Introduction

In Part II, Section x, of the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, Wittgenstein discusses what is known as ‘Moore’s Paradox’. Wittgenstein heard G. E. Moore present the paradox in a paper he gave to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club in 1944, and he expresses great excitement at Moore’s observations in a letter he wrote to Moore after the meeting. The paradox concerns the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’. Moore observes that although it may, for example, be true that it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining, it is absurd for me to say ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is’. For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. How is this to be explained? Moore’s own suggestion for how to resolve the paradox is to recognize that we need to distinguish between what someone *asserts* and what he *implies* in asserting it. Thus, someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. It is, according to Moore, because someone who asserts that it is raining implies that he believes that it is, that it is absurd for him to go on and assert that he does not believe it.

Wittgenstein clearly believes that Moore’s paradox reveals something important about the way the concept of belief functions. However, his reflections quickly lead him to formulate what he sees as the real paradox in a
different way from Moore. Moore focuses on the fact that there is something which may be true of me—it may be true that \( p \) and I don't believe that \( p \)—but which cannot, without absurdity, be asserted by me. Wittgenstein's re-formulation of the paradox, by contrast, directs our attention to the fact that 'I believe that this is the case' appears to be used differently in the language-game of asserting and the language-game of supposing. He writes:

Moore's paradox can be put like this: the expression “I believe that this is the case” is used like the assertion “This is the case”; and yet the hypothesis that I believe that this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is the case. (\textit{PI} p. 190)

This distinctive formulation of the paradox suggests that Wittgenstein recognizes that Moore has put his finger on something which has the potential to reveal something important about the way the concept of belief functions, but that he believes Moore's own understanding of where the paradox lies is mistaken.

Moore's account of the absurdity of my asserting 'It is raining but I don't believe that it is' starts from the assumption that the expression ‘I believe that it is raining’ is not used like the assertion ‘It is raining’. Thus, Moore is assuming that by prefixing the words ‘I believe …’ to a proposition, \( p \), I thereby change the topic from the subject matter of my belief—\( p \)—to a report of my own state of mind.\(^2\) For Moore the resolution of the paradox depends upon showing why the assertion that one state of affairs obtains—the state of affairs described by \( p \)—implies that another state of affairs—my believing that \( p \)—obtains, even though the existence of this second state of affairs is not logically entailed by the existence of the first. However, it is clear that this is not Wittgenstein's view of the problem posed by the paradox. His presentation of the paradox makes clear that he believes that, in many circumstances, ‘the expression “I believe that this is the case” is used like the assertion “This is the case”’. It is not, therefore, the absurdity of ‘\( p \) but I do not believe that \( p \)’ that needs explaining. It would be more correct to say that the fact that this sentence strikes us as absurd reveals a general equivalence in the use of ‘\( p \)’ and ‘I believe that \( p \)’. Thus, Wittgenstein points to the fact that ‘I believe’ is not used, in the way Moore assumes, as a report of my own mental state, in the remark that occurs prior to his re-formulation of Moore’s paradox, at the opening of Section x:
Wittgenstein does not give an answer to the question, but his re-formulation of Moore’s paradox makes clear that he believes the answer to it is ‘No’. The idea is that we learn to use the words ‘I believe …’ in circumstances in which use of the expression “I believe that this is the case” is equivalent to the assertion “This is the case”; this use of the words ‘I believe …’ has no connection with anything that might be a topic of introspection, or which I might ‘become aware of’, as I might become aware that I am sad, or bored, or anxious. Thus, the absurdity of ‘\(p\) but I don’t believe that \(p\)’ is merely a reflection of the way we learn to operate with the words ‘I believe’. However, it is also clear that Wittgenstein does not think that this observation is on its own enough to dispel the paradox, for there is another way to express Moore’s puzzle, namely, that while ‘the expression “I believe that this is the case” is used like the assertion “This is the case”, … the hypothesis that I believe this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is the case.’ Wittgenstein goes on to give a further gloss on what it is that he believes troubles us here:

So it looks as if the assertion “I believe” were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis “I believe”? (PI, p.190)

Or again, it looks as if:

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)

