A CASE OF EARLY WITTGENSTEINIAN DIALOGISM: STANCES ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF “RED AND GREEN IN THE SAME PLACE”

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1. Dialogical style and musicality

My contention in this paper is that a dialogical structure may serve philosophical purposes, such as Wittgenstein’s inquiry into the meaning of the impossibility of two colours being at the same place at the same time. I aim to capture how his various statements about this subject “sound”.

In his Old Masters, Thomas Bernhard points out: “each of us possesses our own fully original logorrhoea, and mine is musicological … As you well know, I think all the time” (Reger’s words in the novel). Such lines, as Chantal Thomas has rightly noted in her book on Bernhard, are unmistakably Bakhtinian in character.¹ Musicians sometimes put into music conversational noises, even disharmonious or unpleasant raw voices. In his Notes on Literature, Adorno suggests that Beckett’s Endgame could be turned into a dissonant musical piece in the Viennese style. Thus it is that an asocial discordant speech, the modulations of which conform to the monomaniac behaviour of a narrator, would give rise to music of some kind.²

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It is this compositional approach that prevails in a dictation by Wittgenstein to Waismann, on the case of “Red and green in the same place”. The way in which it distributes various voices is an example of a dialogical style that operates philosophically (i.e. argumentatively). This dialogue takes place between various distinct “voices” or “I’s”, through each of which some character negotiates his own awareness of what the world represents for him, in accordance with modalities that always fall short of completeness and none of which coincides with the author’s voice.

What I am referring to here is the musical character of a philosophical compositional mode of writing, which I find to be operative in the work of Wittgenstein. In my view, unless one introduces dialogism of the kind that Bakhtin identified in his account of Dostoïevski’s poetics, the musical character of Wittgenstein’s work is bound to remain unintelligible. The latter also affords an instance of such a dialogism that is distinctly philosophical in character.


3. The text is from a typed manuscript by Friedrich Waismann, and titled “Rot und Grün”. It is published by Gordon Baker together with a dictation to Schlick from around 1930, called “Rot und Grün an demselben Ort” (pp. 9–11 of Wittgenstein Nachlass item TS 303), in The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle (VOW), original German texts and English translations, transcribed, edited and with an introduction by Gordon Baker, transl. by G. Baker, Michael Mackert, John Connolly and Vassilis Politis, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 396–411. The book is based on two sets of typescripts by Waismann, which mostly contain transcriptions of dictations or discussions with Wittgenstein. The “team of translators who produced the French text”, mentioned by Baker in his preface (p. xlviii), refers to Jan Sebestik, Christiane Chauviré, Gérard Guest, François Schmitz, Jean-Pierre Cometti, and myself, who have translated and commented these texts (Dictées de Wittgenstein à Schlick et pour Waismann, Paris, PUF, 2 vols., 1997–1998). In the second volume of the Dictées, the reader will find Gordon Baker’s article on “Our method to think about thinking” (see vol. 2, p. 292), where “our method” refers to different neglected aspects of philosophical conceptions. Baker seems to attribute to Waismann the idea of exhibiting internal conflicts in the philosopher by frontal reasoning, in order to expurgate prejudices in the manner of a Bakhtinian dialogue, but with a therapeutic goal resulting in the acknowledgement of one’s own rules.

In this way I hope to cast some light on the importance of a plurality of voices – rather than of a voice (in the singular) – which is echoed in the title *Voices of Wittgenstein*, which Gordon Baker gave to his posthumous English version of the Waismann papers.

In the short text we are here considering, no determinate voice may be singled out as Wittgenstein’s. Rather, it is as if some voice other than his own were speaking, and as if that voice itself splits into three distinct voices. In order to identify who is speaking through each of these voices, it is necessary to elucidate the meaning of the “we” (*wir*) in “we abrogate the rule” (*VOW* p. 405). One thinks of Henri Michaux: “One intends to write a novel and ends up writing philosophy”. In his “dialogical” text titled *Qui je fus*, three different voices talk together in a dissonant way; as if on a battlefield, the poet’s mind is assailed by the materialist, the “redemptionist” (or idealist), and the sceptic. Each states his own conception of things in his own words and grammar. In short, each one has “his music”. The view of the world as seen by the first voice can be summed up as “Our access to the world is through our hands”, that of the second voice as “Man is nothing but soul”, and that of the sceptic as “The mind is Dadaist”. Thus, these three voices are in dispute. The poet Michaux is in torment as long as these voices continue to discuss and prevent him from being at rest and thinking in silence; but, I’d like to ask, would he think at all in silence?

