms occur: “Gesichtsbild” (visual image), which stays the same ‘in one sense’, “Auffassung” (interpretation or a way of taking something), which can change, and “Gesichtseindruck” (visual impression), which can alter without any claim to a change of aspect, the example here being something seen as a bowl on one occasion and as something else on another. That is a very
careful skating around the issue, because what one really wants to know is whether, on a single occasion, changing neither visual image nor aspect, one could see something successively as a bowl and not, perhaps simply by deciding not to break an egg into it. That would be an example of a change of Gesichtseindruck and Auffassung without a change of aspect and a fortiori without a change of Gesichtsbild. It would also separate the concepts of aspect and ‘seeing as’, which we normally take as the same idea. § 33, incidentally, on page 114, is complemented by § 50 on page 115, as typescript and print declare. Much later in these notes, as we shall see, Wittgenstein draws back from his firm conclusion that no change in visual image is required by a change in aspect, but only temporarily.

§ 34, as I have mentioned, takes us back to page 63, with three paragraphs on ‘hearing as’, after which a series on informal logic starts, into which Schweitzer’s not being Swiss is fitted (§§ 40 and 41). This gives way to meaning and concepts until § 49 on page 78, and page 88 is where we came in with paragraphs on aspect. Just where these reach the joint paragraphs 33 and 50, on page 115, there is an aside enclosed between vertical lines which suggests uneasiness.

These remarks, like many others, stick to the eggshells of earlier interpretations.

One might say: interpretations of interpretations, for what is at stake is what one ought to say about the “somewhat strange” phenomenon of aspect change. As to the explicit admission of § 33 that nothing changes in our field of vision when there is an aspect change, a child who first solves a puzzle picture will declare that it has jumped before its eyes, but that does not oblige us to agree in sober middle-age.

Further evidence of this being a moment for reconsideration is the change of subject in the next paragraph (§ 51), which begins a new series arising out of the observation that in assimilating “will” to “wish” philosophers have failed to notice that the former has significantly different meanings in ordinary language.

The earliest actual contribution to *Investigations* Part II comes on page 67, with an early draft of the A. Schweizer passage in Section ii (he is called R. here). Two more come on pages 71 and 76, and are the origin of the first two paragraphs of Section xii, the second being redrafted on pages 33v and 34r of MS 133. The next starts at the foot of page 91 of MS 130, a remark about an illustration in a textbook that serves three different purposes, coming on the first page of Section xi. Nothing then gets into Part II until page 126, where the first two sub-paragraphs of Section x (on Moore’s paradox) can be found. After that there is nothing until well beyond the first date, 26.5.46 on page 147.
That date brings us to § 91 of *Remarks* Volume I, and there is no obvious break in thought to suggest that earlier paragraphs had been written much earlier in the year. On the contrary, the page 71 contribution to Section xii (on the relation between Wittgenstein’s conceptual analysis and facts of nature) marks the beginning of the ideas that, to us, set *Investigations*’ Part II apart from his earlier thought. The aspect passages of the opening 33 paragraphs of *Remarks* Volume I are the ones that one could guess were written earlier, though this does not mean that they preceded his realising that *Investigations* would benefit from being revised.

Wittgenstein’s concern, expressed in the evolution of those two paragraphs of Section xii, is that although it is indubitable that the world as we happen to find it influences our concepts, he does not want to propound this as an hypothesis – if such and such were the case, this rather than that would be the way our concepts work – and he escapes from what would be an unwelcome demotion to being a kind of amateur scientist by declaring it all to be a matter of thought experiment: imagine these and these improbable circumstances and you can find yourself imagining these and these improbable conceptual variants. Admittedly, he had long defended his right to invent non-existent linguistic contexts.

Another stage in Wittgenstein’s finding his feet in his progress beyond *Investigations* comes in a Part II contribution on pages 240 and 241, giving the three sub-paragraphs that open Section ii, the first two being startling and illuminating, the third deeply mysterious. They are §§ 175, 176 and 177 of *Remarks* Volume I, and readers of that will notice that a reference to someone called ‘bedeutungsblind’ has been dropped from Section ii, who has been mentioned in the preceding undicted paragraphs together with someone who is ‘gestaltblind’ (§ 170). Neither of these people is essential to the revelation of the first two sub-paragraphs, which point out that the meaning of a word can be grasped in a moment but corresponds to a use that plays itself out in time, while one can intend at some moment to do something that will take time to carry out. Incidentally, I must point out that my page references here follow the electronic edition, which gets them wrong after page 93, the last numbered by Wittgenstein, by calling the next page, left handed and needing an even number, 95.

For biographical reasons I need to go back to page 186, where there is the date 22.7.46 and a coded remark about someone coded as R, which could be ambiguously I or J. For a long while I took this to be uncoded (as individual letters often were) for Roy Fouracre, whom Wittgenstein had known at Guy’s, until an internet correspondent, citing Monk, pointed out that Fouracre’s date of demobilisation
made this impossible, but because of the ambiguity of the code I shall continue to refer to whoever it was as R.

[I am terribly oppressed. Completely unclear as to my future. My love affair with R has quite drained me. For the last nine months it has had me in thrall almost like an insanity. It is as if I had been chasing a will o’ the wisp [Phänomen, in its 1929 meaning] with my whole strength; sometimes in the hope of catching it, more often out of fear or despair. But I cannot reproach myself, which is to say I don’t. Was it good, was it bad? I don’t know. I only want to say: it was a terrible disaster.

Near the end of MS 130, on page 287, there is a date, 8.8, and a coded reference to a B, coded as Y, presumably Ben Richards, who has helped take his mind off his worries, which include his position as professor, and at the very end there is a considerable quantity of code, about his feeling of dependence on somebody not named, which actually relate to the non-coded § 221, the coded paragraph before which is illuminating for its confession of philosophical vanity. All he has to justify his dream that he is an exceptional person is his discovery of his especial talent. I believe that what he means by this is his slow discovery in 1929-1932 of his ability to analyse philosophical language, not his Tractatus discovery of his ability to write philosophy that impressed his contemporaries.

§ 222 comes at the opening of MS 131, dated 10.8.46. The first interesting undictated paragraphs to note come between §§ 225 and 226. They are on pages 8 and 9 and concern aesthetics and objectivity. Aesthetic terms like “beautiful”, “ugly”, “good” and “bad” (objective in form, one might say) are better propaganda than (the honestly subjective) “do that!”, “don’t do that!” (my own parentheses), while Wittgenstein quotes Loos’s “Modern people sit like this” and the common “One doesn’t do that!” (aimed at being explicitly objective) as apparently justifying his asserting that “… is good” is objective. Naturally he goes on to ask what that means and what one is comparing an ethical statement with when one calls it objective. If one says “Well, objective simply means ‘independent of us’”, what kind of dependence is one contrasting it with? He insists that “That is good” is no kind of judgement of taste. Is all one can say to repeat that good is objective? What one wants to say is that “good” is like “red”, not like “pleasant” – but in what way is “good” like “red”? For the fact remains that in many respects the concept ‘good’ is more similar to the concept ‘pleasant’. These uncompleted digressions of Wittgenstein’s are often as stimulating as his best final efforts – if only one could complete them.

On page 15 there is a telling coded aside:
Religion would give me a certain modesty that I lack. For based on whatever is half human in me I dream something up as if it were based on a property that distinguishes me.

On pages 16 and 17 there are two halves of § 232, in which the man who is blind to meaning is re-introduced. Because this idea is important to Wittgenstein it is important not to misunderstand it. Someone who was truly blind to meaning would not be able to use words at all. What he has in mind is someone who just takes the meanings of words as they come and cannot say of an ambiguous word whether he heard it as having this meaning rather than that.

On page 19, in between §§ 237 and 238, which seem to be coming close to an admission of thoughts with no words, there is a brief paragraph marked as an aside by being put between vertical lines, which also seems to come close.

The thought that works its way towards the light.

On page 35, in an unddictated context of meaning-blindness, there is (also unddictated) a query about subjective and objective experiences. Subjective are what in medicine are called symptoms rather than signs – the patient has to tell the doctor about them. It then strikes him that an after image is also something one would have to tell other people about, while a mental image is subjective (he seems to want to say) to a deeper degree. He does not resolve this.

On page 26, with no recent date, there had been a further coded reference to someone who de-codes as B, presumably Ben Richards, who seems to be losing his affection for him, though in fact he stayed close to him until the end of his life. The person called R (code for I or J) is coming up shortly for a second time, and causes Wittgenstein serious grief, whereas here the sorrow is merely wistful. On page 37 this R upsets him by not writing, and he concludes that he has left him. On page 45, under the date 18.8, he writes in code “It is very difficult to really kill a great hope. There is always some life in it still, it always springs up again.”

Under the date 19.8, on pages 65-67, there are coded passages that include very odd things about the atom bomb. The hysterical fear that it evokes is almost a sign that it is a therapeutic discovery, like a bitter medicine. If it wasn’t something good the philistines wouldn’t make such a fuss. At least it brings the prospect of destroying horrible, soap-and-water science; but what guarantees that the destruction would follow? Of course the people who disparage the production of the bomb are the scum (literally expectorates) of intelligence, but even that doesn’t necessarily prove that what they detest is to be prized. These coded pages also include “Sorge und Angst” (care and anxiety) about B.
They are followed by paragraphs on various subjects, including (on 20.8 on page 72) logic, which opens in the printed Remarks Volume I with § 269. Page 92, dated 23.8, is important for having the opening paragraph of Section vi of Investigations' Part II, § 293 of Remarks. This (and the whole of Section vi) is about something that goes beyond what a meaning-blind person might fail to experience, namely actual sensations, feelings, even emotions that a word can evoke, or, retreating somewhat from those, atmospheres. §§ 302 and 322 of Remarks, written on pages 110 and 138, where the date has moved to 29.8, are also contributions to vi, and on page 145 they begin to come thick and fast, with § 331 and § 332, and with § 334 on the next page, preceded by § 333, which is relevant but not in vi. The subject of other paragraphs is the if-feeling, the Wenn-Gefühl, sometimes the Wenn-Empfindung, which if it exists at all must surely be less than a sensation or a feeling. I can no more take it seriously than the colour of vowels and find it a detraction from an otherwise interesting Part II section. The best that can be said about the atmosphere evoked by “if” is said by Wittgenstein in an unddictated paragraph written on page 145 between § 331 and § 332:

Is the Wenn-feeling definitely the same as the if-feeling? – Compare them! (if you can, I take him to imply). §§ 331 and 332 back me up here: the former directs our attention to the circumstances in which the feeling arises (if it ever does) rather than its making a natural contribution to meaning, the latter instructs us to twist ourselves into giving ourselves the feeling of one meaning when using a word in another in the course of conversation.

A mysterious “therefore” in Section vi is, if not exactly explained, given a context by a dictated but unselected paragraph (§ 336) preceding the dictated and selected § 337, which opens (on page 151) with this “therefore”:

The atmosphere that is inseparable from a thing – it is therefore not an atmosphere.

Why isn’t it? Because serious atmospheres are bestowed by us on things, his example in § 336 being a framed signature kept on his desk. The last paragraph in the section, on what on earth one could make of being told that that someone wished to paint a picture of what Goethe would have looked like composing the ninth symphony, § 338, is drafted on page 152. (See Investigations Part II, vi, on page 183.)

In a coded passage on page 150, incidentally, he had wondered whether his writings were too weak to be readable in the near future. People would yawn at what he had written while yawning.
The subject moves to the person who is meaning-blind in the sense explained above, and an unddictated paragraph on page 159 brings out Wittgenstein’s problem – what such a person would make of the statement “Green is green”. “Green” as a personal description was one of his words – he considered Bruce Hunt to be green. An unddictated example following on § 332 had depended on the German word “sondern”, meaning to separate as a verb or replacing “but” after a negative. This person presumably speaks good German and can use and understand “sondern” correctly in both meanings, but does not, as it were, hear any difference between them in either his own or anyone else’s speech. Whether he understands “Green is green” should depend simply on whether he has heard of “Green” as a name and met Wittgenstein’s private use of “green”, and the questions Wittgenstein asks seem to imply that his inability to hear the words differently is no impediment to his being able to use them differently.

On page 165 there is a paragraph that is only partly dictated (the beginning, namely § 348), the remainder being crossed out. That concerns an operatic joke: in Rheingold, Wotan is unwilling to give the giants all the gold he has promised them for building Walhalla. The goddess Erda sings “Weiche, Wotan, weiche!”, meaning “give way and let them have the lot”. As an adjective “weich” means “soft”. At a famous performance the Wotan had whispered to the Erda “wie magst du Eier?”, how do you like eggs?, just before she was to sing this. Bruce Hunt, in one of his walks with Wittgenstein during the 1946 Michaelmas term, gave him the unwelcome news that in German slang “Eier” meant testicles. He was enormously embarrassed and Bruce delighted in caricaturing his declaring that he would never have said it in a lecture if he had known. So he duly crossed it out of MS 131. (But there is somewhere where he left it, translated by Elizabeth as “Begone!”, which has some justification in that “Weiche von mir” can mean “Get out of my way!”). This meaning is also archaic, addressed to Satan. The Wotan joke is also in the 46–47 lecture book, and if it is later there than the Michaelmas term, since Bruce told me about his walk at Christmas, my story is exaggerated.) In § 359, on page 177, a third meaning is mentioned, the noun “Weiche” for railway points (in the singular).

§ 358 on page 175 is important because it makes clear Wittgenstein’s view that if we do have ‘experiences of meaning’ their importance is precisely that they have nothing to do with meaning but only with a variety of experiences that we find interesting for, on the whole, other reasons.

On pages 187–8 comes § 366, discussing different things that people might think they know the meaning of – such as what Queen Victoria was thinking of
just before her death and how many souls could find room on the point of a pin. The question, of course, is what we can do with such propositions. There seems to me a wide difference between these two examples, with plenty of room for other types of would-be meaning in between. For example, I do not jib if I am told that the consciousness of this person became, after death, the consciousness of that person – I even have a weakness for such fantasies – but if I am told that this person became that person, I want to ask what anybody who understands the essential uniqueness of every human being can mean by saying that (see Drury’s *The Danger of Words*, page 34). Incidentally, I have read more Medieval philosophy than most people but nowhere found a query about the number of souls or angels on the point of a pin. I suspect this is one of the myths people invent, like everyone before Columbus believing the world was flat, or pigs being intelligent.

On page 200 there is an example of poetic meaning, from the last act of *Faust Part II*, replaced in the translation of § 377 by a more extreme piece of poetic meaning from Marlowe. In his German (on “Ewiges Düstre steigt herunter”, eternal gloom comes down) Wittgenstein defends Goethe’s meaning – there is no pretence that we are hallucinating darkness, we just understand the metaphor. Isaiah Berlin has a much more interesting example: the Psalms talking of hills rejoicing, a metaphor no Greek, he says, could have understood.

Two pages later comes § 379, a diagram seen as an arrow or as something else, and the remainder of the manuscript book, except for one coded paragraph and some discarded ones, is of ‘potential’ Part II material. The coded paragraph (pages 220-221) expresses deeply pessimistic anxiety about his sanity, and also records Drury taking his leave of him – in Dublin, presumably. The book ends on page 224, on the ninth of September, the date of the beginning of the next, MS 132.

On pages 14 and 15 of that, just before the date 13.9, there is an unddictated paragraph that makes Wittgenstein’s views on aspect very clear, ending with:

... Then what shows that he doesn’t believe that the picture has changed? For isn’t that the essential thing? In other words that he sees that only the aspect has changed.

This manuscript book is by no means restricted to aspect, but I find nothing particular to comment on until the last two days of September. On the 29th, still in Dublin or possibly travelling, Wittgenstein writes in code about Ben Richards, at first touchingly and then with extraordinary self-centeredness:

“For our wishes hide from us even the thing we wish for. Gifts come down to us in forms of their own etc.” I say that to myself when I receive B’s love.
For I know well that it is the great, rare gift; I know well that it is a rare precious stone, – and also that it isn’t quite of the kind that I have been dreaming of.

The sole entry of the 30th is also coded.

Arrived in Cambridge today. Everything about the place puts me off. The stiffness, the artificiality, the self-satisfaction of the people. The atmosphere of the University is odious to me.

On the first of October, after telling himself in code not to be impatient, he writes one of those much corrected and unddictated paragraphs that one wishes one could perfect for oneself.

The effect it has on us when we search a place for something: to think that the Godhead knows the whole time where it is, that it doesn’t, like me now, look all worked up in this place while the thing is there. The Power of the image! [Many alternative phrasings.]

Much that follows, including §§ 458–470, contributes to the ideas of Investigations’ Part II Section i, as paragraphs written recently in Dublin had, while § 470, written on the third of October, is also a kind of bridge passage towards the next subject, Moore’s paradox. This is briefly interrupted on page 101 by an unddictated paragraph that seems to go with another of my stories about Wittgenstein and Bruce Hunt. Bruce had been, for technical reasons, allowed to leave the Friends Ambulance Unit more than a year earlier than me, in time to take up his mathematics scholarship at Trinity in October 1946, but he wanted to use it to study philosophy (Moral Sciences). For this he needed Wittgenstein’s permission. The third of October, a few days before the start of the term, is a very likely date for his interview with him. Wittgenstein asked him why he wanted to do philosophy. “To find the truth”, he replied. “What do you mean by truth,” Wittgenstein asked. “The truth about this table and these chairs?” As a paid up table and chairs philosopher myself I am on his side, and I do not know what Bruce said to persuade him to let him transfer. This paragraph’s final remark, however, does seem to echo the interview, the more so since it does not strictly follow from the rest.

The requirement for a simple rule. Race hatred. “All Jews are bad.” The beneficence of a simple rule. We want to find our way. The requirement is no less than that for rest, for change, for entertainment, etc. As if the only strong requirement in thinking were the requirement ‘to find the truth’!
In reference to the Moore paradox the amusing § 486, on page 114, is prepared for by an unddictated paragraph on page 112. Does a station announcer believe what he announces? What difference would it make if he said “I believe the train ...”? If the announcements were made by a gramophone would “I believe ...” have any meaning? Yet it would be meaningful for the gramophone to say “The train ... probably leaves at ...” And it could even say “We believe ...” meaning the railway company. That a gramophone saying “I believe” would be taken to meaninglessly mean itself while its saying “We believe” would be taken to meaningfully mean the company is a triumph that Wittgenstein could have used to better advantage.

This region (pages 116-117) is where Wittgenstein expresses the doubts about his preoccupation with the paradox already quoted. On page 123 I find § 495 interesting for a linguistic hermaphrodite he has invented to have the capacity to say “I believe it is raining but it isn’t”, whose purpose seems to be to point out that inventing such a creature doesn’t make its utterances meaningful. For that language games have to be invented, which Wittgenstein does on the next day (6.10) on another page (125). Two preparations for Part II Section x come here, § 493 on page 122 and § 494 on page 124.

I should like to move ahead here to two coded remarks that are relevant to tensions in Wittgenstein’s personal life, and mention by way of excuse that many intermediate details will be found on my website, www.wittgenstein.co.uk, including a reference to an unddictated drawing of an 0.4.2 locomotive on page 144 and to Honneger’s (French) misapprehension that a 4.6.2 was a 2.3.1. The first of these private remarks was written on the eighth of October on page 147, and describes his luck in having been living with B for a fortnight. The second was written on the tenth, on pages 162-163. It picks up from a hint of pessimism in the first to say that he is not yet out of the wood, only in a clearing. Between these, also on page 162 and on the ninth, there is § 518, where “Auffassung” is badly translated as “conception”. I suggest:

No ‘seeing as’ that is not also ‘taking as’.

On the sixteenth, on pages 190 and 191, there are two short coded remarks about feeling mentally as well as physically ill, and on the nineteenth, on page 197, there is an uncoded paragraph on the same subject. He wonders if a kind of optical illusion is making him see a distant abyss as a close one and compares his feelings of loneliness with those put by Lenau into the mouth of Faust. The next paragraph compares himself with Lenau: much chaff and only a few beautiful thoughts, and bad stories but great and true reflections.
The subject matter, meanwhile, had been almost entirely aspect and meaning. Another coded passage on page 205, dated 21.10, calls for courage in his love-life, and it is followed by a reference to Bacon as being no sharp thinker. Had Wittgenstein really read Bacon? I could not believe it. A letter to von Wright written on 19.1.50 (quoted by Rothhaupt on his page 384) reassured me. He had only read about him, in Goethe’s *Farbenlehre* – only in “the last two weeks”, admittedly, but (see ahead) that was certainly not his first reading of the *Farbenlehre*. Then the subject becomes the privacy of thought, which can be found introduced by § 564 (page 207). 21.10 is the volume’s last date and the next, MS 133, begins with 22.10.46 on a left hand page numbered 1 by Wittgenstein. A Wren librarian has corrected this by numbering right hand pages only, starting with Wittgenstein’s “2”, as 1, 2, 3 etc., in effect the numbering adopted by Bergen, except that they call his 1, strictly the verso of an un-numbered page, 1v, and his 2 ‘2r’. On page 7r, Wittgenstein’s 12, there is the date 25.10 and a very long and introspective coded passage starts: Ben only has a preference for him, and he has neither the courage, the strength nor the clarity to look the facts of his life in the face. This carries on through the next day as well, a little less pessimistically. This is the very period of the famous and variously reported encounter with Popper at the Moral Science Club, and I have only been able to disentangle the complicated chronology with the help of Professor Smiley of Clare College Cambridge, who has had access to the Club’s minutes (which themselves included errors of dating that took detective work to correct).

