The Linguistic Optimism: On Metaphysical Roots of Logic in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Marcos Silva

Abstract



In opposition to the positivist interpretation, represented paradigmatically by
Vienna Circle philosophers, I defend that philosophy of logic from
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus has strong realistic and
metaphysical roots. However, his realism in logic is different from Frege’s and
Russell’s realist account of logic. It demands, as a precondition, the
assumption of an essential isomorphism between world and language. As a result,
I hold this tractatian principle of “all-embracing world through language” as a
peculiar kind of linguistic optimism. The main objective of this paper is to
give a contribution to the current debate on philosophy by showing that the
status of logic in Tractatus requires _ optimismcally _ that language can fully
cover the world. Its secondary aim is to ground the statement that the
tractatian philosophy of logic is metaphysical and, even more, it is realist.


Keywords


philosophy; 20th century philosophy; Wittgenstein Ludwig; realism; isomorphism; philosophy of logic; essential harmony

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