Although the theme of the incompatibility of colours in Wittgenstein’s writings is very different, it confronts us with a similar dialogue in a disputational mode. Let us recall Wittgenstein’s point about colours. The dilemma can be traced back to the *Tractatus* (see *TLP* 6.375 and 6.3751). The parenthesis in 6.3751 stresses that the logical product of two elementary propositions can be neither a tautology nor a contradiction.

In *Remarks on Logical Form* (1929), what used to be considered a contradiction now appears as a mutual exclusion. “R P T” and “B P T” cannot

5. *Qui je fus* (1927), Paris, Gallimard, 1998. “Redemptorists”, or “Bollandistes”, refers to the Jesuit school Henri Michaux attended in Belgium when he was young.

contradict each other, yet still they exclude one another.\textsuperscript{7} Now, strangely, there is something here that cannot be shown in a truth-table, since the logical product of the two propositions, $p$ and $q$, represents an impossible combination to which no state of affairs can correspond (RLF pp. 33–34). Herein lies the exclusion as opposed to the contradiction.\textsuperscript{8}

What is at stake here is the possibility of grasping logical form, of intuiting a simultaneous visual relation between R and B (or G) in the same place. The discordance that one feels here hinders, but does not prevent, the act of grasping. It hinders it, insofar as there is a “conflict in intuition”, to use Husserl’s words. But it does not prevent it, since one is able to grasp the relation “as one”. It is therefore an instance of “seeing as”. It is in such cases that rules intervene. Insofar as one may see the relation under various aspects, various possible voices become relevant, each of which embodies a distinct philosophical stance. “Seeing as” here opens the way to a dialogism which would seem otherwise to be confined to the genre of novels.\textsuperscript{9}

2. Three (four) voices

The various voices in “Red and green at the same place” are: an empiricist voice à la Mill, a phenomenologist voice à la Husserl, a grammatical voice à la Schlick, and an additional, different grammatical voice, which contrasts with the Schlickian voice.

First stance: the empiricist standpoint à la Mill (or how the experience accords with the perception of colours): “We” ask whether the empiricist could indicate to us

\textsuperscript{7} By the notation “R P T” Wittgenstein means “a proposition which asserts the existence of a colour R at a certain time T in a certain place P in our visual field”. See “Remarks on Logical Form”, repr. in Philosophical Occasions, J. Klagge & A. Nordmann (eds.), Indianapolis, Hackett, 1993, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{8} Cf. Philosophical Remarks, VIII, § 78.

\textsuperscript{9} I refer the reader here to previous articles of mine on this same problem of intuition in Husserl and Wittgenstein, “Comment saisir une relation d’impossibilité? Deux solutions pour un même problème d’intuition (Wittgenstein et Husserl)”, first published in Recherches husserliennes, Vol. 13 (Bruxelles, 2000), later in the review Manuscrito, Vol. XXIII, n. 2 (Campinas, Brazil, 2000), and since recast in my Comment écrivent les philosophes?, Paris, Kimé, 2003.
what one would see if such a proposition (and likewise its negation) were false. His response would be that he is indeed able to see it, yet it is beyond the reach of explanation. “We” reply that it is a grammatical rule. “We” is the instance that “abrogates the rule” (see VOW p. 401).