The Club’s meetings were normally held on a Thursday, but this one was put to Friday the 25th of October to accommodate Popper. Wittgenstein’s last entry of the 24th had been the unddictated

Oh a key can lie forever where the master [locksmith] has placed it, and never used to unlock the lock that the master wrought it for.

I take it that everybody knows now the story of Wittgenstein, Popper, the poker and the various descriptions of its wielding, as well as Wittgenstein’s abrupt departure, and I only need to add two details: that the minutes got the date wrong as the 26th and that their summary of the encounter was “The meeting was charged to a considerable degree with a spirit of controversy”.

Of the long entries of the 25th and 26th, it is reasonable to guess that the entry of the 25th was written after the early return from the meeting. On the 27th there is an uncoded and unddictated pair of paragraphs that clearly refer to the Popper encounter.
“Not everyone who derides his chains is free” is something one can say of those who deride linguistic investigations in philosophy and do not see that they themselves are entangled in deep conceptual confusions.

The investigation of language in philosophy is a [matter of] describing and comparing concepts, with the help of concepts constructed ad hoc as well. This “ad hoc” corresponds to “Vergleichsobjekte” in Investigations § 130, on invented language games. What surprises me about this second paragraph is how un-momentous it is. Wittgenstein has accused Popper of deriding his philosophical use of linguistic investigations, pauses for breath before saying what these linguistic investigations are all about – and out of the elephant trap peeps a mouse.

The next day’s writing is devoted to an unddictated paragraph which seems all of a piece with these volumes’ background ideas but does not lead to anything in the immediate neighbourhood, so I quote it in full.

I say “Let me think!”, think, then talk – what happened as I was thinking? I thought. (Naturally, that isn’t an answer.) But I didn’t do nothing during that time! If mental vacuity is what is meant by “doing nothing” I did do something and not nothing. – Imagine someone told you: “My mind was not still but in movement”. But what is meant by “still” and “movement” in this context? We must climb down to the concept of “describing” – of “reporting” or “narrating” an occurrence. – But what about the occurrence that I am reporting?! – Are you sure you are detecting an ‘occurrence’? And if you say you are sure, what is this certainty worth? What does it count for in trade [im Verkehr]? (“Black, a visual sensation or a lack of visual sensation?”)

There is what might be a reference to Popper rather than to Wittgenstein himself on page 21 (11v) dated 31.10, unddictated and under an unddictated remark about Freud:


(Popper was a methodologist, and on page 129 of MS 135, on 1.8. [47] and discussing method, at the end of § 1109 of Remarks Volume I and left out in print, there is “(Popper.”)

The second of a series of four papers was given on the same day, Thursday October 31st, by J. L. Austin, on ‘Non Descriptions’, or the performative use of language as Austin came to call it. This was, one might say, up Wittgenstein’s street, and there is no hint in the minutes that any disagreement arose between them.
(Wittgenstein was in the chair again). Nevertheless, tension was present in some form, perhaps subjective, felt by Wittgenstein, unless members really were cold towards him because of the Friday before. I cannot believe it had anything to do with the courteous and reasonable Austin. (But I may be wrong here. I met Austin some years later, and from a recent biography of H. A. L. Hart I find that in his earlier days Austin was often extremely aggressive.) On the day of the paper Wittgenstein had written, in code,

Oh, why do I feel as if I were writing a poem when I am writing philosophy?

It seems as if there were some small thing here that has a glorious meaning. Like a leaf, or a flower.

But on the day after, dated in full as 1.11.46 and also in code, he wrote

Yesterday “Moral Science Club”: I myself conceited, and stupid as well. The ‘atmosphere’ miserable. – Should I go on teaching?

Readers of the electronic edition should beware that the query is mistranscribed in code as “Should I learn again?” and decoded as that.

The third meeting was not a paper. It took place on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of November, and the minutes are simply “Nov. 7 Impromptu discussion opened by Dr. Malcolm. Professor Wittgenstein in chair.” I guess Wittgenstein asked Malcolm to do this so as to give him time to prepare for a fourth meeting, in which he addressed the Club himself on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of November. The minutes for that are: “Professor Wittgenstein, ‘Philosophy’. Professor Wittgenstein’s main aim was to correct some misunderstandings about Philosophy as practised by the Cambridge school [i.e. by Wittgenstein himself]. In a way the paper was a reply to Dr. Popper’s paper (October 23\textsuperscript{rd}). [Another minute-writing mistake.] Dr. Ewing in the chair.” I find it difficult to think of Wittgenstein ‘delivering a paper’ in the normal sense, but no doubt people who were there will be telling us whether he read from a prepared script. The only apparent reference to it in the manuscript volume is an undDictated entry dated 13.11:

“But why do you only talk of the use of words?” I don’t only talk of the use of words but just as much of the use of a colour sample, of a measuring rod, of a clock, of facial expressions, of gestures.

A detail that I find intriguing is that from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} to the 11\textsuperscript{th} of November Wittgenstein had been writing about colour. These entries can be found on pages 580-588 of Rothhaupt’s \textit{Farbthemen}. I cannot help suspecting that like Malcolm’s
'impromptu discussion’ they were an attempt to think about something else while his reply to Popper formed at the back of his mind. The entries begin on page 16v with what is in print as § 602, and between that and § 603 on page 17v there are interesting colour observations, including one on Goethe’s inability to accept white as physically composed, as a consequence of his proper inability to see it as ‘colour-composed’. This idea plays an important part in the late colour notes, to which these pages form a first preparation.

A personal remark dated 15.11 and in code suggests that problems of two friendships were still unresolved.

Don’t tie yourself to someone unworthy and leave someone worthy in the lurch. Don’t be too cowardly to put a person’s friendship to the test. If a prop doesn’t take it if one props oneself with it, it isn’t any use, however sad that might be.

A stick that looks fine as long as one carries it but bends as soon as you lean on it is useless.

Two revealing patches of code begin on pages 41r and 43r, with dates running from 19.11 to 27.11. The first begins

I foresee an evil end for my life. Loneliness, perhaps insanity. My lectures are going well, they will never go better. But what effect will they leave behind? Certainly not more than if I were a great actor playing tragedies to them. What they are learning is not worth learning, and my personal impression [on them] is no use to them. That is true of them all, with perhaps one or two exceptions.

The second is

Can’t you be happy without his love as well? Do you have to drown in misery without this love? Can’t you live without this support? For that is the question: can’t you walk upright without leaning on this staff? Or can’t you decide to give him up? Or is it both? – You must not be always expecting letters that don’t come! But how am I supposed to change things?

It isn’t love that draws me to this support but my inability to stand alone on two legs.

The last entry for 1946 comes on the 4th of December on page 45v, and the first of the next year is dated 7.1.47 on the next page, 46r. Just below, dated 10.1 and in code, is
In Quarr monastery. My thoughts are not spiritual but worldly. Perhaps that will change.

On the next day, and still on that page, he writes an undictated

The usefulness of philosophy. It says: “Why should it be so?” Naturally, in saying that it sets a prejudice aside.

Dictated passages then restart with § 667.

An undictated paragraph starting at the foot of page 57v introduces the word “Eisenbahnweiche”, railway point, but includes such a bad joke that I cannot bring myself to quote it.

On page 55r, just after the brief § 689, the remnant of a largely undictated paragraph, there begins a long, completely undictated and interesting paragraph on the possibility of introducing new terminology into philosophy – not usually a sensible thing to do. He is thinking of psychological categories (something he put great effort into later in these ‘Part II’ notes) and suggests calling understanding a word an ability (a very Ryle point of view). Intending, however, would not be an ability, and meaning this or that by a word is an intention. This suggestion is no help in categorising what one might call “Now I know!” moments, and I leave readers of the electronic edition to find his problems (and a number of related undictated paragraphs that follow).

With § 704 on page 64r Moore’s paradox returns, also with many undictated paragraphs, and with dictated and undictated paragraphs on other subjects besides, until § 722 is reached on page 73r, where he proposes a family tree of psychological concepts. He does not tackle this task systematically until much later, although there is an explicit reference to it on page 124 of MS 134 (see ahead). Here it is worth mentioning that the brief paragraphs 721 and 723 are both cut down from much corrected manuscript paragraphs, the latter on the difficulty of giving up theories, which are significant as something he had regarded as reprehensible for some years.

§ 731 on page 76r needs mentioning for its difficulty of translation. “Vergleichende Furcht und Angst mit Sorge” would in normal German mean “Compare fright and fear with worry (or care)”, although Wittgenstein does seem to mean “anxiety” by “Angst” in an undictated paragraph on page 79r where he calls it “the physical feelings of fright without [consciousness of] its cause”. He really does intend “physical feelings” here because he goes on to mention James, who believed that physical feelings could set emotions going, but unconsciousness of the cause of sensations and emotions alike is the central idea that he is grappling with in this
paragraph, and it brings with it problems of description. As to “Sorge”, not only the next paragraph, § 732, but § 853 on page 52 of MS 134 show that it had a stronger meaning for Wittgenstein than either “care”, “concern” or “worry”, because he uses again one of his favourite Faust quotations for it, “Ewiges Düstere steigt herunter”, spoken indeed by Sorge. Here he says that he hasn’t sufficiently emphasised these metaphorical paraphrases – it is important that we have them at our disposal. He seems to think that it is not enough to say, as he did the first time, that we just understand them, but the fact is that that is just what we do. Consider a thoroughly down to earth example: calling a check on a tweed cap loud. Someone who had never heard this usage before would not have the slightest difficulty in understanding it. (Though the fact that that is the case does remain remarkable.)

Between those two paragraphs in their respective volumes there is much examination of psychological concepts. § 750 on the psychology of judgement and § 751 on the psychology of belief, on pages 80 to 81r of MS 133, have an undictated paragraph between them, on 80v, on lying about whether it is raining, that suggests that Moore is going to return. Wittgenstein, instead, says that “it is true” and “it is false” have manifold meanings, but neglects to admit that constructing various sentences containing those phrases does not entail that “true” and “false” have manifold meanings – for these varied usages are parasitical upon the constancy of the basic meanings.

§ 752 on page 81r seems to be the start of a series that leads to a discussion of voluntary and involuntary movement, taking up that significance with § 755 on page 82r. An undictated paragraph on page 83r has him walking through his Trinity court (Cambridge for “quad”) and asking what difference there would be between his walking voluntarily or involuntarily. The topic ends with § 766 on page 87r and general psychological concepts take over. Moore’s paradox appears briefly, starting with an undictated paragraph on page 16 of the next volume, MS 134, leading to the dictated § 816 on page 17, ending with § 823 on page 25, with an undictated extra on page 26, where § 824 has introduced pretence. Among the general ‘psychological’ investigations that follow there is an undictated paragraph on page 49 that has a particular interest for me. It is Wittgenstein’s first definite admission of the possibility of a wordless thought: he thinks how unfriendly someone’s glance is, but he does not say these words to himself. Nevertheless, he can properly say “I thought”.

With § 860 on page 55 aspect re-appears in the form of the duck-hare, always mistranslated, like the Easter-hare, as a duck-rabbit. The date we next meet, incidentally, is the 21st of March. On the 25th, on page 68, § 877 introduces a short-
hand with opposite arrows for the two interpretations of the duck-hare, and the problem that one might have failed to notice that the two were interpretations of a single picture. Does this prove that if that were so one would have been seeing different images? In other words, the apparently settled problem of the same or different sense data going with different aspects has re-arisen. § 878 repeats this for a portrait that has an ambiguous facial expression, and that one sees on a different occasion as having the other expression without realising that it is the same picture. The conclusion is simple: once I notice that it is the old picture I see that nothing in it has changed (and by implication nothing in my visual image either).

In § 881, on page 70, the quandary is expressed emphatically, for one would never have thought the two pictures were the same, they haven’t the slightest resemblance, in spite of the fact that they are congruent (“identical” in the manuscript). This paragraph is put into the final draft (MS 144) of Part II, and into print on page 195 of *Investigations*, among a much later manuscript context where the quandary is taken even more seriously before being finally resolved.

On page 71 and 72 there are unddictated paragraphs that mainly support my analysis, but one may seem not to:

What makes aspect into sense impression is continuation.

This is still not to say that a new enduring aspect requires a difference of sense data.

The topic is kept up, with related ones, until, on the 2nd of April on page 83, with § 895, the ‘family tree of psychological phenomena’ is considered, but still not worked on systematically, though some of the next paragraphs do contribute to the idea. These perhaps include an unddictated paragraph on freedom of will on page 86, important for its common sense summary of his views on the subject, mentioned on [typescript] page 156 of Chapter 6.

“The will is free” really means: “There is such a thing as will”. Instead of saying to someone “Your will is free” one could tell him “You have a will”; and perhaps there are peoples who express themselves like that. Or perhaps like this: “You don’t have to”. Yet what I’ve been saying isn’t right; for what does it mean to say “There is such a thing as will”? Who does one say that to? – If one tells someone his will is free, one wants to strengthen his feeling of responsibility, one wants to influence his life.

Except for one paragraph (§ 899 on page 92, really there as part of ‘will’) aspect does not return until § 952 on page 157 on the 11th of May. There are two unddictated ‘psychological categories’ paragraphs, on page 124 where the family tree is
one of experiences, and on page 128 where psychological verbs and nouns are discussed.

Meanwhile, on page 95 and dated 3.4.47, there is an uncoded aside quoted by Malcolm (from *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, of course, not from MS 134) on page 18 of his *Wittgenstein, a Religious Point of View* as having a religious meaning. Wittgenstein says that his philosophical labour was only worth the effort if it received a light from above. Ahead I shall cite a passage where a light from behind is mentioned which clearly has more romantic significance than religious.

On pages 107 and 108 there is an undicted paragraph that is about psychology rather than philosophy of psychology, though Wittgenstein still has a philosophical axe to grind. In position it is just before dictated paragraphs 911 and 912 and explains what they are about. Nothing can be more wrong than to believe that misunderstandings in psychology can be removed by introducing more terminology. Only profound changes in our thought will help, and to be sure those will lead to changes in terminology.

On page 119 there is an intriguing example of the way Wittgenstein’s mind worked like a word processor: a reference to the clock that by not moving tells the right time twice a day (see typescript page 92 of Chapter 3).

On page 122 there is a coded reference to Ben Richards as “(B.I.)”, the first initial uncoded and the second coded, incorrectly decoded by Bergen as “(Y.R)”. On page 138, § 934 is a remarkable anticipation of the very final paragraph of the *Certainty* notes. There is a very pessimistic private remark on page 143, and on page 152 a most remarkable expression of his hatred for Cambridge and the English (in English: “The disintegrating and putrefying English civilisation”). On page 157 there is a remark that prophetically hits the nail on the head as to the way he will have to write *das Buch*, that is to say by using these long preparations, intended as material for revising *Investigations*, as nothing but the ingredients of a separate work, known to us now as Part II of *Investigations*.

The book is full of life – not like a human being but like an ant heap.

Aspect returns in good measure with § 960 on page 163, continuing into MS 135 (the last entry in MS 134 is § 991). And as a final item in the selections from this volume, having nailed him for not reading Bacon, I must mention a long undictated paragraph on pages 166 and 167, which show that he knew one of my favourite Darwin books, *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*. It is too long to quote, but easily recognised by dealing with love and hate.

MS 135 has on its opening blank right-hand flyleaf another pessimistic assessment: “In this volume there is not more than one halfway good paragraph every 10
or 20 pages.” Few paragraphs make their way into ‘Part II’, and for quite a while few are dictated. Wittgenstein starts writing on the verso of that blank page, with the date 12.7.47, enabling Bergen to call them respectively 1r and 1v, and the next page has a printed “2” and is termed 2 by Bergen, but after that these printed right-hand-only numbers are ignored and, sensibly, every individual page is numbered.

The opening paragraph, undictated like the next, discusses the usefulness of aspect-ability to mathematicians in recognising similarities between formulas, but with the third, § 992, normal aspect discussions resume. On page 3 a series of undictated paragraphs begins, the first being the significant

And yet something is still missing from my whole consideration, something essential, fundamental.

I am still seeing something under a false stereotype.

The only meaning I can give this is that while, to me, he has already sorted aspect out perfectly well, he has not done so to his own satisfaction, as will appear ahead. The next undictated paragraph is marked as an aside, and it is a very interesting one. There is no reason to assume that a crowd of ordinary people could do something extraordinary, and this does not just apply to a committee composing Bach’s 48 but to historical movements as well (expressed with one of Wittgenstein’s rare uses of the word “Führer”), and to think otherwise is a stupidity that no scientist could afford in his own discipline.

Not until §§ 995 and 996 (dictated in reverse order) do dictated passages begin to be frequent again, but many undictated stretches still recur. I shall jump ahead to a single-paragraph change of subject on page 53, the origin of the section (xiv) that the trustees put at the end of their Part II, § 1039, on confusion in psychology. A propos of a disagreement with Köhler on aspect in § 1035, it provides, in effect and rather distantly, the first paragraph of that section, but the undictated paragraph that follows, on page 54, mainly a criticism of Köhler, picks up from a dropped passage in the first the idea that confusion in ‘foundations of mathematics’ is relevant. The second paragraph of xiv asserts Wittgenstein’s belief that that phrase could be given a meaning that he would approve of.

§ 1035 suffers from a mistranslation where Elizabeth has misunderstood “zweierlei”, in attempting to make Wittgenstein’s meaning more obviously reasonable. It concerns a “way of expressing oneself” with respect to map colour, and “It is simply not the same to say ‘That shows that here two different kinds of things really are being seen’ – and ‘Under these circumstances it would be better to speak of “two different objects of sight”’, but to Elizabeth they seemed exactly the same,
and so she chose “two ways of seeing”, but the whole point is that the former is a natural way of referring to a familiar phenomenon while the latter expresses an unwanted interpretation of it: much like the difference between “in pain” and “having pain”.

With §§ 1058-1061, on pages 81-83, useful editors’ references alert us to four paragraphs that go into Part II’s Section xi, as a few earlier ones have done. Only one other such contribution remains, § 1075 on pages 94-5, to earlier in Section xi (page 199). Unlike the former paragraphs, which go into that section with the minimum of editing and a clear sense, § 1075 and its unused predecessor § 1074 do not give any impression of having attained philosophical stability. Essentially, § 1074 is an admission (an undictated preface to it helps us understand this) that in philosophising an ordinary expression can seem odd to the philosopher because he has assumed that a paradigm of his own invention must be the proper thing. In § 1075 and Section xi Wittgenstein imagines such a paradigm-making philosopher declaring that what he sees in the proper sense must be what the object seen has brought about by cause and effect. It must therefore be a kind of copy (inside him of what is outside him) and can in turn be looked at. It can thus be, for example, a smiling face, but the concept of smiling will be foreign to this interior simulacrum: if, of course, the philosopher takes that line. The whole thing is an Aunt Sally set up to be knocked down, but what on earth have students working from the printed *Investigations* over the last fifty years been able to make of it?

The remainder of this manuscript volume divides on page 146, where § 1137, the last of this dictation, gives way to “[Bis dahin diktiert]” and “9.11.47”, which could be either the date at which dictating finished or new writing began (or both). Up to then the majority of paragraphs contribute to the visual-aspect and meaning-aspect ideas of Section xi without contributing to its text. I shall therefore mention merely a few paragraphs of that kind that have caught my personal attention.

On page 100 there is an aside about closed-eye after-images. He says that they incline as one inclines one’s head, and quite apart from the fact that my after-images stay upright I find it surprising that in spite of his interest in colour and his having a colleague (Rushton) who could have taught him how to evoke them, Wittgenstein never mentions open-eye after-images. (He may sometimes have in mind involuntary open-eye images such as come from catching a glimpse of the sun.)

On the next page there is the date 27.7 and the following coded entry:
As little philosophy as I have read: I have certainly not read too little, rather, too much. I see this if I read in a philosophical book: it doesn’t improve my thoughts, it makes them worse.

To many people this must seem outrageous conceit, and I certainly wish he could have read philosophers I think important and shared with us his thoughts about them. Nevertheless, a comparison makes me sympathetic. I sometimes looked at A-level mathematics text books being studied by a friend and found the experience painful. When I am tempted to belittle Wittgenstein for this kind of remark I remember those text books and ask myself if he could really have found reading Spinoza, Leibniz or Hume a pain of the same order. If he did one has to grant that he was entitled to.

On page 104 there is an unddictated paragraph that always reminds me of a remark of Isaiah Berlin’s, making fun of a pupil who claimed to have seen a causal connection. Here, insisting that one can see that a visual impression is three-dimensional is compared with feeling the connection between the thing that instils fear and the fear itself. I noted against my copy of this “… but by George, anyone who has felt frightened by a snapping dog has felt a causal connection”. I assume that Wittgenstein would agree and that he was using the second example to illuminate the immediacy of the first (three dimensional vision).

On page 109 there is an object lesson for people who think they can detect hidden meanings. Life is compared to a path over a mountain knife-edge, with a steep and slippery descent on each side. This read to me like a description of Striding Edge on the way to Helvelyn. From this, with a change of view in manuscript notebooks of October 1930, some coincidental phrases in Ryle’s Concept of Mind and the information that at some time in 1930 he had shared a walking holiday with Wittgenstein, I drew the conclusion that the holiday had taken place in the Lake District just before the 1930 Michaelmas term. The publication of diaries edited by Ilse Somavilla made it quite clear that there was no time for this to have happened.

August 1947 arrives on page 126, and on page 129 there is the paragraph on methodology (1109) mentioned earlier, printed without “(Popper.)”. This is a seed for the top paragraph on page 225 of Part II, and although it limits itself to measurement rather than scientific research in general it is a quite fair comment on Popper.

