True, but Inexpressible?
Wittgenstein and
‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’

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In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard (2007, 2008, 2009) has attempted to defend John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy (adumbrated, for example, in McDowell 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, and, most recently, in 2009) against a number of influential criticisms, most notably the ones offered by Crispin Wright (2002, 2008). In this respect, Pritchard has distanced himself from views he himself expressed in earlier work (2003, 2005)—where he still seemed to share many of Wright’s misgivings as regards McDowell’s strategy—and has come to think that ‘if the McDowellian proposal could be made palatable then it would constitute the holy grail of epistemology’ (2009: 472) by providing ‘a direct and elegant response to the problem of scepticism’ (2009: 473). Pritchard goes on to offer a ‘neo-Moorean’ interpretation of McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy according to which claims to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses come out as true, but as conversationally inappropriate.

Interestingly, Pritchard claims to find similar strands of ‘neo-Mooreanism’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Pritchard 2005: 88), and takes this as providing some support for his reading of McDowell (Pritchard 2009: 477). In this paper I will argue that Pritchard’s account fails, since neither McDowell nor Wittgenstein can be turned into ‘neo-Mooeans’. For if McDowell and Wittgenstein are right, the impulse to make anti-sceptical assertions stems from being enthralled by a particular picture, and disappears once this picture is undermined. So, there can, on their conception, be no such thing as non-trivial, but inexpressible, truth-claims.
‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’

In his (2009) Pritchard begins by discussing Wright’s ‘I-II-III’ characterization of what gives rise to the sceptical problem. Consider the following ‘Moore-type’ anti-sceptical argument:

**Type-I Proposition:** It seems to S as if she has two hands.

**Type-II Proposition:** S has two hands.

**Type-III Proposition:** S is not a brain in a vat (BIV).\(^1\)

According to Wright, S’s evidential position is captured by the type-I, not the type-II proposition. The problem with this is that type-I propositions merely provide prima facie evidence for belief in type-II propositions, while only type-II propositions entail type-III propositions. For if S is in fact a handless BIV, then the type-I proposition—its seeming to S as if she has two hands—will provide no good reason for her belief in the type-II proposition that she has two hands. Hence, one is only entitled to the type-II proposition if one can already rule out in advance that one is a BIV—that is to say, if one already has independent grounds for asserting the truth of the type-III proposition. But no such grounds seem available, so scepticism.

According to Pritchard, it is at this point in the discussion that McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy becomes salient, since it provides a way of blocking a I-II-III argument for scepticism (Pritchard 2009: 470). For on McDowell’s disjunctive conception of perceptual experience veridical perception is factive: in the ‘good case’ (where the environment is epistemically friendly) seeing that p provides factive epistemic support for the belief that p, while in the corresponding ‘bad case’—where the environment is epistemically unfriendly and one only seems to see that p—one does not have factive epistemic support for one’s belief.\(^2\) In other words, in the good case, seeing that one has two hands entails the proposition that one has two hands, which means that one doesn’t, in order to be entitled to this proposition, first need to be able to rule out that one is not a BIV, and so Wright’s argument fails to engage (Pritchard 2009: 470).

But Wright has objected that McDowell’s disjunctive conception only works as a way of blocking scepticism if one already knows that one is in the good case. Given that everyone agrees that one cannot tell whether one is in the good or the bad case, however, since one’s experiences would be the
same, phenomenologically speaking, in both, it follows that perceptual reasons cannot, after all, be factive (Wright 2002: 346).

Pritchard (2008: 294) sums up the argument implicitly in play here in the following way:

*The Highest Common Factor Argument*¹

P1. In the ‘bad’ case, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of the way the world appears to one. (Premise)
P2. The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable. (Premise)
C1. So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs in the ‘good’ case can be no better than in the bad case. (From P2)
C2. So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of the way the world appears to one. (From (P1), (C1))

The idea behind the argument is that one’s perceptual reasons can only consist of what is common to the good case and the bad case—that is to say, of their highest common factor. But although McDowell would accept (P1) and (P2), he thinks that it would be a mistake to let our epistemic standing in the good case be determined by our epistemic standing in the bad case. Consequently, it is simply question-begging against McDowell’s disjunctive conception to suppose that (C1) follows from (P2). As Pritchard forcefully puts it: ‘it is the collective failure amongst contemporary epistemologists’ to recognize that (P1) and (P2) fail to entail (C1) ‘that has led them to succumb to the sceptical problem in the first place’ (Pritchard 2009: 472).

