Grammar and Silence

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1. Introduction

1. Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, culminated in silence. The relentless steps of the search for clarity and meaning leads to the famous pronouncement of silence in the final sentence, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.” Because Wittgenstein returned to philosophy some ten years later and worked persistently at philosophy for more than two decades until the end of his life, the question arises whether his return to philosophical work defied his earlier conclusion or had the effect of canceling it. His later philosophy continued his pursuit for clarity and meaning, but was dominated by what he called grammar rather than by logic. In view of this revision in the fundamental tools of his work, a useful specific form of the issue is whether making grammatical remarks, as Wittgenstein did in his later work of clarification, is a continuation or a rejection of the silence with which his early work had led him into.

The plan of my paper is simple. I will first consider what is included and what is not included in the key terms ‘silence’ and ‘grammar’ as Wittgenstein used them, and then argue that restricting philosophy to grammar was a way of continuing the silence with which Wittgenstein so dramatically concluded the Tractatus. I will conclude with some reservations about adopting Wittgenstein as a role-model in this respect.

2. Silence

2. Wittgenstein’s silence is not an absence of noise, nor even an absence of verbalization. The silence applies only to “what we cannot speak about”, and Wittgenstein held that there are indeed things that we can speak about, namely matters of fact, which he equated with the domain of science. The distinction between philosophy and science is drawn sharply in the Tractatus, and the silence applies to philosophy. This interpretation is uncontro-
versial, amply supported by the remarks immediately preceding the proclamation of silence:

The correct method in philosophy would be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science – i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – *this* method would be the only strictly correct one.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (TLP 6.53-6.54)

3. Wittgenstein does not make such a clear distinction between philosophical doctrine and philosophical clarification as he does between philosophy and science. Is there such a distinction? The passage just cited (TLP 6.53-6.54) suggests it. In response to a metaphysical claim, I am urged to demonstrate to the speaker that he has failed to assign meanings to some of his terms. Doing this seems to be both pointing out a kind of fact (though perhaps not a kind of fact that Wittgenstein recognizes in the *Tractatus*) and a part of the work of clarification.

In the central section of TLP (cited in Note 1) Wittgenstein says that philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity. What he says in 6.53-6-54 fits with this earlier description of philosophy. His wording, however, slides rather mischievously over the fact that this activity involves using words. It is true that the words are not used to state doctrines, and therefore they do not involve the sort of nonsense that Wittgenstein mainly objected to. The words used in the work of clarification have sense in so far as they state facts. But that a word has or does not have a meaning is not a matter of fact in TLP; it is something that can be shown but not said. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive how the work of clarification can be pursued in
silence. So it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the work of clarification is neither something to be spoken of nor something to be consigned to silence.

The distinction between philosophical doctrine and philosophical activity seems useful in this connection. Wittgenstein seems content to continue the work of clarification but insists that we cease formulating theories and doctrines about it.

4. The sanction for violating the silence – for attempting to speak about what we cannot speak about – is to utter nonsense, that is, to utter words and sentences that fail to make sense. Uttering words that make no sense amounts to not really saying anything. Not saying anything is itself the same as remaining silent. Here Wittgenstein is playing with us, for in the ordinary sense of the words, speaking nonsense is quite different from remaining silent, even though it is not really saying anything – politicians do it everyday. So what looks as though it might be a syllogism, is an invalid argument, unless we grant Wittgenstein his special meanings for ‘saying’ and ‘silence’.

Granting the special meanings of ‘saying’ and ‘silence’, the conclusion of the *Tractatus* is less a moral injunction than a logical necessity. That my words fail to make sense when I attempt to speak about what we cannot speak about is a logical consequence rather than a moral duty. The ‘must’ in the final sentence is a logical rather than a moral ‘must’, in spite of the mystical tone and undeniable ambiguity of these words.2