To page 140 I have noted that in the brief § 1125, about a picture that does not organise itself for us, Wittgenstein’s manuscript sketch is actually very well organised. The first stretch of dictation ends, as I have said, on page 146.
Anyone reading the second printed volume of Remarks will notice that problems of aspect retreat (though many later reappear) to be taken over by general conceptual problems in psychology, and the und dictated passages reinforce this impression. I find one early dictated paragraph (§ 3) particularly interesting because it includes a common-sense revision of an old assumption. One can sometimes notice what it is that one wishes by observing one’s reactions – and I believe in other ways as well, for example encountering something new to one and ‘realising’ that one had always wanted it – but the question appears to arise, is what one observes, or realises, the same as one normally expresses without second thoughts, namely a wish? Wittgenstein dismisses this as like asking “Is the chair I can see the same as the chair I can sit on?”, even though that is just the sort of distinction that he had been in the habit of drawing before he decided it was meaningless.

§ 7 on pages 152-3 is a declaration of the possibility, already admitted by an example (an unddictated one on page 49 of MS 134, mentioned above), of thought being wordless.

From page 157 to page 160 there are seven S’s at the head of unddictated paragraphs which seem to mean something more than the normal “don’t dictate”. They are exaggerated in their form. The first five deal with a person who is meaning-blind, the seventh with one who is ‘Gestalt’-blind and the sixth moves from the one to the other. My assumption in copying them was based on believing that these people were either meaningless inventions or were invented to be knocked down, until I realised that they were a quite reasonable supposition, people who took meaning (or aspect) as it came but could not savour any ‘feeling’ of it. These seven paragraphs make it plain that this was Wittgenstein’s intention. There is nothing in them for him to apologise for, except in so far as he sometimes asks over-subtle questions about what these people can do and one wants to respond “You’ve invented them! Just make your mind up what they can do.” The varied answers, however, do entail differences in concept, so the questions are not idle.

The next paragraphs, starting with § 14 on page 161 until § 35 on page 175, where they give way to a brief interlude on aspect, deal with psychological verbs. One of these, in § 15 on page 162, is “hope”. A suckling infant cannot be said to hope, an older child can, and possibly it might in between use the phrase “I hope” for the first time, but it seems a conceptual impossibility to pinpoint a moment when it hoped for the first time. This brought to my mind the non-problem of a Roman boy who vowed to pick up his bull-calf every day so that he would eventually be able to pick it up as a bull. A bull-calf grows so fast that there is no difficulty in finding that one can pick it up on one day and not on the next. What is so
different about hoping? “Well, daily life gradually grows into something in which there is space for hope.” This is reminiscent of “Lebensform” in *Investigations* (§ 19) and the same word in Section i of Part II, where it introduces patterns in the tapestry of life. Incidentally, there is among these psychological verb paragraphs an unddictated one on pages 164–165 marked with an eighth exaggerated S. Coming between §§ 17 and 18 it reinforces them by pointing out that responses suggested in them are *superfluous* as information. The reason for not dictating it seems to be over-elaboration, and it does not suggest any significance for the exaggerated “S”.

When psychological verbs return after aspect, with § 45 on page 180, there is a more businesslike attack on their problems. Seeing and hearing (leaving aside aspect complications) are classed with pain as states of consciousness, while believing, understanding, knowing are not; these are classified as dispositions, with the characteristic that interrupting consciousness or attention does not interrupt a disposition.

On page 184 there is an unddictated return to the idea of a family tree of psychological concepts. A requirement for this would be to specify an order in which the concepts could be explained, but that is not yet clear to him.

Unddictated paragraphs on the next page introduce the concept of genuine duration, dictated in § 50. The translators (no longer Elizabeth) correctly translate “verfolgen” there as *follow* (with attention), a noise for example, to say when it changes, but one can’t follow one’s having forgotten what one once knew, though I insist that one can *chase* something one has forgotten, and apply attention to doing so.

In § 55 on page 188 Wittgenstein gives a good example of how his style of expression can help make a point. Children learn to say “I know that now” and “I can hear that now” but how different the contexts of these concepts! The difference is so huge that it is hard to juxtapose the usages to bring it out (and hard for me in paraphrasing to bring out Wittgenstein’s punch). In this region he seems to be exercising the brevity of phrase that he comes to achieve in the best parts of Part II. With § 56 on the next page, however, he goes too far in brevity. It seems to contradict § 55 by saying that similarity is what is difficult to see, difference easy, but that is the end of a long and otherwise unddictated paragraph suggesting language games for training children in usages for seeing and understanding (except that he gives no examples for the latter and merely says they can be outlined). Presumably he means that if one goes to all that trouble similarities will be obscured by detail.
On the unruled end-papers of MS 135, termed 191 and vi, § 57 is an island amid interesting unddictated paragraphs, where Wittgenstein seems to be bracing himself for his family tree of concepts. People (presumably psychologists) take belief and expectation to be a means of preparing the nervous system for an [impending] event in the outside world; and think intention is an experience because a mental image of the thing intended can accompany one’s decision to obtain it. What can one call that sort of thing? It is a confusion of categories. A weakness for making one kind of concept do for all. A failure to understand the logic of our language. The very fact that certain kinds of concept are more readily understood than others, more primitive, now leaves them calling out for explanation.

MS 136 begins on the same day as its predecessor ended, 18.12.47. It too is a quarto volume, but it is ruled for book-keeping, as the final two of this series (which are foolscap) are, and the three are given a new style of name, Q, R and S. The pages have printed numerals, repeated on left and right, and the electronic edition has them as 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b etc.

The first paragraph is dictated, § 58 of Remarks Volume II, and it picks up the unddictated idea summarised above, of primitive concepts presenting difficulties. In this case, a stage of language with individual sense-words such as “see”, “hear”, “taste” but no general concept of sense-experience. Unddictated paragraphs on sense-perception condense into §§ 59, 60 and 61 on analogies, similarities and differences, and a few more bring us to a summary paragraph, § 62, which gets its intended order wrong. Putting it right, the concepts of psychology are (and are properly, he implies) everyday, relating to those of the exact sciences (newly formed for their precise purposes) as those of nurses and old wives relate to the concepts of scientific medicine. Unspoken is the implication that psychologists would do well to leave things like that and not concoct specialist concepts. Naturally, for specialist purposes they have to, but an itch to be doing so unnecessarily was shown recently in the reporting of primatologists’ work on chimpanzees: the evidence would have led any lay witness to say things like “sympathy”, “empathy”, “insight”, “sensing another animal’s feelings” or “being aware of an encountered personality”, but all this was encapsulated into a phrase misplaced from epistemology, “having theory of mind”.

Then, “I should now like to sketch a plan for the treatment of psychological concepts”, cut down as the opening of § 63. The promise of a ‘family tree’ is continued with § 148, on pages 27a-28b. In between, most individual paragraphs and many beyond are contributions to this idea. A point where mere classification
seems to be left behind seems to come after the second sub-paragraph of § 161, actually a full paragraph in the manuscript, where he has asked:

Is disgust a sensation? – Has it a location? And it has an object, like fear. Are there characteristic sensations with disgust? Certainly! [Changed from a question into a statement in dictation.]

followed by the undictated

(One can only treat these problems, with any kind of hope of success, by treating a wide field.)

This widened region of enquiry gives me an occasion to quibble about a translation, in § 163 and § 164. “Konstatieren” is a problem word because it shares an ambiguity with “observe” in both languages, namely “notice” and “declare”, and sometimes means “establish”. Here the translators (Luckhardt and Aue) have chosen correctly, pretty evidently in § 163 because one does not normally need to notice that one is afraid, and in § 164 because a comparison is made (and dismissed) with an extremely gentle groan of fear, but they have gone too far with “give notice” so as to be able to use the noun “notice”. The verb “declare” and the noun “declaration” would have done perfectly well.

The date 1.1.1948 is reached on page 37b with § 166, still on fear, but attempting to escape from the state of mind of the person suffering fear and concentrate on behaviour. Can we not have a special word for fear behaviour? Actually, there are many such expressions, but as Wittgenstein points out their significance is that they deal with behaviour in certain circumstances. His only error is to draw a comparison between “I squint” and “he squints” (left out in the corresponding paragraph in Zettel, § 523): one needs to look in a looking glass to know that one is squinting but not to know that one is shaking with fear in the presence of an angry dog.

With § 171 on page 39b and some undictated paragraphs that follow, we reach an interesting comparison with Part II, and the phrase in the fourth paragraph of Section i, “mir graut davor”, it makes me shudder with dread. There is enormous condensation in arriving at that paragraph, and while the manuscript here helps us understand it there is nothing in this region contributing to the condensed text, and the same is true of most of the remainder of MS 136. Indeed, except for numerous contributions to aspect in Section xi it is true all the way to “[Bis hierher diktiert]” on page 76a of MS 137, ending Volume II of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. It is only with the undictated part of MS 137, and the whole of MS 138, that serious work on the text of the final ‘Part II’ begins. I therefore feel
entitled to give notice that I shall end my study of these penultimate manuscript books by only calling attention to isolated items that seem significant to me, often for purely personal reasons, and beginning still within the scope of Remarks Volume II.

While the first date in 1948 had been 1.1.48 on page 37b of MS 136, with §166, on preferring to consider fear–behaviour rather than feelings of fear but denying that behaviour gives the word’s entire meaning, the next is 2.1.48 on page 45b, where §183 is a long exposition of a possibility of wordless thoughts expressed by a workman with mere grunts, who is still entitled to say “I thought” and indeed to put his thoughts subsequently into words.

On page 46a, immediately after §184, summing up the above, there is a significant error of transcription in the Bergen edition, in an und dictated paragraph that seems to be an attempt to revise §7, on wordless thoughts, wishing he could accommodate it to his earlier ideas, in which thought had at least been a manipulation of symbols: “It is incorrect to say – as I once wrote – that thought is a kind of speech” is transcribed as “It is important to say”. It had been dictated as “It is not true” in §7. Here, symbols will hardly do because it is so difficult to define them, but he still thinks that thinking about requires symbols. §§188 and 189 are a further struggling attempt to assimilate symbols to thought.

The enquiry moves to the way our actual circumstances can give meaning to or subtract meaning from our concepts, summed up in §191 on page 48a:

The problem that disturbs us here is the same as in the reflection: “Human beings couldn’t learn to count if everything around them were in a state of rapid coming about and disappearing.”

To quote my notes on copying that: one may be in danger of talking nonsense if one tries to describe a world in which things vanish into thin air as one counts them, but it is indubitably an empirical fact that in our world things do not (on the whole) so vanish; and it is a sort of grammatical fact that it is not a good idea to try to count things that do (like sparks in a smithy). It is also an empirical fact that our world is not made of dirt (with local exceptions), but the thought that anybody could imagine a world that was is appalling in a way that goes beyond the empirical. [Here I was prompted also by a comment on Moore in an und dictated paragraph on page 48a, namely:

If you talk of a ‘world’ in which all things come about and vanish like flickering lights, you are in danger of talking nonsense. (Rather similar to
Moore’s mistake when he hypothetically assumes a world made out of dirt.)

This idea of the linguistic consequences of different kinds of worlds is pursued in §§ 197-199 on pages 51b and 52a, in respect of colour, preceded on page 51a by an undictated remark already quoted at the end of my Chapter 3, about the old chaos and needing to be willing to go down into it again and feel good in it.

On pages 59a and b there is one of Wittgenstein’s many remarks about genius and talent, claiming that Kraus had only the latter, albeit to a degree out of the ordinary. The greatness of what someone writes depends on everything else that he writes and does. I feel that the truth here is less sharp: great things have been done and said by people with character defects, but discovering that this is so is always profoundly disturbing. Frege’s anti-Semitic diaries are a case in point. Of course, this is complicated by our tendency to see character defects where there are only unaccepted deviations. A biblical quotation here escapes me and I leave it to others to find and complete.

Dare I make a private point that the sketch in § 219 on page 60a is the spitting image of Yorick Smythies?

In the region between § 232 on page 64a and § 244 on page 71b there are a remarkable number of undictated paragraphs. There are also the dates 5.1 on page 62a and 6.1 on page 68a. A clue to the subject-matter of these paragraphs is given by

One mustn’t look for what accompanies words but for their use.

on page 64b and, on 69b,

Ought I to call intention a state of consciousness? Can it have the duration of a sense impression? In other words start and stop at the same time as one?

(to show that not only meaning and thought are in question).

On page 72a this undictated parenthesis sets the ideas in Wittgenstein perspective:

(I am, as strange as it might seem, doing logic in all these reflections. Even if I am doing it clumsily and it is difficult to see the logical significance of what I am saying.)

To page 75b, while copying § 254, where two meanings are given for “what did you mean?”, the first being to ask what was meant and the second to ask what was going on in the person’s mind as he spoke, I could not forbear to note “only some-
one bewitched by Wittgenstein could possibly mean ‘what did you mean?’ in his second sense”.

On page 80a there is an illuminating remark about a letter from Schiller to Goethe in which Schiller describes finding thoughts coming to him with the same excitement as views of nature – or that is Wittgenstein’s interpretation, and he does not think highly of his own thoughts of such a kind. The light from above, mentioned previously, will certainly have been a numinous one, if not religious, but here he is just self-deprecating.

… and [because Schiller didn’t produce anything very good] I am by no means convinced that what I produce in such a state of mind is really worth anything. It is very possible that my thoughts [of that kind] only get their brilliance from a light that is behind them. That they don’t illuminate themselves.

On page 81a there is a last “[Zum Vorwort.]”, not in fact used in the preface to Investigations, and it could argue against my claim that Wittgenstein now meant by “das Buch” the new effort for which these notes are a protracted sketch, since it is clearly the basic Investigations that he has in mind here.

Not without resistance do I commit the book to publication. The hands into which it will fall are mostly not the ones in which I should like to imagine it. May it – I wish for it – soon be forgotten by the philosophical journalists, and so, perhaps, be kept aside for a better class of readers.

On page 81b there is a beautiful comparison which I found early in my researches and then, to my regret, lost for many years: the sentences he is writing remind him of a barber snipping with his scissors ‘in thin air’ until he can see what he wants to cut with them.

On page 86b a series of notes begins which, with many asides and interruptions, continue as far as page 100b as a prelude to the final ‘Certainty’ (i.e. knowledge) notes. One is an aside that Wittgenstein later, leaving out Kraus, copied into the aesthetics MS 168 as a reason why he was giving up that selection attempt (quoted in that form in Chapter 7). It is on page 92a.

Raisins may be the best thing in a cake, but a sack of raisins is not better than a cake; and someone who is in a position to give us a sack of raisins still can’t bake a cake, let alone do anything better.

I am thinking of Kraus and his aphorisms, but also of myself and my philosophical remarks.

A cake, that isn’t the same as thinned out raisins.
Other interruptions are on Moore’s paradox, on intention and on colour. Roth- 
haupt quotes a long colour passage in his pages 588-592, but it is preceded by the 
following aside on page 92b.

Colours stimulate us to philosophise. Perhaps that explains Goethe’s pas-
son for the theory of colour.

Colours seem to set us a riddle, a puzzle that stimulates but does not 
work us up.

One of the Moore passages is particularly interesting for its quality of imagination. It 
begins on page 88a and turns poetic. “How glorious! It is raining and I’ve been 
granted to believe it!” Putting this in paradox form takes more effort. “Terrible! It’s 
raining and I don’t believe it!” He can only get away with this by thinking of it as 
poetry. Later, on page 94b, there is a more down to earth example. There could be 
people who say in their own language what we should have to translate as “It’s 
raining. Is it really raining?”, with an answer “Yes, your unconscious has certainly 
got it right.”

On page 95a there is § 290, an echo of Investigations § 500. It follows a knowl-
edge paragraph but harks back to the Moore paradox. One has to remember that 
“a contradiction is meaningless” does not mean that its meaning is nonsense. We 
shut the contradiction out of our language, thus avoiding its having any meaning at all, 
nonsensical or otherwise. This idea impressed me enormously when I met it in the 
Investigations paragraph, for it expressed perfectly my own philosophical convic-
tions. There is a very brief paragraph in Certainty, § 33, that says, with § 31, much 
the same – we eliminate propositions that are no use to us. In later years I softened 
and came to think one could safely allow meaning to the meaningless, for one 
needs to do so in order to examine what is wrong with it, quite apart from being 
charitable to people who have let their expressions run away with them.

All these asides make this region of knowledge notes very difficult to disentan-
gle. As disentangled by Wittgenstein in his dictation they are easier: they can be 
found in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II as §§ 277, 284–289 and 
300–303 (but § 300, a puzzling one, must have been dictated from elsewhere). 
Nevertheless, many of the paragraphs left out are important and by no means the 
equivalent of scissors-snipping. I shall mention some of these when I reach the 
notes published as On Certainty and give an account of the various preliminary 
notes that anticipate them.

On page 100b aspect arrives, for nearly fifty pages. An interruption on page 
110b is another contribution to St. John’s Street Aesthetics, about Mahler in com-
parison with Bruckner. That Bruckner had something that Mahler hadn’t is a
belief that has grown with me over the years, but I do not see that as a reason for not enjoying Mahler. Wittgenstein, however, declared that he was worthless, with convolutions that are well worth examining for their relevance to his doubts about his own worth. This entry is copied into MS 168 without its original date, and with only minor improvements in style, and one change less minor, the dropping of a telling underlining.

On pages 123a and b there is both a beautiful opportunity missed and an editors’ or translators’ misinterpretation of a diagram, in § 398. Taking his cue from the navigational colours red for port and green for starboard but not taking full advantage of them, he imagines an ‘important’ (left out in translation) dividing line, the obvious example being the centre line of a boat. He imagines, again, red on the left being called the same colour as green on the right. He writes as if this requires a great effort of thinking oneself into this conceptual world, but one only has to imagine an eccentric sailor who calls red objects to port and green objects to starboard ‘navigation coloured’ and green objects to port and red objects to starboard ‘un-navigation coloured’. This sailor would not hesitate for a moment to admit that a navigation coloured object on the left was the same colour as an un-navigation coloured object on the right, and would not know what you were talking about if you asked him whether a green teapot changed colour as it slid from starboard to port. Wittgenstein makes a great to-do to justify calling green an aspect of red in this concept world. Worse, he imagines the inhabitants of this concept world saying that the green teapot is ‘externally identical’ in colour as it slides across the cabin table. Then, as an analogy for the concept ‘externally’, he draws a diagram of a hollow cube where geometrically equal angles are ‘externally’ (i.e. on the flat page) unequal, while geometrically unequal angles are equal on the page and thus equal ‘externally’. This only appears to be an analogy to the colour case because of the latter’s obsfuscation, but on top of that the angles that are only equal in depiction are printed as delta plus alpha and epsilon plus gamma, misreading his shorthand ‘and’ as a plus sign. His meaning is that delta and alpha are externally equal and so are epsilon and gamma. The Bergen editors interpret this correctly and transcribe the shorthand ‘and’ as a proper ampersand.

All of a sudden we are in number sequences, with § 400, which opens “But in all of that I have caused a confusion”, whereas the confusion above has nothing to do with number sequences – yet a connection is set up in order to make his sequence investigations of old seem more reasonable.

§ 415 jumps to Moore’s paradox, and it is a textual jump too, because it comes at the beginning of the next manuscript volume, MS 137, with the date 2.2.48.
The last date in MS 136 had been 25.1 on its page 144a, and 144b had been its last page. In dictation, the hitherto unused remainder of MS 136 has gone back to § 306, on remorse, with two paragraphs on it left out. The date of the second of those is 18.1, and these displacements in the typescript only end with § 354, also on Moore’s paradox and the last entry in MS 136, with which we shall consequently have to stay for a while.

On page 128b of that, just before remorse gives way to general philosophy of psychology with § 311, there had been an interesting reflection on style. Wittgenstein says that when he reads he pauses at punctuation signs, and he wants people to read him slowly, and that is why he puts signs in. In effect, this means commas, and while there are occasional passages where commas required by German grammar are left out, there are none where extra commas are put in. All he means by putting commas in to make the reader pause is writing German with grammatical correctness.

§ 311 deserves quotation.

My treatment of all these phenomena of mental life is not important to me because completeness concerns me, but because, for me, each one casts a light on the correct treatment of all.

On page 129b there is another reference to Bacon, rather more sympathetic to him, followed by § 312 on the next page on colour words, reinforcing if not exactly corroborating my belief that Wittgenstein had found Bacon in Goethe’s Farbenlehre. On page 131a there is § 318 (interrupted by a short undictated paragraph), whose continuation, on saying that something is a chair is not the same as saying that it might be, introduces § 319, on not teaching children doubt when one is first teaching them about chairs. We do not simplify like this because they could not understand dubiety nor, to make things easy for them, teach them something that is not strictly correct. Some way ahead, on page 139a, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that some children could understand such dubiety – a very intelligent child might be taught it from the start (“That is probably a chair”), but the doubt is not whether it is really only a stool but whether it exists at all, and on page 139b we are comparing realists and idealists in the ways they teach children: an idealist still uses the word “chair” when he wants his children to bring him one. The upshot (in § 339, whence § 414 of Zettel) is that the difference is merely one of war cries, a word he borrowed from Hardy, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter. I frequently wish that more of the world’s philosophical, and especially theological, differences could be seen as mere war cries.
Following the return of the Moore paradox and belief at the beginning of MS 137, there is a brief colour interlude (to be found on pages 592-596 of Rothhaupt’s book and edited by dictation into §§ 421-437), occupying the 4th, 5th and 6th of February, and on the 7th, at the bottom of page 9b, lengthy notes on aspect begin again, with § 438. Including meaning-aspect these can be said to continue to § 557, §§ 558-570 being on privacy and §§ 571-574 on meaning-aspect again, while § 575 on James on sentences known in full at their first word makes a new start. The page is now 45a and the date the first of June 1948. One should remember that Section xi of Part II moves on Part II’s page 220 from meaning-aspect to privacy. § 569 on that (“I cannot know what going on in him” is above all a picture … ) is not in MS 137 but it does come in Section xi on page 223. It echoes a series of 137’s paragraphs, on pages 39b, 42b, 43a, 43b, 50a, 50a and 54b (both with personal overtones) and 58a.