Thus, as Wittgenstein sees it, the real paradox lies in the fact that the word ‘believe’ seems to mean something different, or to be used quite differently, in different contexts. In one context, when it is used in the first-person present indicative, its occurrence in the sentence adds nothing to what is asserted by the proposition to which it is prefixed; in another context, when it is used in the framing of an hypothesis or in the past tense, its occurrence in the sentence changes the topic from the subject matter of the embedded
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proposition to our own mental state. But surely, we feel, ‘I believed’ must tell just the same thing in the past as ‘I believe’ in the present. It is this, Wittgenstein is suggesting, that calls for an explanation, or rather it calls for a clarification of the grammar of the concept of belief; we need to see just how complicated the use of the expression ‘believe’ is. In particular, we need to see more clearly, not only how distinctive the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’ is, but how this use relates to its use in other constructions. Thus:

Don’t look at it as a matter of course, but as a most remarkable thing, that the verbs “believe”, “wish”, “will” display all the inflexions possessed by “cut”, “chew”, “run”. (PI, p. 190)³

Wittgenstein on Moore’s Resolution of the Paradox

Commentators on Wittgenstein’s remarks on Moore’s Paradox have generally focused, not on Wittgenstein’s re-formulation of the paradox, but on his critique of Moore’s resolution of the original formulation. The focus, in other words, has been on the contrast between Wittgenstein’s and Moore’s treatment of ‘p but I don’t believe p’. Interpreters have argued that Wittgenstein is correct in holding that the assertion of ‘p but I don’t believe p’ is equivalent to a contradiction, and that this shows that there must be an equivalence between ‘I believe p’ and ¯p. They argue that any account which accepts, as Moore does, that ‘I believe p’ is a report of my own mental state cannot do justice to the manifest contradictoriness of the Moorean sentence. For if ‘I believe p’ is a report of my own mental state, then its truth or falsity depends entirely on whether I am in the relevant mental state, and is therefore independent of the truth or falsity of the embedded proposition. It follows that the conjunction ‘p but I don’t believe p’ is not equivalent to a contradiction, and that the source of the paradox is, at best and as Moore holds, merely pragmatic. This, it is argued, goes against our sense—insisted on by Wittgenstein— that the Moorean sentence is contradictory. The fact that we recognize that the sentence is contradictory is held to show that the source of the paradox must lie in what we mean by the words ‘I believe’, and not in the pragmatic rules surrounding the act of assertion. The only way to secure the contradictoriness of the Moorean sentence, it is argued, is to claim, as Wittgenstein does, that ‘I believe p’ is not a report of my mental state, but just another way of
asserting $p$. The claim is that this requires that we abandon the idea that beliefs are mental states and recognize that any conception of belief which treats them as internal states of the speaker is mistaken.

Interesting and important though these reflections are, they clearly fail to engage with what Wittgenstein believes is the real source of what troubles us, for they leave Wittgenstein’s reformulated paradox unresolved. For given that the hypothesis that I believe that $p$ is not the same as the hypothesis that $p$ is the case, we still have the apparent paradox that ‘the assertion “I believe” [is] not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis “I believe”’. It is this version of the paradox which interests Wittgenstein and it clearly cannot be resolved simply by pointing out the equivalence between ‘I believe $p$’ and $\neg p$. Thus, although it is true that Wittgenstein takes the Moorean sentence to be contradictory, and thus to show that, in many circumstances at least, ‘I believe $p$’ is just equivalent to $\neg p$, this is by no means the end of his discussion of Moore’s paradox. For if we look at the details of Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore, then it is clear that once he has arrived at the point at which he feels he has made clear the equivalence which underlies the contradictoriness of the Moorean sentence, he then moves to his re-formulation of the paradox, which is now seen to be the real source of perplexity. Removing the perplexity which arises from the fact that what is asserted by ‘I believe’ does not appear to be what is hypothesised in ‘Suppose I believe’ calls for something more than a recognition of the equivalence between ‘I believe $p$’ and $\neg p$. What Wittgenstein’s reflections on the re-formulated paradox reveal is, I want to argue, the real focus of his concern, insofar as it further illuminates the nature of the asymmetry which characterizes my relation, on the one hand, to my own words, and on the other, to the words of others.