5. It is useful to think of TLP 7 as a platitude or tautology, that is, as nothing more than a logical truth. The first implication of this reading is that the work of a philosopher will have no more relevance to matters of life and death than do modus ponens, modus tollens, and the principles of syllogistic inference. It is by recognizing and accepting these limits that philosophy becomes possible at all. This aspect of the *Tractatus* seems not only to flesh out but also to revise radically Wittgenstein’s pre-war remark that “Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its basis.” (NB 106) What happened between the *Notes on Logic* of 1913 and the completion of the *Tractatus* is that Wittgenstein came to realize that logic, being senseless, cannot be the basis for anything, so that any metaphysics presumed to be based on it must be nonsense.
6. The mysticism of the *Tractatus* is palpable and inescapable. It seems clear enough in his remark about seeing the world aright (TLP 6.54) but is more explicit in TLP 6.522: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.”

7. There is a powerful tension, but no contradiction, between the logical analysis and mysticism in the *Tractatus*. There is, after all, even an element of the mystical in logic. Logic is not a science, the so-called proofs in logic are really psychological aids, and we can really only *show*, not *say why* (not even say *that*), a proposition is a logical truth. Whereas in the scientific philosophy of Russell and the Vienna circle logic serves as a tool for combating mysticism, in TLP logic and mysticism reinforce one another.

Wittgenstein thought the quest of philosophy was for clarification rather than for knowledge. His yoking together logical tautologies and moral principles, in that they both lack sense, suggests that he thought of the clarification provided by logic as closely identified with the clarification required by moral integrity, and hence that logical confusion was not only a sin but the most significant sort of sin.3 This is not a common perspective on either logic or morals, so it is no wonder that it disconcerted Russell. Being a philosopher meant adopting an unusual stance towards the world, assigning facts to scientists and morals to moralists, while as a philosopher remaining silent about both what is the case and what to do.

8. So Tractarian silence is both a logical truth and a moral commitment. It does not mean an absence of verbal utterances but rather abstention from truth-claims in domains other than the natural sciences. It is based on the insight that logic is not a science4 as well as on a deep understanding of how logical analysis leads to the clarification of the sense of propositions.

3. **Grammar**

9. Near the beginning of his second career, Wittgenstein wrote (CV 9) that his goal was clarity as an end in itself – *Klarheit als Selbstzweck*5 – and he proceeded to lay out over the years a conception of clarity radically different from the conception of analytic clarity developed in the *Tractatus*. 
10. Being interested in clarity as an end in itself entails being disinterested (as a philosopher) in scientific and moral truth. Thus, as is well known, he steered clear of metaphysics and rational ethics (whether Kantian or consequentialist). Wittgenstein did make allowance in his work for certain factual truths that he came to regard as part of grammar. In \textit{Grammatical Remarks} and \textit{Philosophical Investigations} these truths were primarily remarks about language-games, and since mastering the use of a language is a feature of our complicated form of life, they also included remarks on the natural history of human beings (PI §25, §129). In \textit{On Certainty} the range of allowances was broadened to include both the expressions that Moore thought he knew for certain and analogous platitudes, such as that his name is Ludwig Wittgenstein and that he has spent his whole life on or near the surface of the earth. With respect to metaphysical and moral truth, however, he made no such allowance. The distinction between seeking clarification and seeking knowledge, prominent in the \textit{Tractatus}, is thus retained with emphasis in his later work.

In his later work he adopts a radically different conception of clarification (based on grammar and uses of language), a significantly different conception of science (based on knowledge and method rather than on the totality of factual truth), and a different conception of knowledge (excluding certainty but including theories and explanations). The new approach also features sharp distinctions between knowledge (which invites doubt) and certainty (which excludes doubt) and between science (which involves testing, explanation, and progress) and natural history (which is limited to description of plain facts).

It is difficult to hold all these conceptions and distinctions together in a coherent picture, and therefore no wonder that Wittgenstein crisscrossed the same territory again and again from different directions.

11. The conception of clarity that Wittgenstein developed in his later work was never made fully explicit, more often being shown than articulated. I will therefore try to highlight some of its prominent aspects.