The new start might be said to be on the implications for privacy of interior thought (such as mental arithmetic) but on the third of June, on pages 47b and 48a and in §§ 589 – 591, dissimulation or pretence aimed at personal deception is introduced. After § 601 on page 50a there is the date 11.6, and well below it, separated by twelve lines, 14.6. In the text between these dates there is evidence of a quite extraordinary piece of trustee-delinquency that will require a trebly anecdotal aside.

In 1952 (at the latest during a brief visit in 1953) Elizabeth asked me to see her burn a slip cut from one of the foolscap volumes (137 and 138) that I knew from her shelves but had not read. I knew that a programme of photographing texts had begun at the insistence of the Rockefeller Foundation, who were subsidising her editing work. She was holding not only the volume and the slip but a foolscap photograph of one of its pages. She explained that one side of the sheet in question had been photographed before she cut out the slip so that only the other side would lose any text. She also explained that she felt entitled to cut out the slip and destroy it because it referred to someone who was still alive. As I have mentioned in my preface the only remarks about living people I had met were uncoded ones about Wisdom and Ayer and their inadequacies as philosophers, and I was naïve enough to suppose that this was of that kind. I cannot remember whether Elizabeth drew my attention to the writing on the slip being in code. I had only met a little code, in MS 166, and not yet discovered how to decode it. I took for granted, and still do, that the whole business was in preparation for the Rockefeller programme of photography, which would mean that the trustees’ bound photographed copies (a very handsome job, as I found later when I was lent two of
them) did not include this cut text, and I cannot imagine what Rhees and von Wright had to say when they found that their copy of MS 137, the volume in question, was incomplete (as it also was in a later passage, as I discovered in 1995).

In 1980, during research at the Wren, I not only had access to original manuscript volumes but to the magnificent uncensored microfilms being made for Trinity by Dr. Nedo and now acquired in full by Bergen, which I believe he had begun in 1978. Elizabeth was anxious for me to do as much of my work as possible from these so as to spare the originals. In the microfilm of MS 137 I found this cut. Not all the code had been removed, and I remember mentally congratulating Elizabeth on her scruples. What remained made it clear that the person in question was Ben Richards. Also visible in this microfilm was a dried, pressed pansy, as I have mentioned in my preface, but it is no longer to be seen in the Bergen facsimiles.

I at last obtained these in February 2003, paid for out of a legacy. I was so familiar with the appearance of the cut in the Trinity microfilms that MS 137 was quite low in my priorities for the things I needed to check. I did not look at it until July 2003, and was astonished to find that the cut had been enlarged and that Ben's code initial, Y, was no longer there. The difference in size of the cut was palpable, and only a vestige of the code, at the beginning, remained. In the middle of the cut portion was a small slip, written by Elizabeth in capitals and ending with her initials, GEMA: “What was here concerned a couple of Wn’s friends. I cut it out & gave it as something to help the one of them to whom it referred – soon after Wn’s death”. There was no mention of the fact that she had cut it out in two stages, separated by some thirty years, nor of the fact that the intended recipient had not in fact received it; that, however, is not a serious omission since it is the most natural thing in the world that Ben would only have wanted to keep Elizabeth's decoded translation. I at first assumed that the other friend was Roy Fouracre, who had been released from the Army too late to be mentioned in the 1946 notes, but the Monk biography (see page 534 and ahead here, where a code X and Y are Con Drury and Ben Richards) makes it probable that he was Drury – except that it is very difficult to imagine jealousy between those two, and if there were no emotional overtones why on earth did Elizabeth cut it out? I met Ben Richards at St. John's Street, and someone else I met there to cause me further confusion was Barry Pink (see Monk on pages 567-8) but Wittgenstein had only met him in 1950 as a fellow lodger at St. John's Street, so he could certainly not have been an emotional entanglement in 1948. I used to call him Cavalry Twill because of a rather threadbare jacket that must have been made when genuine cavalry twill was
somewhat cheaper than it soon became. His description (to me) of conversations with Wittgenstein tallies perfectly with Monk’s on page 567.

I must add a postscript to this story, having been told by a friend of the Geach family that Elizabeth came down with Alzheimer’s at the end of her life. It seems to me quite likely that her new anxiety to protect Ben Richards or his memory could have been set going by Alzheimer’s.

On page 71a there is the date 11.7 and the coded entry:

I think a lot of the last times with Francis, of my frightfulness to him. I was very unhappy then; but simply with an evil heart. I cannot see how I can ever in my life be freed from this guilt.

On pages 72b and 73a, dated 14.7, there is a long coded passage expressing unhappiness at Rosro, on the west coast of Ireland, where his rented cottage, I understand, is now a youth hostel. “Without the goodness of X and Y I could not live here.” Y is of course Richards, and I assumed “X” not to be a code but a mathematical joke for his other companion, who I guessed was Drury from Letter 33 in the Malcolm Memoir, of 6.11.48. The simple explanation that Wittgenstein called Drury Con never occurred to me.

The next date is 21.7, and on 25.7 on page 73b, the beginning not in code, there is

The problems of life are insoluble on the surface, and only to be solved in the depth. In the dimensions of the surface they are insoluble.

It seems that I am not capable of learning wisdom. I am always having the same unwise thoughts. I can only for brief moments submerge into the deep and otherwise flicker on the surface.

In dates there is a gap from 27.7 on page 74a to 20.8 on page 75a, and on 23.8 on the same page aspect and general philosophy of psychology are dropped for § 731 on propositional calculus, with a reference to page 14 of MS 136, where, on 21.12.47, truth functional conditionality had been referred to by the old fashioned term “material implication”. There then come § 732 on the same subject, §§ 733-5 on 25.8 on psychological concepts, and on page 76a §§ 736-7 on knowledge, the second of which could have done very well as a prelude to the final notes on knowledge:
Only a philosopher would say “I know that I have two hands”; but one can very well say: “I am not capable of doubting whether I have two hands.”

But “know” is not usually used in this sense. [Dictated down to here]

The date immediately below is 19.10.48.

The rest of this volume and the whole of what was written in the next, except for paragraphs excluded by the editors for various reasons, is printed in *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* Volume I. Philosophically, most of the exclusions are tolerable, but a few would have been illuminating and some are excluded for no obvious reason, one suspects from carelessness. Many, however, while personal and therefore coming under the editorial rubric set out in the preface, would be very helpful psychologically. There is one rather comic instance near the end of MS 138 where one of the old Cornell masking slips is still in place in the facsimile, masking a date and a single line of code, while the code is transcribed in the text but the date is omitted.

The editors’ preface says that over half the paragraphs that are printed in Part II come from this region of MSS 137–138, i.e. from *Bis hierher diktiert* to the end, and this gives the correct impression that something approaching half come from the earlier contributing manuscripts, but the important comparison is with the respective *quantities* of manuscript, and taking those into account we find that paragraphs making their way into Part II come much more thinly from the earlier manuscripts. One can infer from this that Wittgenstein was beginning to find his feet, in October 1948, as to the shape and content of his new book. Nevertheless his methods of composition do continue for a long time to look more like an ant heap than a draft for a book. This is perhaps expressed by a paragraph on page 92b of MS 137 that became §150 of *Last Writings* Volume I:

> It is no accident that I am using so many interrogative sentences in this book.

This comes in the middle of the entries for a single day, the ninth of November 1948, which embrace §§146–153 of the printed volume and appear to express something of a crisis in the problem of aspect, as I warned would occur.

To start with the beginning, however, the first paragraph written after the break with dictation is not printed, and it deserves to be quoted because it offers an architectural analogy to Wittgenstein’s conviction that he was a good philosopher in a time of bad philosophy.

A good architect in a bad period has a quite different task from a good architect in a good period. Nor must one be seduced by the general con-
cept-word [i.e. ‘architect’, meaning ‘philosopher’]. Do not take comparability but incomparability as what goes without saying.

The first printed paragraph, § 1, introduces an invented verb, “fürchteln”, meaning to torture oneself with fearful thoughts, which one might assume had no first person present – optimistically, because one can quite reasonably imagine someone saying “I must pull myself together, I’m just frightling myself”. A second attempt is more successful, in § 10, which supposes (as I am sure animal behaviourists could devise) a concept of fear that applied only to animals. Naturally it would have no first person present, since animals don’t speak, so I take this as a trivial success. Finally, in § 141, introducing a return to Moore’s paradox, a verb meaning to believe falsely would have no first person present indicative, and one has to agree. Wittgenstein put this in what is printed as Section x of Part II, devoted to Moore’s paradox. Many paragraphs of that come from these unddictated notes, in particular §§ 82, 83, 85, 86, 87 and 88, which come from MS 137’s pages 85b and 86a, §§ 416, 419, 421 and 422, from pages 119b and 120a, and §§ 524 and 526, from pages 128b and 129a.

The crisis of the ninth of November relates to the crisis described early in this chapter with reference to §§ 27 to 33 of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume I, and to §§ 877-882 of that, mentioned as near-crisis resolved. §§ 146-151 of the first Last Writings volume (pages 92a and 92b of 137), also involve the term “Gesichtseindruck”. Someone who asserts that some image is contained in a puzzle-picture is not implying that the image comes and goes in the picture at different times. “The remark is therefore timeless and one can call it ‘geometrical’.” Someone who finds the hidden image can tell himself that the picture itself has changed, when it hasn’t, or contrariwise it can actually change while he believes it is the same, making him think he has discovered a mere hidden aspect. One ought really to be able to point to one’s own visual impression (inside one?), he imagines someone suggesting, to show what one is actually seeing, which would be a confusion of language games, like “this’ is the real name” (harking back to § 34 of Investigations). In § 149 the term “Gesichtseindruck” (visual impression) occurs four times, extremely confusingly, and in § 151, with its second component italicised, it is equated with sense datum, and the query is, is it a new one (after whatever has changed has changed)? Whereas, in § 33 of Remarks Volume I, he had said expressly that this only seems to be the case and nothing in the Gesichtsbild has actually changed, here he has apparently given up his useful distinction between Gesichtsbild and Gesichtseindruck. This means that the aspect problem is no longer
adequately sorted out, and leads to many paragraphs in the remainder of MSS 137-138 that do sort it out, of which a good few make their way into Section xi.

Confusingly, the crucial paragraph in Section xi, on page 195, admitting that the hare-duck head’s different appearances are congruent in spite of having not the slightest similarity, is taken from the ‘near-crisis resolved’, on page 70 of MS 134, written 25.3.[47]. Naturally, since the diagrammatic figure is necessarily congruent with itself, there would be no point in saying this unless the respective Gesichtsbilder are also taken to be congruent, making this just the admission we need. The fact that this declaration in Section xi is separated from its first occurrence by an episode of doubt would never be guessed from its context in print in *Investigations*.

§ 429, on page 120b, is where ‘the phenomenon we are talking about’, namely the dawning of aspect, comes under systematic consideration. On page 123a, between §§ 453 and 454, there is an incomplete parenthesis in the manuscript:

[Perhaps this good period comes to an end here.

The reason why it is incomplete is that, as can be seen in the facsimile, the remainder has been cut out, presumably by Elizabeth Anscombe. Unlike the first cut, no clue remains as to what we aren’t allowed to know. Whatever Wittgenstein’s feelings about his good period being over, frequent contributions to Section xi continue until § 517 (followed by contributions to Section x, beginning with § 522). If one wanted a contribution to xi that put the temptation to dubiety in a nutshell, I suggest § 476, printed at the foot of *Investigations* page 195:]

> But what is different: my impression? my point of view? – Can I say? I describe the alteration like that of a perception: quite as if the object had altered before my eyes.

(The second italics my own, to bring out the meaning and the German *Satzklang*.) And as to the difficulty of resisting this temptation there is § 591, printed in xi on page 204:

> It is difficult to see here that it is a question of sorting out concepts.

> A concept forces itself on us. (That is something you must not forget.)

Between §§ 536 and 537, and written on the 22nd of December 1948 on pages 130a and 130b, there are many entries marked as asides and not printed, which I must leave readers to find in the electronic edition. § 580 on page 134a is marked as an aside but printed. § 598 is a much illustrated paragraph that at first sight betrays the manuscript, in which Wittgenstein has written an ‘Umkehrung’ of “Freude” in the strict sense, by simply turning the volume upside down and writ-
ing it normally, but since he says it is difficult to write he clearly intended a reflection, not a rotation, and so the print (in Section xi as well, on page 198) does give us what he wanted. (On page 47 of MS 144 he settles it for us with the instruction “[Spiegelschrift]”, mirror writing.) Beyond this the manuscript has a number of unprinted asides, again too many to quote here. The last printed paragraph written in this volume is § 694, on page 143b, on the ninth of January 1949.

MS 138 opened with the date 15.1.49 and the coded remark that he had been ill that week with stomach cramp, followed by § 695. A paragraph marked as an aside on page 4a, dated 18.1, appears to be the origin of von Wright’s choice of an English title for *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, “Culture and Value”.

My own thought about art and values is far more disillusioned than that of people of a hundred years ago could have been. And yet that doesn’t mean that it is more correct. It only means that disasters are in the foreground of my mind that were not in the foreground of theirs.

On page 4b there is another coded remark about his health: in pain, not certain whether to take medicine, and anxious to avoid an operation. Such observations become quite frequent, and near the end of the manuscript volume there is a despairing doubt as to whether he can continue to work at all. Nothing is written between 22.3.[49] (§ 978) and 20.5.[49], after which comes only § 979 and thee paragraphs that were not printed. I first assumed that Wittgenstein used this gap to write MS 144, the basis of the lost typescript from which Part II of *Investigations* was printed, but there is evidence against this in Malcolm’s *Memoir*, on page 83 (page 67 in the second edition). A letter is quoted there written in May recording going to Vienna in the middle of April, after which he was hardly able to write at all, and indeed had done no work since the beginning of March. Perhaps he did not count his distilling his ant heap into MS 144 as work. On the same page a letter written in June tells much the same story, which suggests that he did not count dictating the typescript as work either, for it was ready when he sailed to America in July, and he took it with him. There his troubles became acute, and in his Memoir Malcolm describes what a relief it was for him not to have had his prostate cancer diagnosed there, where he was sure he would have been operated on, but only after his return to England.

In MS 138, on page 9a, dated 24.1, marked as an aside, there is light relief for the reader in the form of a philosophical greeting:

The greeting between philosophers should be: Give yourself time!
I should also like to single out another private but uncoded remark because it leads to a textual mystery that I cannot solve. Dated 9.2, it comes on page 17a and refers to Wisdom, Ayer “and others”. They are like someone who has stolen a bunch of keys but cannot open any doors with them. In my preface I have referred to similar remarks written in one of the very last notebooks, which in one case included the name of a third philosopher, whose name I much regretted not noting. I had found these remarks in 1952 when I had the run of the Wittgenstein papers, both in Elizabeth’s presence and during her absence in Austria. As I have said above, MS 138 and its predecessors had simply been volumes on Elizabeth’s shelves, and beyond noticing that some of them were ruled as ledgers I never examined them, because my preference was for the last notebooks, on colour and knowledge, and to a certain extent on ‘das Innere’, though I did not know those so well. Somewhere among them was a set of key-bunch remarks, repeated and polished, but they are nowhere to be found in the electronic edition, which only includes a separate set of paranoid remarks. Nor can I summon up any visual memory of their context that would enable me to posit convincingly that an entire late notebook had been lost. My preface was written in the early months of 1991, in Scotland. I bought the electronic edition in February 2003. I did have access to the Trinity microfilms in 1980 but I never reached MS 138 in them. I could well have known it from the Cornell microfilms in 1976 (indeed, I remember the philosophers’ greeting from those) but I failed to notice the bunch of keys in it. When I found the remark in 2003, having already noticed its variants’ absence in the late notebooks, I was very relieved, since I could hardly have hallucinated remarks so similar to one I was not to meet for fifty-one years.

On pages 18a and 27a (10.2 and 25.2 of 1949) Wittgenstein records his eldest sister Mining’s terminal illness (Hermine). On page 30a on 3.3 he records ten days spent happily with Ben Richards but adds that he is still ill and does not know how his health will progress. On page 30b, the date now 16.3, there is the most pessimistic of his coded remarks:

> Often, my soul is as if dead.

The three unprinted paragraphs that come at the end of the volume with § 979 are important, because they elaborate on what is meant in that by “soul” (definitely one of the occasions where “Geist” does not mean “mind”) and on the seriousness of the image the word offers us, not to be denigrated as a superstition. The first of these paragraphs discusses conflicting senses of humour, after all an important constituent of personality but perhaps judged by the editors to be insufficiently spiritual to be included.
What remains in this assessment of the ‘penultimate’ manuscripts is to consider the relevance of MS 144, the ‘Part II’ manuscript, which, fortunately, differs only in small details from what the trustees made in print of the lost typescript. It is contained in a wider than quarto ring-clipped folder and consists of similarly wide lined pages. The Bergen editors do not follow Wittgenstein’s page-numbering, and so I use only theirs. In the Cornell microfilms it was particularly well photographed, and the Bergen facsimile photography is equally good but for a different purpose: the aim is to bring out the colour of paper and ink, and this makes for inferior legibility. It is no use complaining about this – one cannot have both.

Section i appears to have lost three paragraphs at the end, two written on the next page (Section i itself taking up two manuscript pages and leaving unused lines) and one on the page after that, possibly indicating that they were intended to be two separate sections. The sections are not headed i, ii etc. but are simply indicated by starting on a fresh page. Sections ii–v offer no problems, but vi is followed (on page 20) by another single-paged paragraph:

Our understanding a sentence only shows that in certain circumstances we could use it (if only in a fairy tale), but it doesn’t tell us what and how much we can accomplish with it.

On page 26 there is another of these single-paged paragraphs, coming between viii and ix:

‘If you had asked me “What did you mean by the word … ?” I should have said …’ But how could I know that I should have reacted like that if …? – How? There isn’t any how. But there are indications for my being right to say it.

Section ix begins on page 27 and x on page 32, without problems, and the long Section xi on page 38.

With that, however, serious problems arise. It was quite possibly not intended as a single section, because it was interrupted by three shorter sections, now printed as xii, xiii and xiv. Of these, xiv was placed at the end by the trustees themselves because, as Elizabeth told me when we reached the ‘Part II’ typescript in my checking, they thought it so impressive. (This was definitely put in the plural by Elizabeth and there was no hint that it was her personal decision. But in Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works, Bergen Working Papers No 17, page 342, Kenny says that von Wright was too ill to take part in the editing of Investigations at all, and so he can have had no say in where xiv was placed.) Section xiv was actually the first of these interrupting sections, and it begins on page 70 of MS 144,
The final years

page 69 having ended with “Here the physiological is a symbol for the logical”, printed at the top of page 210. Section xi resumes on page 71 with “What is someone perceiving who senses the gravity of a melody?”

The second break comes where there are only two lines written on page 86, coinciding with the bottom of printed page 219. First there is an instruction to put remarks about the subjective size of a hole in a tooth with a pain passage (ahead on printed page 224?), occupying page 87; then Section xii on page 88, and Section xiii on pages 89 and 90. Section xi resumes on page 91, in print at the top of page 220.

One has to remember that all these details were Wittgenstein’s preparations for dictating his own typed version, at which stage he could quite possibly and properly have changed his mind. Malcolm, on page 78 of his Memoir, prints a letter from Wittgenstein saying that there were only three copies of Investigations itself (i.e. what is printed as its Part I), and declining to send him one. Malcolm had already seen a copy in Cambridge “in 1946-7”, i.e. the academic year of Wittgenstein’s last lectures, and in fact (see the next page) he relented in America and left with Malcolm a copy that had travelled with him. “After his death I put it in the hands of his literary executors.” The typescript dictated from MS 144 is referred to on page 81 as a quite separate entity. As I have already said, he brought a copy of it with him to America and showed it to Malcolm, but he did not leave it with him. It would have been quite unlike him not to have had a carbon copy made, and I assume that there were just two copies, one at Blackwells, who will have lost it with their copy of Part I, and one, also eventually lost, at Elizabeth’s, where it was doled out to me in much smaller wadges than Part I had been. I take this as evidence that there was no third copy in reserve.

My personal view is that MS 144 deserves to be printed on its own as the nearest we can get to Wittgenstein’s intentions as to the work that came between Investigations and his three final efforts (of which the short Part I of Remarks on Colour is the only one that can be said to be complete). Naturally, instructions such as one paragraph coming above or below another one should be followed, but the ‘sections’ should come as they are indicated by page breaks, even when that leaves single paragraphs occupying a page. The four paragraphs at the end of MS 138, of which only one was printed, could be put at the front as a preface to the main thing. They do, after all, come after the ‘ant heap’ out of which the work was so improbably selected, and if not written between selection and dictation they must have been written before either.
On his page 538, as mentioned by me near the opening of this chapter, where I begin my discussion of MS 130, Monk refers to discussions in Dublin during December 1948 in which Wittgenstein told Anscombe and Rhees that his post-dictation manuscript writing and the two dictated typescripts had been attempts towards a revision of *Investigations*, but on his page 544 Monk appears to imply that the new dictation, made in Cambridge in late June and early July before going to America, was a further step in that same attempt, unfortunately left unfinished. Wittgenstein must have known, however, before dictating it, that no revision would take place, and the text is clearly an admission of failure. Had he had any hope of incorporating it into *Investigations* he could not have left it so intractably unassimilable in its style.