Second stance: what a Schlickian tells “us” (or the ostensive-grammatical position as a way of contradicting us): But a grammarian could object – and this is Schlick’s ostensive standpoint – that the logical impossibility derives from the meanings of words. Schlick is therefore that other who would say that “an ostensive definition fixes the meaning of the explained word” and thus the grammatical rules governing it (VOW p. 403). To this “contradicting” grammarian, “we” respond by pointing out that the rule does not follow from the explained meaning. “We” thereby dissociate ourselves from such a grammatical path. Thus, the grammarian who stands in opposition to both the Millian and the Husserlian does not coincide with the ostensive grammarian à la Schlick. There are in effect two distinct grammatical paths, and it is that of Schlick to which a notion of the ostensive use of concepts corresponds. Yet, it is not in virtue of an ostensive definition that red and green exclude each other; it is the role of a different grammatical voice and objection to elicit another way to treat the collision.

The “we ourselves” is now kept distinct from the “we” that, according to my reading, designates the former contradicting grammarian, e.g. Schlick (Dictées, vol. 1, p. 204; VOW p. 407). “We” reply – object – that the rule does not follow from the explained meaning (a Schlickian view). The distinction is corroborated by the passage in which “we” reply to the Schlickian, who thinks that ostensive definition is a ground for the incompatibility between red and green since the occurrence of a mental image cannot be equated with the meaning of words (Dictées, vol. 1, p. 202; VOW p. 403). An adept of a Schlickian conception of grammar reveals himself as endorsing a kind of instant-solipsism. So here the target of the argument has become a solipsistic construal of instantaneity, “Whenever I speak or hear the word ‘red’ I actually imagine something red” (VOW p. 403), the very idea of intentional directedness, a certain way of conceiving comparison (a word gets compared with an “object”), or again a private grasp whose validity holds only for an instant, hence cannot be shared.

The criticism of ostensive definition includes a criticism of a causal conception of meaning, which is also the target in other dictations. This con-
ception is deterministic: anyone who is given the ostensive definition thereby seems not only to have acquired this definition, “but also something else, in fact the sense that stands behind the word”. Thus “it seems that the understanding of the word ‘red’ contains in embryo everything which is later as it were spread out in front of us in the form of rules of grammar” (Dictées, vol. 1, p. 201; VOW p. 403) (the myth of logical possibility).

*Third stance: another grammatical path, “our” path (by contrast with the Schlickian one):* The question arises whether this third stance amounts to a “view”. It can be equated with the negation of the Schlickian thesis. In other words, the point is that it is not in virtue of an ostensive definition that red and green exclude each other. Note that the distinction between the second and the third stances parallels the duplicating of the meaning of “grammar”, revealing some uneasiness of the philosopher as confronted with the embarrassing case of “the rose is identical to red”. A parting of ways takes place within the philosopher. He is inhabited by two conflicting grammatical rules. This parting of ways expresses an alternative between two ways of seeing. It induces in the philosopher a feeling of irresolution, fostered by a feeling of the absence of rules (Dictées, vol. 1, p. 117; VOW p. 231).

*Fourth stance: Husserl’s stance (or the charge of the phenomenologist according to which we are trapped into arbitrariness):* This stance (which is subjected to criticism in a passage entitled “Anti–Husserl” in Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle), expresses the move to the idea of the a priori and essential nature of the “cannot” in “Red and green cannot be in the same place at the same time”. Wittgenstein and Schlick both challenge the idea of a phenomenal a priori, based as it is on the assumption of (what Elisabeth Rigal has called) a “logicity of experience”. What is here dismissed is the idea of any “third path” between the logical and the phenomenal. Such a third path is postulated by the claim that there exists a specific intuition whose object is a third

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kind of entity, distinct both from the purely phenomenal and the purely logical. According to Husserl, in effect, the opposition between the two may well be overcome. The content intentionally aimed at has objectivity in virtue of “the law-governed nature of the being-so” (eine Gesetzmässigkeit des Soseins) by which it is structured.\(^\text{13}\)

Husserl thus postulates a “discerning” (a “savoir-voir”, as Jocelyn Benoist puts it),\(^\text{14}\) which is sustained by laws of pure essence. One may invoke an experience-of-it-not-being-able-to-be-otherwise. Its ideal necessity has a unity which is just what underlies the intuitive conflict between two incompatible things, and which solves at a deep level what amounts to a mere dilemma at the superficial level. What has been mistaken for an arbitrary act of stipulation effectuated by the logician proves to be grounded, in fact, upon the very “nature” of colours, so to speak the colour in itself, a nature which no stipulation could ever undermine.