12. One important aspect is that it is contextual rather than analytic.\textsuperscript{6} Clarity is rarely to be achieved by analyzing a complex into its constitutive elements and their distinctive arrangement. Reliance on context rather than analysis is shown most emphatically by Wittgenstein’s repeated focus on the use or uses of words and sentences.
13. There are different sorts of use. Wittgenstein uses five German words that are translated as “use” in English versions: Gebrauch, Nutzen, Benutzung, Verwendung, Anwendung. In some instances the reference is to quite general usage (Gebrauch in der Sprache) and in others to the employment (Anwendung) of a word or sentence in specific circumstances. In every case, however, there is at least implicit reference to some context or other, rather than to analysis, for the work of clarifying meaning.

Wittgenstein begins his discussion with the most general, not with the most specific. His focus is on whole expressions; if these expressions are individual words, they stand alone as expressions rather than as elements in sentences.

14. The early sections of Philosophical Investigations culminate in §23:

How many kinds of sentences are there? Perhaps assertions, questions, and commands? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of all that we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, something given once and for all; rather new types of speech, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence and others wither away and are forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)

The word “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence that speaking a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. . . . .

It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools of language and the ways of their being used, the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentences, with what logicians have said about the construction of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus.)

15. Here we see a focus on what we might call complete expressions, ones that stand alone as everyday utterances. They are different kinds of sentences, different uses of language, and their differences from one another are basic in the sense that they are not to be understood through analysis of their components. They are not ultimate wholes, about which nothing further can be said, but taking these wholes rather than their parts as basic constitutes a radical break with the mainstream of analytic philosophy.7
16. The focus on language-games, that is, on uses of language, is evident from the manner in which Wittgenstein begins the *Investigations* and is confirmed in later texts. At PI §656 he writes, “Look on the language-game as the primary thing.” In Part II (p. 226) he makes the intriguing observation, “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*.” This observations contrasts with usual conceptions of the given, which understand the given to be particulars or universals rather than anything so broad and undefined as *forms* of any kind.8

It is useful to conceive our human form of life, comprising as it does the mastery of the use of a language, as the large vague context within which the various language-games make sense. That large vague context makes possible an amazing range of human understanding. As Wittgenstein says (PI §206): “The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.”

17. It is difficult to see the distinctions among these uses of language, these language-games, as constituting a part of grammar.9 It is not grammar in the most common sense, since that consists of morphology and syntax. To understand him, therefore, we must see how his grammar differs from morphology and syntax.

18. The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure made a distinction that can help us. It is characteristic of morphology and syntax that they have to do with *langue* rather than *parole*, in the terminology of Saussure. That is to say, they concern the structure of language isolated from its use. Since language-games concern context and use rather than structure, they do not seem to be a matter of grammar in the common sense. That is one aspect of the difficulty.

Phonology, however, is also part of the general description of a language, and one branch of phonology, phonemics, focuses on *parole* rather than *langue*.10 Wittgenstein’s insistence on distinctions among language-games as fundamental to his work of clarification also involves primarily *parole* rather than *langue*. If we can see Wittgenstein’s work as having features in common with phonemics, it will be easier to see that it is a form of grammar.

19. Identification of elements of *parole* requires methods different from the primarily analytic methods of morphology and syntax. Two methods used
in phonemics to replace analytic definitions are contrast and distinctive feature analysis. Both these methods, which are not entirely independent, are prominent in Wittgenstein’s later work.

The contrasts that matter in phonemics are not ones that could be made but ones that actually are recognized by speakers of the language in question. In English, for example, the phoneme /p/ is contrasted with /b/, and we recognize the difference between ‘pet’ and ‘bet’ and between ‘sup’ and ‘sub’, as well as that between ‘limper’ and ‘limber’, even when they are pronounced as isolated words rather than in context. In Arabic, on the other hand, this distinction is not phonemic, and the Arabic phoneme /be/ sounds sometimes like the one and sometimes like the other, so that ‘Pepsi’ is likely to come out as ‘Bepsi’. Similarly, we do not notice that our phoneme /p/ is phonetically different in different contexts: its two occurrences in ‘pop’ and its still different occurrence in ‘spot’ are phonetically distinguishable and would likely be heard as different sounds in some Turkic languages.

