Wittgenstein’s Attitudes

Fabien Schang

Abstract



What's wrong with modalities in (Wittgenstein 1922)? In (Suszko 1968), the writer
argued that “Wittgenstein was somewhat confused and wrong in certain points. For
example, he did not see the clear-cut distinction between language (theory) and
metalanguage (metatheory): a confusion between use and mention of expressions”.
Furthermore, a modal logic was proposed in (von Wright 1986) as depicting
Wittgenstein's bipolarity thesis in a S5 frame.

The aim of the present paper is to deal with the specific case of epistemic modal
logic: such a logic of propositional attitudes assumes a philosophy of language that
would violate Wittgenstein's two main assumptions.

Keywords


philosophy; 20th century philosophy; Wittgenstein Ludwig; attitude; belief; truth function; analysis; psychologism; solipsism

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