The rather untidy notebooks in which ‘das Innere’ was drafted are well presented in *Last Remarks* Volume II and I have only minor improvements to suggest. *Colour’s* only major fault is that its Part I should come at the end, since it was condensed out of what is printed as Part III. A minor one is that Part I’s § 57, on page 9, is a *das Innere* interpolation that should also have been put at the head of Volume II’s last section (VI, from MS 176). (And it should have gone into Section IV as well, as coming in MS 173, where it was first drafted.)

The notes on knowledge published as *On Certainty* are well edited as regards the basic text, which small additions would improve and larger ones might make ideal, but their translation is another matter. Elizabeth’s haste to bring them out after neglecting my translation of § 300 to the end for so long (it was drafted in 1952) and then, after not waiting for my §§ 1–65 and losing my §§ 66–192, translating the first two sections herself, has left me wishing I could have some say in a new translation. From § 193 to the end is basically mine, but it could all do with improvement. The first section, §§ 1–65, I understood, was not discovered until shortly before Elizabeth gave me a photocopy of it, in loose sheets, early in 1967. I could easily have translated all the rest in 1952 if I had not been over-impressed by her story of how unable to think Wittgenstein had been under the influence of his anti-cancer drugs – all I needed to do was use her absence in Austria to copy everything and then translate it at home, instead of translating there and then what I thought most important. Malcolm, on page 96 of his *Memoir* (now page 77), quotes a letter from him written in January 1950 saying how sluggish his mind was, and § 300 onwards (starting 10.3.51) is certainly written more fluently than the rest, but § 66 onwards starts in a notebook (MS 174) that already includes the
date 24.4.50 and it reads fluently enough. These details convince me that §§ 66-
676 form a unit, to which §§ 1-65 are only a prelude.

This is corroborated by Malcolm’s Memoir. In respect of knowledge, Malcolm
does two services to Wittgenstein: first, on page 33 (now page 30), he describes his
reaction to a report on a paper read by Moore to the Moral Science Club in 1939
which he had not attended. Here, the knowledge was one’s own of one’s own sen-
sations. Second, on pages 87 to 92 (now 71 to 75), he recounts a series of convers-
sations during the American visit between Wittgenstein and himself about the two
Moore articles that sparked his final work. These pages suggest very strongly that
§§ 1-65 are correctly placed, as being written with the American conversations in
mind but, in philosophical terms, significantly before the remainder – in fact, as
Monk relates on his pages 562–3, towards the end of a Vienna visit over the winter
of 1949–50. (Having long been familiar with the relevance of the conversations to
the final notes, I found it astonishing to read in the second Additional Note of
1983 that Malcolm was not told until his Memoir was published that Wittgenstein
had written “extensively on the topics of these discussions”.) I have already men-
tioned earlier paragraphs that could well be printed as preparatory to §§ 1–65, and
in Last Writings Volume II Section I there are some paragraphs from MS 169 that
could equally go in front, while Sections II and III print paragraphs from MS 170
and 171 that also ought to go into Certainty; and probably at its beginning. In Sec-
tion IV there are three paragraphs that can only come between §§ 65 and 66. Of
course, this is not to say that these paragraphs should never have been printed in
Last Writings Volume II.

It is especially gratifying to find how well respected the German text is among
contemporary philosophers, and in particular I must mention an article by Clem-
ens Sedmak that has only just appeared, in Die Wiederkehr des Idealismus?, Peter
Lang, 2004. This, centring on the term “Weltbild” in §§ 93, 94 and 95, presents a
unified and comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein’s programme for these
notes (the context of this word is set in § 92, where a king, brought up to believe
that the world began with his birth and persuaded otherwise by Moore, would
have been brought to view the world in a different way). It would be a good exercise for
anyone new to the notes to read them in the printed text, then the article, then the
text again, and decide on how unified they are. Personally I am only half con-
vinced, for while they are a unit they are one with many terrier-like jumps aside.
In respect of them, I find myself a fox to Sedmak’s hedgehog. I must, however, add
that it is very kind both of him and his fellow contributors to say nothing about
the translation. (People who want further details about that can read the item
called “Wittgenstein on das Innere”, on my website www.wittgenstein.internet-today.co.uk/.

To complete this survey of the three subjects I must add a brief note on the physical appearance of their manuscripts. MS 169 is a grey octavo volume with a dark grey spine, and it introduces a new numbering system, being called Notebook No 2 on a flyleaf (where that is also crossed out). MS 170 is a twin to it, except that it is hardly used. On a blank flyleaf and in Wittgenstein’s hand it is called Notebook No 3. I can find no rhyme or reason in these numbers – the remainder seem higgledy piggledy. There is no notebook called Notebook No 4, which might be evidence for the loss of a notebook that I knew in 1952. MS 171 has no number, being a cheap reporters’ notebook bought in America and described ahead where we meet it as part of ‘knowledge’. MS 172 is a set of lined loose-leaf sheets, contained in a brown folder and comprising, first, Part II of the printed colour volume and, second, §§ 1–65 of Certainty. MS 173 is a red or reddish quarto volume and is called Notebook No 5. MS 174 is black with speckled white, the same size of quarto and called Notebook No 7. MS 175 is a shiny black and smallish octavo, called notebook No 1, and stuck over the cover it is described in another hand as September 1950 to March 1951. MS 176 is a smallish quarto, of the same shiny black, and it is called Notebook No 6 at the top of its page 1. MS 177 is the third of these shiny black notebooks, the same shape and size as the second, and also called Notebook No 6 at the top of its page 1. It is, of course, hardly used, opening with the date 25.4.51.

As to the texts of the three final efforts, there is no doubt that the knowledge notes are the third (though they have a last addition to ‘das Innere’ interpolated by Wittgenstein near their end), but it is difficult to separate out the other two and order them. Purely for convenience, therefore, I shall take the colour notes first.

Their Part II, written on the same set of loose pages as §§ 1–65 of Certainty, reported to me in 1967 as having just been found, cannot, in spite of an editor’s note expressing doubt, have been written after their Part III. That opens with the date 24.3.50, while their Part II was the first item written in Vienna during the previous winter. Their Part I was written last of all, at the beginning of MS 175, the first of the three notebooks with shiny black covers. Part II, then, to start at the proper beginning, is hesitant and consists of only twenty paragraphs. It would be much easier to tell a consistent story about the colour ideas without it, that is to say if one had only the notes scattered in MSS 130–138 and then Parts III and I to
connect with them. § 1 of Part II is particularly badly expressed, for it reads as if it refers to the combination of pigments which contribute to the final pigment painted onto a surface to make it, for example, brown, but it is about the component impressions of colour that contribute to the brown impression. Such a way of talking goes back to the work of Hering, whom Wittgenstein had certainly read in his early years, who pointed out that in spite of our childhood experiences of using yellow and blue paints to mix a green, we cannot, if presented with a central green, see any yellow or blue in it. This is a remarkable observation, first said to have been made by Leonardo, and I believe taken by Hering from Mach. Similarly, and even more counter-intuitively, red and green shafts of light shone on a screen give a bright yellow at their intersection, in which it is impossible to see red and green components in spite of their palpable presence on either side of it. With orange, in contrast, we can see the red and yellow visual components whether they are provided in the form of pigment or of light. Now we are familiar enough with mixing brown paint from component pigments, whether they are in some sense primaries or are other browns, but we do not talk of the impression of brown as being composed. If we say that one brown inclines a little towards red and another a little towards yellow, our memories of pigment mixing, precisely what Wittgenstein is ruling out here, may be enlivening our judgement, but we are not recording a mixture of impressions. We normally see a brown simply as brown, and though we might well ask what colour it gives an impression of leaning towards we do not see it (like orange) as composed of colour impressions. Not surprisingly, this paragraph is not crossed out vertically as fit for further use (neither are §§ 7 and 8), whereas the remainder are. I cannot, however, offer any account of what use these other paragraphs may have actually been put to elsewhere.

§ 2 also confuses two languages, of pigments added and impressions of colour, and how this leads to a problem of 'clear transparent white' I cannot say, but at least it is useful for introducing us to that problem, which becomes one of Wittgenstein’s recurrent itches in the serious colour notes.

Similarly § 3, which can otherwise be left as an exercise for the reader, introduces phenomenology as a temptation, preparing us for § 248 in Part III and its copy, § 53 in Part I, namely “There is no such thing as phenomenology but there are phenomenological problems”.

Of the remaining paragraphs, §§ 4–20, I should like to draw attention only to § 16 for its reference to Goethe’s Farbenlehre and to apparent phenomenology being really conceptual analysis. The whole of the colour work that followed (i.e. Part III condensed into Part I) is an elaboration of that idea. Goethe did actually carry out
colour experiments, some of which he misinterpreted, but basically Wittgenstein’s criticism of him is correct – his queries are far more illuminating to us if we take them as conceptual ones. (A letter to von Wright of 19.1.1950 mentioned above reveals that Wittgenstein had been taking up again his study of Farbenlehre.) As to the paragraphs that I am neglecting, while there are confusions in them I do not regard them as muddled – quite the contrary, they arise out of Wittgenstein’s acute sensitivity to the difficulty of explaining colour phenomena, and their fault is merely that his sensitivity has outstripped his ability to explain.

The Part III notes come in two sections: §§ 1-130, written at the front of MS 173, after a coded note, dated 24.3.50, recording his depression at returning to London from Vienna, and §§ 131-350, without dates, occupying the end of that notebook, starting on its page 47v after notes on das Innere (which are also undated). This second section is a new start, as can be seen from the fact that its first two paragraphs are a draft for the first two of Part I, the final condensed and polished version. Both sections are largely crossed out vertically, indicating their paragraphs’ recycling, but the first section is not recycled into the second – both are material for the final abbreviation. For example, § 21 of that, on Runge’s correspondence with Goethe, is taken from § 94, in the first section. Another example of this side-by-side rather than tandem recycling is that § 117 in the first section, on a black and white photograph, is a draft for § 63 of Part I, while §§ 271, 274, 276 and 277 in the second contribute ideas to § 64, and § 65, on the same subject, comes from § 275.

In MS 173 these later ‘black and white’ paragraphs run from page 80v to page 82r and bring us to where colour-blindness, in § 278, introduces a region that merges into das Innere. Last Writings Volume II gives § 296 as where MS 173 returns to das Innere, and § 295 could well have been included as a watershed:

What I am writing about so protractedly may be obvious to someone with an unspoilt mind.

The das Innere volume unfortunately leaves out of this region a long paragraph on belief in God (preserved in Part III of Colour as § 317), after which we have, not a return to colour but to what might be called the philosophy of the psychology of vision, and both volumes continue with MS 173 to its end. As I say in my web section on das Innere, there is no harm in both volumes containing this stretch of text, which I admit would drive any editor to despair. In any case, the last three paragraphs of MS 173 (printed in both volumes) are about knowledge and certainty. One could do worse than put those in all three volumes. In Certainty they would
come between §§ 65 and 66, while the paragraphs from MSS 170 and 171 already mentioned would need to come before § 1.

In a few of the earlier paragraphs of Part III Wittgenstein uses a technical term that he dropped in the final condensation, “saturated”, but it remains in the background of his ideas. In its intuitive meaning it is simply the opposite of “diluted”, and a definition is given on page 487 of the second edition of Colour Science by Wyszecki and Stiles (pupils of Rushton’s). This allows for one sample of a colour to be more or less saturated than another sample, or indeed for samples of different colours, but Wittgenstein uses the word in the sense of fully saturated, in §§ 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 21. In the first two of those he uses “pure” as a synonym, and in § 161 of Part III he uses the two words in combination, but in the final reworking he uses “pure” of white (the least saturated colour), in §§ 3 and 5 of Part I. In § 18 of III he speaks of its being something of a surprise that a given [fully] saturated colour could have lighter or darker examples, but this is fully allowed for in the technical definition. One thing he doesn’t say but gives the impression of taking for granted is that a fully saturated colour must always be ‘pure’ in the Hering sense, but it is just as proper to speak of a fully saturated turquoise or orange as of a blue, green, yellow or red.

When I made my own translation of the condensed notes in 1952 I was aware of various shortcomings in Wittgenstein’s arguments and pronouncements, which were reinforced when I began to make my own experiments with coloured light in 1975 and when, later, with the help of Rushton, I studied colour science. In § 6 of Part I he gives an unnecessarily evasive answer to whether green is a primary colour (while admitting, as he also does in § 158 of Part III, that he inclines to call it one) – language games decide, but he doesn’t tell us what they are. The matter is quite simple. If one is speaking in terms of pigments and their mixing it is not primary, because it can be mixed from yellow and blue; if one is speaking in terms of lights, it is a primary, because yellow can be mixed from it (with red); if one is speaking in terms of visual impressions it is also primary, provided it is reasonably central, because one cannot see either yellow or blue in it.

In §§ 11 and 14 of Part I and § 30, § 123 and § 163 of Part III he discusses the difficulties of having a concept of reddish green, in § 11 and § 163 saying (forgetting the rainbow, apparently) that if someone could construct a continuous gradation of colours between the two, that might lead him to call reddish green what we call brown (which is certainly not in the rainbow). In § 30 of Part III, a little more reasonably, olive green answers to this, a colour I have mentioned at the end of Chapter 3. Leaves are not mentioned in these notes, but they do come in a colour
note added, like a few on knowledge, near the end of MS 171 (see page 59 in *Last Writings* Volume II). There they offer a solution spread over time, but much more important than the fact that in autumn leaves can turn from green to red via yellow is the fact that in spring, opening from the bud, a leaf can appear simultaneously red and green. It will not do so all over but will show an intermingling – in other words it will not be *monochromatically* reddish green.

There is a similar solution to another of Wittgenstein’s nagging problems, of transparent white (for example § 19 of I and § 177 of III in *Colour*). This appearance can manifest itself in fabrics: here one sees the white of the cloth, there the colour of something underneath; in other words it is not a monochrome effect. And somewhat similarly for another solution, diamonds. These are not transparent, because of their high refractive index, but neither are they opaque. In the trade a perfectly untinted or colourless diamond is called white, and no one, even outside the trade, would dream that this implied opacity.

Luminous grey and its supposed impossibility (see §§ 217–226 of Part III and §§ 35–38 of Part I) was a problem to which Wittgenstein missed a solution by only a year or two. It is a matter of context. A weakly luminous white light can appear, as he suggests, luminous white in one context and non-luminous grey in another, but in a context of brighter luminous white lights and sufficient surrounding dark it can appear a quite unambiguous luminous grey.

§§ 72 of Part I and 126 of Part III deal with Goethe’s refusal to admit that (as I have termed it already) his proper denial of white’s giving a visual impression of colour composition was no evidence at all for his claim that white light could not be composed of coloured lights. § 73 of Part I expresses scepticism as to Goethe’s ‘theory of colours’ being useful to painters, but there was a school of such painters to whom I was introduced towards the end of the war. They were followers of Steiner, and if Wittgenstein had met them he might have allowed “useful” but he would have been vindicated in essence by their paintings’ extraordinary simple-mindedness.

§§ 43 and 44 of Part I come from §§ 236 and 237 of Part III, and § 50 of Part I from § 246 of Part III, and all deal with basically one problem, how to describe a polished white reflective surface and its difference from a polished black one. Describing a polished black is less of a problem, though it still teases, as I discovered when walking past polished Rolls Royces as a boy. The inside of a polished black piano lid works in the same way. For white, Wittgenstein suggests, but does not believe, that one might see things reflected in a white surface as being behind a ‘white transparent’ surface. The reason why this is an impossible effort of imagina-
tion seems to be that one can focus on the surface or on the reflected things but not on both, while to see transparency one would need, if not to focus on both, at least to be aware of both simultaneously. These paragraphs are related to §§ 25 and 184 of Parts I and III on cinema screens.

§ 67 in I and § 157 in III deal with the mesopic, colour vision in which there is little enough light for our colourless ‘rods’ still to be active while our ‘cones’ are just able to give an impression of colour. This affects colour balance. Dr. P. Trezona of the National Physical Laboratory has studied the effect, and one of her early papers is cited by Wyszecki and Stiles. Wittgenstein must have observed it himself. He suggests looking at a twilit scene indoors and then turning the lights on and painting what one has seen. This would of course be a challenge even if it were not for the subtle colour changes, so his point would still be valid, but it is much more telling if one admits that he was quite capable of observing a hint of the real visual differences.

If anyone complains that however interesting all these details are they have nothing to do with philosophy, I must first respond that they have a great deal to do with meaning, and moreover with such very unexpected aspects of meaning. Second, however, there is a paragraph in Part I that I cannot find a preparation for in Part III, namely § 32, which indubitably has philosophical significance, indeed sets the whole inquiry in a philosophical context. It fascinated me from the beginning, and I made use of it in my own philosophy. I am gratified to find that it was actually a late addition.

Sentences are often used at the boundary between logic and empirical experience, so that their meaning shifts to and fro, and they now count as an expression of a norm, now as an expression of an experience.

(For it certainly isn’t a mental accompaniment – which is how we think of ‘thoughts’ [in relation to sentences that express them] – but their application that distinguishes a logical proposition from an empirical one.)

Turning to ‘das Innere’, its presentation in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II is, like knowledge in Certainty, reliable except for small details. For continental readers I need to mention that the equivalent edition published by Suhrkamp differs in pagination. I discovered this in reading Katalin Neumer’s article in Die Wiederkehr des Idealismus?, which quotes an important paragraph in Last Writings Volume II’s Section V, devoted to MS 174, as being on page 113, whereas in the Blackwell edition it comes on page 84. This is also my first quotation in my internet section on das Innere, so I shall start with it here.
The ‘inner’ is an illusion. That is to say: the whole complex of ideas which this word alludes to is drawn like a painted curtain across the scenery of how words are really employed.

As I say there, this does not mean that there is no ‘inner-and-outer’ but that the way we describe it results in illusion.

This internet section was first put out after I had recovered from an operation, and was based on my copy of the printed volume, in which I had made notes when reading the Cornell microfilms of its constituent notebooks. Naturally, I have now included details that I have discovered in the electronic edition, but one thing I have not needed to change is a description of teaching a nurse the medical distinction between signs and symptoms (what a doctor can observe and what a patient has to report). Wittgenstein never made use of this, but it would have been grist to his mill. It enabled me to say on my website that, contrary to the impression given by “Das ‘Innere’ ist eine Täuschung”, he would have had no disagreement with anything I told my nurse.

Nor have I needed to change a phrase I used to typify the way the paragraph just quoted, and many others, make some readers doubt Wittgenstein’s essential common sense in this investigation, namely his cagey ambiguity, but with a few more examples I hope they will come to appreciate that, given his philosophical method, this was just the characteristic that he needed in order to preserve his common sense.

The Last Writings Volume II book on das Innere has, as its Section I, an almost complete transcription of MS 169. Until printed page 27 the majority of paragraphs in that notebook are crossed out vertically, indicating their being done with after use elsewhere, and editors’ notes help identify just where that was: in Part II of Investigations (or more immediately in MS 144) and in Last Writings Volume I, the printing of the passages in MSS 137 and 138 that were never dictated. This shows that MS 169 comes quite early in the story of the ‘last quartets’. Nevertheless, on the very first printed page, the fourth of these crossed out paragraphs, destined to contribute to the second paragraph of Part II’s Section v, puts in a nutshell what Wittgenstein is going to need to be cagey about.

A psychologist reports the utterances of his subject. But these utterances, “I am seeing …”, “I am hearing …”, “I am feeling” etc., are not about behaviour.

In other words, there is a split possibility – a patient reports symptoms which require no support from behaviour, while a psychologist reports those reports as
examples of behaviour, in other words as signs. And in a more clinical context than that quotation indicates, a clinician could well suggest qualifications to symptoms while searching for a diagnosis – “Are you sure you are feeling … ?”

At the top of printed page 26 (manuscript page 39r) are two paragraphs that are marked horizontally as separate and not crossed out vertically in the revision process, and which encapsulate the same problem:

Show us what it’s like, being in pain. – Show us what it’s like, pretending to be in pain.

In a play one can see both being portrayed. But what a difference!

One could say that das Innere proper begins at the foot of manuscript page 40v of 169, on printed page 27, where tribe–members never dissimulate, or only with a rarity that Wittgenstein expresses so oddly (as like our walking on all fours) that he can say that there is in spite of it no distrust. Nevertheless, mere absence of dissimulation is not enough for us to say that these people know how their fellows are feeling – but if Wittgenstein had allowed them to have absolutely no pretence – –?

Yet he goes on to imagine that even as he has sketched things, these people’s language does enable them to draw conclusions as if from knowledge. “If he looks like that he is sad.” This still won’t mean “If he looks like that, that is going on inside him”, but only that they can draw with certainty conclusions (behavioural ones, I take him to mean) that we can’t. On manuscript page 43r he has two paragraphs that express what he doesn’t want us or them to be allowed to mean. First, pointing out that with the best will in the world from the people we are trying to sound we can be wrong about their feelings, he then gives us a reductio ad absurdum for “the inner is hidden”: this would be like saying of a multiplication that we only see an outer play of numerals, while the real multiplication is hidden from us.