What matters in this method is contrasts that are in fact significant in a given language rather than ones that could be significant. This focus on fact rather than possibility as primary is congenial with a strain in Wittgenstein’s thought that is evident at the beginning of the Tractatus and continues throughout his work.

20. Wittgenstein once emphasized the importance of contrast by saying that he could use the line “I’ll teach you differences!” (from King Lear) as a motto for his work. He made this remark in the context of commenting on the difference between Hegel and himself: “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” It is obvious contrasts that he refers to in PI §23; and again in PI §78:

Compare knowing and saying:
how many feet high Mont Blanc is —
how the words ‘game’ is used —
how a clarinet sounds —
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.
Note that here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein not only presents the extreme contrast between the first and third examples but also provides an intermediary case.

21. Sometimes Wittgenstein refers to distinctive features in order to make a contrast obvious. In distinguishing expressions of emotion from expressions of sensation, for example, he notes that although a pain might last only five minutes, one could not say that same thing about grief. In this case the distinctive feature concerns what might be said next, as well as what is characteristic of emotions as contrasted with sensations. Possibilities of discourse continuation, and recognition that in some contexts a certain continuation is nonsense, are distinctive features of the grammar of language-games. “I christen this ship the Mary Belle” is a declarative sentence, but the response “I doubt that” would be nonsense in the normal circumstances of its use – a distinctive feature that shows that this declarative sentence is not a truth-claim.

Distinctive features help in recognizing and remembering contrasts.

22. Wittgenstein’s grammar thus differs from traditional grammar by extending the study of language from langue into parole and by focusing on context and use rather than on structure and analysis. Contrasting various kinds of utterances and inscriptions through distinguishing the different circumstances of their use and their different possibilities for discourse continuation is indeed part of a general description of language, and hence a part of grammar in the most general sense. Wittgenstein makes use of methods of grammar, especially methods of phonemics, but he applies them where grammarians and linguists have not commonly done so. Grammar lessons are perhaps normally somewhat therapeutic, and this is emphatically true for Wittgenstein, but modern linguistics aims at science rather than therapy. Although the confusions upon which Wittgenstein hopes to work his therapy of clarification are grammatical confusions embedded in the use of language, his remarks are philosophical rather than linguistic.

23. Wittgenstein’s later work makes use of grammar rather than logic, and context rather than analysis, in order to pursue his work of clarification. Grammar cannot be foundational in any sense. It is necessarily secondary rather than primary, since it depends on the prior existence of the language it describes. Nor can it lay the groundwork for wisdom about either the
physical world or our human world, since its subject-matter is language rather than the world or our behavior in it. In these respects Wittgenstein’s later work of clarification is a refinement of the silence of the *Tractatus*.

Just as the silence was a logical conclusion rather than a moral exhortation, so also the remark that grammar is necessarily secondary, and hence philosophy can never be foundational, is a grammatical rather than a metaphysical or epistemological or moral observation. It is not that one *ought* not to lay philosophical foundations, but simply that if you are laying foundations you are, willy-nilly, playing some other game than that of philosophy.

4. The Power and Perils of Silence

24. The silence with which the *Tractatus* concludes is not broken in *Philosophical Investigations*, nor in other later work. The silence consists in focusing on the work of clarification and refusing all temptations to contribute to quests for knowledge or for causal or moral judgments or explanations.

Wittgenstein was adamantly opposed to the spirit of his times, that is, our times. He conceived our times as centered on progress and growth (CV 9) and dissociated himself and his work from moralism, scientism, and problem solving (CV 5-10 *passim*). He chided Renan for apparently supposing that science might enhance wonderment (CV 7) and certain architects for “succumbing to temptations” (CV5); and for those who think they have discovered solutions to problems of life, his contribution will be to show them how to see that they are wrong (CV 6). For philosophers the recommended asceticism consists in eschewing explanations, deductions, and theses, and limiting our work to “assembling reminders” and presenting descriptions of what is open to view “*before* all new discoveries and inventions” (PI §§ 126-128).