This leaves the question of whether, if McDowell is right, one can just argue for anti-sceptical knowledge directly. For if one indeed knows that one has two hands in virtue of possessing a factive reason in support of this proposition, there cannot be anything wrong with deducing, and hence coming to know, that one is not a BIV. But this seems problematic given that everyone (including McDowell) agrees that one cannot tell the difference between BIV and non-BIV scenarios.

Pritchard (2008: 301) believes that it is this problem that lies at the heart of McDowell’s reluctance to call his strategy an answer to scepticism. Nevertheless, he claims that McDowell could be bolder in his treatment of scepticism, since with adequate supplementation—such as an account of
why Moorean assertions are true but conversationally inappropriate—his strategy would be perfectly feasible. Pritchard in effect goes on to argue that, in the absence of possessing the relevant discriminatory capacities (that would allow one to distinguish BIV from non-BIV scenarios), being in possession of reflectively accessible favouring grounds in support of the proposition that one is not a BIV is sufficient for knowledge-possession, but at the same time renders claims to know inappropriate, since such claims conversationally imply that one can distinguish the proposition claimed to be known from the relevant error-possibility (Pritchard 2008: 304). Given, however, that it is impossible to do this in the sceptical case—since one precisely lacks reflectively accessible discriminating grounds that would enable one to distinguish BIV from non-BIV scenarios—it is illegitimate to claim knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses, even though, if one is in the good case, such knowledge is in fact possessed.

A Critique of Pritchard’s Conception

In order to motivate the distinction between ‘favouring’ and ‘discriminatory’ epistemic support, Pritchard draws the following analogy which is worth quoting at length:

Imagine that one were to hear someone claim, without qualification, that they know that the zebra-shaped object over there is not a cleverly disguised mule. Wouldn’t you take them to be representing themselves as being able to offer supporting grounds for their assertion which would show that they are able to discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules (e.g. that they have special training, or have made special checks)? If this is right, then we should expect the same to apply when it comes to claims to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, in that in making such an assertion one represents oneself as being able to offer grounds which would indicate that one could discriminate between, say, having two hands and being envatted and merely seeming to have two hands. The problem, however, is that such grounds are not available, by anyone’s lights, and thus assertions of this sort are by their nature problematic (unlike the corresponding ‘cleverly disguised mule’ assertions). Thus, the distinction drawn above between favouring and discriminatory epistemic support can again work in McDowell’s favour. (Pritchard 2009: 477)
The reason why Pritchard thinks that the distinction works in McDowell’s favour is that even though no reflectively accessible discriminating grounds are available in either of the cases just described—the ‘zebra’ as well as the radical sceptical case—favouring grounds are nevertheless available which are sufficient for knowledge possession. In other words, Pritchard takes it that the ‘zebra’ case is analogous to the radical sceptical scenario: while only specially trained people can discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules, no special training is available that would allow one to make the relevant discriminations in the sceptical case. Nevertheless, given that such special training is not necessary for knowledge possession in the zebra case, since other ‘favouring’ grounds are available—such as the low likelihood of ‘disguised mule’ deceptions occurring, for example—the lack of discriminatory grounds in the sceptical case can similarly be regarded as compatible with knowledge possession.