Wittgenstein presents a version of Moore’s resolution of the paradox as follows:

“At bottom, when I say ‘I believe: …’ I am describing my own state of mind—but this description is indirectly an assertion of the fact believed.” (PI, p. 190)

He then gives the following gloss on this idea:

As in certain circumstances I describe a photograph in order to describe the thing it is a photograph of. (PI, p. 190)
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This is not an accurate report of Moore’s account of the paradox, but it can be seen as identifying what Wittgenstein believes is the central mistake of Moore’s approach: it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state. This is to assume that the role of the words ‘I believe’ is to describe a mental state with a certain representational content. The sentence ‘I believe that \( p \)’ asserts that I am in the mental state of believing whose representational content is specified by ‘that \( p \)’. On this understanding of how the words ‘I believe’ function, Wittgenstein suggests, I could read off what the facts are indirectly from an examination of my own mental states, much as I read off what the facts are indirectly by looking at a photograph. Wittgenstein is not concerned here with the details of Moore’s resolution of the paradox, rather, he is investigating the picture of how the words ‘I believe’ function, namely, as a description of an internal state of the speaker, which is implicit in the account. His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.6

If the words ‘I believe’ describe my internal, representational state, then, Wittgenstein suggests, it ought to make sense for me to ask whether my belief is a reliable guide to what the facts are. If I read off facts about the world from a photograph, I must also be in a position to say that the photograph is a good one, that it is a trustworthy representation of what is the case. And similarly, it ought to make sense to say: “I believe it’s raining and my belief is reliable, so I have confidence in it” (PI, p. 190). ‘In that case,’ he remarks, ‘my belief would be a kind of sense impression’ (PI, p. 190). But this is not how the words ‘I believe’ are actually used, for ‘[o]ne can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s own belief’ (PI, p. 190). Saying ‘I believe that \( p \)’ is equivalent to asserting that \( p \) is the case, and is not a means of telling that \( p \) is the case, which I might trust or mistrust. This is shown, Wittgenstein suggests, in the fact that ‘[i]f there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present indicative’ (PI, p. 190). There is a clear contrast here with the verb ‘to see’. For there is a use of the word ‘see’ in which it is roughly equivalent to ‘see falsely’, for example, when I say ‘I see (seem to see) everything double’, or when I say, looking at the Muller-Lyer, ‘I see (seem to see) two lines of unequal length’: I describe what I see (seem to see) while at the same time acknowledging the objective falsity of my description. Wittgenstein’s claim is that there is no equivalent first-person present indicative use of an expression meaning ‘to believe falsely’.7 Again, this brings out the equivalence between ‘I believe that \( p \)’ and ‘It is the case
that \( p \): the presence of the words ‘I believe …’ does not change the subject matter of my assertion from the subject matter of my belief to my own mental state.

Wittgenstein does, however, acknowledge that we may use the language-game of reporting as a way of obtaining information, not about the facts reported, but about the person who gives the report. This is the case, he suggests, when, for instance, a teacher examines a pupil. He now imagines that we introduce an expression—‘I believe …’—which is used in this way: ‘it is to be prefixed to reports when they serve to give information about the reporter’ (PI, p. 191). Here the point of the words ‘I believe’ is to indicate that the point of the report is to inform the hearer about the person making it. However, it is clear that, even in this language-game, ‘“I believe …, and it isn’t so’ would be a contradiction’ (PI, p. 191). Even when the point of the words is to indicate that the report that follows is intended to inform the hearer about the speaker, the words do not describe the speaker’s own mental state: ‘I believe that \( p \)’ is, in this language-game, still equivalent to the speaker’s asserting ‘It is the case that \( p \)’. The point of the comparison is to allow us to see that it does not follow from the fact that a speaker’s saying ‘I believe …’ throws light on his state—that, for example, conclusions can be drawn about how he is likely to act—that his words are functioning as a description of his own mental state. For, as he observes, ‘[i]f … “I believe it is so” throws light on my state, then so does the assertion “It is so”’ (PI, p. 191). The occurrence of the psychological verb is not essential, and it is not because he is describing his own mental state that conclusions about his conduct can be drawn from his expression, for exactly the same conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the assertion ‘It is so’. The same applies in cases in which the words ‘I believe …’ are used to indicate that there is some doubt, for here too the use of the psychological verb is not essential: the expression ‘I believe …’ is equivalent to asserting ‘It might be the case that …’.