On printed page 29 (44v), Wittgenstein does use “what is going on in him”, precisely to show that this need not be the whole story.

Even if I were hearing everything he is saying to himself, I’d know as little as if I were reading one sentence from the middle of a story. Even if knew everything that is going on in him now, I still shouldn’t know, for example, to whom the names and images in his thoughts related.

This shows that a paragraph in inverted commas at the top of printed page 31 (47v) is what I call a didactic non sequitur.

“But there certainly isn’t any doubt for him whether he is pretending. So if I could look inside him there wouldn’t be any for me.”
In other words, this is ironic: Wittgenstein is claiming that a person’s knowledge of his own pretence, like his knowledge of whom he is naming, is not one of the things ‘going on inside him’.

At the bottom of printed page 33 (the very bottom of 52v) a paragraph consisting of four subparagraphs begins, one of the few marked at the beginning with a slanting line, indicating approval for whatever text he was preparing.

/ My thoughts are not hidden from him if I speak them aloud involuntarily and he hears. But they are, for even then he doesn’t know if I really mean what I am saying, and I do. Is that right?

But what does my knowing whether I mean it consist in? Above all: can’t he know too?

What would it be like if my honest admission were less reliable than the judgement of a third person?

Or: What kind of fact is it that that is not the case?

This paragraph is important because it not only has Wittgenstein’s imprimatur but is at the heart of his cagey ambivalence towards das Innere. One does sometimes wonder whether one’s friends understand their own feelings or know their own intentions, and Wittgenstein had been having just such suspicions in respect of his own life with his friends. At the foot of printed page 34 (54v) he makes a declaration that could well have closed the matter, but it didn’t, and I must bow out of this notebook with it, leaving many further details on my website:

My thoughts are not hidden from him but are just differently open to him from how they are to me.

The next notebook, 170, is in the same grey binding as 169, but only its opening pages are used, to the tune of two and a half pages in print. It appears to be a failed attempt to open a new subject, the concept of concepts, and does include some concepts related to das Innere. In any case the last four paragraphs, marked as separate, go with knowledge.

MS 171 is slightly longer, five printed pages, beginning on das Innere, but just over half way through there is an isolated knowledge paragraph (a mock syllogism about a sycamore tree being an external object), one more on pain, and then it is on knowledge to the end, except for one of the earlier paragraphs being rephrased. Nevertheless, these early paragraphs do appear to constitute a serious attempt to make a start with the subject of the inner, and I must mention two in particular, the first and the fifth:
An interior, in which it looks either like this or like that; we [i.e., we outsiders] do not see it. In my interior is either red or blue. I know [which], the other chap doesn’t.

What is important for us is not that the evidence makes the experience of another person ‘only probable’ but that we consider precisely these phenomena as evidence for something important.

For on the one hand it is indisputably true that if I am sitting still and visualising, alternately, red and blue objects or patches, nobody (outside a laboratory perhaps) will be able to detect which is which, but at the same time, nobody (outside a laboratory) will have any interest in which is which. Yet on the other hand, the subtle facial betrayals of what is going on ‘inside us’ can in some circumstances be of extreme importance (Wittgenstein is thinking of anxieties as to whether a friend is telling the whole truth). Naturally, between these two poles of indifference and anxiety there is a huge psychological area, which Wittgenstein goes on to try to map with his technique of offering examples of the different things we say. I discuss a few such examples from the remainder of this notebook on my website.

MS 173 opens with Wittgenstein’s pessimistic return from Vienna, mentioned above, and continues with colour. The last date in that, 12.4[50], is also the last date in the notebook, and so the notes on das Innere that follow must have been written later in 1950, but not much later, because there remains a great deal more for him to have written before the 1951 notes on knowledge. The das Innere notes are interrupted (on page 71 in print) by §§ 131-295 of Colour, which occupy manuscript pages 48r-86v. After this, i.e. from § 296 of Colour to its end, the two subjects are interwoven in a manner that amply justifies the joint passages being printed in both books (though I have complained above about God’s being printed in only one, namely as § 317 of Colour).

In my website I express disappointment in MS 173’s contribution to das Innere, and even now I am less enthusiastic about it than the notebook that follows, which I shall discuss in more detail, but I do at least withdraw my assumption that any fault was the consequence of anti-cancer drugs. What disappoints me is simply that it does not make progress in the solution of the essential problem (how common sense can prevail when we try to replace misleading expressions of ‘inner–outer’ by better ones) but merely, in effect, skirts it, and at great length. It certainly, however, keeps the problem alive. For example:

But there is evidence for the inner and evidence for the outer.
"But all I ever perceive is the outer." If that is meaningful it must determine a concept. But why shouldn’t I say I perceive his doubts? (He can’t perceive them.)

Indeed, I can often describe his inner, from my perception of it, without being able to describe his outer.

The connection between inner and outer is part of these concepts. We aren’t making this connection in order to magic away the inner.

There are inner concepts and outer concepts.

What I want to say is exactly: that the inner differs from the outer by its logic. And that, to be sure, logic explains the expression “the inner”, makes it comprehensible.

These paragraphs are introduced by two manuscript pages (31v and 32r, in print on pages 61 and 62), which are crossed out vertically, indicating that they have been put to use elsewhere, but there is hardly anywhere in later passages on the subject (in MSS 174 and 176) where this could have been done. I cannot help fearing that this adds probability to my guess (see remarks above on stolen bunches of keys) that a late notebook has been lost.

The apparently re-used paragraphs (which spread to the top of page 62) are very condensed, as my attempts on my website to rephrase them show. A paragraph on page 63 paraphrased there needs to be quoted in full, for giving a strong impression that the problem is dealt with and then saying it hasn’t been.

“Naturally, what I see is really only the outer.”

But aren’t I actually speaking only of the outer? I say, for example, under what circumstances people say this or that. And I do always mean outer circumstances. So it is as if I wanted to explain (as it were define) the inner by means of the outer. Yet that is definitely not the case.

One is bewildered to know what is the case. In the middle of this printed page some very interesting paragraphs about Shakespeare have been omitted. Immediately after them is another remark in inverted commas, suggesting that Wittgenstein finds that, too, over-simplified:

“I see the outer and imagine an inner to go with it.”

But then, in a new paragraph, he puts what is wrong thus:
When mien, gesture and circumstances are unambiguous, that is when the inner seems to be the outer; only when we cannot read the outer does there seem to be an inner hidden behind it.

The truth is that when there are no problems we adopt the inner as a natural metaphor, as it were transparently behind the outer; when problems arise, we add “hidden” to this metaphor, but that does not mean that without problems we abandon the metaphor.

An important idea begins at the bottom of page 65, predictability of behaviour, and this leads to: in what ways might a human body behave so as to give us no temptation to speak of inner-and-outer in respect of it? Wittgenstein’s answer is “mechanically”. At the top of page 66 there is an important detail. If predictability included all the fine shades of behaviour that matter to us, might we give up speaking of inner as opposed to outer? He questions whether, in saying this, we have been visualising predictability clearly – for example, does it entail that we can’t ask someone for a decision?

To me this is the nub of the problem of whether we need to worry about predictability if we believe in free will. We might know a friend’s behaviour so well that we feel we can predict it absolutely, but it will still be meaningful for us to ask him for a decision about it. Wittgenstein maintained the freedom of the will resolutely, as Isaiah Berlin did, and I have quoted Wittgenstein on the subject in Chapter 6, but those paragraphs seem to me to take freedom of the will for granted rather than argue for it, while here we have a hint out of which we can make an argument. What Wittgenstein is using the hint for here is to keep a residual meaning for the metaphor of inner-and-outer. (And my complaint is simply that he shies away from allowing that metaphor to be as robust as it could be.)

The very next paragraph at the top of page 66 introduces the metaphor of the soul. Wittgenstein asks what a living human body without a soul would be like, and answers that it would behave like an automaton, and thus would precisely not be a human being; consequently it would be no counter-example to the popular assertion “a human being consists of a body and a soul”. Naturally, having brought up the possibility in a thought-experiment argument, Wittgenstein worries at the question of how such an entity would behave, and answers, as with the predictable body that gives us no temptation to inner-and-outer talk, “mechanically”. He then assumes that such a body would feel no pain, and subtle distinctions arise – merely writhing as if in pain might not count against having no soul but displaying facial expressions of pain might, and then again always showing the same expression.
might not. On page 67 this leads to a point which I think he could have expressed more approachably:

It is not as if I had within me direct evidence for my soul-like [my mental, since the discussion has removed any traditional overtones of “soul”] while the other chap only has indirect evidence. No, he has evidence for it, (but) I haven’t.

I do not need to have evidence for my consciousness, for I am conscious, and this word would have made the whole discussion both clearer and less problematical.

The longest paragraph on page 68 leaves much to be desired, but I must criticise it without quoting it. Knowing what is going on behind someone’s brow can be a matter of indifference to us, but in the notebooks we have been examining Wittgenstein has given many examples of finding whatever this phrase means extremely important. Whether the question is trivial (like blue or red) or matters (like the tribulations of friendship) is irrelevant to the phrase’s meaning, but it is precisely in cases that matter to us that we are likely to use the phrase. And our uncertainty does indeed refer to the whole human being who responds to our friendship, but if trivial things like red and blue can be hidden from us so can feelings about friendship, and while the general mental contribution to friendship finds much expression in the bodily, there can still be hidden components and we still need a proper description for them. In a sub-paragraph he says very reasonably that to uncertainty about the inner there corresponds uncertainty about the outer, but this does not mean that no hidden component is left for us to wonder about. Nor does the distinction between number and numeral at the end of a calculation help — people who have read Frege understand it and people who haven’t find it trivial, but no one finds friendship trivial.

Yet the very next paragraph expresses my point: it does not follow that uncertainty about the mental can always be expressed as uncertainty about the external, and he gives an example. Grief in its very essence expresses itself in our facial features, but I may have no readier way of describing those features than by “grief-stricken”. In other words, we can need an ‘interior’ word to describe something external (distortions of the face).

On page 69 there is a mistranslation: “inkonsequent” means “inconsistently”.

On page 70 there is a metaphor that he makes much use of in the next notebook but here dismisses: uncertainty about someone’s anger is no excuse for calling the real state of anger an expression on an inner face, sharply drawn but unclear to the outsider.
Between the third and fourth paragraphs of page 71 the second section of
Colour’s Part III begins, making das Innere jump from manuscript page 48r to 87r,
while Colour reappears at page 91v, where God is left out of das Innere; and from
“Ich beobachte diesen Fleck” on printed page 74 both printed books run together
to the end (of Colour’s Part III and das Innere’s Section IV respectively). The com-
plications are such as to make it a kindness to the reader as much as myself to bow
out of this notebook and move to MS 174, which opens on the subject of das Innere and stays with it until page 14v, where the subject becomes knowledge (at § 66 of Certainty).

Twenty-eight pages of manuscript and seven of print is not very much for
Wittgenstein to condense his thoughts into, and it may well be that he was con-
tinuing to write in MS 173 when he began this notebook: after only three para-
graphs that are compressed in style as well as short, we meet the date 24.4.50, only
twelve days after the last (colour) date in MS 173. So the opening twenty-eight
pages of this notebook may not be an attempt to distil what he had thought so
much as to write in as condensed a style as possible what he was still thinking. At
all events, it was these twenty-eight pages, together with the ten pages inserted into
the knowledge pages of MS 176, that so impressed me that I included das Innere among the ‘last quartets’.

The first four paragraphs do all make points made before, but with such conci-
sion that the reasoning behind them may not be obvious. Expressing pain straight-
forwardly does not relate to the pain as expressing it with pretence relates to the
pretence. Pretence is not as simple a concept as being in pain, because the former
has to be learnt or at least in some way acquired. And even if acquired through the
development of natural dishonesty, formulating it requires the child to be taught,
and as a practical necessity this will entail teaching it to look out for dishonesty in
others. The fact that the evidence available to us only gives probability to what
another person is experiencing is less important to us than the fact that this pattern
that is so difficult to describe matters to us for what it is evidence of.

A ‘knowledge-inner’ paragraph at the end of page 2v (still on the opening
printed page, 81) settles that we are not dealing with the absolutely hidden:

“What is going on in me is something he cannot know.” But he can suppose
it. So all he can’t do is know it. So all we are doing is drawing a distinction
in the use of the word “know”.

There follows a remark taken from MS 169 (see printed page 49, whose second
and third paragraphs are crossed out vertically in the manuscript to show that they
have been used elsewhere, presumably here): does an astronomer predicting an
eclipse say that we cannot of course know the future? We say this when we are in
doubt about the future, like a landlubber about the weather. A joiner doesn’t say
that one cannot know whether one of his chairs will collapse.

So much else of what follows relates das Innere to knowledge that one might
think it has been printed in the wrong volume, but there is no doubt that the
prime emphasis is on das Innere. One does often say that one knows someone was
glad to see one, but what consequences does that have? Confidence in the asser-
tion, and that other people will understand it (Wittgenstein does not say believe it),
but this seems a shadow of the assertion’s interest for us, and what exactly is that? In
an example of his trick of ascribing his own philosophical temptations to the rest of
us, he says that we wish to project everything into the other person’s interior. We
do this to evade the difficulty of describing the assertion’s field, a helpful metaphor
he takes from physics and mathematics, while the next metaphor, from the chemis-
try of benzene, is obscure. “But why do I say that I ‘project’ everything into the
inner? Doesn’t it reside in the inner? No. It doesn’t reside in the inner, it is the
inner.” I find that a vivid expression of what I take to be Wittgenstein’s aim, to
show how the things we say in our instinctive inner-outer language draw a veil
across the real truth of the matter, while our interest in our phrases, what makes
them matter to us, is the core of the real truth of the matter. Yet he goes on imme-
diately to say (at the foot of page 82) “And that is only a superficial logical classifica-
tion and not the description we need.”

On the next page he re-introduces a dismissed idea that I warned he was going
to make much of, the face within. Imagine that the soul is a face, and when some-
one is glad this inner face smiles. Take this seriously – but we still want to know
what importance this smile (or any other facial expression) has. This could actually
be our normal way of expressing ourselves: “His inner face smiled when he saw
me” etc.

Now it is clear (to us) that the fact that we can imagine a society in which that
was accepted idiom does not mean that it is any more than idiom, but Wittgen-
stein proceeds to apply his best philosophical analysis to it, the upshot being that
whatever makes the inner smile important to us makes the outer one important
too. Then he confesses “It is not easy to realize that my manipulations are justi-
fied”, and one can only suspect that they are not. Finally, if “I know that he was
glad” certainly does not mean “I know that he smiled”, then what I know and is
important here is something different from that. For even for people who took the
inner smile seriously the question of its meaning (i.e., its significance for them)
would remain.
Two paragraphs that I have summarised on my website are separated by an omitted one that deserves to be quoted:

One time misunderstands the other one, and a petty time misunderstands all the others in its own hateful way.

These three, bringing us to page 6r and printed 84, are followed by a pertinent aside that is, fortunately, printed:

If one doesn't want to solve [double underlining] philosophical problems, why doesn't one give them up? Solving them means changing one’s point of view, one's old way of thinking. And if you don't want to do that you should consider them insoluble.

At the bottom of page 10r, however, he has an image to help him keep trying, which took me nearly forty years to rediscover, having met it, with great pleasure, in the trustees’ bound photographs, to find it missing in print and only in 1993 to find it in the electronic edition.

Philosophy hasn't made any progress? – If someone scratches because he has an itch, must there be some progress to be seen? Is it otherwise not a genuine scratching or not a genuine itch? And can’t this reaction to the irritation go on for a long time before a cure for itching is found?

The proper place for that in print would be at the top of page 87, but going back to page 84 the ‘insolubility’ quotation is followed by an illuminating exposition of Wittgenstein’s core belief about das Innere, followed by the paragraph I quoted at the beginning of this section, on the ease with which the truth is disguised.

One always presupposes that the person who smiles is a person, not just that what is smiling is a human body. Certain circumstances are also presupposed, and connections between smiling and other forms of behaviour. But when all those presuppositions are made, another person’s smiling is a pleasure to me.

If I ask the way of someone on the street I prefer a friendly answer to an unfriendly one. I react immediately to the other person’s behaviour. I presuppose the inner in so far as I presuppose a human being.

There follow a number of paragraphs on das Innere’s boundary with knowledge, with an unprinted one on God’s judgement and a private one on a friend and her son. A general paragraph on page 9v (printed 86) comparing Freud’s psychological explanations and Goethe’s of colour with ‘animistic explanations’ (one has to guess what those are, but the common point is that all three fail to predict) brings the
It seems to me as little an established fact that there are only genuine or disguised expressions of feeling as that there can only be major or minor modes.

It is just possible that these last two paragraphs constitute the condensed rewriting of the first four manuscript pages of MS 173, explaining their vertical crossing out.

They caught my eye in 1952 as coming just before what is now § 66 of Certainty, and it is a great regret to me that I neither read the whole of MS 174’s opening then nor copied its continuation. I did, however, both copy and translate the interpolation on das Innere that comes towards the end of MS 176, and which is printed in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II as its final section, all written while Wittgenstein was in Cambridge waiting to die. I have put this translation at the end of my website section on das Innere, where unfortunately I dismiss the first five paragraphs as a mere prelude to the important message of the rest. As a serious resumé of ideas already expressed, however, they deserve comment. They tell us that while we can be as certain that someone is in pain as that $12 \times 12 = 124$, the fact remains that one can’t prove it according to generally recognised principles, and moreover that one can sometimes reasonably doubt the informant’s reliability. And on the other hand again, the fact that (reliable or not) the person cannot doubt his own experiences makes it philosophically improper to say that he knows them. Moreover, the phraseology of ‘what is going on inside’ goes beyond the kind of experience one can’t doubt one is having and embraces possibilities where one can well be suspected of not being sure.

Such to-ings and fro-ings lead naturally to the ‘important message’ that Wittgenstein was clearly anxious to get down on paper before he died. One could imagine some kind of connection between one person and another, or (a little further on) a clinical pain-thermometer. The connection would not enable one to say that one person had the other person’s pain, but it might turn out to be, by common sense criteria, a reliable guide to the other person’s kind of pain. Now, this reliability could be strong enough for us to put more trust in it than in the person’s word. And then, communities could be imagined who come to put so much trust in the pain-thermometer that the primary meaning of their word for pain is what the
thermometer tells them. This is elaborated in many paragraphs. Finally, in a very long one, entirely dated 15.4,[51], he asks how much our language would change if we took that course, and with it how much our form of life would change. – “And how could I answer that?”

In preparation for my final section, on knowledge and whatever paragraphs on it could usefully be added to the text of Über Gewissheit, I have read all my suggested extras (and some more that I discovered in doing so) in what seemed their appropriate position, mostly preceding it. The only paragraphs that I can confidently put between §§ 65 and 66 are the last three in the portion of MS 173 printed in Last Writings Volume II, its Section IV. The knowledge paragraphs of MSS 170 and 171 certainly come before §§ 1-65 (i.e. the knowledge portion of MS 172) and could conceivably even come before the conversations on knowledge recorded by Malcolm as taking place in America, but are more likely to come after those, while knowledge paragraphs in MS 169, starting on Last Writings Volume II’s printed page 44, almost certainly come before America.

I have already mentioned what I think the earliest relevant printed paragraphs of all: §§ 277, 284-289 and 300-303 of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II. As I warned, unprinted paragraphs in the region of MS 136 that those are taken from also have to be considered, but I shall begin with the printed § 284. It is important for first formulating a theme that becomes central to the entire exercise, but it also appears to contradict Wittgenstein’s later interpretation of this theme.

I have convinced myself of something and now I know it. “I know that the earth has existed for the last ten minutes” is not something one says; but one does say “people know that the earth has existed for many thousands of years”. And not because it is unnecessary to assure anyone of things like that [i.e., of the former].

In later notes a very strong impression is given that the simple superfluity of such assertions is what makes Moore’s philosophical use of them suspect, and it is only towards the end (late March, and April, 1951) that a satisfactory account of their fault is given.

The entries in MS 136 of 9.1.[48] end, on page 86b, with the revealing paragraph

Who would believe that here, even if very clumsily, I am doing logic.

followed by the date 10.1 and
Knowledge: a disposition. There is still something very unclear here. I am thinking of knowledge as an ability; for example, 'knowing by heart' – (I can recite the ABC).

But knowledge as a degree of belief is something different – if I say “I know for certain that it's full moon today” that is naturally not the expression of a state of consciousness; I know it even when I'm not thinking about it. [In other words, it is a disposition but of a different kind.]

Do “It’s raining” and “I know it’s raining” tell us the same?

Much is then crossed out, and more still left undictated, beginning with

“Knowing” is used in the same language game as “believing”. One asks “Do you only believe or are you certain?” and one can’t ask this of a machine. Not even, I believe, if it was set up to inform us, for example, of the larger or smaller probability of an event.

These paragraphs are followed by § 277, that one says one knows it is raining in response to doubt, and, undictated, by something that I am at a loss to give significance to, that one can receive the answer “yes” without being able to see who believes it is raining, after which § 278 follows on page 88a, on the logic of reports or messages.

This brings us to a region that I have already sketched when reporting on MS 136, out of which I should like to mention a paragraph which turns up in Certainty as § 649 (i.e., quite late) but is not on knowledge as it appears here. § 649 is put between parentheses and illustrates a point in § 648, that slips of the tongue are possible. The slip is saying “elm” when one means “ash”, but on page 96a of MS 136 it enables Wittgenstein to ask “What is going on in someone who says ‘elm’ and means ‘ash’?”, an old work-horse that is not part of the knowledge agenda.