Since modern philosophy has focused on explanations, deductions, and overall solutions, Wittgenstein’s stance on these matters is rightly seen as an effort to silence academic philosophers. Basing his work either on tautologies (TLP) or on grammar (PI) is a dramatic alternative – and a rebuke – to the search for certain knowledge characteristic of modern philosophy. This rebuke is a main feature of Wittgensteinian silence.
25. It is no surprise that few philosophers have accepted this rebuke without protest. To review the varieties of objections to Wittgenstein’s philosophy is out of the question here, but it will be useful to take note of one rather friendly objection. Arnulf Zweig rebukes Wittgenstein for remaining silent about the Holocaust (Zweig 1997). Zweig makes this criticism not as a hostile critic but as an anguished friend. Others have pointed out that there are criticisms of Hitler and other moral judgments in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and correspondence, and perhaps Zweig exaggerates. Nevertheless he has a point, and others concur that Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and in particular his steadfast adherence to a search for clarity rather than for truth and justice, is unacceptably remote from the urgent problems of real lives.

This anguished criticism is cogent, but I hesitate to agree that it implies moral failure on the part of Wittgenstein. The silence might better be seen as philosophical integrity than as moral failure. Wittgenstein’s mission was to work in philosophy, as an artist, and if he succumbed to the temptation of also (or thereby) being a moral beacon, he would be in the same position as the poor architects mentioned above (CV 5).

26. Clarity as an end in itself is something like the Holy Grail, radically removed from the problems of daily life and providing an almost impossible ideal. It is absolute, and not in any way conditional. This is in conformity with what Wittgenstein took to be the nature of philosophy (and logic). In continuing to pursue this ideal, Wittgenstein seems to have continued to see obscurity as a sin. His commitment to his work of clarification has an unmistakable religious dimension, a continuation of the mystical/prophetic dimension McGuinness identified in the Tractatus.14 When Wittgenstein remarked that he could not help approaching every problem from a religious point of view,15 he may well have been referring to this persistent dimension of his work.

27. As much as I admire Wittgenstein, as clearly as I see his later work as both continuing and revising the earlier work in its search for absolute unconditioned clarity, as certain I am that sound philosophy seeks clarification rather than knowledge, and in spite of the power and consistency of his continued Tractarian silence, I do not feel easy about joining Wittgenstein in either the absolutism of his commitment or the abstinence from moral and political comment.
In my book *Wittgenstein & Approaches to Clarity* one main theme is that in the course of my own work in philosophy I have always sought clarification for some other purpose, not as an end in itself. Those other purposes generally take the form of exegesis, advocacy, or criticism, for all of which rigorous clarity separates a thoughtful philosophical approach from a more passionate one. Perhaps all of this work of mine is applied philosophy, rather than philosophy proper. Nonetheless it remains heavily indebted to Wittgenstein, and in particular to his focus on language-games.

28. Wittgenstein writes, “There is only *logical* necessity.” I take that to be a logical or grammatical remark, grounded on the insight that genuine necessity is unconditioned in a way that only logic is unconditioned. If I echo this remark of Wittgenstein’s in the face of necessities asserted every day by politicians and moralists, is my utterance still a logical remark? or has it become preaching? or political commentary? That query is, in his terms, a grammatical question, on which he offers little guidance — except perhaps through the example of his persistent refusal to engage moralists and politicians, an example which I find breath-taking, but which, like Zweig and Russell, I do not find edifying. Nor does it seem required of a philosopher, unless a philosopher must have a singular public identity (such as Wittgenstein seems to have allowed himself\(^\text{16}\)) and so cannot also publicly be a citizen or an essayist.

There seems no final answer to the questions of grammar and silence, any more than there is a final solution to the problems of life.

References


Notes

1. See TLP 4.11: “The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences.” The distinction between science and philosophy is presented in the following sections, 4.111-4.112. The key points are: “Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. / Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. / A philosophic work consists essentially of elucidations. / Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’ but rather in the clarification of propositions.” [My slashes represent new paragraphs in Wittgenstein’s text.]