These observations are intended to show that the expression ‘I believe…’ does not function in the way that is assumed by the sort of psychological resolution of the paradox which is given by Moore. And this shows that the problem is not to explain the absurdity of ‘\( p \) but I don’t believe \( p \)’—which, as the interpretations mentioned above emphasise, really does no more than reveal the equivalence between ‘I believe that \( p \)’ and the assertion ‘It is the case that \( p \)’—but to clarify the use of the expression ‘believe’ in a way that reveals the nature of the asymmetry between ‘I believe …’ and ‘Suppose I
believe ….’. This asymmetry makes it look as if the assertion ‘I believe’ were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis, ‘Suppose I believe …’, and this troubles us insofar as we feel that surely the word ‘believe’ has the same meaning whether it is used in an assertion or in the statement of a hypothesis, in the present or on the past tense. And this, Wittgenstein suggests, tempts us ‘to look for a different development of the verb in the first person present indicative’ (PI, p. 191). That is to say, it tempts us to imagine a use for ‘I believe’ which brings it closer to the use of the verb in other inflexions and tenses, so we can see how the first-person present indicative might be used to assert what is supposed in the hypothesis. Wittgenstein wants to show that this different development of the verb—one which treats ‘believe’ on the model of ‘cut’, ‘chew’, ‘run’—is not possible: the distinctive use of the first-person present indicative is a reflection of the kind of capacity we develop when we learn to use language in the expression of judgements; the other tenses and inflections of the verb ‘to believe’, Wittgenstein tries to show, have to be understood relative to the distinctive status of the first-person present indicative use of the verb.

‘I seem to believe’

Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation of the use of the expression ‘I believe’ begins with the following observation:

I say of someone else “He seems to believe …” and other people say it of me. Now, why do I never say it of myself, not even when others rightly say it of me?—Do I myself not see and hear myself, then?—That can be said. (PI, p. 191)

I learn to operate with signs: to describe, report, infer, predict, and so on. When I engage in these activities, I do not at the same time watch myself and draw conclusions about what I believe, or how I am likely to act. It is in the context of these activities that I learn to use the words ‘I believe that this is the case’ in a way that is equivalent to the assertion ‘This is the case’, and which does not depend upon self-observation. Thus, there is no expression ‘I seem to believe’; this expression is connected with the possibility of learning what someone believes on the basis of observing what he says and does. Normally,
I am in a position to say what I believe without recourse to observation of what I say and do, and the expression ‘I seem to believe …’ has no place in the language-game I play with the expression ‘I believe …’.

However, if we are inclined to hold that ‘I believe’ ascribes a mental state—the same state whether it is used in the first-person present indicative, in the past tense, or in the context ‘Suppose …’, or in the third-person—then we want to see ‘a different development of the verb’, one on which ‘I believe …’ is never equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’. Wittgenstein outlines the following picture:

This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. It has duration; and that independently of the duration of its expression in a sentence, for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person. This is shewn me in the case of someone else by his behaviour; and by his words. And under this head, by the expression ‘I believe …’, as well as by the simple assertion. (PI, pp. 191–2)

On the ‘different development of the verb’, I am to be understood as ascribing a certain disposition to myself, the disposition which the state of belief is held to consist in. On this view, ‘I believe …’ is not equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’, although conclusions about my state of mind may be drawn on the basis of both. The expression ‘I believe that \( p \)’ is equivalent to the assertion that I am in a certain dispositional state. But now the question arises: ‘how do I myself recognize my own disposition?’ Surely, ‘it will have been necessary for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw conclusions from what I say!’ (PI, p. 192). The absurdity of this suggestion—expressed through the presence of an exclamation mark—shows, Wittgenstein believes, that the words ‘I believe’ are not used to ascribe a disposition to myself.