Of the dictated knowledge paragraphs in this region not so far mentioned, § 289 needs quoting in full, as a kind of flag declaring his aim.

Many people will say that my talk about the concept of knowledge is irrelevant, because as philosophers understand this concept, while it doesn’t, to be sure, agree with that of everyday talk, it is still an important and interesting concept that is formed by a kind of sublimation out of the common or garden and not very interesting one. But the philosophical concept has been derived from the common one via all kinds of misunderstandings,
and it reinforces these misunderstandings. It is not in the least interesting; except as a warning.

The last of them, § 303 on page 100b, seems to be Wittgenstein’s attempt to formulate the philosophical concept, but he spoils things by turning it into one of his Aunt Sallies. Putting what one might call the lesson of the Theaitetos into a nutshell, something known must not only be true but must not be true by accident – the person who claims to know it must have reasonable (or acceptable) grounds for asserting it. Wittgenstein turns this simple requirement into an Aunt Sally (“ein falsches Bild”) by wrapping it up in the idea of a phenomenon of knowledge, something immediately grasped inside one that justifies one’s assertion. Yet this misunderstanding (Wittgenstein’s) leads to a fruitful idea that becomes important towards the very end of the knowledge notes. This thing inside one ought to make one infallible, and if one turns out to be wrong in spite of that the only explanation must be that one had been blinded to the truth. The latter idea recurs from time to time in the notes, especially near their beginning (§ 66 of Certainty) and their end (§ 676), with a reference to it in § 195 that is hardly developed, but there it loses its derivation from this palpable (and concocted) absurdity of knowledge as an experienced phenomenon: rather, extraordinary circumstances might lead one to be falsely convinced of something and then reveal the truth to one.

Finally, three of these MS 136 paragraphs need mention together, §§ 285, 300 and 301. The first and third make a simple point that leads nowhere in these notes: if one just says “I know how things are” the “I know” cannot be dropped, but if one specifies how things are, then “I know that … is the case” can be satisfactorily replaced by “… is the case”. It leads nowhere because it is harmless and does not need saying again, but in § 300 there is the complication that the former can be said to have the form “There is something that I am in possession of” or “There is something that I can do”. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein uses these forms here quite innocuously: they do not seem to make the propaganda point of pre-war privacy that we are supposed to be tempted to think that there is some entity that we have; any more than a mathematician who proves an existence theorem thereby wishes to draw the Platonic conclusion that some mathematical entity exists in reality.

I have called § 300 puzzling above (on [typescript] page 227) because it includes a ‘deliberate mistake’ for which I can see no reason (unlike getting the date of Napoleon’s coronation wrong): 432 instead of the correct product 7566 (“why all these lies?” I noted when I worked that out). Yet “432” is repeated when the paragraph is re-dictated in § 406 of Zettel. Incidentally, § 405 of that (with a sub-paragraph displaced from one to the other) is the last paragraph of Remarks on
the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II, § 737, the last of my candidates out of that book for putting at the head of Certainty and already quoted.

The first relevant paragraphs of MS 169 start on Last Writings Volume II’s printed page 44 and continue to half way down page 46 (in the manuscript from the bottom of page 71r to the top of page 75v). They are too many to quote and they do not seem to represent a significant advance. Near their beginning there is an interpolated colour paragraph (on whether different people could have different concepts) and the paragraph above that is printed with what looks like a mistranscription, but it is a slip in Wittgenstein’s grammar, with his intention given correctly in the English. At the end, just before the end paper, page 81r, is continued at the front, there are three knowledge paragraphs. The first two are crossed out vertically, the first because it is used in Investigations Part II’s xi, on page 223, and its substance in § 189 of Last Writings Volume I: Does an astronomer calculating an eclipse of the moon say that one can never know the future? The third paragraph is important for its failure to sort out what it tackles. One can only know where there is no possibility of error, or where there are clear rules of evidence. Yet remote possibilities of error, provided they do not materialise, are not normally taken to invalidate a claim of knowledge; and one can speculate about utterly improbable possibilities of error and what one might say if they astonished us by materialising — which Wittgenstein does, as I have already said, at the beginning and very end of his last notes, where he concludes that “error” would not be a fair accusation for someone revealed to have been the victim of a colossal illusion.

The knowledge paragraphs of MS 170 begin at the bottom of Last Writings Volume II’s printed page 52 and the top of manuscript page 4r, with “Test: On the whole chairs do not evaporate”, and end with a sub-paragraph that tackles, with better success, what exactly is wrong with Moore’s assertions of the obvious. Asked if the earth really did exist before we were born, we should be “half annoyed and half embarrassed”, because there seem to be too many reasons for it for us to marshal, out of which we cannot select one in particular, and our only serious possibility of answering would be little by little to teach him a picture of our world — the beginning of the ‘Weltbild’ concept. (In a letter of September 2, 1949, written to Moore while Wittgenstein is visiting him, Malcolm says “I should want to know to what ‘Gedankenkreis’ (as Wittgenstein puts it) your statement belonged”, perhaps another move towards that concept.)

MS 171, a cheap notebook bound at the top by rings and mentioned above as bought in America, has a single knowledge paragraph on its page 8 (57 in print), a caricature syllogism about a sycamore as an external object, and on its page 9 a
series of them begins, interrupted only near the end by one on *das Innere* and another (quoted above) on green leaves turning to red. They include the attempted definition “I know …” = “I have the highest degree of certainty”, which introduces a sub-paragraph that takes up the criticisms of Moore’s “I know …” propositions. This particular criticism makes Moore unfair on other philosophers, who he says say that they only have the feeling of knowledge in such and such cases, whereas *he* has it in others, and backs this up by looking at one of his hands and saying he has the feeling now. The feeling of knowledge is of course not in question. A further paragraph retreats from it by giving a reasonable but rather laboured account of why someone might say “I know that there is a tree here”, and the next, occupying page 12 and printed on page 59, admits that Moore knows that this is a tree, but questions his philosophical use of the proposition. Instead of looking at his hands and saying he knows that they are hands, he should have declared (generally) that he knew a huge number of facts about physical objects and that they were so certain for him that nothing could strengthen or destroy this certainty.

The conversations in America are recorded in Malcolm’s *Memoir* on pages 87-92 (71-75 in the second edition), with an important interruption on page 89 (72) where a change of view is mentioned. At the foot of page 88 (near the top of 72) he had said that in ordinary usage it is always possible to speak of making sure when knowledge has been claimed. My remark above about remote possibilities would imply that it is sometimes possible to speak of making sure, and it is clearly easy to think of circumstances where the response could be “Yes, but please make sure before you take action”. In his change of mind on page 89 he says that it was false to say that it was always sensible to speak of making sure. Indeed, but it is sometimes sensible.

Wittgenstein, continuing on that page, is more concerned with cases where there is no making sure, and cites examples. His complaint against Moore is that instead of giving his own natural examples (as in the ‘huge number of facts’ above) he as it were goes into a trance while looking at a tree so that he can experience knowing. We might quite properly say “A human being knows that he has two hands” if we mean that he doesn’t have to count them, unlike imaginary people (from Mars – see *Certainty*’s § 430 of 23.3.51) who do have to.

Moore’s ‘knowledge’ propositions differ from each other in absurdity (by which Wittgenstein means the difficulty of finding natural uses for them) just as empirical propositions differ in their logical status (the difficulty of specifying circumstances that would falsify them). On page 91 (near the top of 74) he actually says that there are some which future experience “won’t” falsify. That, admittedly,
is not to say that he cannot invent such circumstances, something in which he later
gives himself quite a lot of exercise. Here, his concern is to argue against the scep-
tical philosophers whom Moore himself was arguing against, who wanted to say
that the existence of any conceivable falsification refuted a claim of knowledge.

The last paragraph on page 91 (mid-74 above a line space) makes a point that is
easily overlooked in assessing Certainty. A distinction is drawn between certainty
and conviction. Could this be between “Gewissheit” and “Sicherheit”? In the
main text they usually seem interchangeable, and the chances are that in this
English conversation he had in mind the German “Überzeugung”. Wittgenstein’s
point here is that Moore’s sceptic opponents take his ‘knowing with absolute cer-
tainty’ to express an extremity of conviction. What we need to show them is that
whether certainty is at its highest degree is not a subjective but a logical matter: a
point at which there is neither ‘making more certain’ nor ‘turning out to be false’.
Some empirical propositions do qualify as attaining that point, which justifies the
use of “I know” with them logically. This does not seem to me to tally with the
later notes, but I cannot promise to identify a moment of change of mind.

Finally, the penultimate paragraph, on page 92 (74-5), needs mention, for it is
another early expression of the ‘Weltbild’ concept. I quote the first two sentences.

Certain propositions belong to my ‘frame of reference’. If I had to give
them up, I shouldn’t be able to judge anything.

Of course, there might be copyright problems if a new edition were proposed that
included the American conversations, but I hope these could be overcome. I
regard them as an extremely important part of Wittgenstein’s working out of his
ideas on this subject, and they are what I had in mind when I distinguished above
between small additions that would improve a new ‘Certainty’ edition and large
ones that could make it ideal.

The first section of On Certainty as it is now printed (its §§ 1-65) appears from
the editors’ Preface to have been written in Vienna after the American visit, dur-
ing Christmas–New Year 1949-1950. I shall comment on only a few isolated para-
graphs – beginning indeed with a sub-paragraph, the first of § 1. It is in effect put
in Moore’s mouth, as an expression of what Wittgenstein takes to be his message,
and I quote it so as to bring its meaning out better than its rather lame translation.

If you know that here is one hand [and here is another], we’ll grant you all
the rest.

§ 7 is another expression of the ‘Weltbild’ concept.
My life shows that I know, or am certain, that there is a chair over there, a
door, and so on. – I say to my friend for example “Have that chair”, “Shut
the door”, etc., etc..

§ 12 calls on the elementary logic of “know”, which requires what is known to be
true.

For “I know …” seems to describe a state of affairs that guarantees as a fact
what is known. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

In other words, the use of “I know …” is no guarantee because the claimed fact
can be false, leaving the would-be knower to say “I thought”; but our instinctive
requirement is that more than that should be built into the logic of “know”, giving
some kind of guarantee. The remainder of the notes can be seen as a search for that
quasi-guarantee.

Having already cited §§ 31 and 33, I ought to quote at least the former.

The propositions [Moore’s] that one comes back to again and again as if
bewitched – I should like to eliminate them from philosophical language.

However, later in these notes Wittgenstein does not eliminate them but goes to
some trouble to devise contexts in which their use is reasonable, leaving only their
idle use to be eliminated.

§ 37 is an interesting postscript to the claims of idealists and realists, last men-
tioned as mere war cries, and to meaningless assertions retaining meaning for their
asserters. “There are physical objects” does after all mean something (false and true
respectively) to those antagonists. At least we can say that their assertion and
counter assertion are failures to express something that cannot be expressed in that
manner. Demonstrating their failure, however, is not enough: we need insight into
it, and require an investigation to find a proper point of attack for our criticism. This
never happens with respect to idealism and realism, but this paragraph can be read
as a ‘campaign outline’ for the investigation of knowledge and certainty that is to
come.

The three paragraphs that I suggested could have come between §§ 65 and 66
can be found on page 79 of Last Writings Volume II, and while they are not an
insertion into das Innere are set in its context, as we see from the phrase “diese
Untersuchung”. They form the end of MS 173.

There appear to be propositions that have the character of empirical prop-
ositions but whose truth is, for me, unassailable. That is to say, if I assume
they are false I must mistrust all my judgements.
At all events, there are errors that I accept as normal and those that have a different character, and have to be isolated from my other judgements as a passing confusion. But aren't there also transitions between these two?

If one brings the concept of knowledge into this investigation it will be no use; for knowledge is not a psychological condition whose peculiarities enable one to explain all sorts of things. Much rather, the special logic of the concept ‘knowledge’ is not that of psychological condition. [Italics to express word order.]

This is still not to set apart cases that would (if they happened) be evidence of such deception by puckish circumstance as not to warrant the term “error” at all.

That possibility is, however, hinted at in § 66, where the real ‘knowledge and certainty’ notes at last get under way. This paragraph, incidentally, uses the word “Sicherheit”, not “Gewissheit”, and Elizabeth translates it as “assurance” in the first paragraph but “certainty” in the second, making one wonder whether Wittgenstein means it in the first as equivalent to “conviction” (see above). I believe not, but I leave readers to judge.

I make assertions about reality with different degrees of certainty. How does the degree of certainty show? What consequences has it?

It may for example be a matter of certainty of memory, or of perception. I may be certain of my subject but know what test might convict me of error. For example, I am quite certain of the date of a battle, but if I should find a different date in a well-known history book, then I would alter my opinion, and shouldn’t thereby be adrift in all judgement.

§§ 67-75 then take the bull by the horns and (explicitly in § 71 as a mental disturbance) discuss examples of such preposterously false beliefs that they cannot be called mistakes.

This idea then retreats to give way to ‘Weltbild’ (shortly ahead), while § 84 gives a first explanation of what is wrong with Moore’s over-obvious assertions. This particular one is the earth’s having existed long before his birth. In saying he knows it he gives an impression that he is saying something about himself, besides being about the physical world. His knowing this or that is of no interest to us, only how he knows it. For example, if he had said he knew the distance between two stars we should assume that he had undertaken certain astronomical investigations, but here we all seem to know as much as he does and yet are at a loss to say what our or his reasons are – there is certainly no implication that he has taken a line of enquiry that we haven’t thought of.
§ 90 has an interesting point that the etymological relationship between the German “wissen” and the Latin “videre” indicates a primitive meaning for “I know”, in that it is supposed to express a relation between me and a fact (not the meaning of a proposition, as “I believe” does) and we find ourselves in one of Wittgenstein’s elaborations of our philosophical temptations. This series of paragraphs runs finally into the sand with § 91, where he asks whether Moore has the correct reason for his conviction, because, on Russell’s rules, if he hasn’t he doesn’t know – but Wittgenstein’s whole bent has been that the reasons various people have for these typical truisms are much of a muchness.

§ 92 is a new start, for as I have said it introduces ‘Weltbild’ as a serious concept, with Moore having to convert a king to a new view of the world. §§ 93–95 take this up and I do not think require further comment.

§§ 96–99 express a point that was made in Colour I, § 32, and III, § 19, that sentences expressing empirical propositions can come to be treated as expressing rules by which other empirical propositions can be tested, and vice versa.

§ 106 is the first of many paragraphs dealing with the moon. I find it interesting that none of his arguments in these is seriously undermined by the fact that people have been to the moon. They still, mutatis mutandis one might say, hold water.

§ 132 is an aside that deserves to be quoted for its wit.

People have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts all experience. Today one judges that aeroplanes, the radio etc. are means bringing peoples together and spreading culture.

§ 136 is a concession to Moore, in so far as, while not conceding that Moore was speaking properly in saying that he knew this and that, it does grant him a proper intention: by listing nothing but empirical propositions that we accept without testing, he is exemplifying “propositions that play a particular logical role in our system of empirical propositions”.

This and the previous idea are brought together in summary in § 142:

It is not individual axioms that strike me as obvious, but a system in which consequences and premises mutually support each other.

In § 151 Wittgenstein expressly denies that Moore knows what he claims to know, “but it does stand firm for him, just as it does for me; regarding it as firmly established belongs to our method of doubt and enquiry.”

§ 155 reverts to the point that in certain circumstances one cannot be said to be mistaken. Naturally, this does not stop one uttering a falsehood, nor (one might
add, remembering §§ 67-71) being under a colossal delusion, and so the “cannot” is a logical one. If Moore asserted the opposite of his propositions we shouldn’t just disagree with him but think him deranged.

In § 178 Moore’s improper use of “I know …” is characterised, in effect, as a non-sequitur. He treats it as something that can no more be doubted than “I am in pain”, and since the truth of “… follows from the truth of “I know …”, it cannot be doubted either. If I can expand to bring out Wittgenstein’s characterisation of Moore (I don’t guarantee that it is fair), we agree with Moore because we can see his hands, but Moore is ‘giving vent’ to an inner conviction of knowledge, a knowledge-feeling, and wants us to acknowledge that. Or in § 180, “I believe …” is a ‘giving vent’ but “I know …” isn’t [and has no business pretending to be].

§§ 191 and 192 end this first section. If everything speaks for and nothing against something, does that make it certainly true? One can say it does, but the question still remains whether it agrees with the facts. Nevertheless, this is going round in circles. Justification has to come to an end.

§ 193 picks up on “certainty” rather than “knowledge”. In § 194 it has two meanings: complete conviction, total absence of doubt, is subjective certainty – but what is objective certainty? The impossibility of a mistake – but logical impossibility? In § 195 Wittgenstein brings up again, but unfortunately does not pursue, what this could mean: circumstances in which (here, believing he is sitting in his room when he isn’t) one would not say (my italics) he had made a mistake (his).

§§ 196-286, after which a date is going to appear, form a unit in which all kinds of examples of evidence of certainty are examined, and two brief paragraphs, §§ 220 and 254, encapsulate their message.

The reasonable man [a legal concept, in English at least] does not have certain doubts.

Every ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this.

The date is 23.9.50, and §§ 287-299 make up the end of that section. The first thing to say about them is that they read extremely well, and thus give an impression that they summarise the lessons Wittgenstein has learnt. I select two in particular for quotation as contributing to the ‘Weltbild’ concept, §§ 292 and 298.

Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones, at most change our whole way of looking at things.

We are quite certain of it does not just mean that every single person is certain of it but that we belong to a community that is bound together by science and education.
The final set of notes, begun the next year, on the tenth of March 1951, are preaced by a remark about the dishonesty of plagiarisers, polished as the notes on knowledge progress. These polishings are a distinct series from the missing ones already mentioned about people who find keys with which they can open no doors, and I give here the final effort as I copied it in 1952.

Das entschuldigt die Unredlichkeit derer nicht, die ihren Veröffentlichungen durch meine von mir nicht veröffentlichten Einfälle (Beispiele, Methoden), ein Ansehen verschaffen. Denn wenn auch, was sie davon tragen können, nicht wertvoll ist, so halten sie es doch für wertvoll, und es ist auch besser, als was sie selbst erdenken können.

I cannot reproduce the paranoid flavour of that in translation, but I owe it to readers to give the sense.

That doesn’t excuse the dishonesty of those who win repute for their publications from my own unpublished ideas (examples, methods). For even if what they get from those has no value, they think it valuable, and it really is better than what they can think up for themselves.

This use of “das” (the first two attempts had begun with “damit”), appearing to refer back to something mentioned previously, is the only remotely objective evidence I can offer for the possibility of the existence in 1952 of a now missing notebook containing polished comments on the misuse of stolen keyrings.

The knowledge notes themselves rapidly come to the point, with § 302, that saying “perhaps we are wrong” is useless if the evidence for this is as little to be trusted as any evidence. Doubt about 12 x 12 being 144 in the next paragraph is an example – if we distrust that, why should we trust any calculation at all? § 304 comes to what ought to be the rescue: making a mistake in this calculation doesn’t come into question because of what we say (my italics again) – I might say I had been confused but not that I had made a mistake. As so often, one would think this had been settled in § 71 – it is not called a mistake; but § 305 declares yet once more that yet once more a step is needed like that of the theory of relativity.

Knowledge and certainty, we are told in § 308, belong to different categories, and are not, like assuming and being certain, differing ‘mental states’. Knowledge, not being certain, is what interests us now, and the logical point that for certain empirical propositions there can be no doubt if judgement is to be possible at all. Is it (§ 309) that rule and empirical proposition merge into each other?
§ 310-317 give examples of doubts that are not merely idle but undermine our ‘game’ of knowledge, certainty and serious doubt alike, and §§ 318-331 elaborate this game and how the reasonable man plays it.

§ 332 brings Moore and the moon together: someone who made remarks like Moore’s on the subject without intending to philosophise would seem radically different from us. That this is a difference of Weltbild is clear from § 338, where Wittgenstein asks how the lives of people who insist that it is a mere matter of extreme improbability whether they have ever been on the moon would differ from our lives. He mentions that there really are people who say the same about water freezing over a fire, and asks the same of them. §§ 342 and 344 provide telling summary paragraphs:

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in fact not doubted.

My life consists in my being content to accept a great deal.

In § 402, ahead, Wittgenstein makes use of the German “in der Tat” for “in fact” to quote Faust with

… und schreib getrost
   “Im Anfang war die Tat.”

(and write with confidence “In the beginning was the deed”; but Goethe’s form of the verb was “schreibe”, and I take it that in making this alteration Wittgenstein was addressing himself).

From § 347 to well beyond § 402, one could say to § 425, he gives Moore propositions a run for their money, starting with Moore’s “I know that that’s a tree” and ending with his own equivalents, like (§ 417) “I know that for the last month I have had a bath everyday” and (§ 421) “I am in England”. What is important about this series is that he invents circumstances that show a serious use for such sentences, even, in § 350, a philosophical use, namely to demonstrate that one can know more than mathematical or logical truths. To be sure, later, in § 407, he wants to reply to Moore “You don’t know anything”, but wouldn’t say this to a non-philosopher.

§ 356 requires particular comment. In spite of having argued that knowledge is not a mental state, he says that this mental state (Moore’s, of course) is no guarantee of what is going to happen; but it does consist in our not understanding where doubt could get a foothold or checks would be possible – precisely, I take it, one of the things that knowledge as a matter of logic consists in.
§ 387 is followed by an aside that should put us on our guard that something important has been said – it could interest a philosopher who can think for himself to read his notes. The important thing is that he wants to allow that Moore could meaningfully say “I know that that’s a tree” if he meant something definite by it. How this connects with the opening point, no doubt equally important, that degrees of certainty can be assigned without giving reasons why one is so little or so very certain, I cannot say.