But this is too quick: on closer inspection, the zebra case and the radical sceptical scenario don’t in fact turn out to be analogous. While in the zebra case it is possible, depending on one’s training and the relevant circumstances, to be good or less good at telling zebras from cleverly disguised mules, there is, in the sceptical scenario, no such thing as being better or worse at telling BIV from non-BIV set-ups. For this reason, it is plausible to suppose that a lack of perceptual discriminatory support implies that one cannot claim knowledge in the zebra case, whereas this is not convincing in the radical sceptical scenario, since here, even in the best possible case, there simply is no such thing as being able to tell by closer perceptual (physical) inspection whether or not one is a BIV. That is to say, one can discriminate a zebra from a (cleverly disguised) mule by looking at (and otherwise closely examining) its features, but no ‘examinations’ of this sort will ever enable one to differentiate between a BIV and a non-BIV scenario, for ex hypothesi the BIV and the non-BIV share the same phenomenology. In other words, the radical sceptical scenario is set up in such a way that perceptual discrimination is in principle—not just as a matter of empirical fact—impossible, while in the zebra case this is not so. Consequently, no discriminatory epistemic support is ever available in the radical sceptical case: even if one knows one is in the good case (i.e. that one is not a BIV), one cannot know this on the basis of having perceptually discriminated a BIV experience from a non-BIV experience. So, the radical sceptical scenario and the zebra case are crucially dissimilar in the following respect: while in the zebra case, discriminatory epistemic support is only contingently unavailable, but could, in principle, be had, what makes the
radical sceptical problem so intractable is precisely the fact that here discriminatory epistemic support is necessarily unavailable.

But if this is correct, then ‘conversational implicature’ ought to look quite different in the two cases just described. While in the zebra case, claims to know that one is confronted by a zebra may well generate the conversational implicature that one is able to discriminate the zebra from a cleverly disguised mule—or, at the very least, from other relevant animals—in the radical sceptical scenario, no one, for the reasons just given, ought to expect that claims to know that one is not a BIV are justified on the basis of being able successfully perceptually to discriminate a BIV experience from a non-BIV experience. After all, anyone who understands the radical sceptical scenario eo ipso knows that it is impossible to discriminate between a BIV and a non-BIV experience, as this is the whole point of radical scepticism. Consequently, no one should expect that claims to know that one is not a BIV are asserted on the basis of being in possession of discriminatory epistemic support. So, while in the zebra case it is true that only if one were in possession of discriminatory epistemic support could one claim to know that there is a zebra in front of one, this is false in the radical sceptical case, since here there simply is no such thing as discriminatory epistemic support at all.

In other words, the difference between the zebra and the radical sceptical case is not merely, as Pritchard seems to suppose, a difference in degree (with the epistemic limitations simply being greater in the radical sceptical scenario). Rather, the two cases are different in kind. Given that discriminatory epistemic support is not just contingently unavailable in the radical sceptical case, but ruled out from the start, it makes little sense to expect something—discriminatory epistemic support—that is in principle impossible. But if so, then conversational implicature is actually quite different in the two cases, and Pritchard’s analogy breaks down.

The ramifications of this are far-reaching. If there cannot, even in principle, be such a thing as discriminatory epistemic support in the radical sceptical case, then whether we possess knowledge at all here depends on whether anything remotely like the ‘favouring’ grounds in the zebra scenario are available that would also suffice for knowledge-possession in the radical sceptical context. In order to get clearer about this, it is helpful to modify the original zebra example to make it more like the radical sceptical case.

Imagine a world that contains zebras, and mules that are so cleverly disguised as to be perceptually indistinguishable from zebras and only a
complex chemical test can determine which is which. Now suppose that no one in this world is able to conduct such a test, but that the inhabitants have been told, by extraterrestrials perhaps, that there are zebras and mules about (but not how many there are of each) and they have no reason to doubt this. So the inhabitants of this world are not in a position perceptually to discriminate between zebras and mules—whatever zebra-(or mule-)-like thing these people encounter, their perceptual intake can never give them reason to prefer the hypothesis that they are currently confronted by a zebra over the alternative hypothesis that they are confronted by a mule, just as one’s perceptual intake is phenomenologically neutral between the hypothesis that one is experiencing the external world and the hypothesis that one is a BIV.

Furthermore, and contrary to the original zebra example, where ‘disguised mule’ deceptions are rare, no ‘favouring’ epistemic grounds are available here, as the inhabitants of this world have no reason whatsoever to think that it is, in any sense, more likely that they are currently confronted by a zebra than by a mule (they don’t, after all, know how many there are of each animal). So in the absence of both ‘discriminatory’ and ‘favouring’ epistemic grounds of this sort, it is hard to see what other epistemic support could be available in virtue of which the inhabitants of this world could be said to possess knowledge of zebras.  