The aim was to describe a use of the words ‘I believe …’ that is different from the ordinary one in which it is equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’. The alternative use of ‘I believe’ was intended to show that what is asserted by the expression ‘I believe …’ is exactly what is hypothesised when I say ‘Suppose I believe …’. In both contexts, the word ‘believe’ stands for a disposition to do or to say certain things. But this would mean that I would have to recognize that I had this disposition, and it is impossible to see how this could be done other than by my observing what I say and do. And this would mean that we could imagine a use for the expression ‘I seem to believe’. Thus:
That different development of the verb would have been possible, if only I could say ‘I seem to believe’. (PI, p. 192)

But there is no use for this expression. As Wittgenstein observes: ‘My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people’s’ (PI, p. 192). The use of the concept of belief is woven in with a practice of asserting—that is, of describing, reporting, inferring, predicting, etc.—and the distinctive employment of the first-person present indicative reflects the fact that in making an assertion I speak for myself. When, for example, I assert ‘It is raining’, I express my judgement about the weather. The assertion is not a manifestation of a disposition which is described by the words ‘I believe’: the assertion is the public expression of my judgement. We first learn to use the expression ‘I believe …’ in the context of making judgements, which are also expressed by asserting ‘This is the case’. When I say ‘I believe …’, I do not identify a person and ascribe a disposition to her, rather I make a judgement about the subject matter of the belief. No description of a disposition is involved. We acquire the ability to use the words ‘I believe …’ in the course of developing the capacity to judge, in which my coming to speak independently and confidently for myself is essential.

The idea that in using the words ‘I believe …’ I ascribe a disposition to myself misrepresents the way we are taught to operate with these words. It misrepresents what is an act of making or expressing a judgement about the world as a description of the state of a particular person. Wittgenstein acknowledges that there are circumstances in which it does make sense to say “Judging from what I say, this is what I believe”. These are circumstances in which I stand back from my normal state of engagement and try to take an objective view of myself: I try to see myself as others see me. In these circumstances, saying ‘I believe …’ is no longer equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’ and, Wittgenstein observes, it would be possible for me to say “It seems to me that my ego believes this, but it isn’t true” (PI, p. 192). In these circumstances, it is as if two people—the one on whom I reflect and the one doing the reflecting—speak through my mouth. However, this is not the normal use of ‘I believe …’, and it is a use, Wittgenstein wants to insists, which presupposes the normal use.
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Resolving the Re-formulated Paradox

How do these grammatical observations help resolve the puzzle which Wittgenstein claims is raised by his re-formulation of Moore’s paradox? The puzzle arises insofar as we feel that surely what is supposed when I say ‘Suppose I believe …’ is the same as what is asserted when I say ‘I believe …’. But in the former context ‘I believe …’ is not equivalent to ‘It is the case that …’, and so surely the assertion ‘I believe …’ cannot be equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’: the former must be understood to say something about myself. What it says about myself is whatever is supposed to be the case when I say ‘Suppose I believe …’. Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation has tried to show that this picture of what must be the case is at odds with the way we are taught to operate with the words ‘I believe …’. Not only do we learn to use these words in a way that is equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’, but the kind of use they have characterizes the capacities that constitute mastery of language: the capacity to judge, describe, report, predict, infer, and so on. We cannot preserve the distinctive use of ‘I believe …’ if we imagine the role of these words is to ascribe a mental state or a disposition to the speaker. This distinctive way of using the words ‘I believe …’ characterizes our capacity to judge and defines our relation to our own words. Wittgenstein now suggests that the ability to take part in the language-game of supposing, of forming hypotheses about what someone believes or thinks, comes later in the order of acquisition than the capacity to employ the verb ‘to believe’ in the first-person present indicative. Thus, the grammatical investigation makes clear that things are exactly the opposite of what we had assumed: it is not that what is asserted presupposes our gasp of what is supposed; rather what is supposed presupposes our mastery of how we operate with the word ‘believe’ in the language-game in which we originally learned it, and in which its employment is equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’.

Wittgenstein sums up the point as follows:

Even in the hypothesis the pattern is not what you think.

When you say “Suppose I believe …” you are presupposing the whole grammar of the word “to believe”, the ordinary use, of which you are master. — You are not supposing some state of affairs which, so to speak, a picture presents unambiguously to you, so that you can tack on to this hypothetical use some assertive use other than the ordinary one. — You
should not know at all what you were supposing here (i.e. what, for example, would follow from such a supposition), if you were not already familiar with the use of “believe”. (*PI*, p. 192)

