Holger Lyre


Multiple Realizability (MR) is still regarded as one of the principal arguments against any type reductionist account of higher-order properties and their special laws. In my talk I will argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of categories of MR cases. In a slogan: MR is itself multi-realized. We can, therefore, not expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as a antireductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a suitable taxonomy of the variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each category of cases. The talk will provide first steps into this direction.


20th century philosophy; metaphysics; philosophy; Wittgenstein Ludwig; approximation; bottom up ontology; domain specific reduction; family resemblance; functional reduction; idealization; multiple realizability; Nagel reduction; shared property

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