The situation is similar in the radical sceptical scenario. Again, while in the original zebra example it is the case that knowledge is compatible with a lack of discriminatory support given that one has good reason to believe that ‘disguised mule’ deceptions are rare or improbable—and so these facts can favour one’s belief that one is not, for example, in a ‘hoaxing’ zoo—nothing remotely analogous is available in the sceptical case, since it is not similarly ‘improbable’ or ‘rare’ that one might be a BIV: one’s ordinary conception of the world is not just not compatible with the claim that BIV scenarios are unlikely; rather, they must definitely be false. But how could they be shown to be if, as I have argued, neither discriminatory nor favouring epistemic grounds are available? It seems that all that Pritchard can ultimately say here is that one’s ordinary conception of the world just is one’s favouring ground, but then his position does not constitute an advancement on McDowell’s. Furthermore, given that Pritchard regards McDowell’s own, as it were ‘unsupplemented’, position as question-begging (Pritchard 2009: 478), Pritchard’s proposal can hardly be thought to be immune to similar criticism. Since, as we have seen, Pritchard’s distinction between discriminatory and favouring epistemic grounds does no
real work in the radical sceptical context, ‘McDowellian neo-Mooreanism’ either ends up collapsing back into the radical scepticism it wanted to save us from or, at best, begs the question against the sceptic.

Scepticism and the HCF Conception

It seems that, pace Pritchard, it is precisely because McDowell is aware of the foregoing problem that he does not regard his approach as constituting an answer to scepticism. For the debate between the disjunctivist and the radical sceptic will always end in mutual accusations of question-begging unless the sceptic is prepared to accept that fallibility does not imply global falsehood—i.e. unless he accepts that C1 does not follow from P2. But as soon as the sceptic accepts that, the game is over, and there is no longer a live position to refute.6

Perhaps one reason why Pritchard believes that one must nevertheless persist in the attempt to answer scepticism is because he does not see that not only has the HCF conception caused contemporary epistemologists to succumb to the sceptical problem (Prichard 2009: 472), it is responsible for creating it in the first place. For if radical scepticism is not just the natural upshot of thinking about one’s epistemological relation to the world, but is rather the product, as McDowell argues, of a particular conception of experience that is not compulsory, then it ought not to be surprising, or unsatisfactory, that this problem will simply disappear once one discards this conception.

That the HCF conception and radical scepticism are merely two sides of the same coin becomes apparent once one draws out further implications of what Pritchard calls the ‘Highest Common Factor Argument’. Call this

The Highest Common Factor Argument II

P1. In the ‘bad’ case, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of the way the world appears to one. (Premise)
P2. The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable. (Premise)
C1. So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs in the ‘good’ case can be no better than in the ‘bad’ case. (From (P2))
C2. So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of
the way the world appears to one. (From (P1), (C1))
C3. If the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of the way the world appears to one, one never has access to anything more than how the world appears (i.e. to appearances). (From (C2))
C4. If one never has access to anything more than appearances, external reality lies behind a ‘veil of appearances’. (From (C3))
C5. If external reality lies behind a ‘veil of appearances’, knowledge of the external world—including knowledge that such a thing so much as exists—can only rest on an inference from these appearances to an external reality. (From (C4))
C6. But such inferences will only be valid if one already knows independently (of relying on those appearances) that appearances are a good guide to the external world. (From (C5))
C7. But one cannot know this, precisely because one only has access to appearances and their testimony is inconclusive. (From (C3), (C4), (C5), (C6))
C8. So, there is no non-circular way of demonstrating (from appearances) that the external world exists and knowledge of it is possible. (From (C7))
C9. But such a demonstration is nevertheless necessary, as the hypothesis that there is an external world could be false, for one might be a BIV (i.e. the alternative hypothesis that one is a BIV might be true). (From (C8))
C10. So, scepticism.