3. “Our” answer to the phenomenologist

The answer to the phenomenologist is that the sense may indeed be changed. This is a plea for the arbitrary. Providing that we change the rules, we may claim that red and green are in the same place but under different aspects that we are free to apprehend. Grammatical freedom is here tied up with aspect-perception. A series of questions ensues. This is the positive side of the grammatical standpoint embodied by “us” (Dictées, vol. 1, p. 203; VOW p. 405).

The crucial manoeuvre here is the endorsement of the following inference: if something is red, then it is green, and if something is green, then it...

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12. See her postscript to L. Wittgenstein, Remarques sur les couleurs (Mauvezin, Trans-Europ-Repess, 1983). We have challenged this reading in the paper of ours mentioned above (footnote 9), arguing that there is no such thing as a “logicity of experience” except from a phenomenological standpoint which is criticized by Schlick (especially in the section “Anti-Husserl”) in the name of Wittgenstein.


is red. This solution is based on synonymy. Ostensive definition turns out to be only part of the explanation of meaning. That is to say, it does not by itself settle the meaning. This solution opens the way to the hypothetical non-deterministic path according to which the criterion of meaning is not yet settled. Meaning “fluctuates”. We are here initiated into the stance that is fully developed in the text “Our method” (*Dictées*, vol. 1, p. 145; *VOW* p. 277). It is a “grammatical game”. A case of Greek philology is adduced in support of this argument: the case of the synonymy (= equivocity) of “*kuanos*” in Ancient Greek. To put it in a nutshell, it turns out to be indeed possible to abrogate the considered rule, to suspend the stipulated exclusion, and to posit “red and green in the same place” (*Dictées*, vol. 1, p. 204; *VOW* p. 407).

At this point, the Schlickian character becomes active again. The proposition “red and green in the same place”, he says, resembles the proposition “This piece of paper is green and round”. But by suspending our stipulation of the exclusion of red and green, we are departing from the model of sentences built along the pattern displayed by “This piece of paper has two properties”. Hence we are giving up the former rule and fixing another analogy. We here apply the method of treating problems presented in the Big Typescript (pp. 408–409): one has to specify the analogy that had not been previously recognized as such to prevent the misleading construal of repetitive analogies on the basis of patterns that have remained implicit, or so to speak unconscious. The job of this other grammatical stance is here to stress the fecundity of inventing different analogies. There is no change of rule – therefore no freedom – without abandoning a stipulation in favour of new analogies. It is interesting to note the way Wittgenstein conceives a change of grammar within the use of analogy by construing new analogies. It is a case of using analogies against analogies, that is to say, of using analogy as an argument against the metaphorical temptation inherent in using analogy, or, in other words, a strategy against being captivated by analogies within the very method of analogy (since there is no other way).

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15. On this, see “The justification of grammar”, *Dictées*, vol. 1, p. 118; *VOW* p. 233.
16. On the word “*kuanos*” and its double meaning in Greek, see *Dictées*, vol. 1, p. 203; *VOW* p. 407.
This freedom liberates us from preconceived pictures of either a mythical conformity to reality (the alleged nature of colours), or the model of a private, incommunicable inner (the mental instantaneous talisman, as David Pears puts it), or again a causal view of meaning (in which rules allegedly derive from conventions which are the causes of use).

For all that, this is not to say that language is a matter of whim. What is required is the rejection of a certain construal of arbitrariness, of the kind that one finds in Husserl. The core of grammatical freedom is a new construal of the use of the word “analogous”, which is possible only by working on oneself. What is thereby gained is variation of aspects as an effect of opposing received analogies. Such is the fruit of “anti-dogmatic method” as stressed by Gordon Baker (Dictées, vol. 2, p. 30).

4. Conceptual characters, Denkstile, and the author

Now, is the grammarian a “conceptual character” (to take up Deleuze’s expression) on an equal footing with the Greek characters of “the friend”, “the rival” …? This is far from obvious, although such expressions may be warranted as long as one grants the importance of concept construction, as well as of the physiognomic portrayal of various responses along with their various grammars, each of which stands as a view or style of thought, or a Denkstil (Ludwig Fleck).