There are problems with Wittgenstein’s way of making the distinction between science and philosophy (e.g., whether theoretical statements can have sense on his terms), and even issues (raised by Quine among others) whether any such distinction can be made. These are interesting issues and might usefully be discussed on another occasion. For my present purposes what matters is that Wittgenstein insisted on such a distinction in TLP, and in his later work held to there being a dichotomy, though he expressed it rather differently. See PI §109: “It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones” and OC §308: “‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories.”

2. So Wittgenstein’s apparent injunction to silence is a logical rather than a moral point, and therefore not an injunction at all. This comment depends on distinguishing logic from morals, and logical necessity from moral necessity, seemingly obvious distinctions that Wittgenstein may not have accepted at the time. The final pages of the Tractatus (from about 6.37 on) are full of cryptic and apparently edifying remarks that seem intended to give a perspective on life, what we naturally consider a Weltanschauung. This powerful rhetoric is integral to the power and mystique of the Tractatus and depends in part on not distinguishing logic from morals, as well as not distinguishing morals from religion.

3. See Shields 1993 for useful discussion of these matters.

4. See TLP 4.0312, where Wittgenstein characterizes this point as his “fundamental idea.” There is a useful discussion of this as the fundamental idea of Wittgenstein’s early work in McGuinness 2002, chapter 10.

5. Matthias Kross used this pregnant phrase as the title of his Habilitationsschrift (Kross 1993), which discusses these matters in depth. Wittgenstein’s own phrase is slightly but insignificantly different: “Mir dagegen ist die Klarheit die Durchsichtigkeit Selbstzweck.”

6. For further discussion of this point see Garver 2006, chapter 10.

7. But not necessarily with the Tractatus itself, where a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition (TLP 3.3).

8. It is not clear what Wittgenstein means by “forms of life.” I believe the term is intentionally vague and incapable of definition – see Garver 2006, chapters 10-12. It is nearly certain that he did not always mean language-games – see my discussion in chapter 15 of Garver 1994. With regard to the present text, there is an alternative wording in Wittgenstein’s notebooks, with “forms of life” [Lebensformen] replaced by “facts of living” [Tatsachen des Lebens], which makes it more likely that he meant to refer at least in part to language-games in this text. He certainly did think of language-games as facts of the natural history of human beings (see PI §25, §415, §§654-656, page 174c).
9. Moore, for example, did not understand it. See PO, 69: “I still think he was not using the expression ‘rules of grammar’ in any ordinary sense, and I am still unable to form any clear idea as to how he was using it.” On the same page Moore reports Wittgenstein as having said that he was “making things belong to grammar that are not commonly supposed to belong to it.”

10. The work of Ferdinand de Saussure (see Saussure 1959) made it possible to describe phonemes and to distinguish phonemics from phonetics, the latter but not the former being amenable to methods of physics. For a more practical and more readable account of phonemics, see Pike 1947, and for a good discussion of parallels between Saussure and Wittgenstein, see Harris 1988. I know of no reason to think that Wittgenstein had any familiarity with the work of Saussure or other modern linguists. Parallels between his work and that of linguists are fascinating as well as instructive, but they should not be carried too far. Linguistics is a science, a quest for knowledge, and Wittgenstein held himself aloof from every science, every quest for knowledge.

11. The remarks are reported by Maurice Drury (Rhees 1981, 171).

12. See, for example, PI page 174.

13. For a more extended discussion of philosophy as grammar, see chapter 13 of Garver 2006.


15. He is quoted as having made this remark by Maurice Drury (Rhees 1981, 94). Malcolm discusses it in his last work (Malcolm 1994), which includes comments by Peter Winch. See also the comments by Elizabeth Wolgast in Wolgast 2004 and my comments in chapter 14 of Garver 2006.

16. One might construe Zweig’s criticism as lodging the complaint that Wittgenstein, although identifying himself as Jewish, did so only privately; that is, that his singular public identity as a philosopher evaded publicly identified himself as a Jew, which would have obliged him to speak out about the Holocaust.