Notice how (C3)–(C10) reproduce the structure of Wright’s I-II-III argument for scepticism (Wright 2002: 338–9), and how this whole picture of the inaccessibility of the external world follows from a single, innocuous-seeming move: the step from (P2) to (C1). If one blocks this one move, the traditional epistemological predicament—according to which one is locked into an ‘inner’ world of appearances which gives at best inconclusive evidence about an ‘outer’ external world—crumbles like a house of cards. Consequently, McDowell is right that the ‘prop’ that radical scepticism relies on is the HCF conception—the thought that one’s reasons can never be better than what is common to the good case and the bad case—since it is this that fuels the idea that, for all one knows, one might be radically cut off from reality. Given that, on this conception, all one has access to is appearances, one can never know non-inferentially and hence ‘directly’ what lies beyond them (beyond the ‘veil
of appearances’, as it were). So what might seem, at first, only to be an epis-
temological thesis (C1) actually has strong metaphysical implications—namely,
the inaccessibility to direct perception of the external world.

Someone like Wright, therefore, who believes that (C1) is entailed by (P2),
also automatically commits himself to the metaphysical thesis that perceptual
experience cannot be of anything more than appearances, for even in the best
possible case, perceptual experience always falls short of the facts themselves.
Furthermore, the fact that appearances can be misleading shows at most that
one’s perceptual capacities are fallible, but it is not possible to get from mere
fallibility to radical scepticism unless one is already convinced that perceptual
warrant is (always) non-factive—i. e. unless one is already convinced of the
truth of the HCF conception. For from the fact that one is sometimes misled,
it does not follow that one is always misled (or, indeed, that it even makes sense
to suppose such a thing⁦), even if no ‘experiential markers’ are available that
allow one, at any one time, ‘internally’ to distinguish illusion from reality.⁸

McDowell’s broadly Wittgensteinian approach therefore consists of chal-
lenging the metaphysical and epistemological preconceptions that both the
contemporary epistemologist and the radical sceptic take for granted: the
seemingly intuitive notion that one’s experiential intake in both deceptive and
non-deceptive cases (of perception) must be the same.⁹ Once the move from
(P2) to (C1) is blocked, however, we no longer have good reason to conceive
of perceptual experience along the lines of the HCF model and consequently
the entire metaphysical-epistemological picture that follows from it—accord-
ing to which appearances are conceived ‘as in general intervening between
the experiencing subject and the world’ (McDowell 1998a: 387)—falls by the
wayside. But without such a picture, there is no ‘veil of appearances’ scepti-
cism (variously presented as the BIV hypothesis or Descartes’ dreaming
argument) either. Hence, on McDowell’s conception, there simply is no
radical sceptical context and in this much also nothing to refute or answer.

**Wittgenstein and McDowell on Claims to Know**

If the foregoing is correct, it follows that McDowell does not have to explain
why claiming to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses is conversation-
ally inappropriate, since once one is persuaded by his view, the motivation
for making such claims disappears all by itself. If McDowell is right and the
traditional epistemological predicament dissolves along with the HCF conception, then so does the need to make Moore-type anti-sceptical claims. For in the absence of such a predicament, no one would want to insist that they know that they have two hands, say, as making such a claim (if even fully intelligible) would not, in ordinary circumstances where grounds for doubt are absent, amount to saying anything in particular—rather like saying *Grüß Gott* in the middle of a conversation. One would only be tempted to make a Moore-type claim if one perceived oneself to be challenged by a sceptic who proposes that one might have no knowledge of external reality at all. But in the absence of such a challenge, the need to make such claims evaporates. This leaves intact one’s entitlement to ordinary knowledge claims about the world—such as, for example, saying that one knows that one had breakfast this morning when asked whether one remembers having eaten: but such entitlement has nothing in common with Moore’s endeavour (and is not to be conceived as a response to the radical sceptical scenario). For if it is correct that radical scepticism is the upshot of a misconceived way of thinking about one’s relation to the world, then the same goes for Moore’s project—the sceptic’s radical doubt and Moore’s putative answer stand and fall together.