We have above listed three of four ways of seeing, which advocate experience, essence, and words, respectively. The last of these comes in two distinct versions, i.e. it is construed either along the rigid line of ostension (unmistakably Schlickian), or along the liberal-hypothetic line.

We are tempted to say that Wittgenstein, through these styles of thinking, portrays various “conceptual characters” (cf. Deleuze), each being a certain aspect under which the “and” of “red and green in the same place” may be apprehended. In a way, this procedure reminds us of the old technique of “prosopopeia” according to which philosophical positions are incarnated in the living voice of a philosopher (remember Protagoras in Plato’s dialogues).

18. In French, “personnages conceptuels”; see below.
I am not so sure that we are dealing here with various so-called figures of “a presence internal to thought, of a condition of possibility of thought itself, in other words as a living category, a transcendental experience, a common element in thinking”. I believe that this technique rather enables us to grasp a particular point of view upon the world and upon oneself by exemplifying a *Vorbild* of a problem through the display of a *Denkstil*. During our joint work on the Waismann typescripts, Gordon Baker once told me that he was convinced that a major problem for Wittgenstein was the distinction between scepticism and hypothetism. This, he claimed, is a problem at the heart of these dictations, and probably the root of his interest in the discussions with Schlick.

What matters is what the world represents for each of the characters, and not what each character represents in the world. This is what Julia Kristeva has retained from Bakhtin. However, there is a Wittgensteinian way to render this representation, which is to show how the philosopher works on his own conception by displaying a *Denkstil* mainly (uncritically) based on petrified analogies. With the exception of the author, though. For the author “in person” does not seem to feature in those exchanges; he is absent.

How, then, does a character perceive himself? The grammarian draws his material from those words by which a character stylizes a view as a conception on which he himself is required to work. So far, the subject’s discourse displays the significance of the world in his eyes, to such an extent that, the subject being manifold, what remains is the possible standpoints as they are fleshed out without ever being assigned to the author, as if of no concern to


20. Baker considered the typescript “Erinnerungsvertrauen” (see *Dixtés*, appendix vol. 1, p. 263; *VOW*, appendix, p. 524) to be a Schlickian piece in which one could distinguish the sceptical voice who cannot base his argument on any criterion, and the hypothetist who, just for a time, admits an hypothesis as verified only “in presence of such and such criteria”.

21. As in Dostoïevski’s *Notes from the Underground*: the words of the poor state employee do not refer to an objective reality, but let us hear a kind of prosopopoeia of a man typical of the 19th century, as he stands for a whole vanishing generation (as Dostoïevski himself writes).
him. This “a-subjectivity” is the true counterpart to any good division of the self (as opposed to a schizoid scheme), and extends to his “person”. The autonomous logic, which here unfolds on the basis of the erasure of the author’s world, discloses the so-called “subject” as the locus of “the conflict between truths”. Even though Bakhtin may not have read Freud, one cannot help thinking of the multiple partial selves of the Dichter in Freud’s essay “The Uncanny”. Multiple selves, though, and not multiple personalities! For we are not dealing here with an instance of dissociation, with a splitting of personality or self-invention of the kind whose clinical history has been studied by Ian Hacking.22

In the same manner, the author gets eclipsed by the figures of the empiricist, the phenomenologist and the grammarian (at least, the one advocating ostension). But one is bound to wonder, at this juncture, whether the responses and proposals characterized as “ours”23 do, or do not, embody a view. Is the author assigned a voice, is he granted words to enunciate his own point of view, or does he exist only in a negative way, parasitic upon all the other points of view? If it is true that “One is not alone in one’s skin”, as Henri Michaux said,24 then one could legitimately wonder whether the author is not, after all, the impersonal voix blanche of the grammarian, that is, philosophically, “nobody”. Therefore, it would be wrong to conclude that these different characters are in quest of an author. Instead we are overwhelmed by voices that “do not unspeak” (as Diderot says of the characters in Jacques the Fatalist). Dialogical polyphony is not a mere literary device but a feature of structure that results from the rivalry of various voices in a divided, but not dissociated, self.

