The Normativity of Intentionality

Julie Yoo

Abstract



Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the pros¬pect of reductively explaining
the mind. The core of his arguments turns upon his insistence that contentful mental
states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a “normative element.” In spite
of its pivotal role, as well as its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly
developed and understood. This paper attempts to discern four differ¬ent strands of
the normativity of intentionality and to spark a long overdue systematic examination
of a fascinating and significant thesis.

Keywords


philosophy; 20th century philosophy; Wittgenstein Ludwig; philosophy of mind; normativity of intentionality; psychophysical laws; non-reductive physicalism; mind vs body; intentionality; interpretivism

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