Hence, *contra* Pritchard, it is not that asserting the denials of sceptical hypotheses is to make conversationally inappropriate truth-claims; rather, in the absence of a ‘veil of appearances’ scepticism, and consequently in ordinary circumstances, it is simply no longer clear what is actually being said. In this respect it is revealing that Pritchard misunderstands the previously mentioned remark by Wittgenstein antakes it to support his reading of McDowell. Pritchard says:

> In the right circumstances such an assertion [“I know that I’m not a BIV, but I can’t distinguish normal experiences from BIV-generated experiences”] would be true, non-misleading and supported by the appropriate evidence. Since it would not respond to any particular conversational move, however, it would also be pointless and thus at least to this extent incoherent (like saying “good morning” in the middle of a conversation (cf. Wittgenstein 1969: sect. 464).

(Pritchard 2009: 477)

But if we look at what Wittgenstein actually says in this passage, it becomes obvious that he is not in the least suggesting that making assertions of this sort is ‘true, non-misleading and supported by the appropriate
true, but inexpressible?

Evidence: ‘My difficulty can also be shown like this: I am sitting talking to
a friend. Suddenly, I say “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.” Is that
really just a superfluous, though true, remark? I feel as if these words were like
“Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a conversation.’

So, Wittgenstein does not, pace Pritchard, intend the answer to his
rhetorical question, ‘Is that really just a superfluous, though true, remark?’,
to be ‘yes’, since to say Grüß Gott in the middle of a conversation clearly isn’t
a case of asserting an inappropriate but true proposition at all. Rather, it is
not to make a recognizable move in the language-game, much like saying
‘piggle wiggle’ in the middle of a conversation. Consequently, to claim ‘I knew
all along you were so-and-so’ just is incoherent in these circumstances, and
not, as Pritchard maintains, just pointless or inappropriate. That Pritchard
thinks otherwise just shows that he continues to be in the grip of the HCF
conception of perceptual experience, for it is only against the background of
this picture that assertions of the kind Wittgenstein mentions appear to make
sense. In the absence of such a picture, to say ‘I know I am not a BIV’ is, at
best, entirely trivial (like saying ‘I know I am a human being’), or, at worst, less
than fully coherent.

Consequently, McDowell would agree with Wittgenstein that ‘I know’ does
not tolerate metaphysical emphasis (Wittgenstein (1969) § 482)—it can never
be employed as a means of showing that radical scepticism is false. But once
we are no longer in thrall to the idea that we are only entitled to ordinary
knowledge claims if we are able to show in advance that we are not BIVs, the
desire to give ‘I know’ a metaphysical spin simply falls away. As Wittgenstein
says, the idealist’s doubt that there is a further doubt behind the practical one
is an illusion (Wittgenstein (1969) § 19), not an inexpressible falsehood.
Notes

1. As Pritchard himself points out in a footnote (2009: 468), Moore and McDowell talk about the denial of the sceptical hypothesis that there is no external world rather than about the denial of the sceptical hypothesis that I am a BIV. I think this doesn't much matter, since these are just two different ways of putting the same sceptical worry that, for all I know, I might be radically cut off from, and in this much possibly know nothing about, the external world. More on this below.

2. In McDowell's own words, ‘an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone. As before, the object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself. On the contrary, the appearance that is presented to one in those cases is a matter of the fact itself being disclosed to the experiencer’ (McDowell 1998a: 386–7).

3. I have decided to use Pritchard's 2008 version of this argument rather than the (shorter) 2009 one, since the detail the former provides will help us see later on what I think Pritchard has missed.

4. For McDowell’s own version of the argument against the ‘highest common factor’ conception of perceptual experience, see, for example, his (1998a: 386–7). Pritchard himself provides next to no direct references to McDowell’s writings.

5. Whether one could have attributed knowledge of zebras to these inhabitants before they were told that there are also perceptually indistinguishable mules about, is a question I shall not consider.

6. By ‘refute’ I mean show the sceptic’s claims to be false while not appealing to premises that the sceptic would not accept. That is, attempting to show that the sceptic’s claims are false while accepting the HCF conception.

7. For a critique of the idea that all of our perceptual experiences could be ‘as if’ experiences, see McDowell (2009) and Stroud (forthcoming).


9. See, for example, McDowell (1998a: 386).


11. And if this is correct, then the same will apply to the relevant entailments of ordinary knowledge-claims. In other words, on the McDowell-Wittgenstein conception, to say that ordinary knowledge-claims entail anti-sceptical hypotheses is also either truistic or less than fully coherent.
Literature