After meeting his Martian in § 430, Wittgenstein has in § 431 another personal “I know” that he would only exceptionally utter but shows knowledge of in his behaviour. It reads like a description of his room at the top of 27 St. John’s Street, but it was actually written in his more spacious quarters in Cambridge. Well before this entry of 26.3.51 (Monk on his page 575 says at the beginning of February, which makes all of §§ 300 onwards written in Cambridge) he had already travelled by train to Cambridge with Elizabeth, who read Kleist’s *Heinrich Prinz von Homburg* to him, to his great approval. (In the Moore-Malcolm letters, two written after Wittgenstein’s death give more information about his last days. Malcolm (May 4, 1951) says that Wittgenstein’s last letter to him, printed in the Malcolm *Memoir* as Letter 57, had been written on April 16th, saying that he had twice visited Moore for philosophical discussions. Moore (April 30/51), informing Malcolm of Wittgenstein’s death, says that they had also met while out walking on the 18th, when Wittgenstein looked well and said he was expecting Drury to visit him from the 28th to the 30th, a day too late because he was unconscious when Drury arrived.)

§ 451 withdraws an objection to Moore propositions but not in a way that is satisfactory. Meaning can be given to “That is a tree” by enlarging on what is being called one, thus: “The object over there that looks like a tree is not an artificial imitation of a tree but a real one” – but in what weird circumstances would one actually say that?

§ 460 brings up the question of whether mere superfluity is what is wrong with Moore propositions. Addressed to a doctor: “This is a hand, not [an artificial imitation of one]. I’ve injured it, etc., etc..” might not be understood as a piece of merely superfluous information, indeed might not be understood as information at all. If it is in doubt, why isn’t my being a human being in doubt too? Nevertheless, one can imagine very rare cases in which such a declaration isn’t superfluous, or is superfluous without being absurd.

A few paragraphs beyond that there is a three-day gap at the end of March and the beginning of April, which I originally guessed was when the move to Cambridge took place, but the second edition of the Malcolm *Memoir* settles the matter.
Wittgenstein had written his last letter to Malcolm from St. John’s Street (Letter 54) on 12.1.51, his first from Cambridge (55) on “Today. (That’s all I know)”, his next (56) on 19.3.51 and his last (57) on 16.4.51, the date given by Malcolm to Moore.

With § 464, on 3.4.51, there begins a series of attempts, some of them very witty, to provide innocent occasions for Moore propositions. 5.4 opens with an aside marked with vertical lines:

Here there is still a big gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will be filled now.

This could refer to the last paragraph of the previous day, extra to the above series:

Why is there no doubt that I am called L.W.? It does not seem at all like something that one could establish without ado as beyond doubt. One should not think that it is one of the indisputable truths.

In other words the gap is to explain how ‘local’ indubieties can be as much beyond doubt (to the locals) as global ones and yet lack their status. Wittgenstein does return to this problem later. Or the aside could herald (I like to hope) the problem that Wittgenstein is not happy that he has settled, of the double meaning of “cannot be mistaken”, between no error can pragmatically be in question and could not be called a mistake even if extraordinary circumstance revealed it to be wrong. That problem is expressed in § 492, on 10.4.

“Do I know or do I only believe … ?” might also be expressed like this: what if it seemed to turn out that what until now has seemed immune to doubt was a false assumption? Would I react as I do when a belief has proved to be false; or would it seem to knock from under my feet the ground on which I stand in making any judgements at all? – But of course I do not mean this as a prophecy.

Would I simply say “I should never have thought it!” – or would I have to refuse to revise my judgement, because such a ‘revision’ would amount to an annihilation of all yardsticks?

Here Wittgenstein is regarding the extraordinary circumstances as being the misleading ones, and presumably things are one step more extreme in his later discussion of extraordinary circumstances that actually reveal the truth.

When he says, in the next paragraph, that perhaps he has to accept certain authorities in order to make any kind of judgements, he does not mean distin-
guished members of the academic and scientific community, but guiding facts and rules that govern research.

§ 494, in effect, undermines the gambit of refusing to acknowledge extraordinary circumstances on the grounds that all judgement would have to be jettisoned, by comparing his dogmatic expression of his refusal to Frege’s law of identity (Grundgesetze I, xviii). On the other hand, § 497, faced not with extraordinary circumstances but a sceptic’s constant carping, reinforces the refusal to abandon certainty, calling it infallible because it lays down a language game.

On 11.4, § 498 expresses Wittgenstein’s underlying dilemma: on the one hand, he is in entire agreement with someone who rejects the sceptic by crying “nonsense!”, but on the other hand won’t let him defend himself by saying “I know”. Yet eventually, on 13.4 and 14.4, in §§ 520 and 521, he grants Moore this right, with the proviso that whether or not he is justified in any particular case is of no philosophical consequence. “Moore’s mistake lies in this – countering the assertion that one cannot know that by saying ‘I do know it’. ” In between, however, there has been an important set of paragraphs, §§ 512-515, which ask again whether extraordinary circumstances could force one to give up fundamentally held beliefs. The first answer is that one wouldn’t be forced to, because they are so fundamental that one is entitled to discount (I take it) apparent counter examples; then utterly extraordinary events are envisaged, so that instead of deciding for or against one would no longer know what ‘true’ and ‘false’ meant; neither would one know their meaning if one’s ‘local’ knowledge of one’s own name came adrift.

After Moore’s mistake and two further paragraphs, the final insertion on das Innere begins, including the date 15.4, which is repeated when the subject turns back to knowledge.

From there up to § 554, which ends 18.4, the practical requirement for doubt to be set aside in the practice of our language games is expressed, with two interesting asides. §§ 531 and 532, which allow that “I know” can express the truth of one’s (or Moore’s) state, are followed by

I am doing philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her keys.

One might think that “state” (“Zustand”) here meant “situation”, for example “I am sitting in front a tree I planted twenty years ago, and see how it has grown!”, but § 533 shows that the ‘state’ in question is context-less, in other words a mental state, just what he has been denying, and so it is no wonder that he feels like an old woman.
The other aside comes at the end of 17.4 and follows § 549, which says, correctly, that one is justified, even if wrong, in saying that there is a chair over there, if one is certain, but it does not tell us how one can be certain but wrong that the chair is ‘over there’. In the next room, perhaps, if one put the chair there oneself and did not realise that someone had moved it. His aside is

Pretensions are a mortgage that burdens a philosopher’s power to think.

§ 553 summarises the view that he is content to accept:

It is strange: if I say, without any special occasion, “I know” – for example, “I know that I am now sitting in a chair”, this statement seems to me unjustified and over-reaching. But if I make the same statement where there is some need for it, then, although I am not a jot more certain of its truth, it seems to me to be perfectly justified and everyday.

The only quibble I have with this is that I do not find it strange, but perhaps that is the result of being brainwashed by these notes for over half a century.

I leave unquoted § 555 of 19.4 as an account of different kinds of things known which do not require special circumstances to justify them. One of these is that water put on a fire will boil (and not freeze), which returns ahead, and since no philosophical revolutions intervene I shall discuss it immediately. In § 613, unlike optimistic quantum physics students who tell you (quite correctly but irrelevantly – one is mentioned in § 338, and I once met one myself) that things like that could happen once or twice in the course of the universe’s history, Wittgenstein would assume some special influence (a colossally cold down-draught in my chimney, perhaps) if my heated water froze. § 613 summarises all these quandaries:

But would it actually be unthinkable that I might stay in the saddle however much the facts bucked?

A little ahead (in § 634) being determined to stay in the saddle is expressed by “and if the worst comes to the worst I shall make my proposition into a norm”, and I think the dilemma that is unfolding in these final notes could be expressed by countering “but suppose I thought I was mounting a spirited horse and realised too late that I had jumped onto a saddle-less bull, on whose back there was no question of staying on”.

In § 617 Wittgenstein seems to allow this by saying that certain events could make him abandon the old language game, but in § 619 he steps back from this prong of his dilemma by maintaining that sudden irregularities in natural events
wouldn’t *have* to throw him out of the saddle – he could still draw conclusions but the process might not still be properly called “[scientific] induction”.

In § 622 (on 24.4) he reverts (see §§ 387 and 520) to his admission that Moore was right to say “I know” *in certain circumstances*, although “I know that I am a human being” still means nothing to him. But imagining such circumstances takes away from these sentences “everything that is philosophically astounding”.

After § 634 (the norm) there follow four “Ich kann mich nicht irren” paragraphs (and the date 25.4) which are thoroughly straightforward and suggest no especial meaning for “making a mistake”, but § 639 asks what the devil use that claim is if, as one has to admit, it, and the proposition it is backing, *can* be wrong. Or (§ 640) are we to say that the claim rules out a certain *kind* of mistake? This proves to be an over-simplification – there are various kinds of mistake that it rules out, or tries to rule out. For example (§ 645) my confronting a mistake might take the form of having to admit that I hadn’t been competent to judge. And (§ 647) there are mistakes that the language game prepares for and others that are complete irregularities.

§ 648 is a rather complicated account of attempts to convince someone that the claim is correct, but they can never show that I haven’t dreamed everything, nor that I haven’t been making some consistent slip of the tongue (which is where the ash and the elm come in).

In § 650 there is an interesting contrast with the theoretical improbabilities of quantum mechanics. The possibility of a *mistake* can be eliminated in various cases, and these include the practical elimination of mistakes in calculation. It would be absurd to say after exhaustive checking that a mistake is still only very improbable. Agreed, on grounds of common sense, but Wittgenstein’s grounds have just the sort of ‘fishy’ status that he has always been ready to deride: if the checking appeared to indicate a mistake, once in a blue moon he seems to suggest, why shouldn’t we suspect a mistake in the checking? Because, simply, we are presupposing the sort of checking that can be checked in turn.

§ 654, after the penultimate date of 26.4.51, contrasts the mathematical proposition that \(12 \times 12 = 144\) with the clearly empirical one that the vast majority of mathematicians who carry out that calculation arrive at the result 144. No one would dispute this, but has it the same degree of certainty as the mathematical one? The answer, in the next paragraph, is that mathematical propositions of that type have been given an official stamp of incontrovertibility (in § 657 they are fossils). That cannot be said of the ‘local’ proposition that *he* is called L.W., nor of propositions about the calculations of particular mathematicians. That makes three types of
propositions that he is comparing for their certainty, and I cannot see that their difference as types gives us any clue as to their relative degrees of certainty. That has to be judged for particular cases, and as to mathematical propositions, which seem to be hors de concours in this respect, I am sure that a very talented historian of mathematics could provide examples that were not. (See Imre Lakatos, *Proofs and Refutations*.)

§ 658 is where the final struggle with the dilemma begins. It asks whether someone could be in the grip of a delusion and, perhaps, find out the truth later. Wittgenstein says that this could apply to any item in the multiplication tables, and this is perfectly true: a mathematician might be injected with a drug that makes him declare with absolute confidence that $12 \times 12 = 145$ and come to his senses when it wears off. Nevertheless, the *interesting* cases are where someone suffers some monumental and complicated delusion about everyday circumstances — say that while sitting here and typing this I should be overcome with the detailed delusion that I am Isaiah Berlin sitting in Moscow and doing what he would have done if he had been allowed to go there in 1940 (and speaking Russian, a language I do not understand).

§ 659 is less adventurous. It discusses “I cannot be making a mistake about the fact that I have just had lunch”. Someone I say this to may think I am lying or am out of my wits but not that I am making a mistake. In such a case that would have no meaning — except that there could be some simple explanation like my having fallen asleep and woken up without noticing. That *would* be called making a mistake. So he is prompted to say that he distinguishes between different kinds of mistake. The sad thing is that on this and his last day he has no time to do more than hint as to what distinctions he might draw.

§§ 660–663 form a unit. *How* can he be making a mistake about his name being L.W.? Or about never having been on the moon? “I have never been on the moon — but I can be mistaken” would be idiotic. Even the thought that I might have been taken there in my sleep by some means I have no inkling of *would not give me any right* to speak of a possible mistake here. If I do, I am playing the game *wrong*. The game requires, I take it, that some kind of acceptable mistake must be supposed (see § 670, the beginning of the last day, on the fundamental principles of human enquiry). This enables him to declare, in § 663, that he has a right to say “I can’t be making a mistake about this” even if he is in error. This can only mean (for otherwise it is preposterous) that certain classes of hypothetical and over-fanciful errors would not be *called* mistakes if (extraordinarily) they should happen. Yet what of other periods and other cultures? In them, things quite foreign to Wittgenstein’s idea of the principles of enquiry might count as acceptable imagined
mistakes, and things we accept ruled out. Or is the truth: in the range of human life there might have been all sorts of differences between the acceptable and the unacceptable, but in every society there have been some language games that have been played and others that have not been played?

§ 667 maintains that even if one arrived in a tribe who believed that people were taken to the moon in dreams one couldn’t say “I have never been to the moon – of course I can be mistaken”. Not even if politeness demanded it? Or if they were in the habit of burning non-believers alive? But perhaps those qualifications are irrelevant to Wittgenstein logic.

§ 669 tells us that the sentence “I can’t be mistaken about it” is certainly used in practice, but it might mean simply what it says, namely that there is no question of things not being as I say, or be an exaggeration aimed at convincing people. That is two meanings, and then there is still “even if I turned out to be wrong it wouldn’t be called a mistake”, and perhaps subdivisions of that.

§§ 671 to the end form another unit. They centre round flight, not to the moon but to other parts of the world in the normal manner. I fly in such a way to somewhere distant, but meet people away from the aerodrome who know nothing about normal aviation. I tell them I have flown from … and insist that I cannot be mistaken. To them, the obvious explanation is that I was put in a packing case and put on a train, and imagined I had been flying, which would certainly have counted as a mistake. So I give them lessons in aeronautics, and they admit that I cannot have made a mistake (in the normal sense) but still wonder if I mightn’t have dreamed the whole business or been under a spell. Naturally, not having read Wittgenstein they won’t express that by saying that it wouldn’t be called a mistake.

In § 674 the important admission is made that while Moore has properly cited cases where one is correct in saying that one cannot be making a mistake, and Wittgenstein can offer more, it is impossible to give a common characteristic of them. An example is N.N.’s having flown from America a few days earlier. I took this to be Malcolm, flying to be at Wittgenstein’s death-bed, but letters already quoted show that he did not. “Only if he is mad can he take anything else to be possible.” For whoever it was (or perhaps Wittgenstein was wishing that Malcolm could come) to believe that he had come by steamer and only dreamed that he had flown when he actually had flown would certainly be mad, but so would be the alternative case, that he had actually come by steamer and hallucinated flying. In neither case would one speak of a mistake (and if I am wrong about that it is a case of brainwashing). § 675 comes to my rescue.

If someone believes that he has flown from America to England in the last few days, then, I believe, he cannot be making a mistake.
And just the same if someone says that he is at this moment sitting at a table and writing.

§ 676, the last, deserves to be taken in even slower motion. In cases where in normal circumstances I am in practice infallible, can I not be drugged? Now two kinds of drug can be in question, ones that remove my consciousness but leave me having dreams and ones that leave me conscious but hallucinated. Wittgenstein unfortunately opts for the former. Following N.N. crossing the Atlantic in one way and hallucinating that he had done so in another, he needs the latter kind of drug. After all, he opens with “But even if in such cases …”, i.e. such cases as N.N.’s, but he goes on “If I am [drugged] and if the drug has taken away my consciousness, then I am not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming.” For if I am, I am clearly not thinking, and even if noises are coming out of my mouth and they sound articulated I am not talking. Someone who while dreaming utters the words “I am dreaming” is no more right (here the word is used in its normal sense and needs no italics) than if the words uttered had been “It is raining” while it actually was raining, and not even if there had been a [causal] connection between the dream and the cause of the rain. No one can dispute that, but the fly in this impressive ointment is that Wittgenstein has changed tack. I can only imagine I am dreaming if I am conscious – to be told by Wittgenstein when I say so that I am not ‘seriously supposing’. That may well be so, but the argument is now based on a quite different supposition, that I am not conscious at all. Wittgenstein’s famous final sentence, far from demonstrating the fallacy of worrying about whether one is dreaming while one is merely worrying, demonstrates something quite pedestrian, namely that words uttered while really dreaming are no more speech than snoring while dreaming is. The paragraph is no sufficient response to the Chinese poet who, on waking from a dream in which he had been a butterfly, was not sure whether he was a human being waking from a dream about being a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that it was a human being. I have never understood why everyone else, from Elizabeth Anscombe in 1952 onwards, has always seen this paragraph as an appropriate final masterpiece.

That is not to say that the set of notes as a whole, prefaced by the notes and conversations that led to it, is not masterly. My admiration has not been dimmed by the task of commenting on all of them in detail. Nor do I think any less of the ‘das Innere’ notes, granted that they are only unfinished sketches. And colour: while I have quibbled about particular points, I have always found the notes stimulating and interesting, and I think that artists and stage designers who were willing
both to consider their conceptual lessons and to learn from their failure to hit scientific issues properly, could benefit enormously.

One regret remains to be expressed. The notes on knowledge and certainty were written so directly in response to Moore that it astounded me that Elizabeth never sent him a copy of them. I shall be very glad to be proved wrong if biographers find evidence that she did. The fact, which Elizabeth must have known, that Wittgenstein went twice to talk to Moore in the last weeks of his life, almost certainly about knowledge, makes her failure even more perplexing. In 1953 at the Dartington Summer School of Music I met Moore’s younger son, Timothy Moore the composer, and was itching to tell him about the notes, thinking he could ask his father to ask Elizabeth to show them to him, but I had been given such a drubbing for showing my translation to Iris Murdoch that I gave up the idea and stuck to small talk. On top of my astonishment, already expressed, that Malcolm knew nothing of the notes either, I can only wonder at this disturbing manifestation of trustee psychology.
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My father was born on 21st March 1925, he was the youngest of four children growing up in modest surroundings in the east end of London during a time of great hardship. As a boy, he fell in love with literature and poetry and from a young age began writing stories and poems of his own. He excelled at school and as a result was lucky enough to secure a place at a grammar school where he continued to bury his head in books and in particular, philosophy.

When the outbreak of war came, like most other fourteen year olds, he was evacuated to the countryside to escape the relentless bombardments of the Luftwaffe. Here, he continued to write, but as the war raged on he became increasingly despondent with the immense loss of life that was happening daily, not just on home soil, but all over Europe and Asia. In particular, he viewed with extreme distaste, the RAF’s apparent policy of total destruction in the fire bombing of German cities like Dresden. When in 1943, he was served his call up papers to report for active service, he made the bold and unpopular step of declaring himself a conscientious objector. As a result, he found himself at the tender age of eighteen serving a 3 month sentence at HM Prison Strangeways, Manchester. Upon his release from prison, he joined a Quaker run pacifist organisation known as the Friend’s Ambulance Unit. It was through this organisation that in 1945 he ended up in Berlin as part of the Allied led clean up effort in the immediate aftermath of war. It was here that he learned to speak German.

Soon after he returned to the UK, armed with a new language and a new found drive, he secured a place as an undergraduate at New College, Oxford studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics. It was here in Oxford he had his head turned by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. During the 1950’s Wittgenstein, who had produced very little in recent years, began to impact on the Oxford philosophical scene, although only really amongst a small band of disciples. Denis, with his command of the German language and thirst for new philosophical work, could not resist. It was also here that he struck up what would turn out to be life long friendships with both Isaiah Berlin and Iris Murdoch amongst others. Upon
Wittgenstein’s death, my father was the obvious choice for the executors of his estate to be handed the task of editing and translating his final work. It is said that Denis Paul was the first person to decipher Wittgenstein’s rather odd habit of writing only on the right hand side of a number of notebooks, before switching back to the first notebook and continuing on the left hand side for the remainder – causing immense confusion for quite some time, but once the code was cracked it all made sense.

Wittgenstein’s manuscripts would continue to occupy my father for the rest of his life, although he would often become sidetracked for large portions of time, where he managed to become entangled in various book projects from Irish epics, to new translations of Sappho and Homer and on to wildly optimistic forays into novel writing that produced an abundance of work, but sadly not a word would be published. Although it gave him great pride to see his close friends Murdoch and Berlin achieve continued success, I think that it also must have frustrated him greatly that his work never quite received the attention I believe he thought it deserved. The single constant in his life was Wittgenstein however, and the work that is within these pages is quite literally his life’s work for the past fifty years or so.

My father managed to create a name for himself not by a large body of published work, but by hearsay and relentless correspondence as well as his constant updates to his website www.wittgenstein.co.uk and although he was never affiliated to any particular university (we always believed he was snubbed due to his rather eccentric thinking), there were many Wittgenstein scholars over the years who have come across my father in some form or another and he would always extend to them endless and unconditional time and support in any questions they would want answers to. I honestly believe that the Wittgenstein community owes Denis Paul a huge amount of gratitude and respect for his largely unsung work.

For the final few years of his life, my father would work every hour of the day seven days a week, desperate to have his book finished. He was nearing the winning post when he was diagnosed with terminal cancer shortly after the birth of his first Grandson, Pablo Paul. A few weeks later, on December 21st 2006 my father died aged 81 years, surrounded by his family. It meant so much to him that with the help of Bergen, he was finally able to have his life’s work published for the world to see and his grandchildren to be proud of. I am only saddened by the fact that as I went to his home after he had died in order to gather some of his personal belongings, there on the doormat was the proof copy of his book, ready for his perusal and final amendments – he never saw it in this completed form.
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