The ordinary use which is presupposed is the use by speakers to express judgements about the world, on the basis of which they draw inferences, make predictions, form intentions, undertake actions, and so on. It is our own familiarity with this life with language that gives the hypothesis, ‘Suppose I believe …’, its significance. These words do not conjure up some internal state of representation, but a capacity to judge and to act, and to give expression to judgements in statements of the form ‘I believe …’. There is a shift of focus in the language-game of forming hypotheses, from the subject matter of the speaker’s judgement to the speaker who makes it, but this is not to be understood as a move from a concern with what is the case in the world to what is the case in an inner realm. Rather, it is a shift from judging to thinking about the person who judges, something we can do only insofar as we are familiar with what it is to have the capacity to make and express judgements, and what conclusions about a speaker’s conduct can be drawn from the judgements he makes or expresses. Our understanding of what it is we hypothesise presupposes a grasp of how speakers operate with the words ‘I believe …’, of the kind of employment they make of this expression and how it is woven in with other things they say and do. Thus, the asymmetry between asserting and hypothesising is something that we can now accept as revealing the distinctive grammar of the verb ‘to believe’, and its connection with the kind of capacity which characterizes mastery of a language.
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Notes

1 Wittgenstein writes: ‘I should like to tell you how glad I am that you read us a paper yesterday. It seems to me that the most important point was the “absurdity” of the assertion “There is a fire in this room and I don’t believe there is.” . . . Pointing out that “absurdity” which is in fact something similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t one, is so important that I hope you’ll publish your paper.’ (Wittgenstein, 1995: 315–16)

2 Wittgenstein expresses his dissatisfaction with Moore’s resolution of the paradox in the letter he wrote immediately after the meeting of the Moral Sciences Club: ‘To call this, as I think you did, “an absurdity for psychological reasons” seems to me wrong, or highly misleading. (If I ask someone “Is there a fire in the next room?” and he answers “I believe there is” I can’t say: “Don’t be irrelevant. I asked you about the fire, not about your state of mind!”)’ (Wittgenstein, 1995: 315–16)

3 In particular, we should not take it as a matter of course that the verb ‘to believe’ has a use in the first-person present indicative. For while ‘I run’ says of me what ‘she runs’ says of me, Moore’s paradox shows that ‘I believe’ does not say of me what ‘she believes’ says of me.

4 This is the focus for several important discussions of Wittgenstein on Moore’s paradox, including K. Linville and M. Ring, 1991; J. Heal, 1994; A. W. Collins, 1996.

5 The importance of Wittgenstein’s re-formulation of Moore’s paradox for the interpretation of his remarks is also stressed by Severin Schroeder (Schroeder, 2006).

6 Wittgenstein does not appear to take the contradictoriness of the original Moorean sentence as in itself sufficient to dissuade us from embracing Moore’s idea that the words ‘I believe’ describe my own mental state. He also tries to show that, if the words ‘I believe’ did function in the way Moore claims, then the words ‘I believe’ ought to have a use which we do not give to them. His aim is to show that ‘I believe’ does not function, as it should if Moore’s picture were correct, in the same way as ‘I run’: ‘I believe’ does not say of me what ‘she believes’ says of me, in the way ‘I run’ says of me what ‘she runs’ does.

7 Again, there is a clear contrast here between the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’ and its use in other inflexions and tenses.

8 It is in this way that I might learn, for example, that I am disposed to talk too much, or too quickly, when I’m nervous.

9 Schroeder’s interpretation of the significance of Wittgenstein’s reflections on the re-formulated paradox emphasises the link between one’s beliefs and one’s
intentions. He writes: ‘My intentions do not leave any room for an uninvolved
observer’s attitude towards the intended action …; and so there is also no room for
an uninvolved observer’s attitude towards the beliefs involved in one’s intentions,
which could potentially be any one of one’s beliefs’ (Schroeder, 2006: 174). I want
to see these reflections as aimed at bringing out the way in which the capacity to
judge entails that my relation to my own words is necessarily different from my
relation to the words of others.

10 Wittgenstein suggests that we see the case of ‘believe’ as parallel to that of ‘wish’:
‘Can one understand the supposition that I wish for something before understand-
ing the expression of a wish?—The child learns first to express a wish, and only
later to make the supposition that it wished for such-and-such’ (Wittgenstein, 1980,
§478)

11 Both Schroeder (Schroeder, 2006) and Schulte (Schulte, 1993) see Wittgenstein
as using this point to attack Frege’s idea that every assertion contains a hypothesis.
This may the case, but in the present context his emphasis appears to be on
the distinctive grammar of the concept believe, rather than on criticising Frege’s
conception of assertion.

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