24. In Qui je fus, mentioned in footnote 7 above, all the (ancient) voices say “I” when speaking in present time (and tense). Raymond Bellour (see his introductory presentation) calls it an “unforeseen form of reflexive fiction” ("une forme imprévue de fiction réflexive").
5. A faceless kind of voice – the grammatical garb of the (absent) philosopher

This dialogical triptych (or “quadriptych” – the third voice of the grammarian splitting into two) may be compared to Freud’s methods on three distinct grounds. First, an aspect of resistance may be discerned in it. Each standpoint is defined through resisting another. Second, the polyphony of voices has been construed in a dissonant manner. Nobody agrees with anybody. The erasure of the author has been stressed by the division of the “I” into multiple discordant selves. No standpoint has privilege over any other. Grammar is not a standpoint, nor even a view. That could be our conclusion. The grammarian is faceless. His standpoint is parasitic, and his existence conditional, upon all possible standpoints. He captures aspects by discerning them in Denkstile of others through the different ways each voice displays his conception. And he performs a variation on them whenever needed. Third, this is what his therapeutic role amounts to. He describes language-games without ever advocating or endorsing any of them.

It is at this point that the comparison with psychoanalysis is warranted. In the early 1930’s, Wittgenstein was proceeding toward a new philosophical method, one that consists in comparing systems of expressions with each other, with the aim of attaining a synopsis.

Yet, this polyphony leads to a quandary. There is room neither for a synopsis nor for a table of rules. Wittgenstein’s dictum “We have no system” applies here. There are only aspects. One may see the expression “R and G” according to the meaning that one “wants” to grant to “and”, by putting forward an analogy which is unfamiliar in the language we are currently using.

We are far from Stanley Cavell’s advocacy of an agreement in rationality. Such an agreement is incompatible with dialogism. The picture of dissenting voices is now encapsulated in the very figure of the philosopher. No logos epitomizes the convergence of various distinct views toward one single unified view. Nothing looks more illusory than the musical idea of a harmonic consonance here, i.e. “attunement” in Cavell’s sense. Cavell writes: “But if the disagreement persists, there is no appeal beyond us, … [it is an] intellectual tragedy”. This is the “truth of scepticism”. Yet Cavell insists that Wittgenstein aspires to a sharing of criteria. Such is the significance of the “quest for rationality”.

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One may agree with Cavell if one considers the community, but dissent if one considers the philosopher, who is thoroughly irresolute, if not torn and in pain. How can the philosopher's irresolution contribute to rationality construed as the sharing of criteria? Cavell would object that it is the philosopher, and not the ordinary man, who is exposed to the conflict. Now, let us grant him this. But then the philosopher would in part stand outside the community. What community of agreement is then left for the irresolute philosopher? To this extent, perhaps, the relation between the philosopher and the community remains problematic. Unless one finds place for a polyphonic kind of address within the community as was, after all, the case in Greek society. Wasn't this in fact the meaning of “dialectics” in Protagoras’ mouth, a use Socrates twisted into something else?

At any rate, it is clear that none of the voices standing for philosophical views might speak for the entire community as such. The world of philosophers is a battlefield. It is therefore at odds with a Kantian agreement in judgment of the sort that Cavell maintains exists behind dialogical voices.

For Cavell, to “speak for” the community is the correlate of the sharing of criteria insofar as the appeal to criteria is a way of settling judgments (p. 31). This agreement goes against the grain of dialogism. Cavell maintains that the disagreements that interest Wittgenstein are typically “not those of philosophers with one another but of philosophers with the words of ordinary human beings” (p. 32). Cavell seems to underrate dialogism, and the dictation I have chosen to comment upon – although perhaps not directly from Wittgenstein’s hand – speaks against Cavell’s view. Originating as it does from the early 1930s, and thus earlier than the Philosophical Investigations (known for its dialogical style), it is a piece of dialogism between philosophical views which excludes all sorts of “Hintergrund” forms of agreement or consensus, even unexpressed ones.26

26. I want to dedicate this article to Gordon Baker. The text was translated from French by Jean-Philippe Narboux. I am much indebted to Narboux’s translation.