Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic

P. R. Bhat

Abstract



Language and other cultural aspects are made possible by humans by formulating
rules and thereby exercising their freedom. All cultural rules are normative and
even science would be so. Rules are arbitrary to begin with and become necessary
once we formulate them. Adhering to the rules and their practices makes them
necessary. A word might have several rules for its use or only one.
Interpretations of rules are possible for two reasons. If there are many rules,
in a context, interpretation becomes necessary. If the phenomenon is such that
we must have to perspectivise, interpretation becomes necessary. When we grasp
the rule, we grasp its infinite applications. Kripke’s skeptic mistakes the
logic of rules. He assumes that rules remain arbitrary all along and hence
interpretation of the rule has to be done at every instance of its application.
He also fails to note the general nature of rules. This contention is contrary
to what Wittgenstein believes.

Keywords


philosophy; 20th century philosophy; Wittgenstein Ludwig; action; arbitrariness; expectation; freedom; interpretation; language; norm

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